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Abstract
The self-identified intellectual currents known in Britain as New Liberalism and the 
Third Way can be seen as domestic political responses to two periods of ‘globalisation’ 
-  understood here as a specific type o f transformational change occasioned by 
simultaneous technological, economic, social and political shift. The resulting changes 
in perceptions of time, speed and distance alter political and popular understandings of 
relations between local, national and international, and between society, state and 
economy. It is also indicative of a shift in the development of the state; from the ‘pre­
modem’ to the ‘modern’ in the first timeframe, and the ‘modern’ to a new stage that 
could be termed ‘global’ more recently.
New Liberalism and the Third Way were both developed as elite-led, domestic, 
synthesising political philosophies in the face of an electoral threat brought about by 
societal change and external economic challenge. These examples suggest that the 
current globalisation debate is flawed as it treats as a single phenomenon different 
aspects o f change and fails to recognise the implications of the similarities between 
these two periods. There is no suggestion that there are only two periods of change 
only that systemic change is qualitatively different.
International Relations as an academic discipline is responding inadequately because 
of a reluctance to overcome the tendency to downplay links between domestic and 
international spheres and levels of state development.
By comparing these specific periods of transformation and their political ideologies in 
the British context, this thesis will explore the relationship between international and 
domestic political ideology at times of such change and suggest that the result is a 
specific kind of transitional politics born of both innovation and necessity.
Finally, while this kind of political engagement has been neglected by international 
relations, it may prove to be evidence of stages of development in the state.
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Introduction
Questions
• W hat are the similarities and differences between the Third Way and its 
historical antecedent, New Liberalism, and does the Third Way’s self- 
identification with New Liberalism withstand scrutiny?
• What are the deficiencies of the current globalisation debate?
• Does a new concept of ‘systemic transformation’ provide an explanation for 
these deficiencies?
• How do the deficiencies of the globalisation debate and ideas of systemic 
transformation impact the discipline of International Relations?
• Does the comparison of the Third Way and New Liberalism provide any 
guidance for the wider debates on globalisation and international relations?
Approach
1) The Third Way and its historical antecedent, New Liberalism, each provided a 
specific progressive ideological response as a counterweight, or stabilising domestic 
influence, after periods of laissez-faire or liberal economics. These shifts were caused 
by a confluence o f change not only in the economic system, but in all areas o f social, 
intellectual and economic life.
Domestically, the Third Way and New Liberalism were responses to social dislocation 
and perceived crises o f state legitimacy driven by a massive shift in the overall 
environment. The consequences of, and reaction to, these periods required a political 
re-examination of the model of society, and the role of the individual and the state 
within that society. The domestic politics of these periods of convergence o f change 
have similar features.
Generally, they both sought to provide a political narrative that explained the rapid 
change and to regain (apparent) control over the domestic space. Specifically, they:
• Set themselves out as a synthesis of political thought and promoted the 
pragmatic versus the ideological;
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• Self-consciously reached out to others in the political process and were more 
‘porous’ in their traditional boundaries in terms of party allegiance, etc.;
• Deemed themselves to be ‘of the left’ or ‘progressive’ forces and sought to 
include the agendas o f a variety of single-issue or moral campaigns related to 
social justice;
And finally:
• Were international in their activity and proclaimed applicability, but arguably 
were brought to a close by the state’s involvement in violent conflict.
2) The globalisation debate, as currendy structured, is flawed for two reasons. First, it 
does not consistendy appreciate the significance of the similarities between the current 
and previous periods. Second, it confuses change in a range of systems under a single 
descriptor. The term that Christopher Hill and David Bell use is ‘logics’.1 It is useful 
here in that the areas they outline of politics, military, economics are interconnected 
systems and enmeshed in such as way as to be impossible to privilege one over the 
other but create change through that interconnection. They are also crucially not in 
the direct control of the state.
It is argued that ‘globalisation’ understood as massive multi-level change is present in 
all ‘logics’ now but further that it was also apparent at the end of the nineteenth 
century. This suggests that globalisation, contrary to some commentators, is neither an 
inevitable function of the technology only available at the end of the twentieth 
century nor merely an extension of a continuing process.
3) Rather, that globalisation is not a single change but a phenomenon more accurately 
described as ‘systemic transformation’ along all these intertwined systems or ‘logics’. 
While change is present in varying degrees at all times, these specific periods seem to 
have had a specific impact on domestic politics and ideology. Therefore to discuss 
those periods it is useful to see them as moments of transformation that occurring over 
several years but remain part of the same phenomenon — a kind of ‘transformative 
moment’ which happens at a point of transition in a state’s development.
1 Hill, Christopher. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003.
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For example, in the first timeframe examined, the state shifted from the pre-modem 
to the modem while the more recent shift has been from the modem to what some 
have called the ‘global age’.2 As well as the change in a specific state — i.e. the UK — 
these changes had significant impact on other states as well as the system of states.
4) The globalisation debate highlights areas that are arguably under-theorised within 
the International Relations discipline. The IR  discipline continues to find it difficult 
to deal with the domestic/international divide in at least three ways. Traditional 
International Relations theory tends to:
a) rely on a model of the state that is primarily ahistorical, which means it has 
limited ability to deal with different levels of development between states. By 
suggesting a ‘timeless’ template for the state, International Relations may miss 
underlying patterns o f change, or stages o f development in a state and thus the 
state system as a whole.
It should be noted that given its history and evolution as a state, the British 
notion of ‘state’ is different from many of its continental neighbours. This may 
influence its perception of itself and its reaction to such change;
b) continues to lean heavily on a domestic/international divide, focusing as it 
does on a particular version o f states as primary and rational actors. It therefore 
has litde capacity to explain state responses to events not directly under state 
control, e.g. social trends, cultural change, technological development, or shift 
o f economic base;
c) deals with international theory and international politics in a highly segmented 
way making it difficult to understand actors involved at both domestic and 
international levels or understand the interplay between these spheres and may 
mask the fact that domestic concerns may be driving foreign state action.
5) A further area that is related but currently under-theorised is the idea that the 
state has stages of development3 which influence its approach to development and 
its international actions. While this has been useful in some contexts, the process 
of a state’s development from one stage to another has not yet been fully explored.
This investigation o f the similarities between New Liberalism and the Third Way 
suggests that these periods of fundamental change precipitate a perceived crisis of state
2 Albrow, Martin. The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.
3 Cooper, Robert. The Breaking o f Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century. London: 
Atlantic Books, 2003. Dyson, Bobbitt and others.
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legitimacy. Both of these British political philosophies have common features of 
approach and development as a result of a felt need for a re-examination o f the role of 
the state. Also at both times, while international/economic factors were significant, 
they were equally matched by electoral positioning.
In terms of comparative international politics, as far as can be seen from this 
investigation, this pattern seems to hold true of other Western European states in both 
timeframes.
Argument
The argument posed here is that these political movements are similar because they 
are both responses to a specific type o f simultaneous massive shift prompted by, but 
not limited to, technological innovation that alters the economics, social, cultural and 
political spheres. These domestic political movements in effect move the state to a 
new stage of development through a surge of change and reaction between the 
domestic and international arenas — arguably only possible at moments of such change. 
For example, the shift from an agrarian society to a manufacturing mass society was 
the result of the Industrial Revolution which produced an economic change but also 
altered personal, community and political fife out of recognition. The second example 
is the current ‘de-industrial Revolution’ amongst late modem industrial European 
states, which, while prompted by the increase in the professional and service-based 
economy and a shrinking of the working class, has also brought about a new kind of 
mass society evidenced in social, political and intellectual life.
In both examples, each change was significant in its own right, but it was the proximity 
of different types o f change that fundamentally altered perceptions o f speed, time and 
distance. It is this concurrence of change as well as its depth and breadth that alters the 
relationship between the individual, the state and society. Politically, the result is a 
‘porousness’4 along what had been relatively clear borders both within and between 
states. Boundaries become more like ‘frontiers’5 in which definitions are more open.
Given the necessary leap of technology and information available at such moments, 
e.g. through newspapers and the internet, the individual is enabled to identify their
4 Rosenau, James N . Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
5 Rosenau, ibid.; Ashley, Richard. ‘Living on the Borderlines: Man, Post-structuralism and War’ in 
Der Derian, James and Michael J. Shapiro. International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of 
World Politics. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.
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connection to the wider world more directly as well as the (in) ability o f the state to 
protect them from these forces. The idea o f the role o f the state is challenged by this 
new power o f involvement and action from the electorate. Amongst political elites 
the ensuing domestic discontent creates a perception o f general crisis — and often 
becomes focused around the legitimacy of the state.
This can be seen in the challenge to state-centrism by internationalist movements 
from within civil society present in both periods. The collectivist or socialist 
movements during the last decades o f the nineteenth century, and the ‘cosmopolitan’ 
initiatives around global governance and civil society, democratic peace theory and 
even the anti-globalisation protestors in the twentieth century, offer an ideal o f unity 
at a global level based on individuals rather than relying solely on relations between 
states.
The domestic political response to this change is a struggle to retain credibility in the 
face of the awareness o f the erosion o f a single state’s ability to control the external 
forces that affect economic security. Inevitably, political theorists and politicians revise 
their notions of the individual and the state and their respective roles — though always 
mindful of electoral arithmetic. Political ideology, in turn, is changed both by 
domestic pressure and the international community o f ideas. The result is a drive 
towards a political ‘synthesis’, often pragmatic in nature and decrying ideology, but 
illustrated by state leadership at both the domestic and international level.
W hen these two periods are compared, it becomes clear that change within all these 
systems or ‘logics’ forces actors at all levels -  including states -  to respond both 
domestically and internationally. It is also clear that both the New Liberalism in the 
early twentieth century and the current version o f the Third Way are examples of 
such synthesising political ideologies dealing with this specific type of change. The 
politics of such periods becomes that o f the ‘frontier’ as an elite within a political 
framework seek to create a synthesising political theory to encompass change while 
trying to control its impact — and limit its potential damage — to the basic reputation 
of the institutions and political parties and leaders running these institutions within the 
state. International upheaval begets domestic upheaval begets international upheaval.
Sovereignty is impacted by the ways in which states define their role vis-a-vis their 
citizens and vis-a-vis their fellow states. This complex interplay o f the domestic and 
the international spheres ultimately shapes both ‘faces’ of the state.6 States have always,
6 HaUiday, Fred. Rethinking International Relations. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1994. p. 84-85.
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to a certain extent, been defined by each other but this current period of transition 
has consolidated the ideas of interdependence as the state (at least in the 
Western/developed world) has evolved. The ways in which the two faces of the state 
interact are now more transparent and exposed both to domestic politics and to its 
international counterpart.
Contribution
Politics on both the international and domestic levels, tends to be a constant process 
o f ‘satisficing’, or incremental change, which does not require or encourage 
fundamental shifts of core beliefs. However, there are some periods of particularly 
dramatic and simultaneous change that require both new political theories on the 
domestic level and, often, new institutions on the international level.
In the study of International Relations there has been a considerable interest and 
discussion around the specific concept o f a ‘frontier’ between the domestic and 
international areas of politics. This involves relations between and amongst states and 
their leaders. However, there is, as yet, litde consensus around these types of 
discussion. International Relations retains at least a residual attachment to issues such 
as levels-of-analysis and theories of the state that effectively limit other actors. As a 
consequence this area of overlap remains under-theorised and, as HaUiday suggests,
IR  still needs to move further towards a more holistic approach which can embrace 
both the domestic and the international faces of the state in a more coherent way.
The specific tools may still be some way off, but the UK is a useful starting point 
given its clear links to other debates across Europe as well as to the US at both periods 
of time. However, there are some issues specific to the British context that should be 
borne in mind. The development o f its perceptions o f the two ‘faces’ of the state — 
domestic and foreign — has been different in the UK than in the rest of Europe. Also, 
the self-perception of the role of the UK in international affairs has potentially shaped 
its response to such transformations of the system. For example, at the end o f the 
nineteenth century the UK was the dominant power. The wider environment 
gradually forced the UK to recognise that it could not change the rest of the world 
but that its own policies would have to be altered. At the end of the twentieth 
century Britain projects itself not as a dominant power, but one with significant 
influence, and is once again attempting to lead other states through its assertion of 
intellectual leadership as seen in the Third Way project (see Chapter Eleven).
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Ultimately, both of these identified periods o f ‘systemic transformation’ had a 
profound impact on political ideology as well as on the domestic and foreign policies 
of the governments o f the day. This would suggest there is some merit in this 
comparison if only to explore the relationship between the international and the 
domestic in terms of ideology and the idea that particular periods are ‘more open’ to 
change.7
Despite the issues particular to the UK, this examination is also useful in two general 
ways and potentially in a predictive sense. First, an examination of these two examples 
of political theories evolving out o f ‘porous’ periods may go some distance towards a 
better understanding of the impact of globalisation or the ‘international’ on domestic 
political theory. Second, this process may begin to develop the tools necessary to 
examine political systems at both the domestic and international levels where states 
operate simultaneously.
Finally, this process may also enable us to make some predictive statements regarding 
the Third Way. If the comparison of the Third Way with New Liberalism in this 
globalising context is correct, we would expect that, as transitional approaches, the 
Third Way, like New Liberalism, would begin to lose its relevance. In other words, it 
would be expected that this latest attempt at a new synthesis will be eroded and finally 
washed away as the new frame becomes clearer and by domestic realpolitik as 
categories harden and the political environment becomes less ‘porous’. It remains an 
open question as to whether or not violent conflict is a primary factor in the closing 
down of these opportunities for ‘frontier politics’.
The Third Way and New Liberalism: Responding to globalisation at the 
domestic/international 'frontier'
By the time of the 1997 general election the British Labour Party had been out of 
power for eighteen years. Domestic and global events had forced the party to change 
its approach and its policies, and in the process of that change ‘New Labour’ and the 
‘Third Way’ were self-consciously created, essentially from the three original strands 
of socialist/collectivist thought in the UK. A century earlier, the Liberal Party had 
faced similar global and domestic challenges. This led to a fundamental change in 
approach and policy, termed New Liberalism. In both periods, the dominant political
7 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy.
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ideas that had shaped the party’s ideology and political theory seemed to lose their 
appeal as new information and ideas entered the political debate.
From the outset, the Third Way recognised and celebrated New Liberalism as part of 
its heritage. Tony Blair in particular, even before he became Prime Minister, 
recognised this group of tum-of-the-century intellectuals as part of his self-proclaimed 
‘new politics’. Having identified himself with ‘progressive’ forces, Blair sought to 
attach his party and the Third Way to an ideological past. This link to a time 
perceived in Labour Party and socialist terms as important to its tradition was a 
significant internal ‘positional attitude’. Blair needed to deflect socialist criticism and 
strengthen his support amongst moderate Labour supporters. He also sought to 
broaden his appeal to the electorate, including middle-class Liberals. He thus 
identified New Liberals and the radical liberal tradition as historical connectors to 
both liberal and collectivist ancestries that would open his options with these voters.
However, it was also a point of departure. Blair specifically argued that the split in the 
historical coalition of the left effectively crippled progressive politics for a century. He 
sought a form of reconciliation to reunite the progressive forces but also to facilitate a 
continuing Labour victory in the same way Conservatives had gained advantage from 
its division. This duality of purpose as both ideological advance and electoral 
advantage was a strong theme of both New Liberalism and the Third Way.
Given that such a comparison was not sustained as a part of the Third Way 
formulation, this self-identification could be seen as a rhetorical flourish rather than a 
statement of ideological faith. Certainly, neither Blair nor the Labour Party ever 
suggested a fully fledged comparison between the two. That did not stop some 
commentators8 from pursuing the idea of a comparison — and generally concluding 
that the Third Way was a pale imitation of New Liberalism.
Whatever Blair’s intentions, it remains true that the similarities between the Third 
Way and New Liberalism are strong on a number of levels. The political implications 
of such a comparison stand as a matter of domestic interest but here the comparison is 
used as domestic evidence o f a wider societal shift at specific times. It is argued that 
through this comparison it is possible to explore a number of problems in both the 
current globalisation debate and discussions within the International Relations 
discipline.
8 Ryan, Freeden, Plant and others.
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The Third Way
The Third Way was fashioned by a small group within, and linked to, the Labour 
Party and known as ‘modernisers’. They felt that the collapse of Communism and 
globalisation had to be reflected in domestic political ideological terms because these 
changes had fundamentally altered the role of the state, the individual and the 
communities in which individuals operated. Further, that the de-industrialisation of 
western economies and technological advances had produced social change through a 
compression of time and distance. Some considered the result to be a crisis of the 
welfare state. Combined with electoral defeat, these external changes presented a 
perceived imperative for radical change that had not previously been possible. Against 
strong opposition from a range of internal groups, the modernisers pursued what they 
called a ‘renewal of social democracy’ to deal with this domestic crisis, framed by 
what they argued were the consequences of globalisation.
The domestic leadership o f the group was limited but included advisers such as 
Anthony Giddens and Peter Mandelson. Their ideas were deployed by Tony Blair, o f 
course, as well as Robin Cook and Clare Short given their areas o f responsibility in 
Blair’s first cabinet.
The Third Way starting point was essentially that the ‘new economy’ was destroying 
the heavily unionised manufacturing industries; the traditional working class was 
shrinking and union membership declining. Historically these groups had been the 
core of both Labour Party activism and financial support. Despite charges of betrayal, 
the leadership attempted to expand the Party’s appeal to the growing service industries 
and the non-unionised professional class. ‘Old’ socialist ideas of the dominant and 
interventionist state were declared unworkable. Technology had also created a new 
form of mass society as cable/satellite and digital television and the internet, available 
around the clock, created new demands on political transparency and information.
This approach cleared the way for a smaller state that ‘enabled’ its citizens rather than 
supporting them. The goal of government, in their own words, was to ‘steer, not 
row’ — language that, to many traditional Labour voters, was tantamount to 
abandoning the Labour core. This radical departure from their traditional support 
network was deemed necessary to improve their electoral fortunes.
While deployed by a political elite for tactical purposes, the Third Way was far from 
exclusive in terms of inspiration or those it considered part o f their ‘new politics’. 
Thinkers, academics, commentators, and leaders from many fields, both at home and
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abroad — including other politicians — were actively consulted. These included people 
such as Amitai Etzioni, an American communitarian academic, Will Hutton, a 
prominent economic journalist and Paddy Ashdown, Leader of the Liberal 
Democrats. Many of their ideas were incorporated into the new framework.
As well as intellectual and political ideas, the Third Way sought to create a Europe- 
wide movement for the renewal o f social democracy. A combination o f what was 
perceived as the collapse of state socialism in 1989 and political failure by a number of 
European socialist parties (in the broadest sense) prompted a rethink of public services, 
welfare and employment. The Third Way sought to bring those efforts together as 
part o f a new internationalism, or a new form o f ‘international community’.
The Third Way represented a practical political strategy for managing the wider crisis 
in state legitimacy by actively engaging along the frontier with other like-minded 
‘progressive’ governments to deal with the challenges of current global dynamics. It 
served as a national reassertion of state power and sovereignty but also formed a core 
part o f both election strategy and political manoeuvre — simultaneously a political 
ideology and an electoral tactic.
It may be true that each step was not planned in advance, but there was a clear sense 
that the destination was always electoral victory. International and domestic 
opportunism was evident, but always in combination with careful stage management.
New Liberalism
One hundred years previously, New Liberals found themselves in much the same 
position as the Labour Party. Though the Liberal Party was in and out o f government 
during the period under discussion, its power was clearly being undermined by the 
expanding franchise as working-class voters joined the political debate. The rising 
activism of this new voting block can be explained, at least in part, by the social 
deprivation being ‘discovered’ by the developing social sciences. The Liberal Party, 
like the contemporary Labour Party, was also contending with internal disputes, 
caused, to a large extent, by a confused ideological response to these external changes. 
The Liberals were also dealing with a new force in politics, namely the disparate 
groups that were to become the Labour Party.
Like the Third Way, New Liberalism was developed by a relatively small group of 
primarily middle-class commentators. Many were influenced by thinking at Oxford,
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the new physical and social sciences, and political ‘think tanks’ such as the Fabian 
Society and the Rainbow Circle. Although not within the party leadership, this group 
managed to move the political debate away from the dominant Manchester School 
and towards a synthesising, inclusive or organic social approach. Those named by 
Blair as ‘forefathers’ included J.A. Hobson and L.T. Hobhouse, who will be examined 
further in Chapter Seven.
International influences
Unlike the modern Labour Party, which actively sought support and discussion of the 
Third Way in other countries, the New Liberals were internationalist but not 
particularly international in their contacts. This may be due to the fact that Britain 
was at the height of its economic power or, specifically, that the Liberal Party was, for 
much of this period, in government and therefore involved in the international arena 
as participants in foreign affairs rather than discussion groups. However, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that Britain was increasingly influenced by ideas from abroad, 
particularly as German economic power and intellectual influence began to rise.
This is in contrast to the early socialists, who were active in the philosophical debates 
in both the US and on the continent. Crucially, the overlapping memberships and 
debates within these small groups, and the fact that London hosted a large range of 
international groups and individuals, ensured that the political debate amongst Liberal 
as well as Labour supporters ranged across the international as well as domestic issues.
Both of these transitional phases followed periods of rapid expansion o f free trade and 
laissez-faire economics, or ‘globalisation’. This step-change in the overall capitalist 
model attended changes in scientific, intellectual, social and political life that were 
related to, but not contingent upon, that economic change. These simultaneous 
changes led to a compression o f speed, distance and time and created a shift in the 
overall framework of the society in which they operated. The domestic political 
reactions of New Liberalism and the Third Way to this expansion were also similar in 
that they were both followed by a closing of international trade and violent conflict.
So, just as the processes of industrialisation and emergent globalisation moved the state 
from the ‘pre-modem’ to the ‘modem’ in the first timeframe, so, too, de­
industrialisation and the current globalisation debate has moved the ‘m odem’ state to 
the next stage in recent times. States and, specifically the leadership of states, in the
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form of political elites, respond in very similar ways to such changes or ‘systemic 
transformation’.
For the UK in particular, this convergence of change has been most obvious at two 
specific points. The first point is the end of the nineteenth century, between 1880 and 
the First World War, as technology and the development o f the social sciences which 
led to the creation of New Liberalism. This period concludes with the war. The 
second point is the end of the twentieth century — the mid-1980s to the current day — 
or the ‘de-industrial revolution’. Again, technology and new discoveries in both the 
social and physical sciences combined with the rising agency of organised stakeholders 
and global audiences created the environment for the Third Way. Arguably, this 
period concluded with the most recent conflict in the Middle East.
Together, they represent domestic political responses to a perceived crisis of 
legitimacy in both the domestic and international arenas fundamentally outside the 
state’s direct control. Domestically, they were political narratives designed for 
electoral advantage in the face of demographic, philosophical, and cultural change. 
Internationally, they were designed to support, and where necessary to re-define, 
sovereignty and the state system. In effect, New Liberalism and the Third Way 
provide what we might view as domestic evidence of these wider changes in the 
system.
The globalisation debate
Looking beyond the domestic political discussion, this comparison has implications for 
at least two other debates.
The first is the current globalisation debate. A vast literature has been created by this 
discussion and counter-discussion. The reality, chronology, pattern and impact of 
globalisation have all been covered in depth — with no consensus. The only agreed 
point would seem to be the obvious, which is that globalisation covers every area and 
discipline as well as every aspect of politics, business and social life. However, perhaps 
this debate, though wide-ranging, has not fully grasped the implication of its 
argument.
‘Global-isation’ has come to mean a range of other ‘-isations’ simultaneously, 
including internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation, westernisation,
19
modernisation, deterritorialisation,9 Brazilianisation,10 flexibilisation11 and so on. 
However, if we suggest instead that globalisation is, in fact, not one type of change 
but a range o f change then we are, in effect, arguing for this convergence o f change 
or ‘systemic transformation’. Thus lifting the globalisation debate out o f its current 
confines reconciles at least some of the tensions within the debate. Globalisation 
becomes not wholly new or unique, but the result o f a wider transformation of 
society, representing a new stage of development in the state.
The second area is related to the first, in that the impact o f the globalisation debate is 
necessarily relevant to International Relations and particularly its view of the state and 
the domestic/international divide.
The divide between domestic and international politics is not, as often theorised, a set 
or permanent feature o f the international landscape. It is, instead, a ‘frontier’12 that has 
always been ‘porous’, but is particularly so at moments o f ‘epochal transformation’13 
or, as termed here, at points o f ‘systemic transformation’. There are times at which 
developments in disparate areas come together to force a massive shift in the basic 
relationship between the individual citizen and the institutions that govern their lives 
such as those of the economy, the state or culture. These moments then create 
opportunities or openings for political engagement by a range of actors at a variety of 
levels and thus, for renegotiation o f the overall international/domestic boundary. At 
such moments, domestic state politics and political ideologies are of crucial 
importance as they both drive and respond to changes in the international system.
This comparison exposes the dilemma that exists for the segmentation that exists in 
International Relations in its general ‘disconnect’ between international relations and 
international politics.14 ‘Politics’ is deemed to be what happens inside countries and 
the study of politics is the study of the day-to-day struggle by political parties for 
control of the levers o f power of national government. In a separate area is the study 
of the state and the theory o f the international system of states. It is as if politics and 
politicians are at one end while theories of sovereignty and state development are al 
the other and are not well connected.
9 Scholte, Jan Aart. Globalisation: A  Critical Introduction. London: Macmillan, 2000.
10 Munck, Ronaldo. Globalisation and Labour: The New ‘Great Transformation’. London: Zed Books, 
2000 .
11 Young in Munck, ibid.
12 Ashley, ‘Living on the Borderlines: Man, Post-structuralism and War’; Rosenau, Along the Domestic- 
Foreign Frontier.
13 Rosenau, ibid.
14 Halliday, Fred. Rethinking International Relations; Hill, The Changing Politics o f Foreign Policy.
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This could also be seen as a continuum from the domestic to the foreign.15 Whatever 
the proposed range, the ‘practical’ more or less equals the domestic while the 
‘theoretical’ is applied to the international. Even for those practitioners and theorists 
within International Relations who attempt to investigate the issues around 
interdependence or transnationalism, this kind of approach presents a very real 
challenge to understanding the links between theory and practice.
For these various subjects to be considered discrete topics, divisions must be drawn. 
For International Relations the divide between the domestic and international spheres 
has been fundamental. The existence of such a boundary is a foundation upon which 
interpretations of other crucial features: sovereignty of the nation-state, power and 
legitimacy, are built. W ithout that starting point, the system becomes more difficult to 
comprehend or even to discuss with any clarity.16
This firm division between day-to-day politics and political ideology on the one 
hand, and political theory and international relations on the other, is important to the 
comparison of these two periods because such categories can obscure patterns that 
might exist from a wider perspective. Despite a legacy of thinkers who have done 
considerable work across such boundaries, the fragmentation of knowledge by 
category, discipline and political identity has become the norm. Ultimately this more 
narrow approach, while helpful for specific questions, has damaged the ability to see 
the whole: person, state, or international society.
This has not always been the case. Disciplines are convenient (and recent) categories. 
There have been periods when discussions on the links between practice and theory 
amongst what would today be considered disparate fields, were commonplace. 
Boundaries, and their absence, are an important element o f this discussion, because 
the task of analysing integrative systems of thought, such as New Liberalism and the 
Third Way, becomes more difficult as they cross a number of these intellectual fences.
Ongoing debates around globalisation, conflict, etc., may be helping to shift this 
debate. There is a sense that state power has, in some form, been eroded. The 
distinctiveness of both the international and domestic spheres has been affected. 
Attention is focusing not only on an erosion of state power, an idea which is not new, 
but on access to global information flows. These flows seem to limit state power in a 
different way and make it more difficult for states to satisfy their citizens. The
15 Hill, ibid., p. 38.
16 Hill, ibid; Clark, Ian. Globalisation and International Relations Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999.
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resulting populist backlash results in state resistance to external constraints and a 
reassertion of domestic primacy.
This debate suggests that the international/domestic may have always been ‘porous’ 
than the International Relations frame of discussion. Though conversely, there may 
also be moments when the international boundaries are very firm, e.g. in situations of 
immediate danger such as war, when ultimate control is possible and a heightened 
sense o f loyalty is paramount.
These developments in international politics are opening new avenues for the study of 
International Relations. Issues such as international law, global governance and 
humanitarian and security concerns are gaining popular strength, giving them 
currency in the domestic political arena. This puts the state under pressure, as an 
increasingly inquiring electorate is making demands for domestic transparency on 
issues formerly considered remote. Uncertainty and the speed of change has 
concerned an electorate looking for protection against the outside world economically 
as well as militarily and created a crisis o f legitimacy.
This raises new questions surrounding the domestic/international divide. If the state is 
losing power, or its ability to be the guarantor of security of all kinds, then what is the 
state’s claim to legitimacy? What is the basis o f its power either internally or 
externally? How do competing domestic political actors reconcile these external issues 
with their constant need to gain and retain power? Can states alter themselves — as 
they have in the past — to regain their position?
States are constandy engaged along the international/domestic divide — as years of 
scholarship and study of interdependence, international organisations and comparative 
politics will attest. However, perhaps it is possible that at these times of fundamental 
change, the system allows for borders to become more porous. There seems to be a 
dynamic that creates the circumstances in which new international setdements are not 
only possible but are bom  within domestic political ideologies, then negotiated into 
being by states, for states, thus producing effectively a new international system.
Borders have become not so much a ‘clear bright line’ as a ‘frontier’ with changing 
dynamics and areas that are obscured by other activities, and actors that change in 
number and orientation.17
17 Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier.
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Methodology
This thesis is essentially a case study of New Liberalism and the Third Way as 
domestic political responses to systemic transformation. However, to understand them 
as illustrations first requires an understanding of the context of the debate in terms of 
both issues around globalisation, International Relations discipline and a notion of 
systemic transformation.
Therefore, before proceeding to the case studies, the ongoing globalisation debate will 
be set out to better understand its weaknesses. This debate underestimates the depth 
and range of the current transformation and therefore also misinterprets its similarities 
to other periods of change.
The globalisation debate will then be placed in the more specific context of 
International Relations to highlight the challenges within the discipline to developing 
an understanding of the links between the domestic and international spheres as well 
as the development of the state system as a whole. A particular examination of the 
concept of the state within the UK will also be useful in determining the future 
applicability o f this argument to other states.
This will be followed by a comparison of New Liberalism and the Third Way in 
terms of their historical context and specifically what will be called their ‘positional 
attitudes’ and ‘defining features’ as synthesising political philosophies. This will 
include a brief overview of some of the key ideas and thinkers who fed into the 
development of both approaches as well as a more detailed examination of the key 
concepts developed by New Liberalism and the Third Way.
It is emphatically not the suggestion of this work that there have not been other 
periods of important change. The argument here is simply that there have been two 
periods identifiable as ‘globalisation’ with the features necessary for systemic change in 
the UK. The two transformations under consideration here first moved the state from 
a pre-modern stage of development to the modem and, more recently from the 
modem to what could be called a ‘global’ stage of development — though there is no 
consensus what this stage should be called.
By comparing these two specific periods and the political ideologies that emerged, this 
thesis will explore the relationship between international relations and domestic 
political ideology at times of fundamental change. Further, it will argue that the result 
o f such international engagement from domestic politics by states is a specific kind of
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transitional politics and its ‘porousness’ is bom of necessity but also allows for political 
innovation. Thus, this politics of the ‘frontier’ could be seen as evidence of the stages 
of transition in the development of the state and of the state system.
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Chapter 1
Globalisation -  or global age?
From its humble beginnings as a word that simply implied the whole world — a usage 
which, interestingly, first came into use in 189018 — the term ‘global’ became a ‘new 
grand narrative of the social sciences’, according to Paul Hirst and Grahame 
Thompson.19 Globalisation was, in the words of Anthony Giddens, ‘suddenly 
everywhere’. Though ‘globalisation’ as an everyday term was relatively new, many of 
the currents within globalisation as a phenomenon were as old as the original term.
In the British context, globalisation crossed the bridge between academic discussion 
and popular culture via political debate in the mid-1990s. Giddens, the then Director 
o f the London School o f Economics and key Third Way adviser to Blair (even before 
he became Prime Minister), played a very large role. The globalisation debate was 
initiated in the academic world but much of that work went largely unnoticed outside 
that arena. It was the surrounding political debate and the role that globalisation 
played as an imperative of New Labour policy that helped to shape the concept and 
bring it to national and international attention. This is evidenced by the sheer weight 
o f coverage globalisation received through the late 1990s, together with the Third 
Way (see further in Chapters Ten and Twelve).
The focus here is not the globalisation debate specifically, or even its various phases of 
development, but the frame of that debate and particularly the way it portrays certain 
features. Which has made it difficult to recognise ‘globalisation’ for what it is: a 
combination of change in every aspect of society such that it becomes something 
more fundamental — a period o f ‘systemic transformation’. Because this wider 
perspective is not ventured, it also becomes impossible to examine potential 
commonalities between this period o f transformation and similar moments o f change.
The origins of this debate are long past, but it is useful to briefly rehearse the early 
arguments for two reasons. First, the debate served as the point of departure for 
Giddens and others in the related political debate. Second, it demonstrates the 
difficulties of the usual conclusions and how the process of political popularisation 
served to compound the difficulties o f the academic world in identifying a pattern 
affecting the whole of the system.
18 Scholte, Globalisation, A  critical Introduction, p. 43.
19 Hirst, Paul and Grahame Thompson. Globalisation in Question. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 13.
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The burgeoning of this debate led various academics to attempt to frame the 
unwieldy field. David Held, who was also involved in the development of the Third 
Way and later joined Giddens at the London School of Economics, is therefore both 
useful and relevant in this context. Together with others, he helped shape the ‘camps’ 
o f globalisation thinking. More directly to the point o f this discussion, it is also 
important to examine the way in which Giddens, in his academic (rather than his 
political) role viewed globalisation.
However, the core of the discussion will be the way in which the current 
globalisation debate conflates different processes to such an extent that overall patterns 
o f state development and change have been obscured; further, that the real 
significance of ‘globalisation’ is as an indicator of transition or transformation from 
one period of a state’s development to another — historically from the ‘pre-modem’ to 
the ‘modem’, and currently from the ‘modem’ to the ‘global’ frame.
De-industrialisation as globalisation?
The current globalisation debate began to take shape in the early 1990s. The crises o f 
the 1960s and ‘70s in terms of state control of domestic economies forced politicians 
to look for alternative explanations. As Martin W olf argues:
The stagflation of the 1970s discredited naive Keynesianism; the return of 
inflation discredited the view that monetary policy does not matter; the 
failure of nationalised industries discredited state ownership; the revolt of 
organised labour discredited wage controls; the distortions evident in the 
economy discredited price controls; the superior performance of outward- 
oriented, market-friendly developing countries ... and the equally evident 
relative failure of the inward-looking colossi of China and India 
discredited self-sufficiency; the high inflation and extemal-debt-cum-fiscal 
crises of Latin America discredited populism; and, most important o f all, 
the weakening and collapse o f Soviet state-socialism, discredited faith in 
allegedly rational central planning.20
He goes on to suggest that it was ‘pragmatism in response to experience’ rather than 
political ideology that motivated leaders from a wide range o f countries to begin to 
look for other methods to promote trade and investment in their countries and shore 
up their economies. Thus, a period of economic liberalisation in the 1980s and ‘90s 
sparked a debate on its implications.
20 W olf, Martin. W hy Globalisation Works: The Case for the Global Market Economy. Yale: Yale University 
Press, 2004, p. 133.
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In the UK, liberalisation was a specific part of the Conservative programme of 
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister at the time. However, this approach was not 
limited to the right of the political spectrum. Other European states (including 
socialist and social democratic governments) had identified the underlying economic 
shift and responded, often reluctandy, by reaching out to the global marketplace. This 
will be discussed in Chapter Twelve.
For these states this meant a shift from economies based on manufacturing to service 
and professional industries. Thus, a process o f ‘de-industrialisation’ transformed the 
world of work. For the employer the issues were about competition or even industrial 
survival. For the worker, their lives as employees as well as the lives of their families 
were being forced to adapt. Technological developments and social trends had altered 
both private and public life beyond recognition.
Specifically, white- and blue-collar, semi- and unskilled workers were losing their 
jobs as western economies moved away from manufactured goods and commodities 
and towards services. It has been estimated that in the EU over 75 per cent o f the 
labour force is currendy working in knowledge-producing or service industries and 
that employment in manufacturing is as low as 16 per cent and dropping — down 
from 42 per cent thirty years ago.21 Trade-union membership was losing its 
importance while single-issue campaign groups gained more members than political 
parties. Just as science and technological developments changed the individual’s 
relationship to their world from agrarian to the industrial, the western economies 
were moving from production to post-industrial employment.22
This led to speculation as to the role o f the state. The fact that this economy was 
service-based had a deep impact. As Ruggie argued, service-led economies tended to 
become ‘disembedded’23 — as the economic goods of the country became less 
concrete, it moves towards a system o f ‘networks’ as the ‘core forms in the 
organisation o f production and exchange’.24 Thus, he argued, the state effectively has 
fewer levers in terms of its policy-making.
21 Giddens, Anthony. ‘Challenge o f  Renewal’ Progressive Politics Vol 1.1, 2001, p. 37, and Giddens, 
Anthony. The Progressive Manifesto. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p 2.
22 Cooper, Robert. The Post-Modern State and the World Order. London: Demos, 1996.
23 Ruggie, John. ‘At H om e Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalisation and Domestic 
Stability in the N ew  W orld Economy’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1994, Vol. 24, N o. 3, 
507-26.
24 Ibid.
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The state was also constrained by the notion that this trend seemed to make the 
boundary between the international and domestic less defined. A ‘fuzziness’ was 
arguably undermining the agency of states as global organisations and other non­
governmental bodies seemed to gain power in the international system. Both David 
Marquand and John Gray point to this idea as they argue that even if larger states 
could withstand the power of the ‘gales of intensifying competition and accelerating 
change’,25 their ability to deliver had been curtailed. Politically, Gray points out the 
irony for social democracy as there seemed to be a European ‘consensus’ just at the 
moment the traditional class base was being eroded and the ‘political vehicle’ of the 
state was being ‘marginalised’.26
Martin Marcussen argued to the International Studies Association in Globalisation: A  
Third Way that Travels World-Wide:
By the end of the 1990s, social democratic leaders world-wide have been 
referring to unspecified processes of globalisation when undertaking 
unpopular domestic reforms of organisations structures and policies ... 
Globalisation as discourse is nothing new in itself. In earlier stages, 
political elites of all ideological origins talked about internationalisation, 
external pressure and interdependencies ... the new thing is the amazing 
uniformity in which and the increasing frequency with which 
globalisation is being used in the domestic politics discourse. More often 
than not, globalisation is an integrated part o f the ideological vocabulary 
o f any social democratic leader ... Most social democratic leaders today 
actually wish to liberalise the economy, but in the public discourse they 
seem to prefer to scapegoat processes o f globalisation ... rather than 
admitting that their political priorities at the end of the ‘90s are in fine 
with the priorities of previous conservative leaders ... The globalisation 
discourse is disconnected from the reality out there and serving as an 
explanatory category for organisational reform, economic restructuring, 
administrative change, international cooperation and regional 
integration.27
Marcussen made the point in the rest o f his presentation that while many states point 
to the process of globalisation, in fact they differ as to what constitutes the process. 
Michel Albert in Capitalism Against Capitalism captures this point well when he argues 
there are two types of capitalism: the Rhine model and the neo-American model.
25 Marquand in Radice, Giles., ed. What Needs to Change: New Visions for Britain. London: Harper 
Collins, 1996.
26 Gray, John. ‘After Social Democracy’ in Mulgan, Geoff, ed. Life After Politics. London: Fontana Press, 
1997.
27 Marcussen, Martin. Globalisation: A  Third Way Gospel that Travels World Wide. Columbia 
International Affairs Online. 31 July 2003, pp 1-3.
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The first ‘presupposes different financial structures and social controls ... its 
characteristic features combine to produce a stable, yet dynamic system’28 while the 
neo-American model ‘is based on individual success and short-term financial gain’.29
Albert suggests that France is ‘at the crossroads’ between these models but argues 
forcibly that it, and all of Europe, should reject the neo-American model in favour of 
the strong state offering of the Rhine model. This difference of opinion on the 
subtleties o f the versions of capitalism is important in that it also relates to these states’ 
perspectives on globalisation. While Blair actively promoted the Third Way at home 
and abroad, and various socialist leaders joined the debate, it was still clear they started 
from different views of globalisation and the state. France, for example, did not view 
it as an opportunity but a threat and, similarly, viewed the Third Way with equal 
suspicion. As Albert again comments, ‘financial globalisation is the principal means by 
which the ultra-liberal model is disseminated throughout the world ... the neo- 
American model has thus managed to infiltrate its Rhine counterpart by means of a 
Trojan horse filled with financiers and brokers’.30 This will be discussed further in 
Chapter Eleven.
Radical or 'business-school' globalisation
This infiltration is well illustrated by the ‘business-school’ approach31 or ‘radical’ view 
of globalisation32 is relatively straightforward. Kenichi Ohmae and others argued 
basically for a ‘borderless world’ in which globalisation ‘encompasses all realms’:
Economically, the world increasingly approximates a single global 
economy ... Politically, the nation state is conceived of as less sovereign 
and increasingly anachronistic ... Culturally it is posited that the world is 
becoming increasingly homogenous, as more and more people draw on 
the same set of symbolic references to derive meaning.33
Despite the premise of this approach that globalisation involves all areas, the tendency 
was to focus on economic structures. For example, a core part o f the argument was 
that the post-war economy could be divided into two. Before the problems of the
28 Albert, Michel. Capitalism Against Capitalism. London: Whurr Publishers, 1993, p. 100.
29 Ibid p 18
30 Ibid p 190
31 Watson, Matthew and Cohn Hay. ‘The discourse o f globalisation and the logic o f no alternative: 
rendering the contingent necessary in the political econom y o f N ew  Labour’. Policy & Politics Vol 31 
N o. 3 289-305. The Policy Press, 2003.
32 Giddens, Anthony The Reith Lectures 1999. BBC Online Network. 11 May 1999
33 W hite, Christopher. The Function, Significance and Limitations of ‘Globalisation’ in the New Labour 
Discourse. Unpublished Thesis submitted to the LSE. 2003, p. 76.
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1970s, relatively closed economies made it possible for states to have more control 
over their economies. However, after that point, the global economy had effectively 
overcome the nation state; transnational corporations were creating supranational 
forces that were beyond state control or influence as they would take their business 
elsewhere if states were not compliant. Any state attempting to alter these flows 
would be punished by the market.
It was also argued that this was both a new phenomenon and an inevitable result of 
technological development in terms o f what was produced within countries and the 
ability o f companies to take a wide perspective through communication and instant 
action through new market technology. The argument was essentially technology- 
driven and analysed through a dominant economic lens.34
The sceptics
The radical approach was rebutted by a variety o f writers. Paul Hirst and Grahame 
Thompson in Globalisation in Question were at the forefront of what became known as 
the ‘sceptic’ view. They pronounced globalisation thus portrayed was a myth.
In its most basic form, the sceptics’ argument was that the death of the state was much 
exaggerated. They took as their starting point what they felt to be the flawed logic of 
the radical approach that the expansion o f the global economy rendered the state 
unable to act in its defence. They countered this did not reflect real investment flows; 
and further, the G3’s ability — the triad of the US, Europe and Japan — to influence 
general traffic o f trade.35 They also accused this perspective o f having litde grasp of 
history and its ‘tendency to portray current change as both unique and without 
precedent and firmly set to persist long into the future’.36
The sceptics are often portrayed, particularly by Giddens, as suggesting that the state 
retains control and that, in effect, nothing has changed. However, Hirst and 
Thompson at least among the sceptics clearly recognise that the state has changed but 
that ‘nation states are thus not declining in power per se. States now have radically 
different governance capacities and face different constraints.’37 They also argue that
34 White, ibid; Watson and Hay, ‘The discourse o f  globalisation’
35 W hite, ibid; Hirst and Thompson, Globalisation in Question; Hirst in Gamble, Andrew and Tony  
Wright, eds. The New Social Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
36 Hirst and Thompson, ibid, p. 2.
37 Hirst in Gamble and Wright, The New Social Democracy, p. 84.
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this period of change is no greater than other periods, specifically, that o f the end of 
the nineteenth century and the initial creation o f developed markets in the aftermath 
of the Industrial Revolution. They conclude that globalisation is part o f a longer 
process and neither unique nor overwhelming.
'Strong state' globalisation?
Before returning to the chronological flow o f the globalisation debate, there is a 
slighdy different perspective that is worth noting. It seems to come from a business 
approach but without lionising the borderless economy. As far back as 1990 Michael 
Porter in The Competitive Advantage of Nations38 reported on a ten-country study of 
competitiveness. His background at the Harvard Business School was in business 
advantage, but this study was investigating national strategies for competitiveness. As 
an adviser to President Reagan, it might be assumed the prescription would be a 
smaller state and market liberalisation. Instead, Porter argued that while globalisation 
‘decouples the firm from the factor endowment of a single nation’:
Competitive advantage is created and sustained through a highly localised 
process. Differences in national economic structures, values, cultures and 
institutions, and histories contribute profoundly to competitive success.
The role o f the home nation seems to be as strong as or stronger than 
ever. While globalisation of competition might appear to make the nation 
less important, instead it seems to make it more so.39
This perspective is similar to the next wave of the globalisation debate. Martin Wolf, 
the chief economics commentator and associate editor of the Financial Times, in his 
recent book, Why Globalisation Works, highlights a particular problem within the 
debate. From the point of view of the general terms of the debate, W olf s approach is 
paradoxical. He agrees with much of what Hirst and Thompson have to say as to the 
overstatement of the radicals, but rather than being a ‘sceptic’ or a rampant neo­
liberal, he is a believer in the potential o f globalisation and a supporter of what it can 
create.
W olf argues for more globalisation but with a place for a strong, reformed state. 
Unlike many globalisation writers, W olf limits himself stricdy to the economic aspects 
of the concept. His examination of the same two timeframes under consideration is
38 Porter, Michael. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1990.
39 Ibid., pp. 14, 19.
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useful because it attempts to analyse globalisation along one axis — thus clarifying 
issues for comparison.
He starts by quoting Anne Kruger’s (of the International Monetary Fund) definition 
of globalisation as ‘a phenomenon by which economic agents in any given part of the 
world are much more affected by events elsewhere in the world’.40 His own working 
definition however, is ‘an integration o f economic activities via markets. The driving 
forces are technological and policy changes — falling costs of transport and 
communications and greater reliance on market forces’.41 He goes on to point out 
that: ‘The economic globalisation discussed here has cultural, social and political 
consequences (and preconditions). But those consequences and preconditions are 
neither part of its definition nor a focus of our attention’.42
By focusing on the economic view he is freed from the seemingly endless areas 
arguably affected by globalisation. Essentially, he agrees with the analysis of Hirst and 
Thompson in two areas, First, that there have been previous periods o f growth 
definable as economic globalisation; and concurs with their conclusion that 
globalisation is neither ‘unique’ or ‘new’. Second, that rather than undermining or 
destroying the state, economic globalisation is not created in a vacuum but by states 
themselves, and thus while the state may be changing, it is not destroyed. He suggests 
that the state may even be more necessary than before to control these forces.
Another recent contribution with a broadly similar conclusion is in State-Building: 
Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century by Francis Fukuyama.43 He 
argues that ‘For well over a generation, the trend in world politics has been to 
weaken states’. This, he suggests, has generally been a good thing but it is crucial to 
recognise that it is also true that weak states He at the root o f a growing number of 
international problems. He concludes that it is the small, strong state that has the best 
hope of succeeding in a globalised world.
In terms of previous phases o f globalisation, the period of interest here is the end of 
the nineteenth century. W olf spends time examining this history and concludes that 
while the end of the twentieth century has gone through a period rapid change, in 
fact, the end of the nineteenth century was, in many crucial respects, just as significant 
a period of globalisation. He cites, amongst other things, the greater integration of
40 W olf, Why Globalisation Works, p. 14.
41 Ibid., p. 19.
42 Ibid.
43 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin Books, 1992.
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capital markets, the more effective transfer of resources aboard, the integration of 
markets for various key goods, the higher level o f migration (labour mobility), 
systematic price convergence of commodities and overall growth.
The consensus of contemporary opinion is that there has never been a more rapidly 
integrating world economy than that of the 1990s. W olf argues, however, that the 
evidence is against this. According to Kevin O ’Rourke of Trinity College Dublin,
‘the most impressive episode of international economic integration which the world 
has seen to date was not the second half of the twentieth century, but the years 
between 1870 and the Great War. The nineteenth century, and particularly the late 
nineteenth century was the period that saw the largest decline in intercontinental 
barriers to trade and factor mobility.’44
W olf also concurs with O ’Rourke that in the area of communications the changes 
such as the transadantic cable (1866) which decreased the time needed for a 
transaction from twenty days to a single day was ‘the most important breakthrough for 
the last 200 years for capital markets ... no other innovation, including the late- 
nineteenth-century invention of the telephone or its late-twentieth-century 
equivalent, the Internet, has had comparable impact on the speed of information flows 
and capital market integration.’45
As to the role o f the state, W olf is equally clear that ‘the proposition that globalisation 
makes states unnecessary is even less credible than that it makes states impotent. If 
anything the exact opposite is true.’46 He bases this view on the fact that the ability o f 
globalisation to be effective relies on the quality of the state and its ability to harness 
public goods, human resources and the state’s role as a provider of order. He does 
suggest that global governance will be more important but that need not, in his view, 
come at ‘the expense’ o f the state.
Michael Mann also takes exception to much o f the argument that has gone before in 
his article in New Left 'Review.41 He concurs that the process of globalisation cannot be 
ignored and is undoubtedly a real phenomenon. However, he points to the 
importance of asking how ‘evenly’ and how ‘fast’ globalisation is proceeding as being 
crucial to the analysis. He questions the argument that globalisation leads to a single 
homogenous global culture as well as the neo-liberal view (or even the classical free-
44 W olf, Why Globalisation Works, p. 109.
45 Ibid., p. 119.
46 Ibid., p. 276.
47 Mann, Michael. ‘Globalisation and September 11.’ New Left Review, Second Series 12.6 (2001): 51-72.
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trade view) that unlimited globalisation is a peaceful process. He suggests instead, that 
globalisation is ‘not singular but multiple, and it disintegrates as well as integrating ... 
it is multiple and contradictory ... Most of these divisions generate not armed conflict 
but tensions that can usually be resolved by peaceful negotiation between converging
* 9 48nation-states.
Alternative framework for the globalisation debate
David Held’s work on globalisation has been called ‘complex globalisation theory’ by 
Christopher White, who argues that, ‘Contrary to sceptical thinking, for complex 
globalisation theorists, globalisation is under way. It is thought o f as significant as it 
helps explain much that is novel about the contemporary condition’.49 Held accepts 
globalisation as an explanatory force in world politics but does not go either as far as 
the radicals or the sceptics in terms o f his approach. In Held’s own terms,
‘globalisation is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic 
changes that are reshaping modem societies and world order’.50
However, and perhaps more helpful here, is the fact that Held and Anthony McGrew 
have devised a framework for globalisation literature. This is relevant because Held, 
like Giddens, was also engaged in the ‘inner circle’ of the Third Way, thus his 
categorisation is relevant to the political debate. These two thinkers link academic 
theory and political practice.
In Globalising World? Culture, Economics, Politics,51 Held attempted to set out a more 
theoretical framework for the debate. In a very similar classification to those above, he 
argues that there are primarily three approaches to globalisation. The first is ‘globalist’, 
arguing that globalisation is a real phenomenon affecting every aspect of culture and 
society which must be taken seriously because its impact will change all levels o f 
society. As culture, economics and politics are pulled into global flows, these will take 
control and both localities and states will be pulled into a homogenised form of global 
society. Globalists conclude that state resistance to globalisation is futile. While there is 
a positive and a negative variation within the globalist view, the inevitability of the 
force of globalisation remains unchanged.
48 Ibid.
49 W hite, The Function, Significance and Limitations o f 'Globalisation’ in the New Labour Discourse, p. 95.
50 Held, David, and Anthony McGrew, eds. The Global Transformations Reader: A n  Introduction to the 
Globalisation Debate. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 7.
51 Held, David (ed.). A  Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics. London: Roudedge, 2000.
34
Held terms the second approach ‘traditionalist’. These writers argue that 
the globalists’ concerns are overblown. These forces are not fundamentally 
different from those that have been at work for centuries. The current 
situation is the continuation of, rather than substantially different from, 
the interactions that have taken place in the past. Importantly, 
traditionalists also argue that the state still has a considerable influence on 
the system and that they could use this influence to ensure and protect 
their own preferences.
The third category are the ‘transformationalists’ whose approach lies somewhere in 
between the globalists and the traditionalists. They reject the juxtaposition of the 
other two approaches as opposites but suggest that globalisation is a complex force, as 
unpredictable as it is diverse. They suggest that it requires in-depth examination to 
better understand how it might affect the state and its operations. They do not 
sympathise with the idea that globalisation has a pre-determined destination, but 
neither do they submit to the idea that globalisation has only a moderate impact.52
Later the same year, Held, teamed with Anthony McGrew, made another attempt to 
rein in the runaway concept of globalisation in The Global Transformation Reader.53 
They reduced the three categories to two and labelled them simply ‘globalists’ and 
‘sceptics’. This begins to reflect the division that has gradually become the norm for 
terminology in this area — certainly for the political debate. In their introduction they 
point out several dynamics as to how the term might be handled but their most 
consistent definition is as follows:
...globalisation represents a significant shift in the spatial reach of social 
action ...This does not mean that the global necessarily displaces or takes 
precedence over local, national, or regional orders of life ... As distance 
shrinks, the relative speed of social interaction increases too ...
Globalisation engenders a certain cognitive shift expressed both in a 
growing public awareness of the ways in which distant events can affect 
local fortunes (and vice versa) as well as in public perceptions of shrinking 
time and geographical space. Simply put, globalisation denotes the 
expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact 
o f interregional flows and patterns o f social interaction. It refers to a shift 
or transformation in the scale of human social organisation that links 
distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the 
world’s major regions and continents.54
52 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
53 Held and McGrew. The Global Transformations Reader.
54 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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Radicals and sceptics -  a response
This binary approach is also taken by Giddens in his Reith Lectures in 1999 and in his 
second volume on the Third Way, Third Way and its Critics — a reply to Sceptics in 
2000.55 In the Reith Lectures Giddens previews the Held/McGrew characterisation of 
the two ‘camps’:
According to the sceptics, all the talk about globalisation is only that — just 
talk ... the global economy isn’t especially different from that which 
existed at all previous periods ... Others, however, take a very different 
position; I’ll label them the radicals. The radicals argue that not only is 
globalisation very real, but that its consequences can be felt everywhere.
The global marketplace, they say, is more developed than even two or 
three decades ago, and is indifferent to national borders. Nations have lost 
much of their sovereignty ... however, I don’t believe either the sceptics 
of the radicals have properly understood what it is or its implications for 
us. Both groups see the phenomenon almost solely in economic terms.
This is a mistake. Globalisation is political, technological and cultural as 
well as economic.56
Two years later, Giddens continued to make the argument that both those ‘for’ and 
‘against’ globalisation — as these two lines o f argument could be construed — have 
oversimplified the change that is going on. He goes on to say:
The core meaning of globalisation is increasing interdependence. No 
matter where we five in the world we are all affected by events and 
changes happening many miles away. The most important factors shaping 
globalisation are not those to do with finance and markets but with 
communication. The communications revolution ... coincides more or 
less completely with the origins of globalisation.57
His formalisation of the duality of radicals and sceptics (with the ‘transformationalists’ 
or the ‘complex theorists’ left for the time being) enabled Giddens to do two things: 
first, to set out his argument as a logical ‘third way’ alternative to two flawed options; 
and second, to reiterate his core notion, often ignored or glossed over, that 
globalisation is not only economic — an element of his argument that was regularly 
lost in the general debate. This is particularly important when we come to the final 
element of the globalisation discussion as it underlines its misconceptions. First it is 
important to go further into Giddens’ perspective.
55 Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way and its Critics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
56 Giddens, Reith Lecture, 11 May 1999.
57 Giddens, Anthony. Where Now for New Labour? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, p. 70.
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Giddens on globalisation
Various approaches and definitions o f globalisation have been offered, but looking 
forward to the Third Way, no assessment would be complete without a more detailed 
examination o f the views of Giddens — widely seen as the progenitor of the Third 
Way — with globalisation a cornerstone of that approach.
Giddens’ detailed role in the political development of the Third Way debate will be 
examined in Chapter Ten. Here, three areas are proposed as central to his position. 
These are: the importance of other factors than economic in the process, the ways in 
which power is shifted and altered in the fight of globalisation and the impact that 
such shifts o f power have on the state.
The above discussion on sceptics and radicals is a starting point in terms of the
importance that Giddens places on the idea that globalisation is not a single process or
primarily an economic one. It is a theme that runs throughout his work. Long before
the Third Way became common media parlance, in the same year that Tony Blair
became the leader of the Labour Party, Giddens wrote Beyond Left and Right: The
Future of Radical Politics in which he argued,
Globalisation is not only, or even primarily, an economic phenomenon; 
and it should not be equated with the emergence of a ‘world system’. 
Globalisation is really about the transformation of space and time. I define 
it as action at a distance, and relate its intensifying over recent years to the 
emergence o f means of instantaneous global communication and mass 
transportation. Globalisation does not only concern the creation of large- 
scale systems, but also the transformation of local, and even personal, 
contexts o f social experience. Our day-to-day activities are increasingly 
influenced by events happening on the other side of the world.
Conversely, local lifestyle habits have become globally consequential ... 
Globalisation is not a single process but a complex mixture of processes, 
which often act in contradictory ways, producing conflicts, disjuncture 
and new forms o f stratification.58
In various works that followed, more specifically tailored to the Third Way debate, 
Giddens did not waver in his argument that economic change is not the primary 
cause o f globalisation. It is ‘about the transformation o f time and space in our fives ... 
a complex range o f processes, driven by a mixture of political and economic 
influences ... creating new trans-national system and forces. It is more than just a
58 Giddens. Beyond Left and Right, p. 5.
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backdrop to contemporary policies: taken as a whole, globalisation is transforming the 
institutions o f the societies in which we live.59 Finally:
Globalisation is by no means wholly economic in its nature, causes or 
consequences. It is a basic mistake to limit the concept to the global 
marketplace. Globalisation is also social, political and cultural. O n all of 
these levels, it is a highly uneven set of processes, proceeding in a 
fragmentary and oppositional fashion. While still dominated by the 
industrial nations, it isn’t simply the same as Westernisation — all countries 
in the world today are affected by globalisation processes. Developments 
in science and technology, for example, affect people’s lives in richer and 
poorer countries alike.60
In a closely related thought, Giddens is also consistent in his view as to how 
globalisation impacts power. Although he suggests a rather complicated explanation, 
he returns several times to the idea that globalisation does not create a single flow ‘up’ 
or ‘away’ from the state — or local community — but that it also pushes ‘downwards’ in 
that some things that had been the domain of the state are brought back to a local 
level. Finally, he also suggests that power can be said to be ‘squeezed sideways’ where 
cross-border alliances or regions are created as part of the new global framework.61 It 
is in this context o f shifting power that he quotes David Bell with approval for the 
observation that ‘the nation becomes too small to solve the big problems but also too 
large to solve the small ones’.62
This has a direct bearing on the third element of Giddens’ perspective: the impact of 
shifting power on state efficacy. He suggests that globalisation changes all levels 
simultaneously and while he acknowledges that it may seem strange to leap from the 
individual to the global, he feels that is not only useful but necessary in a world in 
which ‘global developments and individual actions have become so closely tied 
together’63 — or, in other words, that globalisation can be driven by states but that it 
can likewise be driven by the day-to-day decisions of the individual. An act as simple 
as ‘connecting to the Internet or the purchase of a certain item of clothing or food’ 
plays, in his view, a part in the forces o f globalisation.64
59 Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, pp. 31-33.
60 Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics, p. 68.
61 Giddens, Reith Lectures and Giddens in Novak, Michael. Is there a Third Way?: Essays on the changing 
direction o f socialist thought with commentaries by Anthony Giddens, John Lloyd, Paul Ormerod. The IEA 
Health and Welfare Unit Choice in Welfare no. 46. London. 1998
62 Giddens, Reith Lectures.
63 Giddens, Beyond Left and Right.
64 Giddens, Where Now for New Labour?
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This reality, he suggests, constitutes a ‘new world society’. Many of the world’s 
greatest challenges will no longer be traditional enemies, but issues that are trans­
national or have no particular focus, e.g. ecological risk. He therefore argues that 
traditional notions will have to be revised and states will be forced to respond.65 He 
goes on to argue that globalisation has come not only from economic change but that 
it is also the result o f an ‘endogenous crisis of the state’. In effect, he separates the 
economic system from the role and function of the state by stating that change within 
one may have implications for the other but that there is a crisis o f the state in addition 
to massive economic change. This point will be key to the next chapter.
Summary of globalisation debates
These wide-ranging views still seem incomplete. For the radicals or globalists, 
globalisation clearly represents a significant step-change in basic forms of 
communication at all levels of society inside and outside the state context. For the 
sceptics or traditionalists, there have been other shifts that were as significant in their 
time and context as the changes we see today, but these theorists do not take the next 
step of exploring their own assertion. If globalisation has been an ongoing process, 
what patterns, if any, can be discerned? Are there periods of more intense change? 
What causes them? Can they be predicted? O r indeed, even if they cannot be 
identified in advance, are there patterns of behaviour we can identify after the fact?
For these purposes, the radical/globalist divide may be overstated, and its pervading 
sense of predestination unsustainable, but the juxtaposition is often used by Third 
Way thinkers to suggest that there is no alternative and to defend their directive 
approach.
This particular moment in history may be unique — as they suggest — but that can 
equally be said to apply to every moment of transformation. At each such 
transformative moment, the advantages o f new technology or knowledge had 
previously not been known in those societies. Speed and distance, as indicated above, 
are often used as ‘evidence’ particularly from the globalist perspective — but they are 
relative concepts. Therefore it seems untenable that the change felt now is any 
different in perceived impact than the changes that took place at the turn of the last 
century — or any other moment of massive change. This is borne out by O ’Rourke 
and others who suggest that the end of the nineteenth century was more dramatic.
65 Giddens, ‘Third way’s the charm’. Newsweek 4 June 1999.
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The traditionalists, as defined by Held, argue that processes being witnessed today 
have their roots in the past. Thus, their conclusion that globalisation is not ‘new’ 
follows naturally — and certainly the sceptics seem to have managed at least to 
undermine the more extreme forms of the globalist perspective on economic grounds. 
However, the causes of transformation, or the agents of massive change are not 
explored. In this context W olf is unusual both as a ‘promoter’ o f globalisation and in 
focusing solely on the economic. While he recognises that there are a range of 
consequences of globalisation, he does not deem them part o f the definition.
This leaves the vast territory of other theorists, including Giddens and Held, who He 
somewhere in between. They go to some lengths to identify the economic aspects but 
then merge them with a number of different types of change. This results in 
disagreement as to its specific impact or exact manifestations. This is the most 
common approach of the Third Way. The Third Way effectively accepts globalisation 
as inevitable and supports the idea it can be used to the benefit o f the country, but 
give no sense of understanding cause and effect. Third Way proponents are careful 
not to ‘promote’ globalisation or be ‘in favour’ of it but only to ‘prepare’ the country 
and its citizens for its consequences.
To this group, it would appear that all change, at whatever level, can be attributed to 
forces of globalisation. However this makes it almost impossible to analyse the origin 
and direction o f this force. Globalisation, seems to be an inevitable force that alters 
power relations in all directions but with no predictability or consistency.
Modern or global?
It becomes clear from the summary o f these approaches that there is a serious flaw 
underlying these explanations of globalisation. Simply put, the contemporary 
globalisation debate has come to have too many meanings. Globalisation has lost its 
explanatory power in terms of causation and is unable to produce an understanding of 
agency even within the areas of change that it identifies.
In light o f this difficulty, the radical version retains the most power, though it relies 
heavily on the economic system as the only driver and seems unable to suggest how 
all the other changes that are attributed to globalisation are caused by their primarily 
economic analysis. The sceptics, by suggesting that the process is not new but a 
gradual development o f ongoing processes, overcome the problem of agency but still 
have no explanation for the wide range o f consequences that are put at the door of
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globalisation or why there should be an apparent increase in the speed of change, 
except to argue for ‘technology’.
As D.S. Burton argues, ‘Like many o f the other terms employed in the Third Way 
debate, globalisation is hopelessly vague. Indeed from Giddens’ account, it would 
seem almost to have become synonymous for the modem capitalist world.’66 Or, from 
a more sympathetic observer, White suggests that there is a pervasive problem in the 
globalisation literature which is ‘the plural ways in which the term globalisation is in 
fact understood ... The so-called globalisation debate is not so much a debate but 
rather a set of incommensurable discussions about different things.’67
Jan Aart Scholte takes this a step further in that he suggests five general conceptions of 
globalisation are often conflated: liberalisation, internationalisation, universalisation, 
westernisation or modernisation and deterritorialisation.68 Scholte argues that only the 
final conception is distinctive in understanding developments within the international 
system, although he also points out that this expansion of the ‘supraterritorial space’ 
does not obviate the need for states or their functions. The significant change is the 
alteration o f what he calls ‘social geography’. The first four conceptions, he suggests, 
remain compatible with a territorial understanding. However, the idea that modem 
social relations have been decoupled from their ‘place’ has a profound effect on space 
and distance. He concludes that once the confusions of other types o f change are 
stripped away to this last feature, ‘globalisation has generated an intricate interplay of 
continuity and change in the social order. Yet on the whole globalisation has to date 
yielded change within continuity rather than deeper transformations.’69
W hite goes on to argue, with others, that this conflation of globalisation with 
liberalisation helps the political cause of the Third Way in that it makes the source of 
change both more complex and more remote. This places the state, or in this case the 
Labour Party, in the powerful position of understanding these unpredictable forces. 
Thus, best placed to defend a self-defined the national interest. If, for example, 
globalisation is ‘just’ liberalisation, agency becomes clearer and the actions required 
more obvious. The more opaque the phenomenon portrayed, the more pervasive and 
far-reaching are its implications.70
66 Burton, D.S. No Way Out: The Third Way’s Blind Alley. British Institute o f  Contemporary Economic 
and Political Studies. London. 1999, p. 12.
67 White. The Function, Significance and Limitations o f (Globalisation’ in the New Labour Discourse, p. 94.
68 W hite, ibid.; Scholte, Globalisation: A  Critical Introduction.
69 Scholte, ibid.
70 W hite. The Function, Significance and Limitations o f ‘Globalisation’ in the New Labour Discourse, p. 102.
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This problem is also recognised by Michael Kenny and Martin Smith in their article 
‘Interpreting New Labour: Constraints, Dilemmas and Political Agency’. They 
attempt to locate what they call a ‘single modernisation narrative’ within New Labour 
thinking and suggest:
A teleological and quasi-determinist account of ‘modernisation’ 
constitutes one strand of the party elite’s current self-understanding, hence 
arguments claiming that modernisation is about reshaping Labour’s 
political programme in accordance with socio-economic realities that are 
endogenous and unalterable by political forces. The notion of the arrival 
o f a global economy is frequendy invoked in this way.71
Having spent some time on those who start from the economic drivers of 
globalisation it is also worth spending some time on those who view the phenomenon 
as social rather than economic. Scholte takes the argument in this direction by 
suggesting that social geography and the expansion of superterritoriality creates change 
in social order.
However, there are those who argue that globalisation is a domestic phenomenon 
even more than an international one. Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried in Limits to 
Globalisation — Welfare States and the World Economy, identify the varying types of 
change and developments associated with globalisation. They also point out that there 
are differences between social scientists and politicians as to its dimensions. They 
begin their argument from an entirely different place from those outlined above and 
suggest that globalisation is largely:
A coincidental by-product of the welfare-democratic revolution ... Yet it 
also impacts back upon this geographically fixed socio-political order ... 
Moreover globalisation itself is an at first unintended effect of essentially 
domestic political developments, and it makes itself felt mostly in the 
national, apparently totally self-regarding politics of welfare states.72
Instead of the problems around agency found in other ideas of globalisation, these 
authors place that responsibility firmly within the state. They recognise the 
importance of periods of internationalisation of economies, but also clearly see that 
these tendencies are often met with ‘national counter-movements’ and suggest these 
are both a ‘regularly recurring phenomenon’.73 They also point out that these periods
71 Kenny, Michael and Martin Smith, ‘Interpreting N ew  Labour: Constraints, Dilemmas and Political 
Agency’ in Ludlam, Steve, and Martin J. Smith, eds. New Labour in Government. Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 2001, p. 239.
72 Rieger, Elmar and Stephan Leibfried. Limits to Globalization: Welfare States and the World Economy. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, pp. 6 -7 .
73 Ibid., p. 18.
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of internationalisation were relatively brief while the periods of closure were much 
longer in duration. Counter to much of the globalisation wisdom, they suggest that 
rather than making a case for more democratisation to control the forces of 
globalisation, it is in fact a ‘new form of social democracy’ given that it was been 
brought into existence predominandy by democratically elected bodies and 
institutions. From this point of view:
A basic problem in the entire globalisation discussion consists in the failure 
to differentiate sufficiendy between objective problems and political 
liability for them. Much of that which is causally attributed to economic 
globalisation is actually a product of welfare state conditions themselves.
At the same time it must be noted, however, that the interrelation 
between globalisation and the welfare state can assume very different 
forms, and political decisions can play a critical role in its shaping.74
This also relates to Albert as he argues states influence its form of capitalism by 
controlling the development o f its welfare state. The French and German experience 
suggest that not only do they have a different version of capitalism from that of the 
UK, but also of globalisation, as a direct consequence of the decisions they have taken 
over the form of their welfare state. Albert calls this ‘social Colbertism’, harking back 
to the mercantilist policies of Jean-Baptiste Colbert under Louis XIV, who argued 
that that the’ state should direct the economy in order to fulfil political ambitions and 
achieve social progress’.75
From the point of view of this argument o f systemic transformation, Rieger and 
Leibfried conclude that the Industrial Revolution created a market economy in which 
states sought to ignore territories and boundaries and treat the globe as their 
marketplace. Alongside that economic revolution, there was also a democratic 
revolution. This meant that the sovereign nation state and newly formed welfare state 
required closure in terms of boundaries. It is the structures o f the market balanced 
against the demands of the electorate that create the dimensions of globalisation.
These authors are effectively turning the globalisation debate on its head and arguing 
that it is the state that creates the terms of the globalisation debate and not the 
globalisation debate that should dictate the terms of the state’s provision o f welfare.
Thus the complex theorists, or transformationalists, may be the closest to what could 
be regarded as the most rounded explanation — but they are hampered by the way 
they argue their case. They want to propose that globalisation is not just economic 
but is happening in all areas. Globalisation is transforming the individual, the state and
74 Ibid., p. 39.
75 Albert, Capitalism Against Capitalism, p. 233.
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the nature o f international system, but power is changing its location at all times, at all 
levels, and thus agency or causation o f the transformation is impossible to determine. 
Effectively, they argue that globalisation affects everything at all times in all places.
Global-isation -  global age
There is one particular writer who has proposed a more overarching explanation. 
Martin Albrow in The Global Age: State and Society beyond Modernity, argues that the 
problem is fundamentally that the phenomenon of globalisation is an indication that 
the modern age has come to a close:
The ‘-isation’ suffix of globalisation is an indication in itself of the 
inappropriate attempt to assimilate it to the modem. It leads to accounts 
which minimise the contemporary transformation. It cannot possibly be 
adequate for the epochal shift which Ralf Dahrendorf described as the 
mover from expansion to survival with social justice ... Fundamentally 
the global age involves the supplanting o f modernity with globality and 
this means an overall change in the basis of action and social organisation 
for individuals and groups. There are at least five major ways in which 
globality has taken us beyond the assumptions of modernity. They include 
the global environmental consequence of aggregate human activities; the 
loss of security where weaponry has global destructiveness; the globality of 
communication systems; the rise of the global economy; and the 
reflexivity o f globalism, where people and groups of all kinds refer to the 
globe as the frame for their beliefs.76
Albrow suggests that our everyday language indicates the world is no longer state- 
centric, or simply modem, but that we have moved to a new level of development, 
more accurately described as ‘global’. He also argues that this issue has been confused 
by the tendency to rely on such language as ‘late modem’ or ‘post-modern’ as they 
are both still fundamentally defined by the modern rather than allowing for a new 
form. He proposes that by using ‘global’ it becomes possible to escape from the 
Enlightenment paradigm of the current modem/late modem and introduce a new 
approach.
Albrow is not alone in his declaration of a new age as there are a number of writers77 
who make similar assertions but do not go so far as to define this as a new age. 
Discussions o f the post-industrial state, the late modem or the post-modern state are 
all becoming commonplace.
76 Albrow, The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity, p. 4.
77 Gray, Cooper, Giddens, etc.
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Interestingly, Giddens (thanked by Albrow for his comments) came very close to 
making the same conclusion two years earlier — relatively early in the debate — when 
he said:
Reflexive modernisation responds to different circumstances. It has its 
origins in the profound social changes ... the impact of globalisation; 
changes happening in everyday personal life; and the emergence of a post- 
traditional society. These influences flow from western modernity, but 
now affect the world as a whole — and they refract back to start to reshape 
modernisation at its point of origin.78
It would seem that Giddens is listing globalisation as a separate influence, not as a 
concept that ‘covers’ all of the other influences. Before the globalisation debate 
became so deeply embedded with the Third Way debate perhaps he could see other 
factors as separate functions rather than the morass of globalisation. His first book on 
the Third Way identifies almost exactly the same dilemmas as those outlined by 
Albrow and even goes so far as to refer to this new politics as the new ‘global order’ 
or the ‘global age’.79
Conclusion
It is suggested here that globalisation is not unique to the contemporary world. The 
world has been interconnected from the moment traders and pilgrims took to the 
roads and explorers and merchant ships took to the sea — with all the problems that 
followed in their wake.
It is clear that nothing can compare with the speed with which we now deal with 
other parts o f the world. However, the argument is not that we are not experiencing 
a transformation, but that this is a moment of systemic transformation or of transition 
from one ‘age’ to another. As such, this moment of transformation is new in some 
respects but also comparable to other such moments, arguably the end of the 
nineteenth century. The transformation of that age felt much the same to those living 
through that period as these changes feel today. Further, the reaction of political 
theorists and politicians was much the same. Finally, these periods of transformative 
politics have implications not only for domestic politics but also the frontier between 
the domestic and the international.
78 Giddens, Beyond Left and Right, p. 80.
79 Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f Social Democracy.
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The impact of globalisation and of transformation more specifically on the discipline 
of International Relations will be explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Transitions in the state, in capitalism -  or in both?
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, globalisation is a multi-faceted concept with 
potential impact on many areas of study. Ian Clark summarises this frustration:
The high profile enjoyed by the concept, in turn, derives from the 
emerging conditions of global connectedness that appear to be prevalent 
in many facets o f contemporary life. In commonly employed language, 
time and space are becoming compressed to unusual degrees and in 
unprecedented ways. In short, globalisation is considered to be not merely 
a social theory, but a depiction of a new social reality with potentially 
momentous significance. According to one of the avowed champions of 
contemporary economic globalisation, ‘the basic fact o f linkage to global 
flows is perhaps, the central, distinguishing fact of our moment in history’ 
(Ohmae 1995:15). W hy is it that well-informed observers can reach such 
bewilderingly divergent judgements about this topic?80
In a similar way in which the exploration of the strands of the globalisation debate in 
the previous chapter was useful in gaining a better understanding of its weaknesses, so 
too is an overview of International Relations as a discipline. This involves a brief 
review in terms of the issues touched on or challenged by globalisation — i.e. states 
and statehood, sovereignty, and the boundary between domestic and international. 
The focus of this chapter is a discussion o f the implications o f the idea globalisation is 
an indication o f systemic transformation on key concepts within International 
Relations.
States and statehood
The study of International Relations is of states and their activities. This has generally 
been taken to mean the external activities and the international system but in fact, the 
discipline has always struggled with the issue o f where to draw boundaries. W hich 
actors should be considered and what impact that has on the area being studied has 
changed significantly over time.
This is evident whether one looks just before the First World War, when 
International Relations was not a discipline per se but the study of international law,
80 Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, p. 35.
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political theory and diplomacy etc.81 — or to various ‘paradigm shifts’, including the 
development of the studies o f foreign policy and interdependence, up to the 
challenges presented by globalisation under discussion here.
The state, its responsibilities and powers, have remained a constant source of debate 
throughout its history so the challenge posed by globalisation to state power, while a 
part o f the concept’s contribution, is not new. In language that would not be out of 
place in the current globalisation debate, Ernest Barker argued in 1915 that, ‘We may 
need, and we may be moving towards, a new conception o f the State, and more 
especially a new conception of sovereignty ... We may have to recognise that 
sovereignty is not single and indivisible, but multiple and multi-cellular’.82
Thus globalisation is not the only challenge to the state, and through each challenge 
the state has continued to evolve. For example, in earlier forms of the state system, 
order was based on the region. Regional systems and their leaders (or ‘rulers’ to be 
more accurate in this early form) managed to produce periods of stability despite their 
uncertain environment. This uncertainty existed for a variety of reasons, one o f which 
was the absence of communication. Despite this obstacle, coherence was retained 
because, while disconnected, these entities were, at the same time, more enmeshed. 
The ‘world’ (understood by Europeans to mean Europe) operated on a similar basis 
and borders were physically difficult to maintain. This had a major impact on the 
sense of what was ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the territory. As states, largely through 
technology, gained more control over space and distance, boundaries became more 
important in terms of the idea of state sovereignty. As Joseph Camilleri argues:
Confining, for the moment, our attention to Europe — widely recognised 
as the cradle of the modern sovereign state ... Medieval Europe 
comprised a cosmopolitan patchwork of overlapping loyalties and 
allegiances, geographically interwoven jurisdictions and political enclaves.
In the feudal system there was no clear demarcation between the domestic 
and external spheres of organisation, no sharp dividing fine between 
‘public territories’ and ‘private estates’. Yet this diverse and fragmented 
system of rule nevertheless enjoyed a considerable level of coherence and 
unity by virtue o f ‘common legal, religious and social traditions and 
institutions’.83
81 Banks in Light, Margot and A.J.R. Groom, eds. International Relations: A  Handbook o f Current Theory. 
London: Pinter Publishers, 1985; Halliday, Rethinking International Relations.
82 Barker, Ernest. Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1930, p. 
250.
83 Camilleri, Joseph. ‘Re-thinking Sovereignty in a shrinking, fragmented world’, in Walker, R.B.J. 
and Saul H. Mendlovitz eds. Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community. London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1990, p. 13.
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It is clear then, that the state system has gone through a number of stages of 
development. However, an idea less examined but important here is that each 
individual state within that system has evolved with its own ideas of statehood and 
sovereignty, though at different speeds even from its closest allies and neighbours. 
Thus, the development o f the state as an ‘impersonal, abstract’ entity that ‘controls a 
consolidated territory and possesses a systems of offices that is differentiated from that 
o f other organisations operating in the same territory’ was, in Kenneth Dyson’s words, 
‘a ramshackle affair’ and a process that was ‘neither identical nor simultaneous in 
different countries’.84
This can also be said of the development o f ideas of sovereignty as a more formal 
system of states gradually emerged. Again, as Dyson points out:
The idea and practice o f the modem state were forged out o f conflict 
involving medieval parliaments which centralising rulers sought to 
extinguish or make subservient; the Church, as rulers attempted to 
acquire its authority and thereby extend their moral function in relation 
to their subjects; and the nobility, who were either drawn into the service 
o f the prince as members of the royal administration (as in Italy and 
Sweden) or ceded influence to a bourgeoisie rising as powerful officers (as 
in France). There was a close historical connection between the increase 
in ‘stateness’, the expansion of armed forces, rises in taxation and popular 
rebellion.85
As implied in this view, and related to Rieger and Liebfried’s work on globalisation 
examined in Chapter One, this was part o f a process of evolution from the ‘state- 
nation’ to the ‘nation-state’86 — or, in this context, arguably from the pre-modem to 
the modem. Philip Bobbitt goes back even further in The Shield of Achilles to argue 
basically that the Church gave way to the monarchy and finally to a civil state in 
western development. He calls this the shift from the kingly state to the territorial or 
state-nation and then finally to a notion of a nation-state. His focus is on these last 
two stages of development. The state-nation, in his words:
Mobilises a nation — a national ethnocultural group -  to act on behalf of 
the State. It can thus call on the revenues of all society, and on the human 
talent of all persons. But such a state does not exist to serve or take 
direction from the nation, as does the nation-state ... the nation-state 
takes its legitimacy from putting the State in the service of its people; the 
state-nation asks rather that the people be put in the service of the State.
84 Dyson, Kenneth H.F. The State Tradition in Western Europe. N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 
1980, p. 29.
85 Ibid., p. 33.
86 Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War Peace and the Course of History. London: Allen Lane, 2002.
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The state-nation is not in the business of maintaining the welfare of the 
people; rather it is legitimised by forging a national consciousness, by 
fusing the national with the State.87
He argues that the shift from the kingly state to the territorial state-nation created a 
crisis throughout Europe. As kingly states lost their support for huge military spending 
they faced a choice to cut back expenditure or find allies within society and 
effectively share power. This changed the notion of statehood from one of 
overlapping identities to the idea of nations that were more bounded as territories and 
formed what is known within the International Relations discipline as the classic 
‘Westphalian’ system. It was the shift from the state-nation to the nation-state that 
created the revolutions in 1848 across Europe as the ‘Poles, Danes, Germans, Italians, 
Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats and Romanians rose in arms claiming the 
right o f self-government’88 — a revolution that corresponded to the Chartists in the 
UK.
For Bobbitt, the state-nation was in decline during the timeframe under discussion 
but the nation-state was still unevenly developed. ‘In only a few decades the state- 
nation would be destroyed in Europe proper, and with it the Concert o f European 
states that had maintained peace ... by the end of these conflicts, in 1870, the state- 
nation in Europe was in rapid retreat.’89
The 'English' state
As the UK is used here as the basic point of comparison, it is important to note that 
the development of the idea of the state in the UK is regarded as having had a 
different path than elsewhere in Europe. Dyson sets out what he sees as the reasons 
for these differences between the UK and its continental neighbours. They are 
instructive, as he points to various features that will be significant when we turn to 
the specific timeframes and look to the response from domestic politics.
The idea of the ‘state’ was, in Dyson’s view, not very developed in the UK. He 
recognises that the term occasionally appeared as a synonym for the ‘nation’ or the 
‘community as a whole’ but that it was ‘not seen as an expression for the legal
87 Ibid., pp. 146, 175.
88 Ibid., p. 179.
89 Ibid., p. 178.
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personality of the executive or as a collective term for the whole or part o f the 
machinery o f government’90 as it was in the rest of Europe.
Dyson suggests this was due to a variety of factors. The basic influence was that the 
UK, unlike most continental countries, developed in line with its medieval history. 
This consistency turned on basic things such as the lack of boundaries with other 
states and the length o f time during which England enjoyed an integrated community 
under a single monarch. Crucially, the monarch’s powers were in many senses 
conditional, as he was contained within the community, as opposed to more 
theocratic societies like France.
Dyson also suggests three other factors that helped create a different UK state: a more 
informal, collaborative nature of control; the more medieval character o f the legal 
professions, independent of politics and not regarded as a ‘public service’; and, finally, 
a common law (instead of Roman law) tradition. The UK (and, he argues, the US), 
both identified themselves as ‘states’ in the foreign arena, representing their interests 
and sovereignty, but unlike continental countries such as France and Germany, the 
idea o f the state did not ‘embrace the domestic policy’.91
This is relevant because Dyson goes on to identify the late 1800s as a period of time 
in which thinkers in the UK began to look to Europe and to ‘rediscover’ the term 
‘state’ precisely because o f these issues around the role o f the state and the 
development of welfare systems. ‘For example, the extension of the functions and 
powers o f government from the 1870s prompted reflection on fundamental principles 
and concern about the limits o f proper ‘state’ activity.’92 He goes on to suggest that 
views o f the state were heavily coloured by the prevailing climate o f Idealism at the 
time:
During the period from about 1880 to about 1910 philosophical Idealism 
enjoyed considerable success within technical philosophy (principally at 
Oxford) and had an influence upon political leaders like Herbert Asquith,
R.B. Haldane and Alfred Milner, social reformers like William Beveridge 
and Arnold Toynbee, and public servants, many of whom were educated 
in Oxford liberalism ... A philosophical understanding of the state was felt 
to be necessary if men were to recapture the full meaning of citizenship 
and community, to find some non-divisive cultural form as a basis of 
social integration.93
90 Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, p. 37.
91 Ibid., p. 38.
92 Ibid., p. 17.
93 Ibid., p. 191.
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The two faces of the state
The most important consequence of the development of the Westphalian system, 
demonstrated by the tensions within the development of the English state, was the 
eventual inscribing of the line between the internal environment of the state and the 
external world. More developed notions o f ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ were being 
created. W ith this newly formed idea of self-containment also came a host of other 
interpretations of the state’s role. The protection of citizens became paramount and 
the corollary of legitimate force. As Robert Cooper points out, this also had an 
impact on the focus o f state attention. If sovereignty had become, in effect, a more 
easily threatened concept because it was no longer acceptable to have overlapping 
identities or loyalties then it follows that boundaries would inevitably require greater 
protection.
In the nineteenth century, German historians evolved a theory called the 
primacy of foreign policy. According to this, the state would always give 
foreign policy interests precedence over domestic considerations. Since 
the origin of the state is in the creation of a common security for its 
people and since the first duty o f every state is to protect itself from 
outside attack, this idea has a certain logic to it. For much of history it has 
probably held true. As long as states were concerned primarily with 
defence, and as long as monarchs owed their position to dynastic 
connections and the sanction o f the Church rather to their people, 
relations with fellow monarchs were of prime importance ... Today the 
primacy of the domestic sphere is evident in almost all countries. What 
keeps governments in power is politics at home, not foreign relations.94
This changing idea o f sovereignty from overlapping to distinct entities gradually 
forced the state to develop what has been called a ‘two-faced’ identity. These two 
faces are ‘all domestic’ and ‘all foreign’. The state, as a player, operates simultaneously 
in two areas that, theoretically at least, were being pulled apart. Fred Halhday apdy 
makes this point:
The most significant theme for International Relations ... is that the state 
is seen as acting in two dimensions, the domestic and the international. In 
its simplest form, the state seeks both to compete with other states by 
mobilising resources internally, and to use its international role to 
consolidate its position domestically. For example, a state may appropriate 
territory, go to war, or pursue an arms control agreement to gain 
domestic advantage, while it may promote industrialisation, introduce 
educational change, raise taxes, or treat an ethnic minority better in order 
to achieve international goals. Conducted successfully, this two-front
94 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, pp. 102-03.
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policy may work to the benefit of the state, and it is evident that those 
holding state power have many advantages in pursuing this approach.95
This evolution of a state’s two ‘dimensions’ has a particular relevance for this 
discussion, as the boundaries between the domestic and the foreign were clearly part 
o f the debate at the turn of the nineteenth century, and are arguably present in the 
current debates around globalisation. As William Wallace, in The Foreign Policy Process 
in Britain96 points out:
The idea that foreign policy is separate from domestic policy is 
fundamental to the traditional concept of the nation-state. As John Locke 
put it, ‘the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the 
transactions with all persons and communities without the 
commonwealth’ constituted the ‘federative’ power, which must 
‘necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is 
to be managed for the public good’ ... According to this traditional 
interpretation therefore, the making o f foreign policy ought to be distinct 
from domestic policy; over the last century in British politics this has 
usually been accepted by all sides except the dissenting minority o f the 
radical left.97
However, in terms of the nineteenth century and state development, the interaction 
of the domestic and the foreign created a chain reaction across the system. Industrial 
capacity was developed within the territory of a state and created effectively a new 
class of subject/citizen, but this was perceived as a threat in other states. The 
consequences of domestic industrialisation led to international change, which in turn 
created domestic responses to that change. In other words, industrialisation (and 
attending de-agriculturisation) led to the creation of an urban working class. The 
education and enfranchisement of that group created new domestic objectives for 
politicians, including the creation of a welfare state. This was a new form of 
nationalism underpinned by mass conscription and the ability to mobilise mass armies.
As Bobbitt points out, it was Prussia that overtly ‘militarised as it industrialised’. After 
the depression of 1873, the Prussian-led German state nationalised railroads, 
introduced compulsory social insurance and increased intervention into the economy 
‘in order to maximise the welfare o f the nation’.98 In contrast, Britain refused to create
95 Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, pp. 84-85.
96 Wallace, William. The Foreign Policy Process in Britain. London: The Royal Institute o f  International 
Affairs, 1976.
97 Ibid., p. 1.
98 Bobbitt, The Shield o f Achilles, p. 203.
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a mass conscript army throughout the nineteenth century and refused to intervene in 
its economy to the German extent and National Insurance did not exist until 1909.
The creation o f benefits and responsibilities that accrued to the individual by virtue of 
their ‘belonging’ to the state produced a situation in which the state had more interest 
in keeping people out, and more o f a stake for those within the country to defend. 
‘Mass society’ within developed countries evolved into a domestic civil society and 
enabled an international civil society. Ideas o f state sovereignty, power and legitimacy 
were forced to follow those two ‘dimensions’.
As for the international face, this new state identity was closely linked to theories o f 
relations between states. An early version o f what could be termed today a variant of 
‘democratic peace theory’ was accepted throughout the Anglo-Saxon world. There 
was a clear belief that democratic, industrialised states should seek to do business with 
each other and that peace would follow as an inevitable consequence of trade. Free 
and open trade was, in their view, the key to a peaceful world.
Bobbitt suggests that after 1871 a new ‘society o f nation-states’ had emerged:
Its mood was one of easily inflamed nationalism and ethnic turbulence.
This reflected the public mood, excited by the press on a scale impossible 
before the spread of free compulsory education and vasdy increased 
literacy. Three new ideas vied in the public mind for attention and 
allegiance: Darwinism, which had been easily adulterated into a social 
credo of competitiveness and national survivalism; Marxism, with its 
hostility to the capitalist relationships of the industrial age; and bourgeois 
parliamentarianism, which promoted the rule of the law in national and 
international society that was becoming increasingly] credulous about the 
role that law could play."
The varying application of these ideas at a time o f change in the international/foreign 
divide through the different state approaches played a significant role in creating the 
conditions that led to the Great War. The rise o f the nation-state combined with 
economic pressure meant that many states, in an effort to please their new electorates, 
raised tariffs, entered competing alliances and sought protection against external 
threats. By pursuing this mercantilist approach they reinforced nationalism and the 
growing sense of closed state identities. This approach, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, was true of many states but most pronounced in the development of the 
German state and what could be called its ‘Realist’ approach to international affairs.
99 Ibid., pp. 201-02.
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Conversely, the UK, though also changing in response to similar domestic pressures 
and economic difficulties, continued to pursue an external policy o f free trade and the 
harmonious international relations that were presumed to follow. One need only look 
at The Great Illusion by Norman Angell100 to see the faith put in this view as late as 
1912.
Precisely as indicated by Halliday above, the domestic/international ‘two-front policy’ 
was clearly being operated at least by Germany and the UK. The ultimate collision of 
their approaches on these two fronts was not, as Halliday would have hoped, to the 
benefit of the states involved, but did affect the overall development of the European 
nation-state.
The Realist/Idealist debate
As for International Relations, after the Great W ar it began to develop as a discipline 
in its own right. However, it carried forward many o f the inconsistencies of the 
thinking o f the previous era. In particular, these two faces o f the state were reinforced 
and rigid boundaries were laid as part of its foundation. From the outset, the question 
o f who exacdy is included in the study of international relations was never 
satisfactorily resolved and continued to permeate all the ‘great debates’ within the 
English-language discipline.
If the Great War laid the foundation for the discipline, the hardships of the 1930s 
created the framework for the first of those debates — that between realists and 
idealists.101 Thus, what was to become the dominant paradigm of International 
Relations was bom in Realism. The domination of the Realists also brought the 
prominence of the role of the state and a particular approach to power in the 
international system of states.
For much of this century the study o f international relations has been 
dominated by the realist tradition... This tradition has often been referred 
to as ‘statist’ because it is almost exclusively concerned with how the 
global state system conditions the behaviour of individual states... Within 
realist thinking, the complex interplay of internal and external forces 
remains largely unexplored. For in the context of a global state system, the 
state is conceived principally as a sovereign, monolithic entity whose 
primary purpose is to promote and defend the national interest. At its
100 Angell, Norman. The Great Illusion. London: William Heinman, 1912.
101 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Halliday, Rethinking International Relations', Light and 
Groom, eds. International Relations: A  Handbook of Current Theory.
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simplest the realist tradition views the state as a vehicle for securing 
national and international order through the exercise of national power.
In some respects, the state is almost taken for granted, with its goals 
assumed and little or no internal differentiation among its elements.
Moreover, the categories ‘state’, ‘nation-state’ and ‘nation’ are often used 
interchangeably even though these terms should be reserved for distinct 
phenomena ... Accordingly, there is not much evidence to suggest that 
realism and neo-realism possess a convincing account of the enmeshment 
of states with the wider global order, of the effects o f the global order on 
states, and of the political implications of all this for the modem 
democratic state.102
The Realist/Idealist divide continues to permeate the debate, and not unlike the 
division between the ‘radicals’ and ‘sceptics’ of the globalisation debate, has framed 
the debate in a way that is unhelpful to many alternative lines o f investigation.
The Realist domination, with some claim to Germanic influence, was established after 
the outbreak of the Second World War. In its aftermath, and combined with the rise 
of science (very similar to the period of time just prior to the end of the nineteenth 
century) a new demand was placed on the discipline. From the mid 1950s through to 
the end of the 1960s International Relations was under pressure to deliver more 
‘scientific’ results. Those who became known as behaviouralists hoped to challenge 
the Realist paradigm. There was also a struggle between International Relations and 
political science as to whether or not International Relations warranted a separate 
discipline, and thus efforts were made to distinguish its work as different from 
domestic politics.
Rising nationalist sentiment and decolonisation combined with the opening of the 
global economy and increased international cooperation gave the impression that the 
Realist analysis o f power was weakening. Observation o f real-world experience by 
the ‘behaviouralists’ did not fit Realist theoretical models. However, they were not 
able to deliver the critique to the prevailing model of international relations that they 
had hoped. It became, instead, more of an attack on Realist research methods and 
more of an adjunct to the Realist school rather than a new approach.103
Following the work of the behaviouralists, other thinkers began to critique Realism 
based on theories of conflict and power and the increasing levels o f cooperation
102 Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modem State to Cosmopolitan Governance. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, pp. 25-26.
103 Banks in Light and Groom, eds. International Relations: A  Handbook of Current Theory; Halliday, 
Rethinking International Relations.
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between states as well as their inability to assert control and authority over smaller, less 
‘powerful’ states. The argument that the state was challenged by other powerful actors 
on the international stage began to take a more coherent form with people like John 
Burton. This approach became known as the ‘cobweb model’ or Pluralist paradigm 
and these ideas formed the basis for more specialisms. One of these areas, Foreign 
Policy Analysis, was particularly powerful in its critique o f the Realist model’s 
inability to look at both the internal and external activities of the state. It built a 
reputation for investigating both faces of the state, with some arguing that ‘foreign 
policy-making is as deeply affected by the domestic political environment as by 
international constraints’.104 This argument became known as interdependence theory. 
It could also be the closest International Relations has to a competitor for — or 
interpreter of — globalisation. As Halliday puts it:
It was in this context that there emerged the distinct approach based on 
‘interdependence’, a concept used to focus on how societies and states 
were becoming increasingly interlinked and what the consequences of this 
process were. The development of the literature on interdependence 
illustrates well the opportunities, and pitfalls, of recognising the domestic- 
international connection: while it provides a context for examining this 
link, it has often led to a simplification of the relationship and a facile 
assertion that all is now ‘interdependent’. ‘Interdependence’ is a term that 
has been intermittendy in vogue for over a century. In contemporary 
usage it originated as a concept in economics, where it had a 
comparatively clear meaning, according to which two economies were 
interdependent when there was a rough equality of power between them 
... Interconnection produced vulnerability and hence acted to restrain 
what others might do.105
Or, as David Held put it:
Some attempts to consider seriously the modern state within its web of 
global interconnectedness can be found in the rather diffuse literature 
which has its philosophical roots in the ‘liberal-idealist’ tradition in 
international relations... In essence, this ‘transformationalist’ literature 
portrays the modem state as trapped within an extensive web o f global 
interdependence, heavily permeated by transnational networks and forces, 
and increasingly unable to fulfil its core functions without recourse to 
international cooperation. A world o f ‘complex interdependence’, it is 
argued, has dramatic implications for the sovereignty, autonomy and 
accountability o f the state.106
104 Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain, p. vii.
105 Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, p. 14.
106 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, pp. 25-26.
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It is striking just how much the interdependence debate within International 
Relations echoes the issues (and many of the conclusions) of globalisation. However, 
it also retains many of the same problems because interdependence theory also 
continues to use the same underlying assumptions: the ‘timelessness’ of the state, the 
domestic/international divide and a disconnect between theory and practice.
This brief overview only serves to indicate just how pervasive these assumptions are 
within International Relations, and how Realist theory intentionally (or 
unintentionally) works to maintain this divide. Increasingly, non-traditional 
International Relations theory — including studies on development, gender, and 
conflict — have been working to explore these underlying assumptions. Having set out 
a framework for globalisation generally and specifically as perceived by Giddens, as 
well as a brief overview of the disciplines as a whole, it is now possible to take on 
more direcdy the issue of what International Relations has to say in the globalisation 
debate.
The globalisation debate and International Relations
The basic challenge that most writers have presented as the main issue surrounding 
globalisation in terms o f International Relations has been its perceived threat to the 
state:
Succincdy expressed, we need to concentrate upon the state since that is 
the principal site of globalisation. Additionally, however, the moot 
question is whether globalisation alone induces a reconstruction o f the 
state, or whether it is the reconstruction of the state that, reciprocally, 
gives globalisation its historical opportunity and character.107
It is widely argued that the compression of time, space and distance puts pressure on 
the state and its ability to manoeuvre in both the international and the domestic 
arenas. However, the suggestion made here is that this view misunderstands the 
mechanics o f both the state and the process o f globalisation. This argument will be 
made in three parts.
First, it has been argued in a variety o f places, the state is not, as might be supposed 
from some International Relations literature, static or somehow immune from 
development across time. Some theory tends to regard the state as a ‘pure’ entity that 
has various powers and roles both domestically and internationally e.g. monopoly of
107 Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, p. 9.
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force within its borders and security of its citizens from foreign threats. This does not 
allow either for differences between states or for the development of the individual 
state in reaction to forces in or outside its control. Interdependence theory, for all its 
strengths in arguing for state cooperation and shared ideas o f sovereignty through 
multilateral institutions, negotiations and codes of conduct or systems of rules, still 
does not allow much change in the basic notion of statehood.
The timeless, bounded, state has been under scrutiny by writers such as R.B .J. 
Walker, Joseph Camilleri, Robert Cooper, James Rosenau and others. Cooper, for 
example, suggests that we can see at least three stages of development:
It is possible to identify (loosely) the three stages o f state development 
with three types of economy: agricultural in the pre-modem; industrial 
mass production in the modem; and the post-industrial service and 
information economy with the post-modern state. The post-modern state 
is one that above all values the individual, which explains its unwarlike 
character. War is essentially a collective activity: the struggles of the 
twentieth century have been struggles of liberalism — the doctrine of the 
individual — against different forms of collectivism: class, nation, race, 
community or state.108
Elsewhere, Cooper suggests that the central issue for global politics is the fact that 
much of the world is at different stages of development. He suggests that what is 
emerging is a new system rather than just a ‘re-arrangement’ of the old, and a ‘new 
form of statehood’.109 This, he argues, is not dependent on events in the international 
arena but on the form of economy primarily within the state. Clark argues in exactly 
the same terms when he says:
By extension, it will be argued that globalisation is not merely a context 
in which the state operates but a new form it takes. The focus then shifts 
to the globalised state as a single unit o f analysis, rather than upon 
globalisation and the state as two distinct fields of intellectual enquiry.110
This idea of stages of state development resonates with a related idea that there are 
phases in the development of modern capitalism. As illustrated by Albert’s argument 
in Chapter One, the differences between the types of capitalism will need to be 
resolved as the neo-American model attempts to ‘take over’ the Rhine model and 
these different types of capitalism and levels of state resistance will result in domestic 
and international tension. O n a slightly broader timeframe, three overall phases in the
108 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, p. 51.
109 Cooper, The Post-Modern State and World Order, p. 8.
110 Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, p. 7.
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development of capitalism are identified and oudined by Attila Agh and Mary Kaldor 
and summarised here by Camilleri:
Attila Agh describes the role of the state by drawing attention to the three 
phases of modem capitalism. The first phase (1789—1872), based on free 
trade, was characterised by the rapid bureaucratisation o f nation-states and 
national economies, with the legal and political infrastructure of the state 
contributing direcdy to the accumulation of national capital and the 
international defence of its interests... The second phase (187-1944) was 
characterised by the collision of rival national capitalisms and increasing 
emphasis on the state’s external and military functions, which gave added 
impetus to the principle o f sovereignty even though counter-trends were 
already beginning to emerge. The third phase (since 1945), according to 
Agh, sees the development of global relations and interactions, of a world 
system ‘characterised by an advanced interdependence, increasing 
autonomy, self-motion and institutionalisation.’ Other writers offer a 
somewhat different periodisation. Mary Kaldor, for example, refers to 
three eras: the textile era, the railway era, and the automobile era.111
These authors include different features in their phases of development, but the point 
here is that despite their differences they share a strikingly similar timeline and identify 
the same moments of transition under discussion here. As Camilleri goes on to argue, 
the state and capitalism are inextricably linked as the state responds to change in its 
international environment. The international environment is altered by ‘domestic’ 
inventions:
The state continues to perform important internal and external functions, 
but is it truly sovereign? The principle of state sovereignty can now be 
seen to have emerged and developed under conditions that are fast 
disappearing ... Historically state sovereignty may turn out to have been a 
bridge between national capitalism and world capitalism, a phase in an 
evolutionary process that is still unfolding.112
That the state has, in some form, evolved is not gready contested. However, parts two 
and three in the development of this argument may require more conjecture. It seems 
there is something going on at specific points in the system that create massive change 
in the entire frame. State development is linked to its type of economy and the phases 
of capitalism are linked to specific scientific or technological advances. The 
chronology for both the state and the global economy are identified as almost 
identical, but the point is that they are linked systems feeding off each other, not the
111 Camilleri, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in a shrinking, fragmented world’, in Walker and Saul 
Mendlovitz Contending Sovereignties, pp. 30—31.
112 Ibid., p. 38.
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same system — nor is there a single system, e.g. the economic system, that causes the 
overall change.
In the context o f the globalisation debate, the second element of this argument puts 
together two ideas set out by Christopher Hill in The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. 
Hill specifically looks at Foreign Policy Analysis in the context of the wider debate 
and focuses on the area of domestic and foreign overlap through time — and the lack 
of attention being paid to Foreign Policy Analysis in the flow of the globalisation 
discussion.
Globalisation, by contrast, is seen by many as having rendered foreign 
policy redundant. At least, the large numbers who write about 
globalisation give this impression by the simple fact of ignoring it. In part, 
foreign policy is a sub-set of the problem of what is happening to the state 
in age o f globalisation, understood as the creation of an integrated world 
capitalist market, and putting in place some of the sinews of a global civil 
society, through developments in information technology, travel and 
education. Globalisation in its turn has been boosted by political change, 
notably the emergence of the confident states o f east Asia in the wake of 
the Vietnam War, and the collapse of the communist bloc o f Europe. At 
one level the problem of globalisation is just the latest episode in the long- 
running debate about the impact o f economics on politics, which began 
with Richard Cobden in the 1860s making a linkage between peace and 
free trade, and has had at least one other active phase, during the 1970s’ 
discussion of interdependence and detente. It was always a bad mistake to 
assume that the present will resemble the past but in the case o f foreign 
policy and globalisation there seem to be good reasons for supposing that 
the death of foreign policy has been forecast prematurely.113
As well as identifying the same timeframe, Hill also discusses what he calls ‘logics’ 
within the system. He does not discuss this in depth but basically points out that the 
world o f foreign policy is one o f ‘systems’:
The most accurate response is that decision-makers have a sense of 
international relations more than anything else as a system. That is, there is 
a regular pattern of interactions... between separate societies still 
ultimately ‘foreign’ to each other ... This system has various different 
levels, mysteriously but definitely interconnected. It would be wrong to 
call them ‘sub-systems’ because that would imply that we can confidendy 
identify the nature of the primary system... Despite arguments which rage 
over this very question, over whether to privilege security and states, 
capital and firms, knowledge and technocrats, the fact is that we are in an
113 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p. 13.
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epistemological blind spot. We have no way of knowing the origins and 
direction of the causal flow.114
Hill therefore stresses that it is ‘not sensible to privilege one side over the other’.115 
Similarly, in his study of foreign policy-making, Wallace observes that it may become 
more accurate ‘to talk about an international dimension which touches most 
important areas of domestic policy ... demanding particular attention from particular 
ministers, civil servants and commentators but inseparable from major issues of 
domestic debate’.116
Hill suggests that as the world does not have ‘sides, top or bottom’,117 we must try to 
view foreign policy and international relations in a way that puts ‘wholeness’ at the 
forefront. Part o f that world o f systems — obviously stemming from a history of 
interdependence theory and the development of Foreign Policy Analysis — are, he 
suggests, three ‘logics’:
The assumption here is that the world has three distinctive logics: the 
logic o f economics (including structures of trade, production, and 
investment); the logic o f politics (which is the competition over how the 
world is to be organised and resources to be allocated); and the logic of 
knowledge, which deserves to be seen as an equally autonomous realm 
because o f the impossibility of confining ideas, which flow like water 
through every crack.118
Hill is not alone in his concept of logics; Bell also uses the ‘logics o f organisation’ 
though he labels them ‘techno-economic, the polity and the culture’.119 He suggests 
that while the techo-economic is a system that ‘consists o f loosely interrelated units in 
which changes in the magnitudes of one set of variables have a more or less 
determinate outcome among the others in the decisions of the relevant economics 
actors ... The system moves, more or less through markets, to equilibrium.’ He 
argues that the polity is not a system as much as a ‘social order, a set of rules, by 
coercion or consent ... the polity is also a set of rules for the administration of justice’ 
and culture has two dimensions: ‘the styles of the expressive arts, and the modes of
114 Ibid., pp. 164-65.
115 Ibid., p. 35.
116 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, pp. vii, 270.
117 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p. 165.
118 Ibid., p. 165.
119 Bell, Daniel. The End o f Ideology: On the Exhaustion o f Political Ideas in the Fifties. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000 (first published 1960), p. xvii.
120 Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.
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Finally, Michael Mann poses what he calls types of ‘power organisation’ that he 
suggests ‘human beings have set up’ in ‘pursuit of their goals’.121 His categories are 
similar to both Hill and Bell — ideological/cultural, economic and political, though he 
adds a fourth category of military. Unlike the other two authors, Mann links these 
direcdy to globalisation and argues that his model:
sees globalisation as consisting of expansions of all four of these networks 
o f interaction, each of which may have differing boundaries, rhythms and 
results, diffusing distinctive forms of integration and disintegration across 
the globe. Discussion of globalisation should not neglect any o f these.
Recent events should bring this home since they clearly involve a mixture 
o f ideological, economic military and political processes.122
In addition to this idea o f ‘logics’, Hill also talks very briefly about ‘openings’ in the 
system. He is clearly talking about openings in the context of Foreign Policy Analysis 
and what might be possible given specific actors and events. His emphasis is on 
perceptions of the actors within the systems, be it domestic or international. As he 
states,
Policy analysis should never neglect the importance o f time: some 
historical periods are more open for change, of a general or particular 
kind, than others. Some policies seem rational at one time, irrational at 
another. Which is to say, firstly, that rationality is contingent, not just on 
place and culture, but also on period, and secondly that history seems to 
provide certain openings in which major restructuring may be attempted, 
or at least begun, before events once again begin to congeal into stable 
patterns.123
However, even with Hill’s caveats as to the wider applicability of this notion, it 
would seem that there is no reason why the idea o f ‘openings’ could not be combined 
with the idea of logics and, in particular, used in relation to globalisation. Expanding 
on Hill then, perhaps another way of viewing those moments of change in the 
development of the state or the history of capitalism — depending on the preferred 
frame of reference — is that they are the points at which change within the ‘logics’ has 
converged. In other words, despite the differing rhythms of the logics posed by 
Mann, there is a moment at when change occurs in all systems simultaneously.
These flow into the system and while not ‘privileging’ one system over another, they 
develop in reaction to each other. This convergence o f ‘logics’ then provides an 
‘opening’ in the system that makes new options possible. Given the dual nature of the
121 Mann, ‘Globalisation and September 11’, p. 52.
122 Ibid.
123 Hill, The Changing Politics o f Foreign Policy, p. 108.
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state and its leaders it is only logical to assume that with change on the level of the 
international system, global economy and state sovereignty, there would also be some 
kind o f domestic ‘fall-out’ to such an opening.
Globalisation and the 'great divide' within International Relations
This line of argument might be considered to be taking Hill and others out o f 
context, except for the fact it is broadly supported by a separate proposition provided 
by Ian Clark. Clark starts from a different perspective in his book, Globalisation and 
International Relations Theory. In the same way the history of the discipline has been set 
out here, he goes back to basic International Relations concepts. He suggests that a 
key struggle for the discipline in dealing with globalisation is this embedded concept 
o f the ‘great divide’. He goes on to argue from that fundamental point that other 
problems are obscured and ultimately misunderstood within the system:
theorising within the field of International Relations rests upon an 
implicit Great Divide between the internal and the external, or between 
the domestic and the international. W ithin such a framework, the state is 
thought to embody the internal and, thus constituted, to embark on 
external activities. The international system may subsequendy present a 
constraint upon its behaviour, but it is not the source of the state’s 
identity in the first place. It will be demonstrated that such an initial 
framework is deeply misleading and has pervasive, and unhelpful, 
consequences for the way in which we think about the subject.124
Halliday similarly suggests that there is more to the international/domestic divide than 
allowed in the past and that, ‘the international was not “out there” as an area of policy 
that occasionally intrudes’ but instead that states operate at both levels in a more 
simultaneous fashion than is understood by theorists. He observes that states are only 
able to compete internationally by mobilising their domestic resources. The two sides 
of the state cannot be divided as they are shaped by each other. He therefore suggests 
that political science, sociology and International Relations should create a more 
productive relationship.125
In the meantime, Clark argues that this divide forces a split between domestic and 
international which has been an underlying challenge throughout the history of the 
discipline. He further suggests that this false dichotomy is now creating even more 
difficulties at this moment of massive shift.
124 Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, p. 12.
125 Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, p. 20.
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Traditional International Relations theory puts all of the state on one side 
of the Great Divide (for domestic purposes) and equally places all o f it on 
the other side (for international purposes). Such a sleight of hand creates 
an illusion of two separate states, acting within separate fields o f forces, 
when actually there is only one state acting within a single field. How 
then might the state be theorised in such a way as to make sense of 
globalisation?126
Clark goes on provocatively to suggest that it is not, in fact, the external pressure on 
the state that is creating the difficulties but that it is the state that is changing at the 
same time and thus obscuring the causal links:
The Great Divide encourages us to see the transformation of state roles in 
sovereignty, economy, security, and rights of citizenship as the necessary 
response o f beleaguered states in the face of overwhelming external forces.
In fact, the much more subtle reality is that these supposedly external 
conditions have, in part, been brought about by new conceptions of the 
state, of which the new policy agendas are symptomatic. The Great 
Divide encourages us to believe that the retreat of the state is a 
consequence of globalisation and is thereby insufficiendy sensitive to the 
extent to which globalisation is also, and simultaneously, a retreat o f the 
state.127
It could be suggested that the ‘divide’ derives much of its strength in effect from what 
we saw as the strong positivist tradition. This hinders International Relations, as 
identified by John Gray128 and Hill129 and others. Whatever the origins o f ‘the divide’, 
it becomes very difficult to get beyond the presentation of this current moment as 
somehow a culmination of the past and globalisation a statement of modernity. The 
tendency is to project globalisation as some kind of telos or conclusion as 
demonstrated in the globalisation debate.
Clark, and academics such as Richard Ashley, seem to agree that this ‘presumed 
outcome’ approach closes down debate because it is blind to the assumptions 
contained in it about both the state and the nature of globalisation. Ashley calls this a 
‘metaphysical conceit’:
As this suggests, a modern attitude toward history entails a metaphysical 
conceit o f no small proportions. This is the conceit that modem discourse 
is situated at the necessary culmination of history, the completion o f time, 
where all the diversity and displacements of the past can be finally and
126 Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, p. 56.
127 Ibid., p. 32.
128 Gray, John. A l Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern. London: Faber and Faber, 2003.
129 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy.
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fully reconciled, comprehended in pure synchrony, and represented as a 
closed totality. Put more simply, modem discourse presupposes an 
unexamined metaphysical faith in its capacity to speak a sovereign voice 
of suprahistorical truth.130
Clark quotes Albrow positively when he suggests that globalisation is ‘unworthy of 
the appellation of an order because it is no more than a transition phase’. Clark goes 
on to further quote Albrow as he takes writers such as Giddens and R . Robertson to 
task ‘because their association o f globalisation with modernity is inherendy 
teleological and ‘treats as an outcome a necessary product of a process’.131
It is suggested here that this issue lies at the heart o f the difficulties the International 
Relations discipline faces in dealing with globalisation. The absence of an 
understanding o f the nature of the true dependency of the domestic on the 
international and vice versa is linked to the issues we saw in the previous chapter. 
This creates serious problems for an understanding o f the process of globalisation and 
its impact on the state. As Hill observes:
The very division between home and abroad, domestic and foreign, inside 
and outside has been brought into question from a number o f different 
viewpoints, conceptual and political. In consequence, a serious division 
has opened up, not for the first time, between the normal discourse of 
democratic mass politics and the professional discourse o f academic 
commentators ... Some attempts have been made at bridging this gap 
through popularising such terms as ‘interdependence’ and ‘globalisation’ 
but since no scientific consensus attaches to them, the only result has been 
to obscure matters further.132
International Relations developed interdependence theory as the role of the state 
changed and other actors and forces became more prominent in the international 
arena. However, the discipline has not satisfactorily resolved the inherent issue of the 
domestic/foreign schism that is now at the forefront of the questions facing the 
international system. Clark attempts to create a more robust argument than just a 
restatement of the simplistic line that the domestic and the international influence 
each other. He insists that the domestic is what it is because it constitutes a part o f a 
specific international structure. Likewise, the international structure is what it is, at 
discrete historical moments, as a consequence of the nature of the polities embedded 
within it.133 Thus, they are, in fact, created by each other, and by responding to each
130 Ashley, ‘Living on the Borderlines: Man, Post-structuralism and War’.
131 Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, p. 43.
132 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p. 1.
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other, continue that development and evolution. The debate around globalisation is, 
to Clark, not just about the development of world capitalism or the state but 
potentially a moment of adjustment for the discipline to recognise the ‘mutuality’ of 
the systems which it observes:
For the International Relations theorist, globalisation needs to be viewed 
as more than a theory of the capitalist system, but it is nonetheless a 
theory that takes capitalism seriously. It recognises that capitalism operates 
both through and beyond states and that in so doing is an important 
constituent of their (changing) identity. Globalisation is precisely a set of 
claims about the most recent accommodation between state interest and 
capitalism, and accepts their intimate embrace. But the model of 
globalisation advanced in these pages is distrustful of claims that the 
former is simply a creature of the latter. It also takes seriously their 
mutuality.134
The frontier
If this mutuality is accepted, domestic change is inevitable and will be driving as well 
as responding to international change. And there are International Relations specialists 
who have looked at the domestic consequences o f globalisation. Some, like Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye, have been working on interdependence theory for years. 
There are others, such as Richard Falk and James Rosenau, who are specifically 
interested in the concept of agency in the international arena and have examined 
NGOs and global governance or cosmopolitan citizenship. Finally, there are a group 
of theorists, including James Der Derian, R.B.J. Walker and Richard Ashley, who 
have been examining the world from a ‘post-modern’ perspective; they are at the 
forefront o f some of the challenges fisted above in questioning the role o f the state 
and its dominant position.
Interestingly, whatever their starting point, globalisation has forced them all into the 
International Relations equivalent of a demilitarised zone between the domestic and 
the foreign; ‘demilitarised’ in the sense that the area does not seem to be limited to 
the theorists or the practitioners, the traditionalists or the post-modems. It could even 
be observed that the range of thinkers all discussing the same ideas has resulted in the 
confused and dissonant debate on globalisation currendy under way. It may also 
suggest that this no man’s land will be the territory of the next International Relations 
‘great debate’.
134 Ibid., pp. 173-74.
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Given the importance o f the concept of the ‘frontier’ to this argument, it may be 
useful to examine very briefly the language developing in this area. The words chosen 
by this range o f writers attempt to indicate both isolation from the clearly demarcated 
areas of study but also to transcend the usual levels-of-analysis type approach. They 
often revolve around trying to convey competing tensions in the system with the 
same word. For example, James Rosenau, a writer in the area o f transnational 
relations, has a variety o f terms for this process, e.g. ‘fragmengration’. He suggests that 
this indicates the ‘simultaneity and interaction of the fragmenting and integrating 
dynamics that are giving rise to new spheres of authority and transforming the old 
spheres. It is also a label that suggests the absence of clear-cut distinctions between 
domestic and foreign affairs.’135
A more recent contributor, Zaki Laidi, proposes ‘world time’ as ‘the tie both of 
globalisation and of the post-Cold W ar’.136 Crucially, Laidi also recognises the overlap 
between different spheres of activity at different times — much like Mann — but 
accepts that it may not be a new phenomenon:
O f course our perception that time is accelerating is probably not new, 
and therefore the gap of meaning and power perhaps represents a 
recurrent, even permanent problem. Sociology has helped us to recognise 
the existence of social times with differentiated rhythms ... At the start o f 
the twentieth century the birth of ‘universal time’ and the progressive 
universalisation of the telephone and car led to a collective perception of 
the acceleration of time and a necessary renegotiation of the relationship 
between people and space. We then saw a parallel development in 
literature, the arts, music and linguistics of ‘modernist’ choices that 
bolstered the promise of progress and the rational planning of the ideal 
social order that would result from it. In other words, the accelerated 
projection towards the future was backed up by the teleological promise 
that ... made it more supportable.137
Ashley offers ‘nonplace’ as the location for the expansion of both research and theory 
specifically on what he calls the ‘frontier’, ‘borderlines’, or the ‘margins’ between 
domestic and international, This, he argues, is the best position for post-structuralist 
theory because it focuses on the area he believes modern theory does not or cannot 
address. He attributes this to its apparent insistence on arguing from a set position or 
single historical perspective. Ashley, like Clark, suggests that that it is the rigidity of 
that boundary in academic study that is now hindering development:
135 Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, p. 38.
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An appropriate position of post-structuralist inquiry, I shall want to 
suggest, is really a ‘nonplace’, a boundary that it puts in question: the 
boundary between domestic and international politics. The analytic 
problem that post-structuralism might there take up, I shall want to 
indicate, is a problem that is intimately related to the imposition of just 
this boundary in history. It is the problem of the inscription o f a paradigm 
o f sovereign man as a central figure in modern narratives of politics.138
Rosenau focuses instead on a more traditional approach, but it nonetheless leads him 
to this same domestic/foreign divide. As well as the forces of ‘fragmengration’, he 
seeks to discuss the more traditional levels of analysis, but in the light of these 
movements. He also has a very concrete view of the politics o f the ‘frontier’. As well 
as identifying what he sees as the changes this brings to the global system, he discusses 
at length what this means for all levels within and between states. Taking the more 
traditional levels he expands on how they are affected; for example, he spends time on 
the concept o f the state and its ability to operate in this system and what states must 
deal with if they are to continue to be effective:
Cast in terms of the politics of the Frontier, all states share at least four 
major preoccupations that consume much o f the time o f their top 
officials. All of them are preoccupied with issues surrounding their 
sovereignty, both as it is challenged by fragmenting forces at home and by 
globalising forces at work aboard. Similarly, and relatedly, all states devote 
considerable energy to the preservation and enhancement of their 
authority over their increasingly articulate and analytically skilful citizens.
No less common to all states is a preoccupation with the integrity o f their 
borders and a felt need to police the human and nonhuman traffic that 
crosses them. Likewise, all states continuously work at steering their 
economies and societies along historical paths.139
He brings an understanding o f the different actors to the process and the ways in 
which their work and efforts will be changed by what he terms ‘epochal 
transformation’ in the ‘essential nature of human affairs’.140
Frontier 'moments'
This brings the argument being posed here to its focal point in terms of International 
Relations. Globalisation has forced theorists to examine their assumptions of the
138 Ashley, ‘Living on the Border lines’ in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds), International/Intertextual 
Relations, p. 260.
139 Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, p. 345.
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different actors and the systems in which they operate. The enmeshed assumptions 
about the division between the domestic and foreign, national and international, are 
being challenged by changes both in the state as it responds to its new circumstances 
and in the international system brought about by new technology and resulting 
changes in economic structures.
It is argued here that globalisation, or systemic transformation, occurs when the state 
and capitalist system are both undergoing related, but not contingent change. Care 
should be taken not to confuse the types or kinds of change so as to ensure that 
agency is not divorced from process. On the other hand, there is little point in 
attempting to ascertain causal links between the systems as they are so enmeshed as to 
make such distinctions impossible.
These moments of clash between domestic/foreign, internal/external and 
national/international are the result of a convergence o f ‘logics’. This provides an 
‘opening’ or a ‘porousness’ o f the political process in which is it possible for actors 
both in their domestic and international capacities to address a new range o f issues and 
previously settled understandings of the international system.
However, this also requires a domestic explanation from states and their leaders, 
especially in democratic countries where the ideas of citizenship and agency are most 
developed. For the UK in particular, this convergence has been most obvious at two 
specific points in its history. The first point of convergence is the end of the Industrial 
Revolution, as technology, the development of social science and the rise of a 
politicised public gave rise to a New Liberalism. The second point is the end of the 
twentieth century, and the onset of the de-industrial revolution when, again, 
technology and new concepts and discoveries in both the social and physical sciences 
combined with the rising agency of organised stakeholders and global audiences lay 
the foundation for the Third Way.
This particular domestic application of the consequences of globalisation or the 
development of a ‘politics o f the frontier’ has been recognised by Hill141 as well as 
others such as Jurgen Habermas:
The stand-off in the debate between the ‘parties’ of globalisation and 
territoriality has sparked attempts to find a ‘Third Way’. They branch off 
in two directions, toward a more or less defensive and a more or less 
offensive variant. One sets out from the premise that, if the forces of 
global capitalism, now that they have been unleashed, can no longer be
141 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p. 303.
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domesticated, their impact can be cushioned at the national level. The 
other pins its hopes on the transformative power of a supranational politics 
that will gradually catch up with runaway markets.142
Conclusion
International relations, as a predominantly Anglo-American discipline, has developed 
several core concepts which define its perspective on the state and its role as well as 
the international system in which it operates. To Realists, the state is an enclosed 
entity and timeless. It has certain powers and abilities and arenas in which it is 
considered to be at least the primary, if not the sole, actor. The
international/domestic divide continues to dominate analysis, although there are signs 
that attempts both within and outside the discipline have begun to have an impact. 
Finally, the discipline, given this embedded notion of a ‘divide’, does not deal well 
with the connection between theory and practice, as it finds it difficult to operate on 
both levels simultaneously.
Various strands of International Relations theory have challenged these assumptions, 
and while some have naturally developed into an integral part o f the discipline — e.g. 
Foreign Policy Analysis or interdependence theory — other areas remain as challenges.
The globalisation debate in its current form arguably presents such a challenge as it 
addresses the function and power of the state and the erosion of boundaries, as well as 
the number and type o f actors that have international significance. However, most of 
these issues are not particularly new. The discipline has adopted notions of 
interdependence as part of the ongoing debate, and others have made similar points 
from alternative perspectives, such as conflict resolution and gender.
However, globalisation, as understood here, is part of something much more 
fundamental or transformational. If this is a moment of transformation from one 
overall frame to another, i.e. from the modem to the global, globalisation is the result 
o f change in not one but all systems, which are not causal but linked.
This argument potentially has a significant impact on International Relations and is 
most related to arguments put forward by Clark. It impacts on the way in which states
142 Habermas, Jurgen. ‘The European Nation-State and the Pressures o f  Globalisation.’ The New Left 
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would be better understood as depending on, and shaping, each other rather than 
systems simply reacting to each other as more or less closed units.
The broader perspective of globalisation set out here requires a new understanding of 
how states evolve and how states at such differing levels of development interact in 
the international system. The boundary between the domestic and international will 
need to be re-examined for the way in which each sphere influences the other and 
the issue o f agency between international theory and domestic practice and the 
reverse.
The rest of the argument proposed rests on this approach to both globalisation and 
international relations. As global or international studies are generally ambitious and 
complicated, it is proposed to approach this problem from the domestic perspective in 
the form o f a comparison of New Liberalism and the Third Way as political responses 
to such moments of transformation.
This requires general thematic comparison between two periods o f time that are set 
out as potential examples with a view to setting out commonalities o f their analysis 
and approach. Each timeframe and its political response will then be examined in 
more detail for insights as to the drivers and consequences of change along this ‘great 
divide’
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Chapter 3
Transformation: 1880s and 1980s
The discussion of the previous two chapters suggests that something else may be at 
work at these two points in time. The wider globalisation debate has identified the 
current shift but seems flawed because of its underlying focus on economics (despite 
several authors who argue that this should be broadened) — an approach which 
overlooks important features of the phenomenon of globalisation.
It is also clear that the shifts or transformations inherent in globalisation are difficult 
for International Relations to deal with given the discipline’s tendency to view 
theories of sovereignty and statehood as completely separate from important domestic 
factors. The domestic/international boundary acts as a potential obstacle to observing 
patterns of behaviour by both states and individuals.
If it is correct to argue that something more fundamental is under way, the 
weaknesses in both the globalisation debate and the issues within International 
Relations should be viewed as almost inevitable. It is difficult to deal effectively with 
the international, let alone the global. Also, it should be assumed that such moments 
o f transformation are relatively infrequent occurrences and therefore more in the 
nature of a paradigm shift than part of everyday analysis.
It is argued here that systemic transformation can be prompted by but not limited to 
technological innovations that alter economic, social, culture and political spheres.
This type of transformative change is not caused by, or contingent on, change in one 
system or another but is simultaneous, and argued that it is the result o f a movement 
from one stage o f development to another in both the state and the economic system.
To investigate whether or not such a shift in the state helps explain these difficulties, 
and rather than attempt a global study, it is proposed to explore the idea of 
transformation through the domestic responses at two specific periods that are 
arguably such times of transformation. As stated, the domestic responses at the heart of 
the investigation will be New Liberalism and the Third Way — the thread being that if 
these political approaches are domestic responses to such change they should share 
similar features. It is an interesting aspect o f the current discussion that so many 
writers have already commented on the similarities between these two periods. From 
Blair and his advisers through to academic and media observers, a number o f themes 
emerge.
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Each domestic response will be examined in depth as the day-to-day political core of 
the structures that have been under discussion thus far. However, it is important to 
consider briefly the ideational link between the wider system and this more specific 
point of activity. Therefore, a brief outline of ideology and political theory will be set 
out, followed by a look at the potential areas of comparison between New Liberalism 
and the Third Way on two levels: first, in terms o f what are termed here their 
‘positional attitudes’; and, second, their ideological or political theory frame for 
policy.
Theory, ideology and practice
As already indicated, Europe historically operated on a relatively established regional 
system. The Church and monarchs provided the basis and crossed whatever 
boundaries might have existed. However, as that system broke down, states developed 
a sense of territory element, and a more secular, industrial frame. In the absence o f the 
Church and in the face o f the rise of the state came modem ideology — ‘modem ’ in as 
much as ideologies could not really exist until the state existed and the capitalist 
model o f the state did not arrive until the Industrial Revolution. Thus, political 
ideologies such as liberalism and socialism were bom  in the midst of political 
uncertainty, as direct reactions to the changes in economic and state structures.
The UK was particularly open to the full range of views, given that it was the first to 
develop a modernised economy and that many continental thinkers as well as native 
philosophers were engaged. In recent times, the UK’s level of activity in the global 
Third Way debate also suggests a role as a lead indicator of such change. The UK can 
be portrayed as not only the midwife of the capitalist system and the Industrial 
Revolution, but also well placed to be the hand that rocked the cradle o f modern 
political thought at these particular points in history. Therefore, it makes an excellent 
case study for the two periods in question.
It should be noted that while the argument here is that this shift has also happened in 
other European, western, ‘late-modern’ countries, it is not assumed that the exact 
dates used here would be direcdy applicable to other countries. It may also be 
interesting to investigate the domestic response to such change in non-western 
countries for the purposes of comparison.
The idea that ideologies are effectively a modem concept may also help to explain 
why the term has only relatively recendy come to be non-partisan. Daniel Bell in his
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book, The End of Ideology, explains that ideology was coined in the late eighteenth 
century by Destutt de Tracy as a means of investigating the ‘truth’, other than 
through the ideas of Church and state. Ironically, he and other Enlightenment 
thinkers were attempting to avoid ‘accidents of bias or distortions o f prejudice’ by 
going back to their point o f origin143 — ironic in the sense that, as Ian Adams suggests:
For most o f its controversial career as a concept, the word ‘ideology’ has 
implied some kind of false thinking, something we could all well do 
without ... Thus Marx saw ideology as distortions o f reality, ‘false 
consciousness’ in the interests of a particular social class ... increasingly 
scholars as well as politicians and journalists have taken to using the word 
... simply as a set of political beliefs about how society ought to be and 
how to improve it.144
This ideological ground is crucial to understanding the debates that reverberated 
throughout the end of the nineteenth century and why they have recurred at the turn 
o f the twentieth.
What, then, is an ideology? Simply, an ideology is a frame for political thought and 
action. A specific ideology takes a position on the nature of human beings and a 
vision o f the good fife and offers a method by which the state proposes to attain that 
ideal. It forms the crucial link between theory and political practice. Thus, is it 
important both to political theory and to practical politics. Again, Bell summarises this 
as ‘an historically located belief system that fused ideas with passion, sought to convert 
ideas into social levers, and in transforming ideas transformed people as well ... 
Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers.’145
To investigate ideology one should look at three points of agency: two players and 
the space they occupy. The first of the two payers is the individual who has two roles: 
an active role as participant and citizen and a reactive role in terms of what the state 
expects o f them. Similarly, the second player — the state — also has two roles: the 
primary one is its domestic capacity, though its international role is also important 
because, as we have seen, both faces o f the state are increasingly visible to the 
individual.
These two players are enmeshed; they depend on each other for legitimacy and 
stability. A crisis in one can precipitate a crisis in the other. Yet they are 
fundamentally different from the third point of agency, which is the space they
143 Bell, Daniel. The End o f Ideology, pp. 294-96.
144 Adams, Ian. Political Ideology Today. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, pp. 2-3 .
145 Bell, Daniel. The End o f Ideology, pp. xi, 400.
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occupy together, i.e. civil society or community. This is important because there are 
things that are not driven by either the individual or the state but by a collection of 
individuals outside the realm of the state — though it is also possible for the state to 
seek to change the community, while the community may seek to change the state 
(including its international actions).
Michael Freeden sets out three definitions o f ideology, highlighting the difficulty o f 
the link between action and theory. He also identifies what he calls the ‘cornerstones’ 
o f each ideology as they inevitably touch on other schools of thought. For example, 
one approach he suggests is to look at the problems ideologies are trying to address: 
‘Ideologies ... contend with the basic and shared problems: human nature, justice and 
redistribution, the relation between authority and liberty, the determination of the 
public interest, allegiance and social cohesion, to name some of the more central 
issues.’146 Alternatively, he suggests they can be compared by their ‘core concepts’ 
which create a series of ‘concentric circles’ forming a ‘core cluster’ of concepts and 
ideas, an ‘adjacent band and a peripheral one’.147 Finally, these concepts can be viewed 
as ‘finked units’.148
As Freeden points out, the priority and proximity of these concepts make up the 
differences between various political groupings, and identification can be complicated 
by the presence o f overlapping features. This is a problem that will be apparent in the 
comparison o f New Liberalism and the Third Way. ‘To regard ideologies as 
consisting o f a number of basic units, some shared, can account for the frequent 
overlap between different ideologies and do away with the type of boundary 
problems that mutually exclusive definitions o f ideology create.’149
To follow this process through, an ideology must start with a view of human nature. 
As Graham Wallas (1858—1932), a leading social reformer in the late nineteenth 
century put it:
The student of politics must, consciously or unconsciously, form a 
conception of human nature, and the less conscious he is of his 
conception the more likely he is to be dominated by i t . .. In the other 
sciences which deal with human activity this division between the study 
o f the thing done and the study of the being who does it is not found.150
146 Freeden, Michael. Liberalism Divided: A  Study in British Political Thought 1914—1939. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 3.
147 Ibid., p. 4
148 Ibid., p.5.
149 Ibid., p.6.
150 Wallas, Graham. Human Nature in Politics. London: Constable & Company, 1948, pp. 15-16.
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This model o f human nature must then be converted into political aspirations through 
some kind of idea of a ‘good society’:
Ideology is first o f all concerned with value; that is, how we ought to treat 
each other and live together in society. Ideologies offer rival visions o f the 
‘good society’, the morally best kind o f society for human beings to live 
in ... All ideologies have a conception of an ideal society, which 
embodies the values that the ideology promotes. And this is not just what 
is the best society for some people in a particular time of place, but what 
is best for human beings as such. To have view like this involves holding 
beliefs about human nature, such that only if human beings live in a 
certain way will they be fulfilled and their true potential flourish.151
And finally, the necessary link between theory and practice:
Ideology is, after all action-oriented ... This is what happened to 
exponents o f mid-Victorian Liberalism who fell into the common error of 
generalising one of its particular manifestations. A viable ideology 
necessitates a constant interplay between the abstract and the concrete to 
avoid the pitfalls of vanity or insignificance. Its principal components must 
at any time be detachable from the historical and political scene but thus 
freed only to be re-anchored to new sets of facts and events.152
Positional attitudes
Political debate has two dimensions. The most obvious element is what is actually 
said, be it policy statement or legislation. However, often a more important 
dimension to the discussion, and one which also attracts attention, is the positioning 
of such comments. While not direcdy about a specific issue or policy, this type of 
comment is important because it indicates an attitude towards the political climate to 
the audience. Such statements position a party vis-a-vis other parties as well as laying 
claim to political territory. They act as a framework within which more specific 
policy actions can be understood. They form the political narrative within which the 
debate is structured.
One of the most basic o f positional attitudes in politics, particularly for the centre — 
even the ‘radical centre’ — is the visual portrayal of politics either being o f the left or 
of the right. This spectrum originated at the time of the French Revolution. It 
differentiated the first and second estates of the aristocracy and the Church, who sat to
151 Adams, Political Ideology Today, p. 4.
152 Freeden, Michael. The New Liberalism: A n  Ideology o f Social Reform. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, 
p. 247.
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the right, from the third estate representing ‘the people’ (though very middle class) 
who opted to sit to the left. This idea of the ‘left’ being representative of ‘the people’ 
as opposed to ‘the establishment’ has carried through to current political debate.153
As David Marquand points out, this visual idea has also become ‘impregnated ... with 
assumptions derived from the Industrial Revolution’. This is relevant in terms o f New 
Liberalism and Third Way debates, as both have sought to ‘move beyond’ this 
spectrum. Like the original demarcation, parties o f the left are those of change and 
revolution, while the right is the party of reaction. Marquand suggests that this history 
carries the implication that the language of left and right means that the left is the 
party of the proletariat while the right is in favour o f the bourgeoisie. The cost of this 
map for the centre, he argues, is that the stark contrast between the defenders o f the 
people and the defenders of the status quo leaves the centre -  or the residing place of 
those who gradually moved towards social liberalism or liberal socialism — as lacking 
conviction. The centre is in favour of change but only in its weakest form, 
‘sympathetic to the exploited, but unwilling to wage war on the exploiters’.154
This crucial positional attitude provides the background for much o f New Liberalism 
and the Third Way. As movements of the centre, the transcendence of the left/right 
dilemma poses as least as much o f a problem for them as the ‘progressive’ one. It 
remains a dilemma that neither political age was truly able to resolve.
In the case of New Liberalism and the Third Way it is argued there are three 
important positional attitudes. Both:
1 Claimed to focus on the rational or pragmatic rather than the ideological — 
and set themselves out as a synthesis, beyond left and right, of political thought 
in the midst of uncertainty;
2 Self-consciously reached out to others in the political process and were more 
porous in that they reached well beyond their traditional political boundaries 
in terms of party allegiance and input into party policy (including the use of 
the media) to the point o f calling for an overall political realignment;
3 Actively portrayed themselves to be o f the left or progressive forces and sought 
to include the agendas o f a variety o f single-issue or ‘moral’ campaigns often 
related to social justice;
153 Donald Sassoon, Donald. One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth 
Century. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996, p. xxi.
154 Marquand, David. ‘Beyond Left and Right: The N eed for a N ew  Politics.’ New Times. Eds. Hall 
and Jacques. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1989, p. 373.
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4 Participated and encouraged debates that were not confined to the domestic 
agenda or even domestic players but issues that were being discussed across 
Europe and beyond. They also subscribed to the idealistic view that trade 
promoted peaceful relations between states.
Blair's territory
Tony Blair has been the most important contemporary purveyor o f these positional 
attitudes. Looking at the Third Way in retrospect, it is impressive to see the number 
o f others who provided not only coherence but consistency between these four 
messages (see further in Chapter Eleven). These concepts are clearly demonstrated in 
Blair’s seminal speech to the Fabian Society in 1995 on the fiftieth anniversary o f the 
1945 Government — also a media positioning statement.
It was in this speech that Blair pronounced himself to be ‘proud’ to be a ‘democratic 
socialist’ and redefined socialism with what became the famous hyphen, creating a 
new term: ‘social-ism’. These self-definitional examples are a part o f these attitudes. 
More importantly, Blair took the opportunity to reiterate history from the perspective 
of New Labour. This lengthy quote outlines the ideas that were to form the core of 
his approach:
Democratic socialism in Britain was indeed the political heir o f the radical 
Liberal tradition ... but with recognisable affinity when put next to its 
progressive liberal cousin ... The ‘progressive dilemma’ is rooted in the 
history of social and economic reform in Britain. Up to 1914 that history 
was defined by the Liberal Party’s efforts to adapt to working-class 
demands. This involved the gradual replacement of the classical liberal 
ideology based on non-intervention and ‘negative freedom’ with a credo 
of social reform and state action to emancipate individuals from the 
vagaries and oppressions of personal circumstance ... after the foundation 
o f the Labour Representation Committee in February 1900, working 
people were able to put new demands on the Liberal Party. These were 
the forces that were eventually to swamp them but for a time they found 
political manifestation inside that party in the rise of New Liberalism.
Radical liberals saw that the electorate was growing and changing, and 
realised that liberalism could only survive if it responded to these 
demands. The intellectual bridgehead was established by Flobhouse and 
others. They saw the nineteenth-century conception of liberty as too thin 
for the purposes of social and economic reform, so they enlarged it. They 
realised that theoretical liberty was o f little use if people did not have the 
ability to exercise it. So they argued for collective action, including state
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action, to achieve positive freedom, even if it infringed traditional laissez- 
faire liberal orthodoxy ... They did not call themselves socialists, though 
Hobhouse coined the term ‘liberal socialism’, but they shared the short­
term goals of those in the Labour Party — itself then not yet an avowedly 
socialist party ...
We must value the contribution of Lloyd George, Beveridge and Keynes 
and not just Atdee, Bevan or Crosland. We should start to explore our 
own history with fresh understanding and an absence of preoccupations 
... Part of that rediscovery is to welcome the radical left-of-centre 
tradition outside our own party, as well as celebrate the achievements of 
that tradition within it ... The New Liberals were people who were both 
liberals with a small ‘1’ and social democrats, also in lower case, living on 
the cusp of a new political age, transitional figures spanning the period 
from one dominant ethic to another ... J.A. Hobson was probably the 
most famous Liberal convert to what was then literally ‘new Labour’.155
Blair did not reposition the party by himself. Peter Mandelson, a close adviser to the 
Prime Minister, makes the same point: ‘New Labour does not accept the classic view 
of the ‘left-right’ divide ... New Labour is a new type o f politics. It is about building 
a new synthesis to which all of the centre and left can subscribe.’156 And others have 
come to this same conclusion. Some, such as Otto Newman, through the bald 
statement that ‘Pragmatism rules over ideology’.157 Others, such as Christopher 
White, in more complex version attributing the positioning o f the Third Way as a 
reaction to globalisation precisely so that this left/right or old-politics boundary can 
be broken:
Globalisation determines an agenda that, first and foremost, compels a set 
o f responses that are presented as unavoidable ... Such a stance allows 
New Labour to posit a move ‘beyond old boundaries between left and 
right altogether’ ... The New Labour orientation is, instead, ‘progressive’, 
because it embraces a new agenda that derives from new times ... this 
relocation holds out the opportunity o f ‘de-politicising’ politics.
‘Ideology’, in an age of globalisation, becomes a thing of the past: ‘[t]he 
era o f grand ideologies ... is over’. Emptied of ideological content, with
155 Blair, Tony. Let Us Face the Future -  the 1945 anniversary lecture. Fabian Pamphlet 571. The Fabian 
Society London, 1995, pp.4, 8, 11; Blair, Tony. New Britain: M y Vision o f a Young Country. London: 
Fourth Estate, 1996, p. 15.
156 Mandelson, Peter and Roger Liddle. The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver?. Faber and Faber. 
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157 Newman, Otto and Richard de Zoysa. The Promise of the Third Way: Globalization and Social Justice. 
Palgrave. Basingstoke. 2001, p. 7.
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its policies now seen as unavoidable, domestic politics are pursued in the 
‘national interest’.158
This new vision of British politics was greeted with scepticism and viewed as a kind 
o f derivative political theory or, perhaps worse, a repeat of previous political thought. 
Though the New Labour proponents of the Third Way made no attempt to suggest it 
was not without antecedents, and even stated their deliberate intention of a kind of 
historic reconciliation of the left, academics seemed unimpressed. For example, Alan 
Ryan in ‘Recycling the Third Way’ asserted that the Third Way ‘first showed up in 
British politics ninety-five years ago. At that point, and so far as it is coherent, it 
remains the ideology known as the New Liberalism ... The truth is that the third way 
is neither new labour as its admirers say, nor warmed-over Thatcherism, as its 
detractors say, but a reversion to a very old idea.’159
Similarly, Stuart White and Susan Giaimo in ‘New Labour and the Uncertain Future 
o f Progressive Politics’, seem to regret that New Labour has ‘ignored or dismissed’ the 
foundations laid by the New Liberals. In their view, New Labour made the mistake of 
thinking they needed to invent the Third Way rather than seeing that the ‘egalitarian 
social liberalism proposed by the New Liberals was, in fact, the original third way’.160
Michael Kenny and Martin Smith are more interested in the overall idea of 
realignment of the political left and the idea that New Labour has a mission to 
recreate a progressive coalition with other social and political forces. This, it is 
suggested, would ensure the exclusion of the Conservatives in the same way the 
divided left has aided the Conservatives throughout the last century. But they 
similarly seem unimpressed given that something being portrayed as new is, ‘in fact, 
rather old’. Taking what they regard as each claim separately, they track it back to 
what they see as the origins:
The claim to have transcended past squabbles and divisions, and the 
zealous imagination of a ‘new Britain’ about to be born can be detected as 
far back as Ramsay MacDonald and indeed have stemmed from the 
moralistic rhetoric of the ethical socialist tradition of the late nineteenth 
century (Bevir 1999). The claim to have transcended the past, to have 
moved beyond the constraints of ‘the British tradition’ and to be
158 W hite, Christopher. The Function, Significance and Limitations of 'Globalisation’ in the New Labour 
Discourse, p. 12.
159 Ryan, Alan. ‘Britain: Recycling the Third Way’. Dissent Spring 1999: 67-80.
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developing non-ideological solutions to contemporary problems is thus a 
rather old feature of British politics.161
It is Marquand who perhaps comes closer to the argument being made here by 
focusing on these political developments as a response to the social frame, not 
necessitated by, but drawn from capitalism:
This is still a world of multiple capitalisms, marked by sharp variations of 
structures, culture and performance ... The heaving, masterless, 
community-destroying global economy of the 1990s ... is uncomfortably 
close to that of the nineteenth century.162
He argues:
The New Liberals of the turn of the century sought to reconcile capital 
and labour, to moralise market relations, to achieve a just distribution of 
resources within a capitalist framework. Their project was based on the 
premise that this attempt was feasible as well as right, that capitalism was 
sufficiently flexible and productive for it to be reformed in such a way.163
However, as he points out, the idea that liberalism can be reconciled with socialism 
may be incorrect; the basic problem is: ‘If socialism was right, New Liberalism was 
wrong; if  New Liberalism was right socialism was unnecessary’.164
Political theory and policy frame
As well as the positional attitudes there are specific areas at the level o f political 
theory, or perhaps more accurately described as the defining features of a policy 
framework. They are not specific policy recommendations but they are the guiding 
principles that point towards policy determinations. These features act at the three 
points o f agency core to the basic definition and function of ideology. Four areas 
seem to stand out and warrant further exploration as part of the in-depth examination 
o f these responses:
1 At the level of the individual both New Liberalism and the Third Way focus 
on a notion o f duty or o f self-governing morality (often relying on a Christian 
approach) o f the individual and a strong link between rights and 
responsibilities in the form of a new social contract;
161 Kenny and Smith, ‘Interpreting N ew  Labour’, p. 236.
162 Marquand, David. The New Reckoning: Capitalism, States and Citizens. Cambridge: Polity Press,
1997, pp. 4 -5 .
163 Ibid., p. 74-75.
164 Ibid.
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2 This leads direcdy to a second area, which is crucial to both New Liberalism 
and the Third Way as it concerns the way in which individuals should be 
viewed in their community. Perceived social crises led both approaches to re­
examine the role of the individual within society towards a more organic 
model o f human nature. They argued that the values of community and 
mutuality are norms of social life and the drivers of individual motivation. 
They both grappled with an overt vision of what comprises the ‘good life’ or 
‘good society’;
3 The role o f the state, especially in its potentially declining potency as 
guarantor, at least of economic security, becomes that o f facilitator. So while 
New Liberalism contended with the creation o f a state system in terms of 
welfare and the Third Way was defending the state as a means of social 
benefit, they were both attempting to re-define the function of the state in a 
changing economic climate;
4 The global economic environment forced both the Third Way and New 
Liberalism to prepare for the global marketplace. For the Third Way, 
globalisation led to a need for competitiveness in all other areas o f government 
policy including education, and social welfare, while for New Liberalism the 
term was efficiency. Interestingly at both times all parties were discussing these 
ideas as a response to the pressure of international trade.
All four o f these areas seem to revolve around Freeden’s core concepts and the 
priorities given to each in terms of the differences between social liberalism and liberal 
socialism. The assumption at both periods of time would, in truth, be on the right, in 
that they were not seeking to overthrow the system — despite the rhetoric o f ‘Blair’s 
revolution’ — but sought instead to create gradual change. They were, in effect, 
attempting to create a counterweight to a system that had ‘gone too far’, at least to the 
extent that empirical evidence o f both timeframes indicated social breakdown.
Two transformational/progressive ideologies
Essentially, both New Liberalism and the Third Way start from a positive view of 
human nature. They both contend that the good life is one in which the responsible, 
self-reliant individual is generally left to create a life for themselves without too much 
interference from the state. They also both see the community as the core of the life 
o f the individual and therefore strive to use the state to shore it up. Duty forms a 
fundamental part of both the rights and responsibilities o f the individual and the state
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in their relationship to each other. It is essentially a three-cornered balance between 
the individual and the community and the state.
Robert Skidelsky argues that the debate for the Third Way has been between the 
social liberals (led by Blair) and the social democrats (led by Gordon Brown) and that 
Giddens would be found on the social liberal side of the equation; and further, that 
Giddens argues that the ‘double-edged consequence o f modernity’ is the release of old 
ties but that this brings with it a breakdown in the social fabric. This breakdown 
requires a new ‘social contract’, and while inclusion is very high on their agenda for 
state action, it has largely taken the place of equality in what was the old-left 
perspective o f the individual. Skidelsky suggests that in this view, ‘The state should 
not be seen as a top-down provider o f welfare but an “enabler” of communal action 
... Social liberal language has litde contact with past socialist and social democratic 
language harking back, if anywhere to the New Liberalism o f the late nineteenth 
century.’165
In the previous period of change, these same two strands were labelled as Fabian 
socialism and New (or social) Liberalism. Again, while not arguing for any kind of 
radical overthrow of the state, they both argued in favour of a version of the state that 
moved on from what was termed ‘the night-watchman state’ to a more proactive 
social policy and the development of a welfare system — though they argued this point 
from two different models of society, as will be shown.166
Leonard Hobhouse, considered pivotal between nascent socialism and New 
Liberalism, demonstrates the original formulation o f the Giddens notion when he 
clearly argues that the government and the state should not ‘feed, house or clothe its 
citizens’ but should ‘secure conditions upon which its citizens are able to win by their 
own efforts all that is necessary to a full civic efficiency’.167
The New Liberals and the Third Way both looked towards the continent as well as 
standing apart from it. W olf quotes Friedrich Hayek:
For over two hundred years English ideas had been spreading eastward.
The rule of freedom which had been achieved in England seemed
destined to spread throughout the world. By about 1870 the reign of
these ideas had probably reached its easternmost expansion. From then
165 Skidelsky, Robert. ‘Five Years’ Labour’. Prospect May 2002: 22-26, p. 25.
166 Driver, Stephen and Luke Martell. New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
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onward it began to retreat, and a different set of ideas, not really new but 
very old, began to advance from the East. England lost her intellectual 
leadership in the political and social sphere and became an importer of 
ideas. For the next sixty years Germany became the centre from which 
ideas destined to govern the world in the twentieth century spread east 
and west ... Although most of the new ideas, and particularly socialism, 
did not originate in Germany, it was in Germany that they were perfected 
and during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first quarter o f the 
twentieth century that they reached their fullest development.168
Thus, New Liberalism and the Third Way could be argued to be firmly part of the 
Anglo-Saxon model within the English tradition of the ‘weak state’ (the New Liberals 
were arguing for a more active state but they were careful not to suggest that the 
liberties already gained should be weakened), taking some ideas from Europe but in 
both timeframes not using European approaches — nor did the traditional European 
left have the sense that there was much on offer either from New Liberalism or the 
Third Way, as will be discussed in Chapters Nine and Twelve.
New Liberalism and the Third Way compared
As domestic political philosophies created in the face of massive change, New 
Liberalism and the Third Way have a number of similar features.
They were both developed by an educated elite o f their day, which had regular 
contact within their own group, not only through politics but a range o f other 
involvements, business, social and political.
In a striking difference, the liberal ‘modernisers’, or New Liberals, did not enjoy the 
initial support of the leadership of the Liberal Party, though it could be said that just 
after the turn o f the century they had more direct political influence with Lloyd 
George and a selection o f MPs elected on a more overt New Liberal platform. In 
contrast, the Third Way was developed as core to the platform and campaigning 
efforts of not only the leader but of the entire leadership team of the Labour Party.
Arguably, this consistency was necessary in the twentieth century given the greater 
reliance on electronic media for communication with the electorate and therefore the 
higher likelihood of any inconsistency being highlighted by the press. However, the 
New Liberals suffered for their lack o f support, not least as it was indicative of the
168 W olf, Why Globalisation Works, p. 106.
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general division of the party. There was no binding consensus as to the analysis or 
approach to the issues. Their influence was diffused through newspaper articles, 
journals, associations and academia for most of their development, with little or no 
focus on the business of politics.
Economic and social change had inevitable electoral repercussions. New Liberalism 
and the Third Way were faced a new voting public. The enfranchisement of the 
working classes shifted the entire democratic frame of Britain towards a representative 
democracy. For the first time there was something that the lower classes could do to 
make their case heard in the political arena. A general class-consciousness entered civil 
society. The New Liberals attempted to include the newly enfranchised working class 
as part of their efforts to broaden state legitimacy. The Third Way had a similar 
problem as their electorate was also changing due to the shift away from 
manufacturing to service industries. They were both attempting to win over a new 
‘class’ o f voter. Ironically, New Liberals were trying to move towards the new 
working class while the Third Way was trying to move towards the new middle class, 
but both approaches were working towards a majority of the left — and both moves 
created internal party struggles.
To achieve this working majority, or ‘progressive coalition’, meant that both New 
Liberalism and the Third Way were also trying to expand their appeal. New Liberals 
worked with the emerging socialists and won over some traditional conservatives, and 
the Third Way deliberately sought to create a ‘big tent’ of opinion and support from 
others in a range o f arenas to join their cause. For the Third Way it was an attempt to 
reconcile the ‘great divorce’ that the New Liberals and the nascent Labour Party 
created when they failed to create such a grouping in their first attempt.
This domestic pressure created a number of issues for both approaches. The newly 
enfranchised or globalised individual in these two timeframes created issues as their 
increased participation led to questions as to state legitimacy. If the state did not 
represent the people, the question being posed by the collectivist movement or the 
wider revolutionary and anarchist movement that influenced an undercurrent of 
political thought at the end of the nineteenth century, was: how can the state be 
changed to better reflect the people? At the end of the twentieth century, this tension 
is created by the anti-globalisation protestors in their case against corporate and often 
state power, or, at the other end, by those promoting global governance structures. 
While these two perspectives are very different they have a common idea that the 
individual has a role to play in politics at the international level. States are arguably
86
domestic players writ large, and international civil society is, or could be made up of, 
individuals and groups operating in the same ‘larger’ fashion.
New Liberals and the Third Way responded by attempting to redefine both the role 
o f the state and ideas of state sovereignty. The New Liberals were faced with a 
growing electoral pressure to abandon the idea of the ‘night watchman’ state and 
adopt a more proactive position that involved shifting from a negative idea o f freedom 
to a positive concept of promoting the welfare, if not the well-being of the individual. 
The Third Way also redefined the state, initially towards what it called an ‘enabling 
state’ and then developed even further to the ‘ensuring state’169 domestically.
Government was destined to ‘steer, not row’ and a system of rights and responsibilities 
built on a firm and moral community would create a structure in which individuals 
were protected to a certain degree but encouraged to be self-sufficient and prepared 
for the competitive marketplace. The state would ensure a basic level of services, but 
not at the expense of the marketplace. Blair in particular also sought to redefine 
sovereignty towards a more collective, cooperative model based on their ideas of 
community but placed in the international arena, (see Chapter Eleven)
External pressure forced both the Third Way and New Liberalism to re-examine their 
understanding o f Britain’s position and economic power in the world. Depression and 
the imposition of tariffs by other countries created unemployment and hardship that 
New Liberals had to deal with. The pressure of globalisation made it increasingly 
difficult to for the Third Way to ensure domestic economic growth and thus a mantra 
o f efficiency and competitiveness became a common language for all political parties 
at both periods.
Conclusion
At the end of the nineteenth century the British state had come through a period of 
laissez-faire economics, democratisation o f the population through wider 
enfranchisement and modernisation of technology on an unprecedented scale. This 
resulted in social upheaval and an electoral crisis for the dominant political power. All 
political actors within the state were attempting to reconcile open borders with social 
justice within. This led to a novel political debate, involving many o f the same 
thinkers and political actors but evolving into a discussion between the New Liberals
169 Giddens Progressive Manifesto 2003
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and the growing socialist movement. This debate produced an organic model of 
society that placed individuals at the centre of their community and new roles for 
both the individual and the state in terms of rights and responsibilities
At the end of the twentieth century this pattern repeated itself, after various financial 
crises amongst states that forced them to conclude that they were unable, in effect, to 
conduct their economies on an isolated or purely ideological basis. The 1980s was a 
period o f rapid economic liberalisation — not only in the UK and resulted in a 
worldwide debate on globalisation. At the end of the decade, the collapse of 
Communism was seen by the left (used deliberately in the older sense of the term) as a 
crisis o f confidence. Socialism in all its forms was called into question, prompting a 
debate as to the legitimacy and role of the state.
The basic premises of socialism were called into question, reopening discussions 
around the state, the community and the individual — not least as the left was facing 
potential electoral meltdown as it was so attached to older, outmoded models of 
society. This re-examination of political purpose and ideology and the Third Way 
was bom  of the conjunction of crisis both on the international ideological and 
domestic electoral level.
The themes set out here are indicative of the areas that will be investigated as we 
proceed to the domestic responses to these two specific periods. First, if it is going to 
be possible to identify the changes within various inter-related systems, it will be 
useful to have a better understanding of the basic historical reference points for these 
changes. This will lead into a detailed discussion o f the positional attitudes and 
defining features of the ideology of New Liberalism. Finally, this will be followed by 
the context of the modem political debate, focused on ‘endings’ and the development 
in the UK of the Third Way.
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Chapter 4
Moving into the 'modern' at the end of the nineteenth 
century
It has been argued that there have been two periods of transformation: first as the UK 
shifted from the pre-modem to the modem during the period from the end of the 
nineteenth century to the First World War; and second from the modem to the 
‘global’ during a period from approximately the late 1980s to the current day.
This not an historical analysis but an exploration of the changes at these times with a 
view to assessing whether or not they warrant the conclusion that they represent a 
fundamentally different category of change. Specifically, this chapter will focus on the 
first of Rosenau’s two ‘epochal transformations’ evident from the late nineteenth 
century to the Great War and the process o f ideological development that produced 
New Liberalism and laid the foundations for what would split to become the Labour 
Party and finally the Third Way.
Industrial Revolution as globalisation
The event o f the Industrial Revolution is dated somewhere around 1750/60, but the 
phrase ‘Industrial Revolution’ was not coined until 1837 by a French writer, J.A. 
Blanqui.170 It was popularised in Britain in 1884 by the social reformer, Arnold 
Toynbee (1852—83), in his book The Industrial Revolution in England, published after 
his death and about the same time that the term ‘global’ came into use. Like 
globalisation, for Toynbee and others the Industrial Revolution was not a single 
change but many. It was ‘a convenient name for the group of events’,171 or ‘a label of 
convenience. It includes a complex of changes — technical, economic, social and 
political’.172
Separate but simultaneous change is key to this argument on the grounds that it is not 
economic factors alone that create transformation but changes in economic systems 
combined with a much broader range o f social, intellectual and political change affecting
170 Briggs, Asa and Daniel Snowman, eds. Fins de Sikle: How Centuries End 1400-2000. N ew  Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996, p. 175.
171 Derry, T.K. A  Short Economic History o f Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 63.
172 Smith, Wilfred. A n  Historical Introduction to the Economic Geography of Great Britain. London: G. Bell 
& Sons, 1968, p. I l l
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both the state and the individual in society. The phrase ‘Industrial Revolution’ was 
used in a similar vein. Whatever the terminology, the late nineteenth century was a 
time o f modernisation, liberalisation and democratisation.
'Golden age' to decline
Ian Bradley identifies the specific timeframe of 1850-1910 as the ‘golden age’ of 
liberalism173 as Britain was moving towards a ‘fully fledged, formal mass democracy’.174 
The predominant laissez-faire economic theories of the early part of the century were 
under pressure and a more interventionist relationship was being developed ‘between 
the state and social forces in society’. Held et al identifies this period as beginning in 
the 1880s, but suggests that the period through to the 1920s was ‘formative’ for 
‘modem democracy and the interventionist state.’175
In almost identical terms to those later used by Giddens, Wallas commented on 
‘progress’ as he looked back from his vantage point in 1932:
During the last hundred years the external conditions of civilised life have 
been transformed by the series of inventions which have abolished the old 
limits to the creation of mechanical force, the carriage of men and goods, 
and communication by written and spoken words. One effect of this 
transformation is a general change of social scale. Men find themselves 
working and thinking and feeling in relation to an environment, both in 
its worldwide extension and its intimate connection with all sides of 
human existence is without precedent in the history of the world.176
The international reach of the UK had quadrupled through its expanding Empire, 
bringing not only wealth but also the troubles of the world to its door. Again, Wallas 
comments in a way that could be an echo of any modem anti-globalisation protester, 
and is equally reminiscent of Giddens’ own definition o f globalisation as ‘action at a 
distance’ when he says:
Every member of the Great Society, whether he be stupid or clever, 
whether he have the wide curiosity of the bom politician and trader, or 
the concentration on what he can see and touch of the bom craftsman, is 
affected by this ever-extending and ever-widening nexus. A sudden 
decision by some financier whose name he has never heard may, at any
173 Bradley, Ian. The Strange Rebirth o f Liberal Britain. London: Chatto & Windus -  The Hogarth Press, 
1985, p. 75.
174 McLennan, Gregor, David Held and Stuart Hall eds. State and Society in Contemporary Britain. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, p. 8.
175 Ibid.
176 Wallas, Graham. The Great Society: A  Psychological Analysis. London: Macmillan, 1932, p. 3.
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moment, close the office or mine or factory in which he is employed and 
he may either be left without a livelihood or be forced to move with his 
family to a new centre.177
Political debate reflected this turmoil. The legitimacy of politicians, politics and the 
state was placed under the spotlight by the expanding franchise. Existing political 
groupings were fluid and the debate focused on the role of the state in relation to its 
citizens. As the electorate expanded and its social context changed, political parties 
sought to identify with their supporters by creating revised or entirely new platforms. 
The Liberal Party was divided but attempting to create a new majority o f the working 
and middle classes while the labour movement sought to reconcile their small-1 liberal 
views with collectivist, individualist and revolutionary ideas coming from the 
continent. This first ‘frontier moment’ effectively created New Liberalism from the 
dominant party and the Labour Party from the collectivist activities, while ultimately 
rejecting more extreme forms of political ideology.
Politicians and theorists o f all kinds discussed these shared questions. However, their 
differences over basic values as to the individual and the state ultimately split the left. 
This schism created the situation in which between 1918 and 1997 the Labour Party 
enjoyed a working majority in the House of Commons (defined as ten seats or more 
over all other parties) for only nine years, whereas the Conservatives held such a 
majority for fifty-nine years.
This was the ‘great divorce’ that was deemed central to the Third Way project in 
philosophical terms, though it was clear in both cases that it would be in the electoral 
interests of the parties of the left to unite. Electoral victory was not enough to 
overcome philosophical differences.
The period under consideration is approximately 1880-1913. A number o f trends 
were evident by the end of the nineteenth century: the beginning o f the rise of 
competition from other rapidly industrialising states, particularly Germany and the 
US; the waning of free trade across Europe, with an increase of protectionist tariffs; 
changes in perception o f the Empire — all shaped by the first Great Depression of the 
1870s. There was another crisis of employment in the late 1880s, and further labour 
unrest and a downturn in the economy just after the turn of the century, which 
fuelled the protectionist debate, but neither compared to the total and global impact 
of this depression.
177 Ibid., p. 4.
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Socialism as a political ideology was not very popular at the beginning of this period 
but as the economy went through various crises unions and working men’s groups 
gained members and were able to apply more organised pressure. Meanwhile thinkers, 
from economists and biologists to budding sociologists, were drawing conclusions as 
to the nature of society and the state. As H.M. Croome and R.J. Hammond put it:
Thus ... a number of influences — political, technical, commercial — were 
converging ... so about 1870-80 we find all working to bring about a 
new Imperialism, a whole new set of widely differing forces; falling prices 
and depression at home, economic nationalism in Europe and the 
stimulus of the new colonial rivalry o f France and Germany; transport 
improvement of every kind, from the Suez Canal to the compound- 
expansion engine; improvements in metallurgy; and the forces of growth 
in the colonies themselves.178
Why 1880?
Specific events are an obvious way of looking at the narrative o f a particular time. 
Sometimes events alone cannot illustrate the pervasiveness o f change unless they are 
placed in context. Fundamental economic structural shift meant that there was a 
massive movement away from an agrarian to an urban lifestyle with the incipient 
poverty and overcrowding that created. There was, at the same time, a great 
blossoming of both practical inventions and discoveries in medicine and new thinking 
in what would now be called the social sciences. This knowledge was disseminated 
for the first time through new means of communication and influenced the economy 
and affected the social conditions and attitudes of the population. This, in turn, had a 
significant impact on the political framework of society as politicians and theorists felt 
compelled to respond to these changing circumstances.
Individualism had combined with a laissez-faire approach to produce a strong 
economic performance and rapid development in Britain. There is litde doubt that by 
the 1870s and 1880s it had become a liberal state believing, as it did, in ‘freedom of 
speech and association, religious freedom and freedom of the press’. John Davis 
considers these to be so well accepted as to be ‘virtually beyond discussion by the 
1870s’.179
178 Croome, H.M. and R.J. Hammond. A n  Economic History of Britain. London: Christophers, 1938, p. 
254-55.
179 Davis, John. A  History o f Britain, 1885-1939. N ew  York: St Martin’s Press, 1999, p. 1.
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A slightly longer list, though with a similar conclusion, is provided by George 
Dangerfield in his classic work, The Strange Death o f Liberal England:
The Englishman of the ’70s and ’80s was really a liberal at heart. He 
believed in freedom, free trade, progress, and the Seventh 
Commandment. He also believed in reform. He was strongly favour of 
peace — that is to say he liked his wars to be fought at a distance and, if  
possible, in the name of God. In fact, he bore his Liberalism with that air 
o f respectable and passionate idiosyncrasy which is said to be typical of his 
nation.180
It was clearly to be a ‘period of transition’181 as the reforming instincts and inclusive 
aspirations that gave liberalism a benign appearance were precisely those that created 
the changes that would alter the most basic structures o f the country in a relatively 
short period of time. As Helen Merrell Lynd put it:
As some periods of history show rapid changes in inventions or 
technological advance so in others changes in thought and social attitudes 
become suddenly apparent. The decade o f the eighties in England was 
such a time; between its beginning and its close, an ideology half a 
century old yielded to a new phrasing of social problems and an effort to 
find new paths to their solution. England, from James Mill to Herbert 
Spencer, thought it had mastered the conditions o f freedom by defining 
them negatively. England in the eighties was facing the problem of how 
to create positive conditions of freedom as we must face it today.182
The franchise was extended first to the middle class (1832) and then artisans (1867) 
labourers (1884) and finally women (1918), though the long-term consequences of 
these actions on the political structure were unclear. Waves of immigrants were 
arriving in an ill-prepared London; an economic downturn starting in 1875 led to 
labour disputes and strikes throughout the 1870s and ’80s as well as overcrowding and 
hardship, particularly in London.
By 1880 the doctrine of laissez-faire — the preaching o f non-intervention 
as the supreme duty of the State, internally as well as externally — seems to 
have passed. It had not only been undermined by the literary prophets: 
facts themselves were against it ... By 1880 Green is lecturing in Oxford 
on The Principles of Political Obligation, and arguing that the State must 
intervene to remove all obstacles which impeded the free moral 
development of its citizens ... if we take a rough line of division, the
180 Dangerfield, George. The Strange Death o f Liberal England. N ew  York: Capricorn Books, 1961, p. 7.
181 Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, p. 206.
182 Merrell Lynd, Helen. England in the 1880s: Toward a Social Basis for Freedom. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1945, pp. 17-18.
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difference between the generation before and the generation after 1880 is 
profound.183
Interestingly from the point of view o f this argument, Held and his colleagues, now 
engaged in the Third Way globalisation debate, have examined this period in terms of 
domestic politics. They make overt the link between the national political situation 
and the wider economic one:
The fact that ‘democracy’ did come is therefore read as a sign that the 
system can be reformed. Economic wealth and power can be separated 
from political power. The economy does not entirely determine the 
nature o f the state. Those political or social rights can be ‘enfranchised’, 
without toppling the whole class system. Or, as T.H. Marshall, one of the 
foremost exponents of this reformist, liberal-democratic perspective, 
would say, ‘the capitalist class system can be abated without destroying 
capitalism as such’. The period 1880 to 1920 thus saw the great 
reconciliation between Capitalism and Democracy.184
Economic context
The assertion that this period of transformation is somehow comparable to the current 
phase of globalisation, requires some basic context. By 1800, Europeans controlled 35 
per cent o f the land area of the world; by 1878 this was 67 per cent.185 Given the 
advances in terms of both information and health care, the population of Europe 
more than doubled during the course of the nineteenth century, from 200 million to 
430 million.186 (See Appendix A — economic context.)
In retrospect, the Great Exhibition of 1851 seemed to denote the opening o f a period 
that marked out the UK as the world’s pre-eminent trading power. Its claim to be 
‘the workshop of the world’ seemed unassailable. The financial reforms initiated by 
Sir Robert Peel and consolidated and extended by Gladstone and others between 
1852, and particularly between 1859 and 1866 completed the free-trade marketplace 
in the UK. France and Britain lowered tariffs in 1853 and in 1857 the US reduced its 
tariffs by 25 per cent. The high watermark of free trade in Europe seems was 
represented by the Cobden—Chevalier treaty with France in 1860.
183 Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, pp. 20-21, 23.
184 McLennan, Held and Hall, eds., State and Society in Contemporary Britain, p. 9.
185 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, p. 176.
186 Briggs and Daniel, eds. Fins de Sikle, p. 164.
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The perception of both ‘progress’ and ‘peace’ were consciously linked through the 
idea of free trade to the extent that a few weeks before the opening of the great 
Exhibition the Prince Consort held it out as a symbol of universal unity. In a speech 
at Mansion House he said: ‘We are living at a period of most wonderful transition, 
which tends rapidly to accomplish that great end to which all history points — the 
realisation of the unity of mankind.’187
This mood was reflected in the press. The Edinburgh Review, in a review of the 
Exhibition’s official catalogue, described it as ‘to seize the living scroll o f human 
progress, inscribed with every successive conquest of man’s intellect’.188 The morning 
of its opening was described by The Times as ‘the first morning since the creation of 
the world that all peoples have assembled from all point of the world and done a 
common act’.189 ‘This mood, which seems almost to have been born in 1851, lasted 
for the next twenty years.’190
If 1851 was the opening of a twenty-year heyday in British trade and power, the three 
decades starting with the 1870s, and even into the early years o f the next century, 
were spent dealing with the impact of its decline. The crop failure in 1873 was the 
first of five bad summers which, combined with the drop in prices due to cheaper 
international long-distance transport, damaged the agricultural market. The 
continuous wet weather led to the loss of three million sheep to rot by 1879. There 
seemed to be no way to recoup losses from one year to the next for British farmers.
In terms o f industry and commerce, the UK’s main competitors began to focus on 
their industrial base. The UK had enjoyed a first-mover advantage, but this meant that 
it did not take as long for others to catch up. Germany particularly pursued rapid 
industrialisation, following the British model, and with more state support. As 
indicated, cheaper long-distance transport as well as other technological developments 
in navigation caused a sharp drop in costs and thus in the prices of basic items. This 
badly affected the UK as its economy was largely based on commodities, such as coal, 
iron, steel, wool and cotton, as well as on the export trade, which left it vulnerable to 
international price fluctuations.
187 Thomson, David. England in the Nineteenth Century (1815-1914). Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1950, p. 103.
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The collapse of the Viennese stock market in 1873 was the final tipping point for the 
‘Great Depression’ which quickly spread through Europe and to the US — ‘the most 
serious depression of the nineteenth century’.191 It reached its climax in 1876—77 
when ‘industry stood still and labour walked the streets idle and discontented’.192
It was the German response to the depression that ultimately destroyed the European 
free trade consensus. Germany had, for some time, been developing a single customs 
union — Zollverein — that allowed for free trade internally but created external barriers. 
Started in 1818, by 1844 it included nearly all of the German states and Austria, 
supporting the industrial base of Germany. Bismarck’s secret deals with southern 
German states and the Netherlands were instrumental in carrying the southern states 
into the new parliament in 1867 on the back of a wave of popular opinion,193 paving 
the way for a united Germany by 1871.194
At the time of the depression Germany was just coming out of a war that had drained 
its economic resources.195 Many businesses and industries failed and those that 
continued began to create goods that were less than satisfactory. For example, at the 
World Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876 the German exhibits were deemed to be 
‘cheap and bad’.196 In contrast to the UK, Germany had no overseas possessions, ‘save 
for one Pacific island, before 1884; the colonies they did secure, arriving somewhat 
late in the day, were comparatively small and poor’.197 This meant it had litde access 
to markets and no guaranteed oudet for its increasingly low quality goods. Bismarck, 
for both internal and external reasons, secured a majority in the Reichstag in 1879 for 
protectionist measures and attempted to join the international ‘scramble’ for territory. 
The size of the Zollverein meant those protectionist measures had a significant impact 
on the rest of Europe.
Germany was not alone. Others amongst the UK’s main competitors also combined 
rapid industrialisation with protectionism. France raised tariffs in 1878 to protect its
191 Lambi, Ivo Nikolai. Free Trade and Protection in Germany 1868-1879. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 
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194 G. Barraclough. The Origins o f Modern Germany. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962; Grant, A.J and 
Harold Temperley. Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Longmans, 1927; Taylor, A.J.P. 
Bismarck: the Man and the Statesman. Arrow Books, 1961.
195 Harbutt Dawson, Protection in Germany, p. 28.
196 Lambi, Free Trade and Protection in Germany 1868-1879, p. 74.
197 Foot, M .R .D . British Foreign Policy Since 1898. London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1956, p. 
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newly developing industries,198 followed by the Meline tariff in 1892.199 Similarly, the 
US, though preoccupied with the Civil War between 1861 and 1865, had been a 
free-trading state supporting the southern agricultural interest, but raised its tariffs in 
1861 and again in 1890.200 Russia, not truly industrialised until the end of the century, 
raised its tariffs in 1877 in an attempt to protect fledgling industries. Tariffs also rose in 
Sweden, Italy and Spain during the 1880s and 1890s and in Latin America throughout 
the last part of the nineteenth century.201 ‘Tariff building has always been 
infectious.’202
The depression lasted until 1879, though there was another slump in the mid-1880s 
leading to riots of the unemployed in the last three years of the decade and again 
between 1902 and 1904. The effect of the breakdown of the free trade consensus 
(though importantly not abandoned by the UK) combined with serious failures in 
agriculture, prompted a re-evaluation in Britain and elsewhere of the importance and 
economic role o f overseas territories as potential guaranteed markets.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, most of the empires of 
European states were in place; the great subcontinent of India was already 
the most important possession of the most important empire. Ironically, at 
about the same time that new nation-states were emerging in Europe, 
with the creation of Germany and Italy, imperialism abroad was 
intensifying. This is the period, as Michael Doyle has observed, that ‘is 
associated with the full transfer of rights of sovereignty (usually marked by 
either treaty or conquest)’ to the governing imperial state; it is usually 
dated from the 1880s and the scramble for African possessions. In only a 
few decades the state-nation would be destroyed in Europe proper, and 
with it the Concert of European states that had maintained peace.203
As various industries began to pay the cost, disputes and militancy spread across the 
UK, being influenced from the continent. This increased pressure on the system 
stimulated a response in other areas both domestically and internationally as social 
problems came under close analysis — and closer public attention.
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Time and space
Often, in current discussions of globalisation, the basis for many claims is the presence 
o f rapid change in all dimensions of society. In particular, almost all debates discuss the 
sense that both time and space have been altered. Even this brief survey of events 
indicates that change was at least as fast, if not comparatively faster, at this time. 
Comparatively faster in the sense that it seems logical to suggest that the sensation of 
going effectively from isolated small rural settings to accessing a global network of 
communication and interaction would produce more of a shift, or shock, than going 
from a global network to a faster global network, arguably the case today.
Transport, communication, daily work, life and social interaction were all 
fundamentally changed by the new economy. The railway was a key feature of that 
change. Commercial and leisure travel were fundamental to the new economy. As 
Black puts it, ‘Trains became the icon of the new age. They cut times for both 
passengers and freight and had a powerful psychological impact. Space had been 
conquered.’204
As well as the impact the railway had in terms of transport, the creation of a national 
rail network also forced other issues such as the standardisation o f time. It seems odd 
looking back, but there had been no need for a shared sense o f time if people did not 
travel far or travelled only by foot or by horse. However, the railways created a need 
for time itself to be commonly understood. So both space and time were beginning to 
work in concert, if  not for the benefit of the people, at least for the benefit of the 
economy. Time was also therefore conquered. (See Appendix A -  technology.)
Communication as a driver
Much in the same way in which Giddens consistendy indicates that one o f the 
primary drivers of globalisation is the speed of communication, the turn o f the 
nineteenth century also experienced a huge leap in speed of contact. Crowded cities 
and the rail network provided a ready and easily reached public; an entire empire was 
connected by cable. The repeal of the stamp duty on paper in 1855 and the relief of 
the excise duty on paper in 1860 meant that global communication was technically 
possible and, for the first time, affordable.
204 Black, Jeremy. A  New History of England. Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2000, p. 178.
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The new mass readership brought newspapers into their element. (See Appendix A — 
newspapers.) A range of specialist papers and publications were also made affordable, 
from the journal of the Rainbow Circle, The Progressive Review, started in 1896, to the 
various papers such as The Miner started in 1887 (known as Labour Leader by 1889) to 
The Link and The Labour Elector, both started in 1888 as papers of the working class. 
There were also a small number of papers that were written or edited in England for 
consumption in other countries.
Finally, a special place should also be attributed to the Manchester Guardian. Being at 
the geographic heart of the first wave of industrialisation, particularly textiles, as well 
as coal and agriculture,205 this region played a significant role in the debates of this 
period — and was staunchly Liberal. Its heritage included the activities of Robert 
Owen (1771 — 1858) who started in Manchester, the foundation of the Anti-Corn 
Law League in 1839, the embryonic Trades Union Congress in 1868 and the 
formation of the Cooperative Wholesale Society in 1886, not to mention the 
‘Manchester School’ (see Chapter Six).
C.P. Scott was the editor of the Manchester Guardian for fifty-seven years from 1871, 
and an MP from 1895 to 1906. He hired both L.T. Hobhouse and J.A. Hobson to 
work for him and took controversial stands. The paper became a focal point for the 
New Liberals as well as progressive and reformist politics.
The British population was more literate and educated than ever before, and now 
linked by modem communications and a national press. These changes in the press 
were symptomatic of the modernisation o f the country. One of the many ways in 
which Victorian London was at the centre of English fife and that o f the empire was 
through the provision of news. Through its press, which lay claim to the title of the 
‘fourth estate’ of the realm, London created the image and idiom of empire and 
shaped its opinion. Aside from this political function, the press also played a central 
economic, social and cultural role, setting the spreading fashions, whether of company 
statements or theatrical criticism.
The repeal of tax on advertising in 1853 also paved the way for the first global brands 
by the end of the 1880s. Household names like Heinz, Coca-Cola, Campbell Soup 
and Singer expanded into other countries. J. Walter Thompson became the first 
advertising agency to open outside its country of origin.206 In what was increasingly a
205 Smith, A n  Historical Introduction to the Economic Geography o f Great Britain, p. 117.
206 Scholte, Globalisation: A  Critical Introduction, pp. 67-68.
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commercial society, the press played a pivotal role, inspiring emulation, setting the 
tone, providing information and forming opinions for its mass readership.
The impact of the papers cannot be underestimated. If these papers had been 
dominated by local news it would not be possible to argue this represented a shift, but 
it seems clear the most widely read papers provided a resource for both domestic and 
international information. The new media also provided a means to disseminate 
information about the social conditions and, by providing an overview, enabled 
activism. The cadre of reformers, investigative journalists and academics took 
advantage of this new voice and created ‘modern’ social awareness and reform 
campaigns. The Fabian Society, the Extension Movement (see further below) and the 
Setdement Movement207 and religious and political organisations began to draw 
attention to the plight of the poor. (See Appendix A — social reform.)
Knowledge
As the star o f ‘progress through technology’ waned, the mechanistic model o f human 
nature also began to seem out o f date. A more organic and biological interpretation 
began to develop and influence the up-and-coming generation of thinkers and 
politicians. For example, Charles Dickens used his novels to illustrate the need for 
social reform, as did Oscar Wilde; a science of ideas was being developed, but it was 
not an easy process. As Michael Freeden puts it in The New Liberalism: A n Ideology of 
Social Rtform, ‘It remains, however, a fact that social and political thought were 
indistinguishable as separate specialisms before the First World War and perhaps even 
well into the 1930s’208 — though it may be argued that perhaps the disciplines lost 
something when the combination of social observation and social engagement was less 
valued than academic credentials or purity.
A prime example is J.A. Hobson, an academic and journalist, who wrote about 
economics. W e will return to Hobson in Chapter Seven; here it is interesting to note 
that his Physiology of Industry, written with A.F. Mummery in 1889, was to damage his 
career precisely because of this changing environment of disciplines. The book was a 
harsh critique o f prevalent economic models, and particularly the use of the notion of
207 The first settlement house was Toynbee Hall, established in 1884 by an Anglican at St Jude’s, 
Whitechapel. Its main purpose was to place educated young men and wom en in disadvantaged urban 
areas to improve their understanding o f  poverty and its causes. The movement spread across England 
and to the US, the most famous example was Hull House in Chicago.
208 Freeden, The New Liberalism, p. 7.
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the ‘rational man’. It was badly received by mainstream economists because it 
questioned their basic assumptions by asserting the pre-eminence of everyday 
experience. It would seem that just as the science of observation was being injected 
into disciplines, a non-economist was already questioning the power of explanation 
these disciplines held.209
Another, and perhaps classic, example of this new science of observation meeting the 
new tools o f communication is Origin of Species, written by Charles Darwin (1809-81) 
and published in 1859. His book was widely reviewed through the new media and 
went on to be named by countless political writers and thinkers as a huge influence — 
both for and against his model of human nature. Interestingly, the version o f his ideas 
that seemed to catch hold of the popular imagination was in fact that of Herbert 
Spencer (1820—1903), not Darwin’s own.210 Thus, Spencer’s phrase, ‘survival of the 
fittest’, may be the world’s first example o f ‘spin’. The spread of this simplified version 
seemed almost to overwhelm Darwin’s arguments; but whatever the process, Darwin 
was to have a huge impact on the interpretation o f man and his basic nature, and in 
particular on L.T. Hobhouse (see Chapter Seven).
Political context
The Liberal Party was in government for about half of the period between 1868 and 
1914. At the same time it was undergoing massive internal debates, including a major 
split in 1886 over Irish Home Rule. Even when in power, it often required the 
support of other groups, including, by the end, the rising socialist and labour 
supporters. Dahrendorf outlines this shift and points to important ideas that we will 
return to in the next chapter:
To describe the British political scene from the 1890s on as being in a 
state of flux is a considerable understatement. In fact it was in a state of 
turmoil and underwent a profound transformation. In the fifty years 
between the fall of Lord Rosebery’s Government in 1895 and the election 
o f Clement Attlee in 1945 there were only two periods o f ‘normal’ 
majority government by a single party — the Liberals after 1906 and the 
Conservatives after 1924 — which add up to ten years at the most. Even in 
these periods the parliamentary majorities were challenged from within.
All other governments were either formed by minorities in Parliament or
209 Allett, John. New Liberalism: The Political Economy ofJ.A . Hobson. Toronto: University o f  Toronto 
Press, 1981, p. 8.
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by coalitions including the ‘national governments’ during the two wars 
and after the Great Depression ... The old certainties had become shaky a 
decade before 1895 when Gladstone embraced Home Rule for Ireland 
and thereby split the old Liberal Party several ways. His most significant 
loss to what were to be the Liberal Unionists was his former President of 
the Board of Trade, Joseph Chamberlain. N o other public figure of the 
time attracted the unorthodox as strongly, which meant of course that he 
was a thorn in the flesh of the establishment.211
Though Gladstone clearly dominated much o f the period leading up to the end of the 
century, even he admitted that the times had changed. ‘Towards the end of his long
life, in 1896, he described himself as ‘a dead man, fundamentally a Peel — Cobden
> 212 man .
The political debate and legislation of the time basically reflects the issues outlined 
above. A great deal o f the programme of every government dealt with issues of 
workers’ rights, education, conditions of work and trade union membership and 
activities. Perhaps the most important legislation, beginning before this period but 
continuing through it, were the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884. The importance of 
the extension o f the franchise cannot be overstated in terms of the pressure this placed 
on the political class to deal with the social conditions. The Second Reform Act 
(1867) raised the proportion of voters to about a third of the male population, and the 
Third (1884) to just under two-thirds.
Again, in a precursor to the debates heard today, the democratic legitimacy of the 
government and the role of the state were also consuming attention. The franchise 
had been extended but voters did not seem to be engaging in a way that those who 
fought for their inclusion felt they should. It would appear that the ‘democratic 
deficit’ is not an altogether recent phenomenon.
Sidney Webb discussed this at some length in an investigation of voter intention and 
participation and while his focus was on the social impact of industrialisation and 
issues o f poverty and disease, he was also concerned about its impact on the state of 
democracy. He felt that by ignoring the plight of the working classes Liberals were, in 
effect, destroying the legitimacy of the system and the state. Quoting from another 
report in his letter, Webb makes it clear that the enfranchisement of the population
211 Dahrendorf, Ralf. LSE: A  History o f the London School o f Economics and Political Science 1895-1995. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 44.
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and the worsening social situation was, in his view, endangering the democratic 
process:
One proof of this political indifference of the mass of the people is 
furnished by the Registration and Polling statistics. ‘London is not on the 
Register’, says Mr. Seager, and this in spite o f an enormously increased 
diligence and activity of most of the parish officials. The 60 London 
constituencies ... had, in 1881, a population o f 3,946,139; in 1885 
probably 4,250,000. Among them there would be over a million adult 
males. Less than half of these (497,841) were on the 1885 register... O f 
the 497,841 registered, less than three-quarters took the trouble to vote 
for either candidate; in 1886, indeed, less than two-thirds ... the 
Conservative majority of 1885 represented the votes of less than a fifth of 
adult male Londoners and less than one-sixth went to the poll to resist this 
misrepresentation. Two-thirds of the London men had no part in the 
election at all, and, it may here be added, five-sixths o f London’s total 
adult population. And yet ignorant or hypocritical class politicians speak 
o f England as being already a democracy!213
As conditions changed and information spread, it could be argued that more common 
participation was possible. Social and ‘collectivist’214 legislation became core to the 
political programme. N ot surprisingly, there are clusters o f activity around each of the 
Reform Acts as pressure built up and the political process responded — sometimes 
several times on the same issue, as loopholes were discovered and closed in successive 
years.
Rising union agitation and strike violence in 1867 created the climate for the 
legislative framework for child labour and other protected groups in the Factories Act 
and the Workshop Regulation Act of the same year, as well as the Second Reform 
Act, and the landmark Education Act that followed shortly thereafter in 1870. Events 
such as the formation of the Trades Union Congress in 1868, further strike action and 
the Great Depression of the 1870s, brought pressure as the labour movement gained 
members. Legislation was often built on previous laws as updates were required to 
deal with the rapidly changing situation. Thus, there were a vast range of select 
committees and royal commissions utilising the new social science reports and surveys 
to investigate both social issues and the concerns o f industry as competition began to 
affect trade. These produced a range of laws, many designed to regulate trade union 
activities (Amending Act, Trade Union Act, Criminal Law Act (all 1871), 
Consolidating Act (1878), Trade Union Act (1875 and 1876) while others set out
213 Webb, Sidney. Wanted, a Programme: A n  Appeal to the Liberal Party. London: Holbom, Westminster 
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employers’ responsibilities (Employer Liability Act (1880) — a further, much more 
extensive act was attempted in 1893 but failed — W orker’s Compensation (1897) and 
the minimum wage in the Trade Boards Bill (1909).
This was also the point at which international regulation and monitoring were 
introduced. These included the International Telegraph (now Telecommunications) 
Union founded in 1865 and the General (now Universal) Postal Union founded in 
1874. Organisations to monitor disease and weather followed shortly after the turn of 
the century.215
However, perhaps due to the lack of strong mandate or the turmoil in public debate 
the Liberal Party was struggling with its own identity, and this was reflected in its 
attitude to legislation. The Liberal Party was no longer capitalist enough for the 
capitalists, but remained far too middle-class in character to win unqualified working- 
class support. Its indecision over the issue o f the eight-hour day in the 1890s illustrates 
this. O n the one hand its commitment, in 1891, to an eight-hour day for miners 
antagonised the Liberal mine-owners; on the other, its refusal to extend the principle 
to other groups of workers left labour dissatisfied. It was a matter of ethos as well as 
policies. The party was anxious not to be out-flanked by the newly-formed Labour 
Party, yet it remained difficult for working-class men to get adopted as Liberal 
candidates, even in obviously working-class constituencies.216
New party politics
The rise of the working class and socialism in the UK is very different from that o f its 
counterparts on the continent. Unions were the organising arm of the labour 
movement, rather than a political party, and while revolutionary means were 
threatened, it was generally an agenda of reform that was followed. One of the more 
interesting elements here is the role that the UK played in the international 
discussions o f the movement and its impact on the domestic debate. While the 
primary focus in this timeframe is the development of New Liberalism, it is also 
important to understand the background o f socialism and the Labour Party, as it will 
lead directly to the development of the Labour Party and the Third Way.
In many regards, the UK was unusual in terms of the number o f foreign nationals 
participating in its political debate. As a haven for emigres, London acted as a hub of
215 Scholte, Globalisation: A  Critical Introduction, p. 71.
216 Arblaster, Anthony. The Rise and Decline o f Western Liberalism, p. 290.
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communication between different groups and movements of political thought, be it 
socialist, communist or anarchist. Victor Hugo of France, Johann Most and Victor 
Adler of Austria, Eduard Bernstein of Germany and o f course Karl Marx, were, 
amongst others, based in London during the last quarter of the 1800s. Many wrote for 
newspapers smuggled to the continent as well as actively participating in the debate in 
England. Internationalism could be said to have kept socialism alive in Britain — or to 
have hindered its own development — but it was a part of the fabric of British 
development.
Even a movement considered to be entirely domestic, such as Chartism, which 
collapsed in 1848, had taken on an international oudook. Chartists were involved in 
the Welcome and Protest Committee (protesting about the visit of Louis Napoleon) 
and together with the Commune Revolutionaire formed the core o f what became 
the International Committee. This first attempt at an international workers’ group was 
set up in 1855 with a British Chartist, a Frenchman and a Russian. They began to 
organise ‘international rallies to commemorate revolutionary anniversaries’ in 
London.217
It was to this group that a delegation o f Frenchmen suggested an ‘International’ or 
‘league of workers of all nations’. Eventually the International Committee set up the 
International Association in 1856, including the German Communist World 
Educational Society, the Union of Polish Socialists and the Society o f Chartists. This 
group later collapsed but its basic structure, together with a group known as the 
International Workings Man’s Association formed in 1864, became the base of what, 
later that year, became the First International. Almost every kind of representative of 
the left in European politics participated in the initial meeting in London.
The reason for going back quite so far into the history o f the socialist movement is 
threefold. First, there is a clear line from the very beginnings o f the movement as to 
the political struggles that are consistent throughout its history. The issues of the role 
of revolution or method of change in the system, and the role of the state, were to 
divide the movement several times. Second, there was a large and influential 
international community within London participating in the development of ideas 
and political movement at both the international and domestic levels. Third, London 
was pivotal not only for the UK but for the whole o f Europe, providing as it did the 
secretariat for both the First International and the Second International until it moved 
to New York in 1872. In fact, as there was no organised working class political party
217 Braunthal, Julius. History of the International 1864—1914. London: Nelson, 1966, p. 79.
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in the UK, the General Council o f the entire organisation served as the executive of 
both the British section and the world movement. Finally, these Internationals were 
not dissimilar from the progressive summits of the modern Third Way. (see Chapter 
Eleven)
The Reform League was set up in 1865 by the unions with a large degree of middle- 
class support and, together with a number of other organisations, organised rallies and 
mass meetings. Karl Marx, in a letter to Engels, wrote that, ‘The Reform League is 
our work. In the inner committee o f twelve (six middle class and six workers), the 
worker’s representatives are all members of the General Council [of the 
International].,218
As Drachkovitch points out in The Revolutionary International 1864—1943, the British 
groups were watching the continent carefully but were aware that they did not want 
to ‘go too far’:
The place o f the International in history was the result of a temporary 
convergence of different interests. The ‘New Model’ British trade 
unionists, conscious of the strength and prestige their recent successes had 
earned them but at the same time anxious not to compromise themselves 
by any risky undertaking, were in close touch with political 
developments. They supported the efforts o f the Reform League. They 
kept close watch over events on the Continent.219
As noted, the Trades Union Congress was formed in 1868 and by 1871 was holding 
its own annual conferences. It had affiliated to the International and became involved 
just as the issues of revolution and control became a serious debate between the 
anarchists and revolutionaries and particularly between Marx (living in London by this 
time) and Michael Bakunin (1814—76), a proponent o f the ‘deed’ and supporter of 
violent revolution. Responding to these tensions, Marx led the International General 
Council’s attempt to centralise and extend its powers. Marx succeeded and Bakunin 
was expelled; the incident split the Movement, and the Hague conference in 1872 
was really the last congress of the First International. However, over the next few 
years some, calling themselves the anti-authoritarians, and others, continued to meet 
separately. The First International was short-lived and divisive but it still had an 
impact and the UK was at the centre because London was the base for Marx and 
other exiles.
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Still, the First International caused quite a stir. It aroused the anxieties of 
both factory owners and heads o f state alike when strikes, which at times 
reached epidemic proportions, were organised under its banner. The Paris 
Commune — in which the International was mistakenly considered to 
have had a decisive influence — caused not only the French bourgeoisie 
but all o f Europe to shake in its boots.220
After the split Bakunin fell into disrepute over financial matters and a failed attempt at 
a coup in Italy. ‘The deed’ was slowly losing favour to the theories around gradualism 
and mutualism. The anti-authoritarians, who voted against the extension o f power 
and thus helped to bring down the First International, met again as a group in London 
in 1881. Kropotkin, a proponent of the mutual aid approach, attended the meeting in 
London, and like Henry George (the radical American) undertook a lecture tour of 
England on socialism. (See Appendix A -  social reform.) The London congress split 
again on means and methods. The anarchists continued to meet for a few further years 
before they collapsed but their approach and philosophy continued to present 
difficulties domestically as well as at the formation of the Second International.
Domestically, the depression was hitting hard and the workers’ groups, particularly 
unions, were growing impatient with the Liberal Party. Public demonstrations, 
hunger marches and protests were commonplace but the movement was disorganised 
within the UK. As Pelling comments:
Clearly, in 1880, Socialism in Britain was as yet a movement without 
indigenous strength ... in 1880 there was a General Election, and the hold 
o f the Liberal Party over the working-class vote was shown to be stronger 
than ever... The elections showed the strength of Chamberlain’s new 
Radical pressure group, the National Liberal Federation, which 
dominated the constituencies in the middle-class interest, to the alarm of 
Whigs and labour leaders alike. So far as the issues of the election were 
concerned, however, Gladstone’s personality and the trade depression 
dominated the voting: the Liberals had a clear majority of seventy-two 
seats in the new House.221
The development of the Labour Party as a political entity in 1906 with only two MPs 
to a core of twenty-nine was the result o f a process started at the beginning o f the 
1880s in three separate strands: the Social Democratic Federation, formed in 1881 by 
H.M. Hyndman; the Independent Labour Party, formed in 1893 with Keir Hardie as
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its leader; and finally the Labour Representation Committee, formed in 1900 with 
Ramsay MacDonald acting as its first secretary.
Influenced by activities on the continent, Hyndman took the initiative and set up the 
Social Democratic Federation in 1881, using the group to organise demonstrations 
and strikes. Domestically, the downturn in the economy led to increasing numbers of 
disturbances. By this time, demands for worker protection and welfare combined with 
issues of protectionism and trade tariffs. The ‘Trafalgar riots’ were a turning point not 
only for the revolutionary groups but also in terms of public perception. Ironically, 
the revolutionaries backed away from violence just as it seemed the key players in the 
establishment became convinced that there was a real threat:
Socialism was more prominently in the public eye in 1886 that it had ever 
been before. The reason was that a severe cyclical depression reached its 
worst point in this year, and there was considerable unemployment.
Throughout the country public order was threatened by desperate men 
who had lost their jobs and had no dole to fall back on. In London, the 
Federation seized the opportunity to take the lead of the agitation o f the 
unemployed. O n 8 February 1886 it held a meeting in Trafalgar Square to 
demand public works to absorb the workless... This demonstration had 
several immediate results. Respectable people woke up to the existence of 
revolutionary Socialism in their midst, and believed that it could control 
great masses of potential rioters... The Queen wrote to Mr. Gladstone, her 
Prime Minister, deploring what she described as a ‘momentary triumph of 
Socialism and a disgrace to the capital’. The press meanwhile demanded 
the trial o f the Socialist leaders ... After 1887, however, the danger of 
violence was reduced as the immediate depression wore off and the 
numbers of the unemployed decreased. The Socialist bodies began to find 
that they had achieved remarkably little for all the energy they had 
expended.222
Pelling goes on to point out that as well as the rising activism and potentially violent 
working-class movements, it was during this decade that government had been 
implementing a range of measures that began to institutionalise the political 
democracy started by the franchise:
The most important factor making for a reconsideration of the idea of 
violent revolution was, of course, the failure o f the unemployed agitation 
o f 1886—87. But underlying this there were other factors o f more 
permanent influence and most of them were associated with the 
development of political democracy in this decade. The Municipal 
Corporations Act of 1882 had removed the property qualifications for 
borough councillors. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 had really put a
222 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
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stop to most o f the methods of bribery of voters, and had enormously 
improved the conduct of elections. The franchise legislation of 1884 had 
greatly increased the strength o f the working class at the polls so much so, 
in fact, that if the size of the electorate is taken as the criterion no one 
except an advocate o f women’s suffrage could now deny to Britain the 
tide of political democracy.223
Internationally, the next split came between trade unionists and the political socialist 
parties, with the British trade unions leading the way. The TU C called a congress in 
London in 1888 but deliberately limited participation to trade unions rather than 
political parties. This same division was repeated the following year in Paris, when 
effectively two congresses met. It was this rather confused combination of events that 
led to the founding of the Second International; the UK and the TU C formed the 
second largest delegation with both Hardie and William Morris in attendance.
In the UK, 1889 was a time of intense union activity. The London dockers struck for 
five weeks. 300,000 workers joined unions and a further 500,000 joined over the 
course of the following two years. This increasing membership participated in events 
like the May Day commemoration, with as many as 300,000 gathering in Hyde Park 
for the first such event in 1890.224
The formation of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) followed in 1893 and in 1896 
the British TU C once again hosted the International. It was the best-attended 
congress and included all the major British trade unionists and activists from what was 
to become the Labour Representation Committee (see below), including the ILP, the 
Social Democratic Federation, and the Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Bernard 
Shaw and Ramsay MacDonald. It was at this congress that the issue of the anarchists 
was reopened and formally resolved that they should be excluded.
In 1900 the Labour Representation Committee was formed, standing official Labour 
candidates in the 1906 general election. The election of its first MPs meant that it was 
finally becoming political, thus joining its continental colleagues. However, by this 
time the issue of colonialism was taking its toll on the solidarity of the workers, 
compounded by the outcome of the economic downturn and the rise of German 
industrialism. Delegations began to fragment in response to the nationalism stirred by 
issues o f colonialism and the naval arms race between Germany and the UK.
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While the sentiments of the International attempted to overcome essentially domestic 
political issues, this proved impossible as Europe moved towards a more protectionist, 
national stance. A particular line of contention was the role of a general strike and 
whether or not workers could avoid a war by refusing their labour in the effort 
towards conflict. Hardie was amongst those who supported a general strike should a 
war be declared. In Brussels in 1874 he said ‘that congress, representing as it does a 
total o f fifteen million socialist votes, is a powerful bulwark defending the peace of 
Europe’.225 However, as Victor Adler pointed out at the time, ‘It does not, 
unfortunately depend on us social democrats whether or not a war breaks out’.226
The participation of socialists in government had been an issue within the 
International for some time, linked to the divisions between the unions and the 
method of reform. This was particularly important in the final stages of the Second 
International, when the German Social Democratic Party voted unanimously for war 
credits in the Reichstag. Austria, France and Belgium all soon followed, as well as those 
in Britain — though they were divided. As the Second International had repeatedly 
pledged itself to ‘solidarity to the proletariat’ and ‘against militarism’ and even to 
‘make war on war’ these motions seemed hollow. As Michael Doyle points out:
Lenin, who was soon to lead the Communist movement, roundly 
condemned them: ‘The conduct of the leaders of the German Social 
Democratic Party of the Second International (1889-1914) who have 
voted for the war budget and who repeat the bourgeois chauvinistic 
phrases o f the Prussian Junkers and of the bourgeoisie is a direct betrayal 
of Socialism.’227
Conclusion
The political elite of the day was engaged in what could be deemed to be ‘frontier 
politics’, as actors on the domestic political scene were actively engaged in political 
debate across Europe and in the United States, and key events in one arena also 
played heavily into the politics o f the other. Moreover, individuals actively sought to 
bring influence to bear in both the international and domestic arenas. British 
participants took a particularly active role in the creation of opportunities for 
international debate and discussion. Their international involvement also coloured the 
development of the domestic Labour Party and the continuing evolution of social 
democracy within the UK.
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As the century ended, this cross between the philosophical and the practical was 
crucial, as was the shift of the societal model from the mechanistic to the organic, 
with the implications for the role o f the individual and the state that would suggest. 
This will be discussed in the next chapter. As Black indicates, in much the same terms 
as Giddens, ‘A new world of speed and personal mobility with its own particular 
infrastructure was being created.’228
In a final, and perhaps ironic, parallel with the current day, by 1894 the word ‘new’ 
was being applied, sometimes enthusiastically, sometimes pejoratively, to almost 
everything from gender to morality, from products to ideas, from fiction to art (the 
term ‘art nouveau’ for example) and not least, to journalism, which had created the 
fashion for the language o f the ‘new’ in the first place. Even the Germans talked of 
the neuen Welt. “‘N ot to be new in these days is to be nothing”, wrote the critic H.D. 
Traill in 1892.’229
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Chapter 5
The rise of the individual and the role of the state
As clear from the previous chapter, the Industrial Revolution changed the economic 
basis o f society. Urbanisation and democratisation created a mass society and a tension 
between individualism and collectivism. External competition and domestic social 
conditions forced the newly ‘modernised’ state to produce benefits for those within its 
boundaries and thus, a form of nationalism as well as the welfare state were born. 
Scientific advance and uncertainty led to a questioning o f the moral underpinning of 
society, while the rise of the study o f the social sciences seemed to present as many 
issues as it resolved.
The focus here is the impact of this systemic change on the political debate, where 
the most fundamental question became the nature and role o f the individual vis-a-vis 
their community and, by extension, the state. Political theory had previously focused 
on a form of negative freedom for the individual — a freedom from constraint. The 
changed environment forced the realisation that such freedom was often oppressing 
rather than liberating. The question was whether or not the community and the state 
could take a role in facilitating the individual to develop their potential. Questions 
over the ‘social contract’, economic liberalism and the dominant ‘mechanical’ model 
o f society were all re-opened as new ideas spread amongst an educated and 
cosmopolitan European elite (see Chapter Six). Essentially, there was a search for an 
inclusive social philosophy that could deal with the enfranchisement of the working 
classes, though the debate also brought into sharp relief potential cleavages such as that 
between society and class.
Because the ideological importance o f the relationship between the individual and the 
state was closely linked to the method o f attainment of this ‘good society’, a key 
debate in Britain and across the continent was reform versus revolution. This issue 
divided Europe on a number of levels. W ithin the British context, as shown in the 
previous chapter, views ranged from those operating within the political system, e.g. 
Conservatives and Liberals who advocated more incremental change, to those outside 
the parliamentary framework who advocated radical and rapid change. This outside 
group included anarchists and Marxists as well as socialists. The extremes of the 
continental debate and the presence o f such views in the UK were a source of 
constant tension; yet the main ground of the discussion remained amongst those who 
supported change but disagreed as to the best route to reform.
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The Liberal Party, as part of the political establishment but in favour of change, was 
faced with a particular dilemma. There were a range of views within the 
parliamentary party but as elected representatives they faced practical electoral issues. 
So while they could generally see the need for a new progressive majority, they did 
not lead the philosophical debate. Thus, progressives outside the parliamentary party, 
whatever their line on the reform-versus-revolution debate, played an important role 
in the development of New Liberalism.
This ongoing progressive debate also helps to explain how New Liberalism developed 
almost in parallel with Liberal Party fortunes. The ‘Liberal Party’ and the ‘New 
Liberal debate’ are not the same. New Liberalism was initially developed without the 
blessing o f the party leadership, in significant contrast to the Third Way. New 
Liberalism did eventually have a more direct influence on the parliamentary party, but 
it was in the wider political and philosophical debate in Britain where they had most 
impact.
Political context
Hugh Gaitskell MP observed in his 1956 pamphlet, Recent Developments in British 
Socialist Thinking, that while it was difficult to choose one specific point in time as to 
‘when it began’ he does not hesitate to suggest that ‘in the 1880s and the 1890s there 
was a quite exceptional blossoming of new Socialist ideas and activities’.230 The same 
can be said for all political thought, because, as H.V. Emy points out, the basic terms 
of the political debate were being altered by changes in wider society. Emy was 
looking at New Liberalism, but stresses that it is a mistake to view it as just a 
‘parliamentary phenomenon’. He suggests it was a ‘search for a new social philosophy’ 
and therefore part of, or a ‘particular example o f a larger trend in society at the time. 
He goes on, in a tone familiar to current writers, when he states:
The certainties of Victorian assumptions about society and progress 
evaporated in the late nineteenth century in a mood of uncertainty, 
personal crisis, and intellectual insecurity. There was a level o f change, of 
intellectual challenge and response, which was a more significant force 
shaping politics than any movement for change taking place in the Liberal 
Party alone.231
230 Gaitskell, Hugh. Recent Developments in British Socialist Thinking. London: The Co-operative Union, 
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Emy ultimately brings this back to the same link between the individual and the state 
as both a philosophical question and a practical one in terms of their vote:
The implicit assumption is that the history of social politics in these years 
is o f especial significance for the understanding o f modern British politics.
The inter-related issues o f the relationship between state and individual 
and individual and society, state and economy, came to assume a direct 
political significance by 1914 in that the individual’s personal resolution of 
such issues was becoming a principal factor in determining his political 
allegiance.232
This chapter will investigate the process o f development in political theory in Britain 
and the impact it had on both the New Liberalism and eventually on the Third Way. 
Rather than party political fortunes, the focus will begin with the groups and ideas in 
the wider political debate in Britain such as the Rainbow Circle and the Fabian 
Society, to demonstrate the ‘porousness’ of politics at the time. This will then be 
applied to the overt political situation with a look at the electoral implications o f the 
evolving political theory.
Theoretical evolution
Richard Sonn argues that the end of the nineteenth century was a moment o f ‘dual 
revolution’. He identifies this duality as capitalist-industrial and liberal-democratic.233 
More importantly, he goes on to argue its significance against what he terms the other 
duality of that age — the enlightenment project:
Enlightenment social thinking left a dual legacy. Natural-law theory with 
its built-in distrust o f institutions led to liberalism and to anarchism. On 
the other hand, the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham with its democratic- 
rationalist formula of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ led to 
the welfare state and to socialism. Freedom for the first, equality and 
‘happiness’ for the second — these were the diverging goals of 
Enlightenment thought.234
Marshall Shatz provides more of an overview as he looks at this same period of time 
as the point of divergence for all major systems of political thought. Like Freeden, he 
offers a spectrum along which core concepts overlap, but he extends that across a 
range of views that differ primarily on perceptions of the role of the individual. Thus,
232 Ibid., p. vii.
233 Sonn, Richard. Anarchism from Tway tie’s Studies in Intellectual and Cultural History. N ew  York: 
Twayne Publications, 1992, p.xii.
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114
he suggests it is anarchism rather than Liberalism which is at the fulcrum of the 
political spectrum. Shatz points out that:
Foremost rivals and objects of criticism have always been liberalism on the 
one hand and socialism or more specifically, Marxism on the other... At 
one end of the anarchist spectrum it is sometimes difficult to tell the 
anarchist individualist from the liberal while at the other the anarchist 
communist becomes also indistinguishable from the socialist. It has been 
observed that anarchism implies a liberal critique o f socialism and a 
socialist critique of liberalism.235
But it is Liberalism in its various guises that gained a primary role in the formation of 
the state in the UK by virtue of its longevity and permeation of institutions and 
political philosophies. At this time, the contested areas of political debate were 
concentrated on social reform and the role of the state in its local and national forms. 
While Conservatives could see the rising tide o f concern in terms of their own 
constituencies and in the legislative debate, their conclusion was to support the status 
quo or a nationalist/imperialist ideology. This left them struggling with the 
mainstream debate and split on the response to social reform. The heart of the 
discussion around the ‘social problem’ fell to the Liberals, collectivist and socialist 
sympathisers and a range of smaller groups both inside and outside the formal political 
process who promoted reform.
The main focus here will be the point at which Liberalism developed into what was 
termed the New Liberalism, as well as the way in which ideas of the individual and 
the state moved across Europe and were used to develop what was termed socialism, 
and the later Labour Party.
A common problem when examining this period is that commentators and politicians 
are put into classifications and categories for ease of analysis. This is compounded by 
focusing on either the domestic or the international sphere, making it difficult to 
examine the relationship, as opposed to just examining each separately.
If the period under discussion here, namely 1880 to the First World War, was, as is 
being argued here, a ‘transformative moment’, it would be expected that social and 
economic ideas influenced all aspects of activity. Thus, the ‘messiness’ or ‘porousness’ 
o f this timeframe was its essence and resulted in the ‘new politics’ or ‘frontier politics’ 
o f New Liberalism and the Third Way. In other words, the new global economic 
framework was operating on all three points of agency. It was changing the state
235 Shatz, Marshall S., ed. The Essential Works o f Anarchism. N ew  York: Bantam Books, 1971, p. xiv.
115
while individuals within the state were changing the terms in which they operated, 
both in their individual capacity as well as in their state capacity. This created a shift in 
political ideology.
The proximity of progressive views
Given the proximity of the social groupings and individuals involved in social reform 
in the UK, it is hardly surprising that there was litde demarcated territory between 
political parties. Groups and publications dedicated to discussing the arts, sciences, 
social reform and politics have already been mentioned, but it is also important to 
understand not only the plethora of locations of such discussions but that people 
overlapped.
There was a shared intellectual community whatever their party political affiliation. 
For example, Idealism dominated Oxford University generally, and Balliol College 
specifically, for nearly a generation. Between 1866 and 1876 Balliol alone produced 
William Wallace, Henry Scott Holland, R.L. Netdeship, Bernard Bosanquet, C.S. 
Loch, A.C. Bradley, A.L. Smith, Charles Gore, D.G. Ritchie, J.H. Muirhead, Arnold 
Toynbee and F.C. Montague.236 This, and other examples, brought a kind of 
coherence to the debate, as it was guided by a relatively small group o f people who 
created a bridge between theoretical discussion and practical politics. This small scale 
also created personal loyalties and rivalries. So it seems obvious to suggest that various 
discussions or political debates would not have been possible without the personal 
involvement. Yet modern analyses often fall into the trap of using categories of 
liberalism or socialism as we understand them today, rather than looking to the wider 
influences and human interactions that were going on. Surely the hallmark of the age 
was precisely a lack o f boundaries.
Fabians and the Rainbow Circle -  a convening of thought
The Great Depression of the 1870s and the crises o f the 1880s and 1890s prompted a 
perceived need for more information in an effort to respond to change with rational 
policy. Various groups attempted to fill that gap. By way of example, two prominent 
groups with significant overlap in terms o f membership were the Fabian Society and
236 Carter, Matt. T.H . Green and the Development o f Ethical Socialism. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003, p. 
13.
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the Rainbow Circle. They were different from others in that they explored practical 
solutions rather than limiting themselves to philosophical ideas.
The Fabian Society237 was founded in 1883 by three people who sought to create a 
socialist debating group. As well as its founders, Edith Nesbit, Hubert Bland, and 
Edward Pease, membership of the Fabians included Graham Wallas, Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb, J.A. Hobson, Bernard Shaw, Ramsay MacDonald, Emmeline 
Pankhurst, Charles Trevelyan and R.B. Haldane. The Society saw its main aim as 
education, or ‘fact finding and fact dispensing’. So when a large bequest came to the 
Society it seemed logical to Sidney Webb in particular that they should use the 
money to create what became the London School o f Economics — which a core 
group o f Fabians and others did in 1895. As Ralf Dahrendorf points out:
More importandy, all these people were highly sensitive to the intellectual 
and political currents of the time ... These currents were variegated and 
strong, but they all had in common that they were reactions to the age of 
Gladstone. The ‘five E’s’ which made up the field o f intellectual forces in 
which the LSE came into being — Education, Economics, Efficiency,
Equality, Empire — were associated with the great or at least the 
fashionable names at the time ... The 1890s were more a time of 
dissolution than o f construction.238
The Fabians set out to be overtly socialist while the Rainbow Circle, formed almost 
exacdy ten years later, sought to be broadly progressive. Freeden calls it a ‘crucible of 
progressive thought’.239 It was established shortly after the Newcasde Programme and 
the failure o f the Liberal leadership under Gladstone to take up external challenges. 
Personal, tactical and electoral concerns produced groups who were seeking to reform 
the Party’s approach in light o f the changing social environment.
The Rainbow Circle is interesting not so much because it led the debate but, in the 
midst of this formative period with a large number of organisations and publications 
in the same area, it was a close-knit group which spread throughout other oudets. 
Thus, the Rainbow Circle helped frame the debate through its own wide-ranging 
discussions, its publication, Progressive Review (established two years after its 
foundation, in 1896) and the reach of its members. The group was deliberately
237 In fact they did not call themselves Fabians until the following year when member, Frank Podmore, 
suggested the name in honour o f the Roman general, Quintus Fabius Maximus, famous not for 
batdefield success, but for harassing operations that ground down the opposition.
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designed to extend across arts, sciences, media and political affiliations. Therefore it 
had at its disposal a variety o f means to access the wider debate. As Freeden points 
out:
It is of great importance to note that the Circle itself was not the initial 
forum or the fulcrum of the activities of its members. Rather, it was 
created at the interstices of a number o f important London social and 
political associations and thus held together a remarkable network of 
interlocking relationships.240
The group was formed by William Clarke and Murray Macdonald and who saw 
themselves as the ‘true inheritors of the mantle of philosophic radicalism, now recast 
in a clearly collectivist or, as it could better be described, communitarian mould’.241 
They took on topics that reflected this approach, from an attack on the Manchester 
School throughout the entire first year of their existence, to the role o f the state and 
various sessions on forms of collectivism and the campaigns against sweated labour.
Over the course o f its forty-year existence its membership inevitably shifted but it 
included Liberals like B.F.C. Costelloe, Sir Richard Stapley, Charles Trevelyan, 
Russell Rea, Percy Alden and R.B. Haldane, clergymen such as the Reverend Lilley 
and D r Morrison, as well as various intellectuals like John MacKinnon Robertson, 
and several Fabians and the prominent editor o f the Daily News, A.G. Gardiner. Many 
of its members were also MPs or parliamentary candidates.
There were also particular personalities: Ramsay MacDonald, who was secretary to 
the group for six years early in its formation until he took up the role o f secretary to 
the Labour Representation Committee (he remained active in the Circle — see 
Appendix B), and J.A. Hobson who was involved for thirty-seven years (see Chapter 
Seven). As an interesting aside, L.T. Hobhouse was invited to join in 1903 but never 
took up his place.242
They sought to bring coherence to the confusion dominating political thought of the 
day. The false starts of the Radical Programme and the Newcastle Programme seemed 
to need intellectual underpinnings if Liberalism in its widest sense was to succeed.
The aim o f the body was ‘to provide a rational and comprehensive view 
of political and social progress, leading up to a consistent body o f political 
and economic doctrine which could be ultimately formulated in a
240 Freeden, Michael, ed. Minutes of the Rainbow Circle, 1894-1924. London: University College 
London, 1989, p. 2.
241 Ibid., p. 1.
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programme of action ... for social reformers.’ According to Hobson, the 
founding by the Circle of a journal, The Progressive Review, in 1896 
marked the origins o f the ‘New Liberalism’. The immediate intention of 
the ‘New Liberals’ was to unify the ‘multiplicity o f progressive 
movements’, to come to grips with ‘that huge unformed monster’, the 
social question, and to implement ‘a specific policy of reconstruction’ 
based on a new conception of ‘economic freedom ... the conscious 
organisation o f society’, and ‘an enlarged and enlightened conception of 
the functions o f the State’.243
The group’s influence stemmed from its ability to influence other like-minded 
people. For example, the Ethical Movement, which included the South Place Ethical 
Society, the London Ethical Society and the West London Ethical Society, was an 
important source o f members and a platform for Circle members. The Extension 
Movement, the Settlement Movement and the London School o f Economics also 
provided important connections.244 This cross-fertilisation gave it a real function in 
the elusive relationship between political theory and political practice:
In this case it appears that theories which were not abstruse or inaccessible 
were received by ministers through the political periodicals, through the 
heavyweight Liberal press — the Daily Chronicle or the Manchester Guardian 
— or through contact with thinkers, like Hobson and Hobhouse, who 
moved in political circles. The pervasiveness of arguments for state 
intervention must have encouraged ministers to proceed with social 
reform projects, but offered little guidance on precise mechanisms.245
This political overlay is also evidenced by the simple fact that no less than ten of its 
twenty-five members were MPs after the 1906 election, five of those for the first 
time.
Equally important was the fact that their topics were not limited to the domestic 
agenda, but examined the political and economic situations in other countries. For 
example, the topic for the 1899—1900 session was ‘Imperialism’, while in 1902-03 
they covered ‘The political and economic situation in France, Germany and the 
United States’. Perhaps anticipating the intake o f 1906, the 1904—05 session discussed 
‘The newer demands of the political left wing’.
General topics were also offered, with areas such as ‘Literature’ and thinkers such as 
Hegel, Marx and Spencer as well as those of more historical importance like Hobbes,
243 Emy, ibid., pp. 105-06.
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Machiavelli and Aristode. Another session, 1907—08, was devoted to the history of 
socialism and included discussions on the redistribution of property, two papers on 
collectivism (one by Hobson), social legislation, the practical proposals o f the Labour 
Party and Labour organisations, and anarchism.246
O f particular note was their impact in the media; several wrote or edited for the 
myriad of journals o f the day, giving their views not only depth and range but also a 
wider audience:
The Press was their chief instrument of power, of influencing men’s 
minds, and also their prime means of mutual Communication, though 
there existed withal semi-institutionalised foci of their activities: the 
Nation lunches, The Rainbow Circle, the Ethical Societies, and small 
groups operating on the periphery o f the Liberal party ... within the 
framework o f the National Liberal Club, or even the Setdement 
Movement. Unlike most other ideological groupings in nineteenth 
century England, with the notable exception of the Fabians, they did not 
theorise in a vacuum. They dealt with acute problems such as dire 
poverty, unemployment, and disease, which constituted the immediate 
challenge to the policy-makers of the period ... In an era which witnessed 
the emergence of new demands upon the political system due to the 
increased awareness of social issues and to the widening circle o f 
politically active, or activated people consequent to the extension of the 
franchise in 1884, they went a long way towards providing the necessary 
solutions. This they did while preserving the essential continuity o f the 
liberal tradition.247
It is clear that both the New Liberals and the growing labour movement developed 
not only from the ‘left’ but also out of a more subtle notion of progressive politics.
Yet the result was not convergence or political homogeneity, but separation. Rather 
than developing towards each other, these two political creeds developed their own 
identities and ultimately, the ideological differences exposed were not cosmetic. That 
process o f evolution is of interest because it is a matter not just of domestic political 
debate but also of domestic responses to international shifts.
The debates of this elite bears a number of similarities to the development of the 
Third Way, whose self-described ‘modernisers’ also set themselves against those who 
refused ‘progress’. The division of these forces determined electoral politics in the UK 
for generations. Freeden identifies this similarity between the two movements:
246 Freeden, Minutes of the Rainbow Circle.
247 Freeden, The New Liberalism, p. 4.
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In the early years of its formation, employing a rhetoric which uncannily 
resonates with the new Labour of exactly one century later, Herbert 
Samuel identified a ‘third social philosophy’ located between the 
liberalism of Bentham and Adam Smith and the socialism of the Social 
Democratic Federation and the Fabians. The root of this ‘new Liberalism’ 
was ‘the unity of society’ — complex in its economics, cooperative, ethical 
and emotional bonds’ employing a view that divisions among progressives 
were institutional not ideational; that ‘the cleavage between the new 
liberalism and socialism is not to be found in their ideas of property but in 
the ordinary political possibilities of the two parties’. O n the eve of the 
foundation of the Labour Party, J.A. Hobson reminded the Circle in the 
presence of one of its most illustrious members, Ramsay MacDonald, that 
the principles upon which a joint progressive party should be based ‘are 
already in evidence in the form of widely held intellectual affinities which 
as a matter of fact place the leaders of the radical, the socialist, and the 
labour groups much nearer to each other than their followers imagine.248
Liberalism -  a broad church and a specific ideology
It was in the early nineteenth century that the more progressive members of the Whig 
party and followers of Jeremy Bentham (1748—1832) first began to use the term 
‘liberal’ as a political doctrine249 with links to the Manchester School and to early 
Liberalism. For ‘original’ Liberals John Milton’s Areopagitica (1644) is the touchstone 
of liberal thought and freedom. As Bradley summarises:
Areopagitica laid down clearly for the first time three key principles which 
he at the heart of the liberal faith. The first is that liberty is essentially 
about moral choice. Its possession is vital because it alone enables 
individuals to realise their true human potential as independent moral 
beings with both the sense and the power to be able to decide for 
themselves how they wish to live. Liberalism is strongly opposed to a 
determinist view of life; it holds that men and women are morally free 
and are able to influence events for good or ill through their freely held 
ideas and convictions ... The second principle follows from the first. It is 
the confident conviction that out of free debate and the discussion of 
different viewpoints each person will find his own truth ... From this 
optimistic view of human nature stems the third and most important 
principle which Milton established in Areopagitica. This is that liberty does 
not mean licence. It is not the freeing of people to do what they like 
regardless of the consequences, but the enabling of them to make the best
248 Freeden, ‘True Blood or False Genealogy’, pp. 152-53.
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o f themselves and contribute to the well-being o f the community of 
which they are part.250
There is therefore, a constant tension between the individual and the community in 
which the individual is based. Freedom is crucial but does not include freedom from 
all constraints. It is a freedom that supports the whole. Threads of both a fierce 
individualism and mutual aid are part of the combination. The role of the state is to 
support both without stifling or overly directing either. As Michael Freeden apdy 
observes:
The study of Liberalism is both simple and complex. It is simple because 
Liberalism is a pre-eminent ideology in Western political thought, 
extensively articulated and amplified, and a familiar component within the 
ideological spectrums of the past century and a half. It is complex because 
its permeation into rival families, both socialist and conservative, makes its 
unravelling difficult, and because its diffusion has led to an extraordinary 
range of variants that, unlike the many nuances of socialism, tend to 
present themselves under the same name.251
Liberalism was, in effect, the hegemonic political ideology of Britain. As it changed 
and responded to the new environment, so too, did other political theories. 
Conservatism was responding, albeit reluctandy. Socialism grew up in the gaps left by 
the New Liberals, taking their basic ideas and posing them in a direct appeal to class 
interests to maximise electoral support for a new collectivist political party.
Socialism
‘Socialism’, as a term, first appeared in November 1827 in the cooperative magazine 
that was the organ for the ideas of Robert Owen (1771—1858) and his cooperative 
textile mill in Lanark. To Owen, socialism was an ethic, a way to live, not the basis 
for a political party. It was Karl Marx who converted the ethic into an ideology,252 
though the ethic was fundamentally a reaction to individualism and a response to 
industrial capitalism.253
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Like Liberalism, socialism was also a ‘product of the rise of science, industry and 
commerce and the decline of agriculture and land as a basis o f power. Both shared a 
post-enlightenment rationalism and an optimistic view o f human nature.’254 
Specifically, socialism provided a gateway for the previously excluded working class 
into the democratic structure of the country and potentially into the distribution of 
state resources.
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, socialism brought together many of the ideas of the 
progressive or collectivist side of liberalism and applied them through the practical 
mechanism of the working class and union engagement. The international influence 
in London and the disparate approaches to issues such as parliamentary involvement 
meant that while there was a great deal of activity it took some time for socialism to 
differentiate itself from Liberalism and then to gain any kind o f coherence.
Thus, before 1900 the term was used freely amongst progressives without any political 
implication. It was only after 1900 and the formation of the Labour Party that 
‘socialism’ began to take on a party political form — a word, according to Freeden, 
that had been appropriated because in the British context it had ‘already been tamed 
and domesticated’.255
From the outset, the socialist tradition developed along three distinct paths: the 
Marxist, revolutionary approach with its rejection of capitalism; the democratic 
socialists who supported Marx’s analysis of capitalism and class exploitation but felt 
that the system was capable of reform and therefore rejected revolution; and finally 
the social democrats who rejected Marx outright and supported the idea o f private 
ownership though felt that redistribution and progressive taxation would be required 
to achieve greater social equality.256 These strands will be important to the discussion 
of the development of socialism and its relation to Liberalism, as well as its internal 
development throughout this period and into the debates of the next century, 
oudined in Chapter Nine.
New Liberalism
By the end of the nineteenth century, a growing number of Liberal thinkers were 
self-consciously re-examining their political ideology with a view to renewing it for
254 Brack, ibid.
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the changing political and social circumstances of the post-industrial Revolutionary 
world. The traditional Manchester School o f laissez-faire economics (see further 
below) no longer seemed sustainable and research clearly showed that the social fabric 
was haying. The rising, educated middle classes were looking for political leadership. 
Socialism had, in many respects, developed out of Liberalism or at least out o f its core 
approach. It was beginning to occupy ground that had seemed firmly Liberal. Public 
debate centred on questions around the role o f the state in the midst of misery, what 
sort o f provision should be made for the welfare of citizens, and what responsibility 
citizens should have for their own welfare.
Given the divisions within the leadership of the Liberal Party, the debate on these 
issues was divergent. The leading lights, or ‘progressives’, for want of a better word 
(they were not all party-political Liberals), took the traditional, independent model of 
the individual and placed that free individual squarely within the community. They 
also looked towards the biological or organic model of society popular at the time. 
But rather than argue ‘the survival of the fittest’, they questioned any model that did 
not conceive of the individual as part of society or suggested that the individual only 
acted in self-interest, as in the economic ‘rational actor’.
The progressives moved towards an approach they argued, understood the social 
environment as separate but as part of the individual. It was a new framework that 
held both rights and responsibilities as core to the idea o f the individual’s place. 
‘Liberty and welfare became twin goals, each in a way defining and explaining the 
other.’257 Further, rights and responsibilities and the attendant definition of liberty 
were not limited to a single state. In this perspective, liberty encompassed the world. 
All these aspects will be familiar to the positional attitudes of the Third Way.
For many, this was still a relatively minimalist approach to state provision, akin to the 
later idea of a state-provided safety-net or, as Masterman put it, a ‘platform ... below 
that Platform no human life shall sink’258 — though, for him, this platform still had the 
Liberal caveat as also being something one could potentially launch upwards from. 
There was both aspiration towards potential, as well as protection for those who 
might otherwise sink into the ‘last penalty of hunger and cold’.
Many of the specific ideas of ‘old’ Liberalism will be examined in the next chapter. 
Here, the focus will be on the transition from old liberalism both in terms o f political 
theory and in practical political terms.
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Transition
R.B. Haldane, Liberal MP for East Lothian for many years and at the heart of the 
‘new politics’, is reminiscent of Lord Hugh Cecil and traces the transition between 
Conservatism and the New Liberals:
If Liberalism is associated with Home Rule, Conservatism is associated 
with the special championship of the interests of Church, Land, and 
Capital. For the rest, in the matter of the treatment o f social problems, the 
distinction between the Liberals and Conservatives is one of degree rather 
than of kind. There is no greater delusion than that which a few years ago 
was current among a good many people, that we were approaching a 
period when the difference between the two parties would turn on 
economic principles, the Conservatives remaining free from any taint of 
Socialism. O n the contrary this taint, if taint it be, has deeply penetrated 
their policy, as it has done that of their opponents, and there is no 
champion of non-interference, however stiff-necked he may have been, 
who has not become infected with it.259
Haldane makes an interesting case, as he served in various Liberal governments, was a 
member of the Rainbow Circle and the Fabian Society, and was also actively engaged 
in the foundation of the LSE. In 1906, while Secretary of War, as part o f the national 
drive towards ‘efficiency’ he changed the way the army operated, and created the 
General Staff. This was followed by the Territorial Army in 1907, trained units 
capable o f being deployed at short notice to the continent. Ultimately, he joined the 
Labour Party in 1918, campaigned for them in 1923 and served in Ramsay 
MacDonald’s first Labour government as Lord Chancellor. He moved party but felt 
such a shift did not require him to change views. He recognised the change in the 
electorate as basic to the fortunes o f not only the political parties at the time but the 
credibility o f the political process as a whole — another parallel with the current 
debate.
The extension of the franchise worked a profound change in the 
composition and the ideas of both political parties. The Liberals it caused 
to pass into a new period... The Conservatives were yet more completely 
changed. Their benches... having got elected on the cry that the 
Conservatives were prepared to do as well as their opponents over the 
new topics which were interesting the constituencies.260
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To make the shift credible, the intellectual leadership of the debate needed to create a 
narrative that would explain this transition to both the party and the electorate. This 
was an attempt to align the new thinking with the old both in terms of positioning 
and policy. The progressives needed to create a consistent worldview, which 
embraced the past but made way for the changes that were needed in light o f new 
information, new technology and new requirements of the state in the face of changes 
in civil society and the global economy. Haldane, a Germanophile, went further back 
and reached into what could be regarded as socialist ideas when he quoted T.H. 
Green at some length to make this point, using a concept not unlike Zeitgeist — which 
he called ‘time spirit’:
Let us see, then, what our new tendency is. I have so often tried to 
express in speeches the changed attitude of the Time Spirit, and so often 
felt the inadequacy of my own statement, that on this occasion I am going 
to quote from a great master of political conceptions, one who was little 
known to the people, who was never in Parliament, but who, 
nevertheless, seems to me to have expressed the necessities of our 
generation in the matter of social progress better than anyone else — I 
mean the late Professor Thomas Hill Green, of Oxford ... ‘Then they 
fought the fight of reform in the name o f individual freedom against class 
privilege... Now, in appearance, though, as I shall try to show, not in 
reality, the case is changed. The nature of the genuine political reformer 
is, perhaps, always the same. The passion for improving mankind, in its 
ultimate object, does not vary. But the immediate objects of reformers, 
and the forms of persuasion by which they seek to advance them, vary 
much in different generations. To a hasty observer they might even seem 
contradictory... Only those who will think a little longer about it can 
discern the same old cause of social good against class interests, for which
under altered names, Liberals are fighting now as they were fifty years
«««»261 ago .
The line the reforming Liberals and progressives chose to adopt was basically that the 
‘old liberalism’ had done its job successfully. As an ideology it had been designed for a 
specific purpose and that purpose had been fulfilled by the changes the Liberals had 
spearheaded. The new task was to respond to the new stage of state development. As 
T.J. Macnamara argued:
Well! What is liberalism? What has it done? Whither would it take us? 
Liberalism stands for freedom, for equality of all men and women before 
the law — equality in matters social, political, religious. To that end its 
record during the nineteenth century is one long story o f this successful
261 Ibid., pp. 135-36.
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removal of unjust social differentiations, which had come done from a less 
enlightened and less liberal past.262
David Lloyd George, unlike most of the Liberal Party leadership (and albeit perhaps 
too late to save the progressive parties from their ultimate ‘divorce’) did participate in 
later N ew  Liberal discussions. In his introduction to a publication o f his speeches,
A.G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News and a member o f the Rainbow Circle, 
highlights this notion of the changing role between the individual and the state:
Liberalism had freed the individual from the tyranny of the state. The 
time had now come to free the state from the tyranny of the individual.
But the Liberal party was slow to appreciate the changed conditions. It 
was attached to the maxims of the Manchester School and did not see that 
real individual liberty should only be secured by the intervention o f a just 
and democratic state which should redress economics inequalities of 
society. Hence for twenty years the Liberal party lay dormant. Its startling 
emergence in 1906 was due less to its own action than to the record of 
Tory Government ... At least the Liberal party had touched the 
imagination o f the country. It had touched it by its courage and by 
showing that is was no longer the salve of a creed outworn. It had 
touched it by raising the banner o f the new liberalism, which was not 
inconsistent with the old liberalism but rather its necessary complement.263
As Macnamara went on to say, slighdy more succincdy, ‘Liberalism’s record I insist is 
one long story of steady, well-considered beneficent advance along the broad highway 
of progress.’264 Essentially, the Liberal explanation was that old liberalism had not 
failed but that a new liberalism was needed for Haldane’s sense of a ‘time spirit’. An 
ambitious party, they had litde choice but to view their record as one of a glorious 
past while arguing that they were being responsive to the new will of the people. The 
story they created will look familiar to New Labour, despite the fact that the New 
Liberals were making their case from outside the core leadership of the party.
A new ideology or tactical advantage?
The Liberal Party was in both an ideological and electoral bind as they faced the 
consequences of the wider franchise they had campaigned for but which had released
262 MacNamara, T.J. Liberalism: Its Past Achievements and Future Aims. London: Liberal Publication 
Department, 1924, p. 6.
263 Lloyd George, David. The New Liberalism. Speeches by R t Hon David Lloyd George MP. Published by 
The Daily News London and Manchester The Daily News Series No 6 Introduction by the Editor o f  the 
Daily News (A.G. Gardiner) 1909, p .3.
264 MacNamara, Liberalism: Its Past Achievements and Future Aims, p. 9.
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a genie from the electoral bottle. The rising influence of labour and the working class 
could no longer be ignored any more than the social circumstances in which the 
economic situation was forcing many citizens to live. Competition from other rapidly 
industrialising countries and the costs of the Empire were creating financial pressure.
At the heart of Liberal political manoeuvre was W.E. Gladstone. By insisting on a 
policy o f retrenchment and tax cuts he ruled out the kind of expansion o f state 
provision that radicals were calling for. While he seemed to show some affinity with 
the masses, this did not always appear to be out of a deep conviction but more a 
temporary holding response to Joseph Chamberlain and others. It did not divert him 
from his own ultimately divisive agenda. Gladstone’s return to the Liberal leadership 
in 1876 after his resignation in 1874265 may have been key both in the brief revival of 
Liberal fortunes and to its demise. As T.A. Jenkins argues:
His interest in social questions, after 1886, was both half-hearted and 
motivated entirely by tactical considerations. Indeed the tragedy for the 
Liberal party, as a whole, was that it acquired an unreal image as a party o f 
the working man which it was scarcely capable o f living up to, and which 
it had assumed quite independendy of those social developments in the 
late 1880s and 1890s that gave rise to the demand for a separate working- 
class party. W hether a Liberal party enjoying a firm tenure o f power after 
1886 could have absorbed the pressures emanating from the spread of 
trade unionism and socialist thinking, and so prevented a separate ‘Labour’ 
party from gaining a foothold in parliament, is impossible to tell, but it is 
clear that its only chance o f doing so was by remaining what at heart it 
always wanted to be: a broadly based party representative of all classes. In 
this sense, the triumph of ‘Gladstonian Liberalism’, in 1886, may be seen 
as an important stage in the Liberal party’s decline.266
Thus, Liberalism as an ideology needed to find a way forward consistent enough with 
its past and responsive to the current situation. However, the Liberal leadership had 
an extra burden relative to the new labour movement in that they were a party of 
power or in contention for power. This meant that their internal rows were part of 
public discussion; they also had to deal with governmental realities not faced by the 
new political forces. Other parties used these opportunities to tar the Liberals with 
their past views. It was in the interests of the other two parties to be as unhelpful as 
possible to the Liberals in making this ideological shift.
265 Gladstone returned to politics on the moral issue o f  the massacres o f  Christians in Bulgaria and 
proposed intervention.
266 Jenkins, T.A. Gladstone, Whiggery and the Liberal Party 1874-1886. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 
p. 293.
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To label liberalism as laissez-faire and thus to deem it incapable of 
thinking out schemes of social reform was mistaken or unjust. Actually, 
by the end of the 1880s, the laissez-faire credo was much more likely to 
be heard from Conservatives o f the type of Lord "Wemyss. Otherwise it 
was mainly official Socialists who raised the image when anachronistically 
taunting the Liberal party.267
Mass or class appeal
In the context of the tactics of the time, it is worth noting that the enfranchisement of 
even a section o f the male population had wider implications. The extension of the 
franchise added a new type of awareness o f class to voting loyalties. Parties had 
previously been able to count on certain sections of the electorate. For the two 
progressive parties that, as Haldane put it, ‘differ more in readiness to apply principle 
than in principle itself, this was an increasing concern.268 Even before Haldane was 
making his observation, Sidney Webb clearly did not think the Liberal Party was 
taking up the radical agenda fast enough and was appealing to it to take action or lose 
the support o f ‘the London masses’. He predicted that:
The Liberal Party stands now once more at the parting of the ways. It 
must either abandon the hope of general popular support, or else make 
clear to the masses that its interest are the same as theirs, and its 
programme their programme.269
For New Liberals this was particularly distressing, as even before these electoral 
challenges they sought to represent the whole of the electorate and act in the 
common good — whereas the emerging Labour Party used this divisive tactic when 
they sought to inflict electoral damage on the Liberals. This was all part o f the 
political confusion that the Rainbow Circle and others had set out to tackle. It also 
led to internal difficulties not only for the Liberals but for all three political 
movements.
The old-fashioned Liberal member was not well informed upon these 
new topics. Borne along by the waves, he had assented to the programme 
of the younger members of his party, but neither with much intelligence 
nor with any great good will. But if Liberalism had lost in one direction it 
had gained in another. Between 1892 and 1895 the party was on the 
whole, though not always adequately, the champion of the progressive
267 Freeden, The New Liberalism, p. 33.
268 Haldane, ‘The N ew  Liberalism’, p. 135.
269 Webb, ‘Wanted, a Programme: An Appeal to the Liberal Party’, p. 16.
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movement, which was making itself felt in municipal life and in the 
relations of labour and capital.270
As Haldane suggests, the party was inconsistent in its official reform or conversion to 
New Liberalism. W hen Joseph Chamberlain introduced his Radical Programme in 
1885, aimed direcdy at the newly enfranchised agricultural workers, it was without 
the approval of the party leadership. W hen the campaigning body he established, the 
National Liberal Federation, set out the Newcasde Programme in 1891, taking on 
broad issues o f religious, rural and electoral reform it was again largely ignored by 
Gladstone despite the fact there was growing support for these ideas inside the party 
and amongst progressives generally:
1893 was a watershed in the development o f progressive thought in 
Britain. The failure of the Liberal party, under Gladstone’s increasingly 
tired leadership, to rise to the challenge posed by the 1891 Newcasde 
Programme exacerbated the tendency of various radical groups to press 
for their inclination, practical or programmatic, towards a more 
collectivist social reform.271
The defeat o f the Liberals in 1895 and their inability to regain power for a further ten 
years is perhaps testament to the party leadership’s inability to grasp the agenda being 
developed. Later, C.F.G. Masterman (1873—1927), a Liberal MP and junior minister 
under Asquith, argued that the ‘great bulk’ of those supporting the new Labour Party 
were not, in fact, any type of socialist but wanting instead to make a tactical vote to 
voice their opposition to the current ruling party. He suggested that what they were 
really looking for was someone of their own class or trade to represent them 
politically.272 Thus, the electoral impact of class was complete.
Whatever the party political outcome, the 1880s and 1890s represented the death of 
laissez-faire individualist liberalism. Sir William Harcourt (1827-1904), later to 
become leader of the party in the House of Commons, made this plain in his oft- 
quoted comment in 1889, ‘we are all socialists now’ — which, in the wider sense of 
the definition of the word, had a ring of truth about it.
Many Liberals moved easily towards the social reform identified by the new social 
sciences, while others found that personal or local issues made it difficult to make the 
change. Harcourt is a good example of this tension. A good campaigner and stalwart 
supporter of Gladstone in later years, he was caught by the not uncommon problem
270 Haldane, ‘The N ew  Liberalism’, p. 134.
271 Freeden, Minutes of the Rainbow Circle, p. 1.
272 Masterman, The New Liberalism, pp. 197-98.
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of the differences between the working classes of the northern mill cities and 
elsewhere. As indicated in previous chapters, the heart of industry lay in those areas 
that combined coal, transport and a workforce. Harcourt was originally elected for 
Oxford but then represented Derby for many years and finally Monmouthshire. The 
contrast of the ‘respectable working class’ of such cities and their longstanding finks 
with the mill-owners — traditionally often the MP — and the strongly unionised and 
increasingly militant working classes in the cities made for sharp tensions within the 
Liberal Party. The ‘radicals’, or ‘advanced liberals’, as many New Liberals came to be 
known, acted in some ways as a buffer between the more moderate leadership and the 
rising socialist movement.
Other Liberals were deeply concerned by the use o f strikes, anarchism and violence as 
a means to change, a view from London as well as on the Continent. This led some 
to shift not towards the evolving New Liberal agenda, but towards the Conservative 
Party, which made concern over ‘revolutionary’ socialists and the rise of communism 
a primary point of their programme. Others simply retired. Those who did fight 
under the changing Liberal banner had difficulty competing with candidates from the 
various socialist or workers groups who often had a better claim to be more direcdy 
in touch with the issues of the working class. The Conservatives were well placed to 
offer protectionist views and portray themselves as the defenders against continental 
extremes.
Thus, by the early 1900s liberals and socialists were struggling to find points of 
differentiation to present to the electors and if they could not find them in specific 
courses o f action, they often looked for them in approach or attitude. The individual 
and the state were a key part of that debate. As Freeden puts it, a period o f ‘a 
complicated love-hate relationship with socialism, certainly more a question of 
ideology than of political action, forced a clarification of basic problems on liberal 
thinkers and did much to bring liberalism fresh awareness of its powers and 
potentials.’273
In language familiar to the Third Way, a group o f ‘modernisers’ began to take 
advantage of the internal struggles and power dynamics within the Liberal Party. 
Supporters of New Liberalism felt the party had lost its way and did not understand 
the global economic or the domestic social realities. They tried to move the party on 
both ideological and tactical fronts, with politicians as senior as Lloyd George 
beginning to join the push towards a more progressive or radical agenda — though he
273 Freeden, The New Liberalism, p. 25.
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had his own political reasons for seeking to jog the party’s conscience. A collection of 
his speeches on New Liberalism was later published by Gardiner, who in his 
introduction said:
W e may say that between 1886 and 1906 the Liberal party in this country 
was dead. It was torn by civil war and miserable personal feuds. W ith the 
exception of the Budget of 1894 there was no single evidence that the 
vital spirit o f Liberalism still lingered in the corpse, and to all appearances 
the Liberal party had become as sterile and unprofitable in Great Britain as 
it is in Germany. The Liberal party based on the principles of the 
Manchester School had largely completed its work, which was the redress 
of political grievances and the establishment of civil and religious liberty 
‘in widest community spread’. It was the task of the old Liberalism to free 
the individual from the restrictions and disabilities o f a conception of the 
State based on property and aristocratic privilege. Hence it adopted a 
purely individualist position. It sought to give the individual absolute 
freedom and equality in the realm o f conscience and citizenship. It held 
the function o f the State to be simply to keep the ring. W ithin that ring 
the individual might fight his competitive batdes unfettered and 
uncontrolled. This was a sound view so long as the State represented the 
interests of a privileged caste. But with the establishment of a democratic 
State the task of Liberalism changed. Political liberty was seen to be only a 
stage in the evolution of the complete liberty of the individual. There 
remained the much more essential element o f economic liberty. That was 
impossible under the reign of the unfettered individualism which meant 
that the tyranny once exercised by a privileged aristocracy was transferred 
to wealth. The world had only escaped the aristocratic Scylla to fall into 
the plutocratic Charybdis.274
Conclusion
The fundamental change at the end of the nineteenth century altered the course of 
development o f political theory. The move from the pre-modem to the modem state 
led to a shift at all levels of society and, as argued here, a particular kind of ‘porous’ 
domestic politics.
In Britain the parties of government both developed responses to the changing 
climate. The Conservatives adopted essentially a negative view of the individual and a 
closed ideology; nationalism and the state were part of their new introspective 
approach. The Liberals, on the other hand, retained their positive approach to human
274 Lloyd George, The New Liberalism, pp. 1-3.
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nature and chose instead to adjust their views of freedom from a lack of restraint to a 
positive notion of state support and community involvement.
It is important to bear in mind that the intellectual debate was not the same as the 
party-political debate. This was particularly true for the forces of the left. Changes in 
the franchise and a new sense of the role of the individual, community and class 
brought new resonance to the left: as a conscious group that had not existed in the 
political process until this point.
Though there was considerable overlap in the personalities between areas of 
discussion, the development of the debate was not consistent between groups. 
Ironically, initial attempts to create consensus around the social agenda, such as the 
Radical Programme or the Newcasde Programme, were politically left to one side 
just as the intellectual debate was getting fully under way.
International and domestic concerns shaped the New Liberal agenda, and practical 
politics seemed to be driving the debate. Thus, progressive politics was attempting to 
address a range of issues brought on by a period of globalisation. New Liberalism was 
a transitional approach that carried the Liberal Party from its classical roots to a new 
understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state in response to 
globalisation and electoral survival. The next chapter will look in more detail at some 
of the key ideas of the time and their influence on New Liberalism.
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Chapter 6
New Liberal concepts
As discussed in the previous chapter, the intellectual debate over the changes in 
existing political philosophies and the new emerging approaches occurred largely 
outside the political arena. There were a number o f concepts that were being 
challenged by information and the changing climate. They form part of the positional 
attitudes and defining features set out in Chapter Three: the social contract, the 
challenge to the mechanical model of society with a more organic, mutual sense of 
community, the role of the state and efficiency and competitiveness. These are all 
common to both New Liberalism and Third Way debates, and will therefore be 
introduced by way of background to the development of the New Liberalism and the 
thinkers who developed these ideas. It is also worth a brief look at the Liberal Budget 
o f 1909 as it was a turning point before the eventual partings of the ways.
In a quote that is uncannily similar to Blair, L.T. Hobhouse provides an excellent 
summary. He amply demonstrates what he felt to be the importance of the link 
between theory and real politics, and the range of people and ideas shaping the age:
A new leaven was at work. The prosperity which had culminated in 1872 
was passing away. Industrial progress slowed down and though the 
advance from the ‘Hungry Forties’ had been immense, men began to see 
the limit o f what they could reasonably expect from retrenchment and 
Free Trade. The work of Mr. Henry George awakened new interest in 
problems of poverty, and the idealism of William Morris gave new 
inspiration to Socialist propaganda. Meanwhile, the teaching o f Green and 
the enthusiasm of Toynbee were setting Liberalism free from the shackles 
of an individualist conception of liberty and paving the way for the 
legislation of our own time. Lastly, the Fabian Society brought Socialism 
down from heaven and established a contact with practical politics and 
municipal government ... Socialism, ceasing to be a merely academic 
force, had begun to influence organized labour, with the determination to 
grapple with the problem of the unskilled workmen. From the Dockers’ 
strike o f 1889 the New Unionism became a fighting force in public 
affairs, and the idea o f a Labour party began to take shape. On the new 
problems Liberalism, weakened as it already had been, was further divided 
... In office it only experienced further loss of credit, and the rise of 
Imperialism swept the whole current of public interest in a new direction.
The Labour movement itself was paralysed, and the defeat of the 
Engineers in 1897 put an end to the hope of achieving a great social 
transformation by the method of the strike. But, in the meanwhile, 
opinion was being silently transformed. The labours of Mr. Charles Booth
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and his associates had at length stated the problem of poverty in scientific 
terms. Social and economic history was gradually taking shape as a 
virtually new branch of knowledge. The work of Mr. and Mrs. Sidney 
Webb helped to clear up the relations between the organized efforts of 
workmen and the functions of the State. The discerning observer could 
trace the ‘organic filaments’ of a fuller and more concrete social theory.275
Social contract -  morality of man or state?
The idea o f a ‘social contract’ had become an underlying assumption of the Whig 
interpretation of history and an enduring part of the Liberal programme. The 
evolution o f the contract has provided a thread of political development right through 
to the current debate. Concepts o f duty, and of rights and responsibilities, are key, as 
is the idea o f the individual and the state engaging in a reciprocal arrangement.
Jonathan Swift wrote Gulliver’s Travels in 1726 as a treatise on the issues of war and 
peace, order and justice. He argued that states were the causes of war rather than of 
peace; and further, that justice and freedom would be the creators o f both order and 
peace within and between states. William Godwin’s work, Enquiry Concerning Political 
Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, published in 1793, was a 
response to Swift and praised his analysis. Godwin was specifically cited by Ramsay 
MacDonald in his history of the socialist movement, Socialism (1907). Godwin argued 
against the ‘social contract’ because it allowed for the overruling of individual reason 
in favour of ‘the assembly’ or community. He went on to argue that the root of the 
problem of war lay within the concept of large centralised states. Godwin placed his 
faith in human reason and felt that coercion by states frustrated reason. Moreover, it 
was the coercion of states that produced disharmony and crime within society as well 
as war externally, thus suggesting he believed that all levels of analysis had similar 
dynamics, though on different scales.
He concluded that men o f reason should have no faith in a society that oppresses and 
forces them to obey orders not of their making:
W hat credit can man take for acting when such action has been ordered 
by the state? Where is his morality and dignity? People have supposed that
275 Hobhouse, L.T. Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964 (original publication 1911), pp. 
112-13.
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when law is vigorously enforced it produces order, but lawful societies 
have never in fact produced order.276
Godwin’s critique of both reason and the social contract struck at the heart of 
emerging liberal thought. Self-possession, the social contract, order and justice were 
under debate — but underlying these concerns was the question of the nature of the 
individual. For example, one of the core debates in the area o f social reform and the 
poor laws was precisely this issue of the morality o f men. Both Hobson and 
Hobhouse would later take on shades o f this argument as Hobson relied on his 
organic model of man to suggest there was a morality of the individual within the 
community. Hobhouse, in Liberalism, similarly argued that the state should help the 
individual develop their own morality without coercion:
Personality is not built up from without but grows from within, and the 
function o f the outer order is not to create it, but to provide for it the 
most suitable conditions of growth. Thus to the common question 
whether it is possible to make men good by Act o f Parliament, the reply is 
that it is not possible to compel morality because morality is the act of 
character o f a free agent, but that it is possible to create the conditions 
under which morality can develop, and among these not the least 
important is freedom from compulsion by others.277
This same idea and debate around the state and its provision o f welfare was also 
present in the tensions of the workhouse system. It was the view o f those, such as Sir 
Edwin Chadwick, a social reformer (see Appendix A — social reform), that this kind of 
support should not allow the individual to shirk their responsibilities or lapse into 
immorality but encourage them to self-sufficiency.
Mutual aid -  mechanical versus organic: the individual and the community
In terms of biological theories, the organic model of human nature and 
society, replacing the mechanical model of the state, was just beginning to 
develop as a result o f the work of people like Thomas Malthus (1766—
1834) and Charles Darwin (1809-81).278 They challenged the then 
established individualistic sense of Liberal ideas. Herbert Spencer, a strong 
supporter o f this atomistic view of nature, seized upon Darwin as 
scientific evidence of this approach to society. As already indicated, it was 
in fact Spencer who coined the term ‘survival of the fittest’ for Darwin’s
276 William Godwin, quoted in Runckle, Gerald. Anarchsim Old and New. N ew  York, NY: Delta 
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work, thus tipping its interpretation towards his own view of the 
individual.278
In terms o f economic theory, and in a similar way to the view that J.A. Hobson took 
on the constructs of the ‘rational man’ or ‘economic man’ as incomplete descriptions 
o f the ‘whole’ person, so too Prince Peter Kropotkin challenged the popularised 
version of social Darwinism by setting it against his theories of mutual aid. These 
theories of ‘mutualism’ or ‘mutual aid’ provided a new view of the community — 
crucial to both New Liberalism and the Third Way — as a kind of halfway house 
between the traditional Liberal night-watchman state and state control.
Kropotkin tamed the violent understanding o f anarchism and provided a 
reinterpretation of the more revolutionary anarchists. Much as Eduard Bernstein 
provided a revisionist view of Marx, Kropotkin’s thought-out version of an 
individualist view took on the organic model through the role of the community. It 
was, in effect, an early type of communitarianism, a term coined in 1841 and, 
together with ‘mutualism’, used by the Third Way in a very similar vein.
Kropotkin spent time in London and even stayed with leaders such as Ramsay 
MacDonald. He developed his ideas o f mutual aid as a more accurate way in which to 
describe the community-based individual. As socialism was still in its early stages of 
development at the time of his visit in 1881 he had the opportunity to influence the 
thinking of the early progressives as well as through the Internationals, as we saw in 
Chapter Four.
His model of the individual within the community was picked up by Hobhouse and 
other New Liberal thinkers as well as by the more collectivist writers. His main 
concern, like that reflected in Hobson’s early work, was the apparent inability of 
economics to deal with a holistic view o f the individual. The individual actor was key 
but needed to be placed within the community:
Up till now the academic economists have always simply enumerated 
what happens under such conditions, without specifying and analysing the 
conditions themselves. Even if they were mentioned, they were forgotten 
immediately, to be spoken of no more. This is bad enough, but there is in 
the teaching something worse than that. The economists represent the 
facts resulting from these conditions as laws — as fatal, immutable laws. And 
they call that Science.279
279 Read, Herbert, ed. Kropotkin: Selections from his Writings. London: Freedom Press, 1942, p. 88.
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Kropotkin’s ideas were based on his belief that each individual understands and 
respects their links with the larger whole. He had spent time in Siberia and observed 
that not only were animals interdependent but the links between nature and those 
making their livelihoods in such a harsh environment were also strong.
Real humanity presents a mixture of all that is most sublime and beautiful 
with all that is vilest and most monstrous in that world. How do they get 
over this? Why, they call one divine and the other bestial, representing 
divinity and animality as two poles, between which they place humanity.
They either will not or cannot understand that these three terms are really 
but one and that to separate them is to destroy them.280
This led Kropotkin, like the other collectivist commentators we will investigate in 
Chapter Eight, to engage with social Darwinism and refute the premise of ‘all against 
all’ by making a detailed biological argument for the survival of species, not of 
individuals. Kropotkin also criticised Darwinism as a false understanding o f the real 
nature o f humans. Kropotkin argues that Darwin misunderstood the nature of 
evolution. He suggests that within a species there is altruism, support and alliance 
rather than intentional killing or competition. His view o f society is firmly based on 
the individual but to the extent that the individual is clearly placed within a context 
o f a community from which they cannot be separated.
His theory o f ‘mutual aid’ was also based on the nature o f the medieval city. He held 
up this age as one in which small producers had face-to-face relations with one 
another, calling each other to account and a direct form of democracy.
The mutual aid tendency in man has so remote an origin, and is so deeply 
interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has been 
maintained by mankind up to the present time, notwithstanding all 
vicissitudes of history. It chiefly evolved during periods of peace and 
prosperity; but when even the greatest calamities befell men — when 
whole countries were laid waste by wars, and whole populations were 
decimated by misery, or groaned under the yoke o f tyranny — the same 
tendency continued.. .And whenever mankind had to work out a new 
social organisation, adapted to a new phase o f development, its 
constructive genius always drew the elements and the inspiration for the 
new departure from that ever living tendency.281
Socialists such as Ramsay MacDonald, well as many of the New Liberals, were taken 
with the idea of mutualism and its related ideas of an organic model of human nature 
as well as with Kropotkin himself. However, this view separated them from others
280 Shatz, The Essential Works o f Anarchism, p. 137.
281 Read, Kropotkin: Selections from his Writings, p. 65.
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strands of collectivist thought as the Fabians focused much more on a rational almost 
mechanical top-down version of society. This division would run throughout the 
century despite MacDonald’s efforts to encompass a more inclusive model such as 
Kropotkin’s.
A large part of the Third Way debate was a re-examination of the mechanical 
preference as modernisers sought to re-centre the debate around community and 
communitarianism. Third Way thinkers even brought back the specific language of 
mutualism — though they also put a great deal of faith in the coercive power of the 
state and the levers o f state policy. The Third Way has still not resolved the moral or 
organic versus the mechanical divide.
Role of the state and the Manchester School
While many of the ideas set out above had significance in terms of the social fabric 
and views of human nature, the Manchester School was really an underlying 
framework as both an economic and political approach to the role o f the state. It 
served as the key to the individualistic model of nature and concepts such as property, 
self-possession and the social contract, and crucially, freedom from interference by the 
state. As well as its domestic agenda, it also argued firmly that free trade and 
commerce promoted peace among states.
In fine with the stage of state development at the time, mercantilism had dominated 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Mercantilism asserted that the wealth of 
nations depended on their possessions and that the state — or, as we saw in Chapter 
Two, rulers — sought to increase status by creating trade surpluses and expanding 
reach through gaining territory. It contained two basic ideas: internal manufacturing 
power must be protected, and that this must be done at the expense o f other 
countries. This system brought with it controls and complicated regulations designed 
to retain assets, create monopolies and gain advantage. As Adam Smith pointed out in 
his dominating work on what became known as the ‘dismal science’, The Wealth of 
Nations (1776), this often harmed, rather than helped a nation’s overall position, and 
combined protection with state aggression.282
Gradually, a new kind of state attitude became more evident in Britain: laissez-faire or 
‘let things alone’, or ‘set things free to take their own course’, or even allow for
282 Penty, Arthur J. Protection and the Social Problem. London: Methuen & Co., 1926, p. 23.
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‘enlightened self-interest’, to use the famous phrase of Jeremy Bentham (1748—
1832).283 As early as 1689 the Toleration Act had meant Parliament no longer sought 
to determine the religion of its citizens; in 1695 censorship o f the press was 
withdrawn.284 But it is the economic interpretation of the concept that has come to be 
most associated with the phrase:
The philosophical basis of laissez-faire was the assumption that the 
maximum of benefits was to be attained by the individual through the 
exercise o f free, unfettered competition, and that if men were liberated 
from regulation and restriction in their activities they would choose such 
courses of actions as would be to their greatest advantage. It was further 
assumed that the pursuit by all men of what was to their own advantage 
must necessarily result in the maximum of benefit to the community as a 
whole ... The duty of the State was to stand aside and take no part in the 
clash of economic interests; it was expected to confine its activity to such 
primary functions as the defence of the country from external attack and 
the maintenance of internal order.285
Between 1848 and 1880, as Barker points out, the ‘general tendency is towards 
individualism’286 and the ideas of laissez-faire gained acceptance in both its domestic 
and foreign policy agendas. Laissez-faire ideas within the state, economy and society 
were inextricably linked with free trade with other states and societies. However, the 
social conditions and changed economic climate of this specific period gradually 
eroded this setdement and ultimately provided a catalyst for both New Liberalism and 
socialism.
Thus the doctrine of economic liberalism was not a way of interpreting 
one area of life, while religion, personal relations, or art developed their 
own philosophies; rather, except to maverick critics, it was the central, 
guiding philosophy of the period by which others must stand or fall ... 
Economic liberalism — the belief that all things work together for the 
good of those who help themselves, are let alone, and put their faith in 
the ‘natural law’ of private enterprise and private property.287
Laissez-faire to free trade
The doctrine o f free trade is closely associated with Richard Cobden (1804—65) and 
John Bright (1811—89), both Manchester men, who:
283 Croome and Hammond. A n Economic History of Britain, p. 129.
284 Southgate, George W . English Economic History. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1962, p. 344.
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286 Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, p. 19.
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... believed ardently in complete Free Trade. They pointed to the success 
British manufacturers and merchants were enjoying under free trade 
conditions; between 1840 and 1847 British imports rose by 44 per cent 
and exports by 34 per cent. They condemned the growth of an Empire, 
because empires in practice involved trade restrictions. Finally, they 
maintained that free trade should become the normal practice o f nations, 
not just because it would bring increased prosperity and a higher standard 
o f living: but also because the more nations trade with one another, the 
more they were likely to be able to live together in peace. For Cobden 
and his supporters, free trade was the road to universal peace.288
While the free trade argument had been gaining ground for some time it was the 
debate around the Com  Laws that finally shifted the balance. Cobden and Bright 
formed the Anti-Corn Law League in 1839 and campaigned vigorously for their 
repeal. It was presented to the working class as a way to relieve price increases and to 
ensure cheaper food, if not job stability. The campaign within the country made 
progress but it was really outside events that created the environment in which Sir 
Robert Peel repealed the laws in 1846. This move split the Conservative Party and 
led ultimately to various Tories joining the Liberal Party, while Britain’s economy 
‘became the freest in the world’289 and created the core of what came to be known as 
the Radical agenda.
Free traders argued that mercantilism was inherently linked to aggression while free 
trade was similarly linked to the cause o f peace. Their ideas of a tolerant trade were 
also generally supported by ideas of religious toleration as they were often dissenters of 
some kind; Bright, for example, was a Quaker. Cobden’s approach was that free trade 
was almost an ‘inexorable truth’.290 It was seen as the logical conclusion of a rational, 
scientific analysis but was often couched in terms that were almost religious. It was 
not only an economic model but a kind of moral code and ‘much of English 
nonconformity shared his view’.291
This happy time when the sentiments o f cosmopolitanism, 
internationalism, humanitarianism, and pacifism (all that a later generation 
was to call ‘Cobdenism’) held sway, sentiment rooted in and confirmed 
by England’s system of free trade, was generally depicted as an interlude 
between the mercantilist imperialism of the eighteenth century and the 
new imperialism, of which Hobson and Lenin were to write ... His 
cosmopolitanism, pacifism, anti-colonialism — were as we know, to
288 Hill, C.P. British Economic and Social History 1700-1914. London: Edward Arnold, 1957, p. 153.
289 Bradley, The Strange Rebirth of Liberal Britain, p. 19.
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become the hallmarks o f Radical policy from the late forties until the war 
o f 1914 ... Indeed Englishmen generally were happy to accept the 
Cobdenite defence o f free trade combining as it did the force of ‘science’ 
with that o f religion.292
From the outset, the free trade ethos appealed to the working class. Its combination of 
peace and progress was so ingrained that even as socialists began to question economic 
individualism in favour of a more collectivist approach, they did not question the 
issue of free imports. This view was supported by Robert Owen and even by Marx. 
The assumption was that free trade was unassailable and would soon be universal, 
bringing with it international peace. In the year following the repeal o f the Com  
Laws Marx, writing the Communist Manifesto in language that sounds very familiar in 
the globalisation debate, said: ‘National differences are today vanishing ever more and 
more with the development of the bourgeoisie, free trade, the world market, the 
uniformity of industrial production and the conditions of life corresponding 
thereto’.293
This free trade approach ‘remained ... in an increasingly protectionist world’, Bradley 
suggests, ‘for the next eighty-five years, thanks in no small measure to the continuing 
sway of the arguments which Cobden and Bright had deployed so forcefully. The 
economic liberalism espoused by these two men ... in what came to be known as the 
Manchester School.’294
The end of laissez-faire
As the tide of opinion began to change, the Manchester School became the target of 
commentators and New Liberal thinkers. Liberals debated the merits o f a system that 
did not provide for those caught in wider economic trends. Just as the phrase ‘survival 
of the fittest’ became shorthand for social Darwinism, so too the Manchester School 
became iconic. This point is made by Hobhouse and quoted by others, including 
Francis Hirst: ‘If I were asked to sum up in a sentence the difference and the 
connection (between the two schools) I would say that the Manchester men were the 
disciples o f Adam Smith and Bentham, while the Philosophical Radicals followed 
Bentham and Adam Smith’.295
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Information about social deprivation was beginning to move opinion away from what 
was perceived as a more atomistic view of society towards more of a community 
approach. As Barker says:
By 1880 the doctrine of laissez-faire — the preaching o f non-intervention 
as the supreme duty of the State, internally as well as externally — seems to 
have passed ... its doctrine of a foreign policy based on pacific 
cosmopolitanism, steadily lost ground ... After 1880 the bankruptcy of 
the old Benthamite Liberalism was beginning to be apparent. New ideals 
were needed for the new classes which had won the franchise.296
The demise o f the Manchester School was not unanticipated and not overly mourned 
as international tariffs were suffocating British trade. Though politicians had been 
confident that free trade was on the rise indefinitely, the shift in Germany and other 
European countries meant that England was forced to re-examine state welfare and 
industrial support.297 Domestically, even those who felt a sense of loyalty to it could 
see that times had changed and that a new basis had to be found for economic 
development and social legitimacy. As many Liberals evolved into New Liberals, they 
developed a new narrative, which accepted that laissez-faire economic theory that had 
played its part, but it was time to move on.
Ironically perhaps, is the view that the Manchester School or laissez-faire precluded 
state activity. In fact, economic liberalism required state action to, in effect, protect it 
from incursion. State action remained ‘offstage’ as Merrell Lynd puts it,298 and 
therefore the ability of the state to act ‘for good’ was not fully recognised. As Merrell 
Lynd goes on to point out, it was the shift in emphasis from preventing bad 
government to planning good government that brought the state out from the wings 
and enabled a new kind of philosophy to take hold. Hirst also points to this important 
observation in terms of the move from negative freedom to a positive notion of state 
and government:
Perhaps the favourite misapprehension about the Manchester School is 
that in its anxiety to enlarge and secure the freedom of the individual it 
was not merely jealous but entirely hostile to the activity of the State.
This vulgar error may be referred to two main causes. First, the work of 
the School in the thirty years following the Reform Act was mainly a 
work of emancipation. The prime necessity o f progress was to destroy bad 
laws and to free society from the chains which fettered moral and 
economic development. The second cause was the action of a slow and
296 Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, pp. 20, 22, 208.
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rather dogmatical section of wealthy adherents, who, after the death of 
their leader [Cobden], displayed a real, but narrow and unimaginative, 
devotion to his principles by persistently marking time when they should 
have been pushing forward to the solution of new problems like the land 
question, which his keen eye had foreseen and marked out for solution.299
Hobhouse also began to set out the notion o f an ‘early’ Liberalism, as opposed to 
what became the New Liberalism, in Liberalism, and including new ideas such as 
‘mutual aid’ along the lines set out by Kropotkin:
The earlier Liberalism had to deal with authoritarian government in 
church and state. It had to vindicate the elements of personal, civil, and 
economic freedom; and in so doing it took its stand on the rights o f man, 
and, in proportion as it was forced to be constructive, on the supposed 
harmony of the natural order. Government claimed supernatural sanction 
and divine ordinance. Liberal theory replied in effect that the rights of 
man rested on the law of Nature, and those of government on human 
institution. The oldest ‘institution’ in this view was the individual, and the 
primordial society the natural grouping of human beings under the 
influence of family affection, and for the sake of mutual aid ... This 
conception of the relations of the State and the individual long outlived 
the theory on which it rested. It underlies the entire teaching of the 
Manchester school. Its spirit was absorbed, as we shall see, by many of the 
Utilitarians. It operated, though in diminishing force, throughout the 
nineteenth century.300
Efficiency
The ‘five e’s’ of the London School of Economics have been mentioned above, and 
the various aspirations of the LSE have been evident aspects o f New Liberalism. 
However, there is one ‘e’ that has not been mentioned overdy but was part of the 
underlying approach. ‘Efficiency’ is relevant not only because it became a ‘catch-cry’ 
of all political parties at the turn of the century, according to G.R. Searle,301 but also 
because it is resonant of the contemporary debate on competitiveness in the face of 
globalisation. As Searle argues, quoting from an article in the Spectator in 1902:
At the present time and perhaps it is the most notable social fact of this 
age, there is a universal outcry for efficiency in all the departments of 
society, in all aspects of life. We hear the outcry on all hands and from the
299 Hirst, Free Trade, pp. xi-x ii.
300 Hobhouse, Liberalism, pp. 32-33.
301 Searle, G .R. The Quest for National Efficiency: A  Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899— 
1914. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971.
144
most unexpected persons ... the same cry is heard: ‘Give us Efficiency, or 
we die’.302
Searle’s definition of the movement highlights the nature of the term as being 
specifically about foreign competition and Britain’s preparedness. As he states:
If one were to sum up its meaning in a single sentence, one might 
describe the ‘National Efficiency’ ideology as an attempt to discredit the 
habits, beliefs and institutions that put the British at a handicap in their 
competition with foreigners and to commend instead a social organisation 
that more closely followed the German model.303
While the term efficiency has not been mentioned explicitly thus far, projects 
undertaken in its name have been. For example, Haldane’s reforms of the General 
Staff and the Territorial Army were the result o f perceived military incompetence 
during the Boer War that were put down to a problem with ‘national efficiency’. His 
reforms to the Officer Training Corps and his encouragement to Baden-Powell to set 
up the Boy Scouts were similarly based on a notion o f encouraging discipline and a 
more efficient younger generation. He was even described by ‘one observer to have 
invented the word efficiency, so often was it on his lips’.304
Similarly, the Rowntree report on poverty in York, though not direcdy driven by the 
efficiency movement, was influenced by this work. Many of the arguments in terms 
of nutrition and ‘the amount of calories, proteins and fats necessary to maintain a 
person in a state o f physical efficiency’305 reflect a concern for the health of the nation 
as an indicator of its efficiency.
As evident from these examples, to those involved in the ‘efficiency movement’, 
people were considered almost to be the raw material of the country — an idea that 
appealed particularly to the leadership of the Fabians at the time. The movement 
gained enough support to produce its own magazine — Nineteenth Century — as well as 
a small dining group not unlike the Rainbow Circle. The Coefficients, as they were 
called, are relevant here only in that they provide yet another overlapping connection 
between players in the wider political debate as the group was essentially a subset of 
the Fabians, LSE lecturers and various imperialists. Its twelve founders included all
302 Ibid., p. 1.
303 Ibid., p. 54.
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three of the LSE directors and a large selection of its lecturers as well as the Webbs 
(who instigated the club), Haldane, Bertrand Russell and H.G. Wells.306
The Coefficients, like the efficiency movement itself, did not last. Increasing hostility 
towards Germany meant that extolling the virtues of their model became unpopular. 
However, like competitiveness in the current context, efficiency was presented as the 
antidote to increasing external pressure. Success in this regard relied not on the state 
but on the individual to help the state address the problem of state inefficiency.
Opportunity lost
One specific opportunity stands out in the course of this tumultuous time for the 
evolution o f Liberal thought: the Budget of 1909 when Lloyd George was able to 
drive forward a reforming budget as part of a wider reforming government under 
Asquith. This is worth a brief examination as a potential ‘opening’ in terms o f the 
cooperation between Liberal and Labour, but setting in train the events that led to 
their ‘divorce’.
Budget 1909
The Liberal victory o f 1906 and the presence of New Liberal MPs in the new intake 
should have ensured strong support for a reforming agenda. As it transpired, the 
reforming measures taken during the period o f 1905—14 were, in the words o f Peter 
Rowland, a ‘hotchpotch’:
At none of the three general elections fought during this period had a 
Liberal programme of social reforms been put forward for consideration 
by the electorate. Such a programme was often referred to, in familiar 
terms which implied that there was no need to spell out the details but the 
plan fact is that (except, perhaps for those who vaguely recalled the 
‘Newcasde programme’ of 1891) it simply did not exist ... by 1907 the 
Government had run out of ideas.307
The downturn o f 1907 exposed the Liberal Party to the tariff reformers and calls for 
more social reform. Asquith, then Chancellor, produced a budget that introduced a 
notion of progressive taxation for the first time but a series of by-election defeats
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seemed to lead the government to introduce various pieces of social legislation such as 
the Licensing Bill, the Eight Hours Bill and old age pensions. The pattern, Rowland 
argues, was, until 1909, one o f ‘hand to m outh’, with reforms being carried out only 
in a ‘piecemeal fashion’. It was Lloyd George’s Budget o f 1909 — which came to be 
known as ‘The People’s Budget’ — that was the turning point.308
Bruce Murray, in The People’s Budget of 1909/1910: Lloyd George and Liberal Politics,309 
suggests that the budget was essentially the product of Lloyd George’s personal 
initiative. It was not a particularly innovative budget, but built on Asquith’s first steps 
towards progressive taxation between 1905 and 1908. However, two additional 
factors were at work. The first was the desire to increase naval spending; or the 
dreadnought race with Germany was becoming intense. Second, Lloyd George, 
following Asquith as Chancellor when the latter became Prime Minster, was 
conscious of the need to retain working class support. He therefore attempted to use 
the budget to create a bridge between the working and middle classes to shore up 
Liberal support. Thus, he tried to avoid antagonising the middle classes by separating 
tax on earned and unearned income and also focused on items such as spirits and 
tobacco rather than direct taxation (this also in an attempt to win over the temperance 
interest). However cautious Lloyd George tried to be, there was still some concern 
from the more moderate Liberals as it was seen as an attack on wealth and property.
As Rowland argues:
... the principal advance by the New Liberals for using finance as an 
essential weapon of reform by means o f taxes and expenditures that 
employed the recourses of the community for the benefit of the 
community. The New Liberals advocated progressive graduated taxation, 
levied in accordance with ability to pay, in order to finance ‘productive 
social investment by the state’. They advanced the idea o f a fund o f capital 
and income that was created by the action of the community itself to 
which the state should secure access, by way of direct taxation for the 
financing of social reform. Freeden makes the point that, whereas the gulf 
between the ideas and policies o f official Liberalism and the New Liberals 
was often immense during the liberal administration of 1905—14, finance 
was the one field of reform in which official Liberalism did not appear to 
be ‘lagging too far behind its theorists’.310
The People’s Budget was successful at both political and electoral levels. It enabled 
the party to consolidate its working-class support and ward off the threat from the
309 Murray, Bruce K. The People’s Budget 1909/10: Lloyd George and Liberal Politics. Oxford: Clarendon 
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Labour Party. As Rowland suggests, ‘by producing a “People’s Budget” Lloyd George 
not only blunted but thwarted the drive of the Tariff Reformers to capture industrial 
England, and contributed direcdy to the containment of the Labour party by seriously 
hampering its ability to differentiate itself clearly from Liberalism.’311
In the event, the Budget o f 1909 was rejected by the House o f Lords, precipitating a 
constitutional row that, as well as occupying the government’s time and attention, 
also diverted the social agenda. There were two elections in 1910 and while the 
Liberals retained power, they were far from secure and needed to reassure the middle 
classes once again. As a direct result of this constitutional row, they were able to pass 
the Parliament Act of 1911 which destroyed the Lords’ veto. They also passed the 
National Insurance Act, creating health and unemployment insurance (where there 
was an interesting debate amongst the unions, as they worried about a loss of power if 
the state took this over) and introduced bills for Irish Home Rule and Welsh 
disestablishment.
The budget o f 1914 looked significandy different in that it was an overt attempt to 
shore up and protect the majority of income-tax payers and aimed more direcdy at 
‘the rich’. Unfortunately, the party’s internal divisions between the New Liberals and 
other influential Liberal MPs had reached the end o f their accommodation. As 
Rowland, drawing on Bendey Gilbert, says:
The revolt by a section of ‘influential’ Liberal MPs against the Budget for 
1914, and the Government’s retreat in the face o f that revolt, indicated 
that by 1914 New Liberalism had effectively run its course. The limits of 
the Liberal Party’s ‘tolerance for social and economic change’ had been 
reached.312
The Liberal leadership and the New Liberals were gradually coming together as more 
MPs entered the House of Commons with a coherent social agenda. However, this 
exacerbated the tensions with other sections of the party and was too late to avert the 
eventual split between the growing Labour Party and the weakening and re-divided 
Liberal Party.
311 Ibid., p. 291.
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A parting of the ways
Ultimately, the ‘divorce’ of the progressive movement was the indirect result o f both 
domestic and international pressures on the political process. As British industry 
stagnated or declined in the face of rising competition, support for protectionist tariffs 
rose as well as civil unrest. In 1906 the Anti-Sweating League was formed and in 1910 
there were strikes and lock-outs in the Welsh coalfields. The following year the 
dockers and railwaymen struck; troops were called out and on two occasions opened 
fire, killing four strikers. In 1912 a nation-wide strike o f coal miners was broken only 
by the introduction of the minimum wage bill. Lloyd George was determined by the 
time o f the 1914 Budget that the Liberals and the Labour Party needed each other to 
survive.
Meanwhile, Hardie, MacDonald and others, now part o f an official Labour Party, 
were actively participating in congresses both in London and across Europe of the 
international workers’ movement. However, these meetings were gripped by debates 
with anarchists over tactics and European socialist parties over coalitions of 
convenience and colonialism. Gradually, the Second International followed the path 
o f the first and broke into national groups rather than pursuing its ideal of the unity of 
the working classes.
Viewed from a modern perspective it is fascinating to see the arguments that 
Masterman deployed in his book, The New Liberalism, regarding the potential relations 
between the Liberals and the Labour Party. Published in 1920, when the Liberals 
were divided and in decline, and the Labour Party was increasing its representation 
and no longer reliant on electoral deals with the Liberal Party, Masterman appealed to 
the forces of ‘enlightened’ politics to come together. It is a lengthy quote but the idea 
of a joined left/left-of-centre party would have created an utterly different landscape 
in British politics and is therefore worthy of consideration:
It profoundly dislikes being placed in the position where it is compelled 
to fight the representatives o f the Labour Party in order to preserve its 
own existence, to the advantage solely of Toryism and their interests. To 
sum up, New Liberalism recognises a Labour Party as a body largely 
animated by the same ideals, and working towards the same ends. It 
desires to co-operate in every practicable fashion towards the attainment 
o f those common ends. In so far as any members of that Party are 
working for a universal Socialism, or for a violent destruction of the 
present social order, these members are working for ideals divergent from 
the ideals of Liberalism. In so far as Labour is working for advanced social 
changes, equal opportunity, less divergence between rich and poor, the
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practical abolition of poverty by attack on the specific evils from which 
poverty is bred, it can work with the utmost harmony ... New Liberalism 
and the policy o f the Labour Party coincide in outlook upon foreign 
affairs, in the advocacy of the League of Nations, in work towards self- 
determination of nations, in attitude towards Ireland, in maintenance of 
Free Trade ... They both advocate a financial system which shall pay off 
debt, establish social services...There is here an enormous field for 
common enterprise, which both alike are preaching as the immediate 
work. To the convinced Socialist this enterprise is merely a step to a 
universal monism, while to the Liberal it is the establishment o f a state in 
which the elements of weakness which now give strength to the 
communist critic are removed. That is no reason why both should not 
work towards a policy which both advocate, and which will require all 
possible united efforts of all men of good will if the interests opposed to it 
are to be overcome. And in common effort for overthrow of this 
dominance, Liberal and Labour Party should brush aside all personal 
polemic, envy or pride, and see if it be not possible for them to rise 
together to the height of the challenge; by the response to which each 
will be approved or condemned in the judgment of all future time.313
In another precursor of the Third Way debate, in the same book, Masterman also 
argued strongly that Liberalism was not a compromise or some kind o f ‘middle 
ground’ seeking support from ‘Tories who are a litde sentimental, and Socialists who 
are a little timid’ but concerned with ‘maintenance o f a party, the winning of the 
approval o f men and women at elections, the formation of a Government, the 
carrying out o f its ideas, through such a Government, in the region o f practical 
affairs.’314
This attempt at bravado is not a view shared by later commentators such as Ian Adams 
who comes to a different conclusion, arguing that Liberalism did become a middle 
way. He suggests that Liberalism was caught between all the currents of the time, 
from socialism and conservatism to collectivism and individualism and even fascism 
and communism. Though even as the Liberal Party continued to decline, New 
Liberal thinkers continued to play an important role in the political debate.
313 Masterman, The New Liberalism, pp. 197, 206-08.
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Proponents of the 'new politics'
The overlap of thinkers and writers and politicians has already been set out, but to 
understand New Liberalism as a response to the transformational times in which its 
proponents lived, as well as the impact on international relations it is important to 
explore the ideas within New Liberalism through the eyes of individual political 
thinkers. Two stand out immediately in this context, as a pair: John Atkinson Hobson 
and Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse. H.V. Emy declares them: ‘The two figures most 
closely associated with the intellectual growth of Social Radicalism’, who, ‘together 
provided for the Liberals a distinctive treatment of the economic problem in politics, 
viewing the inter-related issues less as a matter for separate and independent 
disciplines than as an essay in distributive justice’.315 Freeden suggests that they are:
The two most profound of the liberal thinkers o f the period, who both 
argued that, ‘the social ideal is not to be reached by logical processes 
alone, but must stand in close relation to human experience. But social 
ideals or ethical ends were deduced from philosophical first principles and 
were, as such, abstract.’ While Hobson himself argued in a very similar 
vein that ‘the first and simplest step in every ‘inductive science’ is directed 
a priori, the ordering of facts had to take place with some principles or 
ends in mind.316
To many, Hobhouse stands out because he addressed philosophical and social issues 
while Hobson concentrated on the economic side; but it will become clear that their 
lives and their work overlapped — often literally — and their joint endeavour was to 
apply thought to the practical questions around them. Ernest Barker makes this point:
Here we touch one of the most constant occupations of his thought and 
one o f the greatest services which he [Hobhouse] rendered. To deepen 
Liberal thought; to reconcile its old conceptions with new social demands 
and a new social philosophy; to turn Liberalism from laissez-faire to a 
genuine sympathy with Labour; to discover ‘the measures necessary to 
reconcile the larger share which the workers should have in the conduct 
and the fruits of industry with the maintenance and stimulation of 
personal incentives to efficient service’; this was, for many years, a core of 
his practical endeavour. In this he was associated with Mr. J.A. Hobson, 
his colleague in journalism, his lifelong friend, the writer of his biography; 
and the names of the two run naturally together when one thinks o f this 
aspect of Hobhouse’s work.317
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The next two chapters will examine the ideas of these thinkers and their views on 
globalisation and the role of the state along the attitudes and features already discussed, 
and provide a brief outline of the development of social democracy. The objective of 
this examination of these thinkers and proponents of progressive thought is to 
demonstrate the porousness of politics and the deliberate way in which actors operate 
along the domestic/international frontier at a time of transformation.
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Chapter 7
New Liberals: Hobson and Hobhouse
John Atkinson Hobson
J.A. Hobson was born in Derby on 6 July 1858, seven years after Britain had hosted 
the Great Exhibition, nine years after the repeal of the Corn Laws and nearly ten years 
after the last Chartist demonstrations. The son of the owner of the Derbyshire and 
Staffordshire Advertiser, perhaps journalism was an obvious destination but he became a 
journalist only after studying at Lincoln College, Oxford, and teaching classics and 
English literature in Faversham and Exeter. It was only when he moved to London in 
1887 and met William Clarke of the Fabian Society (also a co-founder o f the 
Rainbow Circle) that his political and journalistic career began. Hobson was also an 
extension lecturer for Oxford and the University o f London and taught two courses at 
the new LSE.
London was just recovering from nearly a decade of depression caused by crop failure 
and international competition, particularly from Germany and the US. The Third 
Reform Act o f 1884 had extended the franchise while rising tariffs in other countries 
were creating structural unemployment that the social fabric was ill-equipped to deal 
with. The Social Democratic Federation had been recendy formed and unions were 
gaining members; the Trades Union Congress even called for an international 
conference o f workers the following year. Hobson was fascinated, as well as appalled, 
by the conditions of the poor living in what was, in all likelihood, the world’s richest 
city. The investigations o f these conditions carried out by Charles Booth, Rowntree 
(see Appendix A — social reform) and others, and the growing publicity surrounding 
their findings, made a profound impact on Hobson in the midst o f the prevailing 
climate o f a sense o f progress and development and a belief in peace through trade.
Hobson did the rounds of the many London organisations related to social reform and 
politics; the Rainbow Circle and the South London Ethical Society were the most 
important to him, but were only two amongst many. Generally, Hobson was not 
overly impressed. He considered the Christian Socialists ‘too sentimental’ and the 
Social Democrats ‘too inflammatory’.318 Interestingly he also ‘found the manner and
318 Allett, The New Liberalism The Political Economy o f J .A . Hobson, pp. 7 -8 .
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argument o f H.M. Hyndman, the leader of the Social Democratic Federation, to be 
‘those o f an oily mouthed, half-educated, self-conceited Dissenting Minister’.319
This may help to explain why he remained in the Liberal Party and resisted joining 
the Labour Party for as long as he did, though he was a prolific contributor to a range 
o f organisations. For the Fabians he wrote Problems of Poverty (1891) and Problems of the 
Unemployed (1896) and two books, Evolution of Modern Capitalism (1894) and John 
Ruskin: Social Reformer (1898). As a member o f the Rainbow Circle he presented 
twenty-two papers over the thirty-seven years of his membership, covering topics 
such as ‘economic deficiencies of the Manchester School’ (first session, 1894—95), ‘a 
progressive party’ (fifth session, 1898—99) and imperialism (sixth session, 1899—1900).
It was just at this point that C.P. Scott invited him to join the Manchester Guardian to 
be their correspondent in South Africa during the Boer War. In Africa, Hobson 
further developed his ideas of imperialism and its relation to capitalism. His reports 
and views on the situation in Africa began to attract attention from a wide range of 
international opinion, including Kropotkin, who wrote to Hobson to say that his 
reports constituted ‘one of the most striking documents on the history o f serfdom’.320
Hobson returned to England in 1900 to a welcome-home dinner co-chaired by 
David Lloyd George at the National Liberal Club. He then went on a lecture tour of 
the country where many of his lectures were disrupted by demonstrators. He was not 
only opposed the war but also took the opportunity to promote his work on 
imperialism. He argued firmly that the age of free trade had come to a close and, 
further, that in all likelihood it had never delivered the benefits promised by its 
proponents. In an article, one of many, for the Fortnightly Review, in March 1902 
Hobson made the point that:
The public confidence of the nation in Free Trade as a basis of 
commercial policy has evaporated during the last thirty years. The rank 
and file of the Conservative Party, predominant in wealth and influence 
to a degree unprecedented in our history, is almost to a man Protectionist 
... Liberal Imperialists are rapidly gravitating towards a re-construction of 
relations between Great Britain and her colonies, which if adopted, would 
involve some unavoidable concessions to the fiscal policy which prevails 
in all our self-governing colonies. Socialism, in all its various forms and 
degrees implying an increased use of the state as an instrument o f public 
policy, has so eaten into the older Radicalism that the former intellectual
319 Ibid.
320 From a letter to Hobson, ibid.
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apprehension of Free Trade as an integral portion of the laissez-faire 
principle of government now remain little more than the discredited 
gospel of a doctrinaire remnant.321
Shortly before Joseph Chamberlain resigned from the government on this point, 
Hobson even suggested that Chamberlain was the only ‘Cabinet minister with an eye 
to the future’. The rise of the US and Germany must continue to worry business if 
the UK did not respond with an ‘Imperial Zollverein’.
Effectively, Hobson denounced modem imperialism. After his experience in Africa he 
believed it to be promoted by manufacturers who benefited from war and those who 
wanted export markets for what he called their ‘surplus goods’. He argued that if 
‘surplus capital’ and ‘surplus goods’ could be better, or more jusdy, distributed it 
would expand the domestic market to absorb these surpluses. As it was, only very 
narrow interests gained whereas the rest of the nation lost. He felt that the success of 
trade unions in securing higher wages and of social reformers in achieving better 
conditions for the lower classes meant that eventually imperialism would be
322unnecessary.
Hobson wrote most of his work between 1897 and 1920. As Freeden puts it:
Hobson was instrumental in reformulating liberalism and enabling it to 
emerge from a period of considerable self-questioning and o f competition 
with rival solutions to pressing social and political problems, unscathed 
but stronger, more coherent and more relevant. In his productivity, 
consistency and range he was the leading theorist of new liberalism that 
began to take root in the late 1880s and that, gaining intellectual 
ascendancy within a generation, laid the ideological foundations o f the 
modem British welfare state.323
Darwin, biology and organic communities
Darwin and his theories of evolution have already been noted, but Hobson provides 
an example o f how the wider community of science was impacting on politics and 
ideology as well as social welfare and reform. As we shall see, Hobson was certainly
321 Cain, Peter, ed. Free Trade and Protectionism Volume II: From Free Trade to Fair Trade 1850-1902. 
London: Routledge/Thoem m es Press, 1996, p. 346.
322 Semmel, The Rise o f Free Trade Imperialism; Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. PfaltzgrafFJr. 
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not alone in attempting to use Darwin’s theories to better understand human nature, 
thus using it as an approach to social theory and philosophy.324
In particular the theory o f ‘orthogenic evolution’ had the most impact on Hobson.325 
Various New Liberals attempted to use the theory of evolution, while avoiding the 
darker conclusions o f Spencer and Huxley. Hobson used this base to create a holistic 
approach to a study o f human nature that encompassed not only psychology and 
biology but sociology and economics as well as ethics. However, as Freeden points 
out, ‘Unlike Spencer ... Hobson drew politically radical conclusions from the organic 
analogy through emphasising not the self-sustaining abilities o f the parts but the 
capacity o f the whole for self-regulation’.326
W hat is possible to take from Darwin was the impact he had on intellectual life. The 
model o f society was changing from the rational and mechanical to a biological and 
organic interpretation. The ‘laws’ that had dominated economics and science were 
giving way to a sense of interaction at all levels of society. This ‘organic’ view of 
human nature became the backbone of Hobson’s work. It coloured his views not 
only of the individual, but also of the state. The individual was an organism but 
placed within another organism, the state, which also operated as a system. Barker 
comments on this aspect of both Hobson and Hobhouse in his commentary on 
political thought:
The development of Liberalism, during the last few years, shows 
considerable traces o f Fabian influence. Liberal writers like Prof Hobhouse 
and M r J.A. Hobson have both argued in favour of the intervention o f 
the State in the field of socially created values. Mr Hobson in particular 
has urged that the individual is not the only unit of economic production; 
that the community is itself a producer o f values; and that the State, 
which is the organ of the community, may claim a special right to impose 
special taxation on such values. The old individualistic view of the State 
thus seems to be definitely shed by modem Liberalism; and Mr Hobson, 
in re-stating the Liberal case, can even enlist the conception of a social 
organism under its banner. That conception serves to justify the taxation 
of socially created values, which are argued to be the results of the growth 
of the organism; and the contention that the State is an organism which 
feels and thinks, and may claim the right to express its feelings and 
thoughts.327
325 Allett, The New Liberalism The Political Economy o f J .A . Hobson, p. 20.
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This organic view marked Hobson out and enabled him to range over virtually any 
topic. His vision o f the individual as a ‘total, integrated being’ stretched his thinking 
across physical, psychological and the biological as part of his approach.328
Hobson's New Liberalism
Hobson concentrated on pointing out the weaknesses in the capitalist system while 
Hobhouse, and others such as Herbert Samuel (1870-1963), later an MP and D.G. 
Ritchie (1853—1903), concentrated on attacking the political philosophy o f ‘old 
liberalism’. David Long, in Towards a New Liberal Internationalism,329 argues that:
Hobson’s new liberalism, like his ideas on human rationality, social 
science, and welfare, was inspired by organic terminology. It was an 
attempt at a democratic compromise between the laissez-faire of 
nineteenth century liberalism and the authoritarian tone of contemporary 
socialistic doctrines of both the Idealist and groups of the radical Left.330
Working through his long-standing interest in issues such as unemployment and 
poverty, Hobson argued that the free enterprise system did not operate well in the 
longer perspective because it was based on a ‘false assumption’ that resources would 
tend to be frilly employed. However, as he demonstrated, instead of frilly employing 
the available resources, uncontrolled capitalism tended to create cycles o f under­
consumption and mass unemployment.
As we saw in relation to imperialism and free trade, this line o f argument went 
completely against the grain of the Manchester School and the classical doctrine of 
laissez-faire, not least in that it supported state intervention to correct the excesses of 
capitalism, both to enhance its long-term efficiency and in its claim that the surplus 
did not belong to the capitalists but to the wider population.331
Also core to this new view of the state was that it became the ‘prime ethical agent of 
the community’.332 A ‘benevolent’ and ‘impartial’ state was required if it was to be 
handed more power in the form of a more collectivist vision o f society, but would 
nevertheless still safeguard the ends of both society and the individual.333
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Hobson was suggesting that the New Liberalism was a kind of ‘socialism in 
liberalism’.334 By which he meant liberalism needed to create economic opportunity 
through education which would ultimately enable the citizens to take on self- 
government.335 In effect, New Liberals were proposing to expand the role of the state. 
They wanted the state in invest in far more than just areas of monopolies or areas that 
could not attract investment or capital. Instead, they proposed a vision that looked 
more like a welfare state and covered at least basic necessities. It was a call for a society 
of more than just a collection of individuals, but individuals as part o f a community.
Its aim was a more substantial form of equality by creating an environment conducive 
to exploring individual potential.336
In some ways, Germany was providing an example as its rise was not through free 
trade but by using tariffs to protect its industries. Meanwhile, domestically, it had 
invested heavily in infrastructure and industry and crucially also provided education 
for its people as the framework of a welfare state. Germany had developed a different 
focus for the state and its role.
Globalisation
As suggested in Chapter Two, there are stages in the development in the state and 
Hobson identifies with this interpretation. He suggested that rather than the accepted 
view o f the state somehow being the ‘final product’, there is a continuing process that 
should be examined. Perhaps due to Hobson’s extensive travel, or his interest in 
international issues, he suggested that current notions of sovereignty and 
independence could be called into question.
History, it is contended, thus supports political theory in insisting that the 
national State is a final product of social evolution, and that the political 
instinct of men has exhausted itself in attaining this goal. But before 
turning to the test of history, one is entitled to question the theoretical 
assumption. What is the worth of this assumption that the associative 
instincts and interests of men, which have gradually built up the fabric of 
the national State from smaller social units by fusion and co-operation, are 
precluded from carrying the process any farther by some absolute barriers 
o f sovereignty and independence?337
334 A phrase he used as the title o f an article for the Nation in 1907, reprinted in The Crisis of Liberalism 
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Hobson also linked this to what would be termed the international/domestic divide 
and argued that the state had the potential for moving across into the international 
sphere but that those links also impacted the state internally. Hobson called them 
‘world-forces’, but globalisation would be the modem term for what he could see as 
part o f both the domestic and the international arena fore-shadowing Giddens who 
argues that traditional enemies should no longer be the focus of the state.
Capital and labour alike are coming to recognise that few of their deeper 
problems are any longer susceptible of merely national solutions. Markets, 
rates o f interest, wages, and standards of living are more and more 
regulated by world-forces. The perception of the futility of all attempts 
either to deny or to reverse these world-forces will more and more lead 
those who do the thinking for capital, and labour to think, not nationally, 
nor imperially, but in terms of mankind.338
Much later and in a more philosophic mood, Hobson wrote a history through the 
eyes of what he called a ‘recording angel’. This angel was responsible for reporting to 
God once a century on the progress of the human race. The reports the angel sent 
point to Hobson’s continuing sense o f the world and humankind as part o f a single 
entity. His organic view of all aspects of society meant that levels were not barriers to 
analysis but indications of unity, just on different scales.
The swift, sure, easy movement of men, goods, news, ideas from any part 
o f Earth to any other is the distinctive achievement of Western 
civilisation. It marks man’s new era o f triumph over his material 
surroundings. It is a great and rapid extension of the reign of reason in the 
field o f material equipment.339
These ‘world-forces’ were not only economic, and they took on a new meaning 
when Europe entered war. The idealists who had believed so firmly in the ever- 
expanding potential for progress and universal peace through knowledge and trade 
were knocked back by the trauma of the First World War. Hobson, however, 
continued to make his case, though now in a small-1 liberal sense, as he was 
increasingly at odds with the Liberal Party over the war.
A speech that was fully echoed by Hobhouse a year later stands as a fascinating 
precursor to the work of later progressives such as David Mitrany340 and even later 
proponents o f global governance such as David Held. Hobson argued for an 
international or world government. In line with Woodrow Wilson, he also insisted
338 Ibid., p. 196.
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15-16.
340 Long, Towards a New Liberal Internationalism.
159
that secret diplomacy must end and a dialogue between peoples be at the heart of 
government.341 But the core of Hobson’s speech was an attempt to continue to apply 
the notions of the integrated individual within their community and society — be that 
national or international — and rights and responsibilities that come with being part of 
that community. Just as the Third Way saw the state as part of the global community 
writ large a century later, he saw the ‘global’ nature of the world:
The first consists in the conscious or unconscious acceptance of a half- 
legal, half-philosophical theory of the National State as the final stage in 
the process of social evolution. The juridical conception of absolute 
independence and sovereignty for the State is supported on the side of 
social Philosophy by the doctrine that ‘consciousness of kind’, and the 
community o f experience necessary for effective realisation o f common 
purposes, are confined within the limits of the nation. Thus no reliable 
basis for effective inter-State or inter-national co-operation is furnished by 
the actual experience of life. The national State, being thus the largest 
type of social grouping, cannot righdy enter into any permanendy valid 
engagements, with other States that impair its complete sovereignty. The 
State in effect is a moral absolute ... It is this false, immoral doctrine, 
inimical to humanity, that a State is an absolute morally self-contained 
being, living in the world with other similar beings, but owing no duties 
to them and bound by no obligations that it may not break on the plea of 
necessity, which is the fundamental vice embedded in that foreign policy 
the fruits of which we are now reaping. If nations were in point of fact 
self-contained, materially and morally, living in splendid or even in 
brutish isolation, this doctrine o f States or Governments might be tenable.
But they are not. O n the contrary, their intercourse and interdependence 
for every kind of purpose, economic, social, scientific, recreative, spiritual, 
grows continually closer. Hence the doctrine of State sovereignty and 
independence grows continually falser.342
It was shortly after the war that Hobson finally broke with the Liberals. (It is worth 
noting that he did not join the Labour Party immediately but stood as an independent 
in the December 1918 election — and lost. It was not until 1924 that he joined the 
Labour Party.) Given his efforts it is not difficult to see why he would be 
disillusioned, not only by the tragedy of the war but the disaster of the peace that 
followed and all that meant for the future of national and international affairs. He also 
saw a pattern in the turn of events. In the words of his angel:
Unfortunately it [the achievement of global trade] has been accompanied 
by no corresponding growth of moral contacts. Facilities of travel and of 
trade, which have made men know more about their fellow-men than
341 Hobson, Towards International Government, p. 7.
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formerly, have not made them love one another ... But let me now 
return to my immediate object. The striking resemblance of my latest 
survey to that of a century ago. The same war to end war, the same 
disastrous peace, the same slow struggle for recovery, thwarted by the 
same collapse of reason and goodwill, in a feeble endeavour to establish a 
lasting peace by an Alliance of Nations.343
Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse
The other half of the ‘New Liberal Gemini’ was L.T. Hobhouse. He was bom, the 
youngest of seven children, on 18 September 1864 in St Ives, near Liskeard, Cornwall 
to the Rev Reginald Hobhouse. A rector of fifteen years’ standing, Hobhouse senior 
was part of the rising Victorian middle class. Like Hobson he was an Oxford graduate 
from Corpus Christi (shortly after Graham Wallas) and also started his career as a 
teacher. He became a fellow at Merton College in 1887 then returned to Corpus 
Christi in 1890. He was an Assistant Tutor there and in 1894 was elected a Fellow of 
the college.344 It was also in 1890 that he met Sidney Webb, a connection that would 
last the rest of his life.
While at Corpus, Hobhouse wrote two books, The Labour Movement (1893) and The 
Theory of Knowledge (1896). A year later C.P. Scott, in advance of the invitation to 
Hobson that would follow in 1899, invited him to join the staff o f the Manchester 
Guardian. Scott had been elected to the House o f Commons in 1895 and when 
Hobhouse joined the paper he was asked to help occasionally on the leader-writing 
team. However, when Scott was re-elected against the odds in 1900 (given his 
relatively unpopular stance on many issues), Hobhouse became a core part of the 
leadership team. Thus, while Hobson was writing for the paper in South Africa, 
Hobhouse was busy writing comment and opinion for the same paper back home.
Writing about Hobhouse and this time, Hobson, together with Morris Ginsberg, 
comments in L. T. Hobhouse: His Life and Work:
The ‘new Liberalism’ whose meaning and distinctive qualities were his 
guiding principles for that interpretation of current events which is the 
role of the daily journalist, was for the time being concerned more with 
external policies than with the just-dawning socialism of organised labour. 
While, therefore, we find Hobhouse in his Manchester period writing
343 Hobson, The Recording Angel, pp. 15-16.
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vigorous articles both on trade union policy and the new ‘socialistic’ trend 
in State aid to labour, as involved in Old Age Pensions, the main force of 
his pen was engaged in matters o f foreign and colonial policy.345
Hobhouse continued to write for the Manchester Guardian for most of his life but left 
its employ to become the editor o f the Sociological Review and then in 1906 joined 
three others to start a new Liberal paper called the Tribune. In 1904 he renewed his 
contact with Webb, giving a lecture series on Comparative Ethics at the relatively 
new LSE. In 1907 he was named the Martin White Professor of Sociology. He 
continued at the LSE, first as a part-time teacher, but after 1925 as a full-time 
professor, writing and commenting on a range o f topics, including current affairs, 
until his death in June 1929.346
Liberalism
Hobhouse was also a prolific writer with no less than sixteen books as well as a range 
o f articles, books and pamphlets that combined his fields o f interest and specialisms 
and contributed to the wider debate and campaigns with which he was involved. 
However, there is one book that stands out and deserves attention as it was a seminal 
statement o f what the Liberal Party became.
Liberalism was written in 1911 as the companion book to Conservatism by Hugh Cecil 
MP and The Socialist Movement by Ramsay MacDonald. The series was commissioned 
because political debate and thought had gone through a chaotic time at the end of 
the previous century. If the last two decades of the nineteenth century was the point 
o f the confusion, the first decade of the new century was an attempt at consolidation. 
Liberalism, as well as the other two books in the series, sought to address that 
confusion. Hobhouse also specifically reflects the optimism of the government of 
1906 and the reforms undertaken by the combined progressive forces; yet there were 
also indications that the growing socialist movement would upset that process of 
consolidation.
Hobhouse’s goal was to make sense of what had been going on within the Liberal 
Party, to restate the core values o f its ideology and draw together the strands of the 
debate. He was given an ideal opportunity to reformulate and renew what had been
345 Hobson and Ginsberg, L.T. Hobhouse, p. 39.
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the hegemonic political philosophy for nearly a century. As Alan Grimes points out in 
his 1964 introduction:
Liberalism was written at a time in English politics when there was a 
fundamental division between the old liberalism, which was defined, 
doctrinaire, and dying, and the new liberalism, which was aspiring, 
amorphous, and still largely inarticulated. O n the one hand there was a 
clear-cut body of doctrine and a decimated political following; on the 
other hand there was a growing political movement which lacked a 
defined social doctrine.347
It was in Liberalism that Hobhouse clearly set out his case that old Liberalism had 
completed its mission, that laissez-faire doctrines were no longer required, and to put 
liberalism on a firmer philosophical base. He reinterpreted Cobden and Bright to 
move liberal thought more towards ‘the thought of Mill and the politics of 
Gladstone’. Social justice at home and humanitarian foreign policy abroad were to 
become the cornerstones.348
Overview
Hobson and Morris Ginsberg oudined four aspects to Hobhouse and his studies: an 
examination o f mental evolution in both animals and humans; the rational order and 
the goal o f development; the validity of thought and the reliability of experience; and, 
finally, a more abstract idea of the individual within structure and their relationship to 
world order.349 They felt that underlying these four elements were two fundamental 
and interwoven conceptions which provided a consistent perspective for all his work 
(though they changed over time as he took in other areas and applied his own 
experience): ‘the conceptions of rationality as organic, and as intelligible only in the 
light o f a theory of development’.350
They go on to point out that these were also the concerns o f the Idealist philosophers 
— as will be seen in various influences on Hobhouse at Oxford and elsewhere — but 
Hobhouse’s approach differed from those of the Idealists in his insistence in a practical 
application. He sought to apply science to the philosophical and to:
... avoid the vagueness which so often attaches to notions like ‘organic 
whole’, ‘system’, and constantly insists upon the importance of
347 Hobhouse, Liberalism.
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remembering that if the parts o f an organic whole are only intelligible in 
the light of the whole, the whole in turn can only be understood in terms 
o f the parts in interrelation. He seeks to maintain a just balance between 
the claims of analysis and synthesis, parts and whole, mechanism and 
spirit.351
Contrary to other areas of investigation prevalent at this time — e.g. economics and 
the notion of the ‘rational actor’ or ‘economic man’ -  Hobhouse insisted that the 
individual could not be abstracted in such a way but must be maintained and 
investigated as part of their community. As John Owen put it, ‘Every individual is the 
centre o f an indefinite number of relations and cannot be considered except as a 
component of the social groups to which he belongs’.352 Or, in Hobhouse’s own 
words, from Liberalism, and sounding like Godwin:
A man is not free when he is controlled by other men, but only when he 
is controlled by principles and rules which all society must obey, for the 
community is the true master of the free man. But here we are only at the 
beginning of the matter.353
Influences on Hobhouse
Hobhouse arrived at Oxford during a great intellectual upheaval. The debates 
surrounding the evolutionary theory of Darwin were at their height and other 
thinkers such as Kropotkin were offering their alternative views.
The biological theory was being used by people who litde understood it 
as a justification for economic exploitation, competitive individualism and 
ruthless nationalistic expansion. A type o f economic liberalism was current 
in the mid-Victorian era: a liberalism which was essentially one of laissez- 
faire. Its great defender was Herbert Spencer, and it was partly in reaction 
to the ideas of Spencer that Hobhouse formulated his own view of social 
evolution.354
Into this intellectual melee there entered a number o f other thinkers who impressed 
Hobhouse. Interestingly, there seems to be a general consensus as to those who had 
the most impact; most commonly named is T.H. Green (see Appendix C) but others 
ffequendy mentioned include Auguste Comte, for his positivism, John Stuart Mill,355
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of course Herbert Spencer,356 Malthus and Darwin,357 Kropotkin358 as well as others 
like Giuseppe Mazzini.359
Despite the fact that T.H. Green had died before Hobhouse arrived in Oxford, his 
legacy in the dominant approach of the Idealist tradition still held sway.360 And while 
Hobhouse is often considered to be a ‘disciple’ of Green’s, it is also important that he 
developed Green’s framework considerably and in directions with which Green and 
many of his other Idealist followers would not have agreed. Hobhouse was in favour 
o f Green’s general social and ethical outlook but he also differed from Green and it 
was out of this disagreement that his own distinctive theories came to be formulated. 
For example, Hobhouse shared Green’s rational humanitarianism but the metaphysical 
basis o f Green’s views was unacceptable to him. To understand this, it is necessary to 
consider the climate of philosophical opinion at the English universities during the 
time Hobhouse was at Oxford.361
Green was a Hegelian and, as such, put a great deal of emphasis on the spiritual.
While Green seemed to point towards a more religious interpretation of nature, 
Darwin and Spencer were arguing in favour of secularisation. These two strands were 
important to Hobhouse and his morality was combined with an insistence on the 
practical in terms of social policy. Thus, Hobhouse developed Idealism in line with 
his interest in biology and the natural world — a scientific approach — while at the 
same time following Green’s idealism.
The basis of Green’s views lay in the notion of a single eternal consciousness, and 
Hobhouse could not subscribe to this. Green had reached this position in an attempt 
to escape from the implications o f the biological view of the world. In opposition to 
materialism, he evolved a ‘spiritual conception’ of life, based upon Hegelian 
notions.362 Owen goes so far as to suggest that it was Hobhouse’s inability to make 
this reconciliation, or rather the difficulties he experienced working to expand his 
thinking against the prevailing intellectual current at Oxford, that led him to leave the 
university in 1897.363
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Human nature and organic development: Darwin, mutual aid and Kropotkin
Hobhouse was not only a social commentator and philosopher, he was also interested 
in natural sciences and biology. As Barker notes, ‘Hobhouse was also a scientist like 
Kropotkin, studying physiology with J.S. Haldane’.364
As such, Hobhouse sought to take a holistic view of the human and examine not just 
one aspect o f his nature or development or social structures but the whole process of 
development and evolution simultaneously. He had little sense of what would now be 
called ‘levels o f analysis’, or if he did it would appear he was endeavouring to 
transcend those boundaries and create a theory of the sum of the parts rather than of 
any one part. So, while he started with a firm base in science and biology he extended 
that to include both the abstract ideas o f liberty and justice as well as the practical in 
terms of welfare and the role of the state. As Owen states, ‘it may legitimately be 
claimed that Hobhouse’s thought represents a systematic unity in which all the parts 
play an integrated role. The implication follows that no part can be taken out of its 
setting within the whole o f his theory if  it is to be thoroughly understood’.365
But these grander theories were all based firmly on the scientific and the rational. 
Hobhouse’s view of Darwin seems to be that of a catalyst, the creator of a ‘great 
impulse’ that was inevitably played out not only in the natural sciences but that 
seemed to require a response from other areas as well.
The conception of evolution is inseparably, and not unjustly, associated in 
our minds with the work of Darwin and the impulse given by him in the 
middle o f the nineteenth century to biological investigation. As we all 
know, the conception of evolution is not confined to biology, nor in 
biology did it originate with Darwin ... In this respect the work of 
Darwin may be said to have cut across the normal and natural 
development of sociological investigation. W hen a great impulse is given 
to one science by some epoch-making experiment or some new and 
fruitful generalisation, that science is apt to acquire a certain prestige in 
the minds o f contemporaries ... Though Darwin was by no means the 
founder of the theory of biological evolution, he does occupy in the 
genesis o f this theory a position not incomparable to that of Newton in 
the theory o f the solar system.366
However, as indicated, it was almost as much the interpretations being given to 
Darwin as much as Darwin’s ideas themselves that led Hobhouse to further his
364 Ibid., p. 11; Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, p. 4.
365 Owen, L .T . Hobhouse, Sociologist, p. 5.
366 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory pp. 17-18.
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investigations. Spencer et al were using the ‘biological debate’ in ways that Hobhouse 
could not accept. He found himself arguing alongside others, who sought to re­
interpret the biological and evolutionary model for more humanitarian, collective 
aims. Also, like Kropotkin, he described a more communal sense of evolution as 
‘mutual aid’. Owen describes the development of the logic o f the debate as follows:
The biological view presupposes that survival constitutes an end in itself.
But if one type of social life is regarded as inherently higher and more 
developed than another, new questions arise which the biologist is not 
qualified to answer. Fitness to survive does not constitute evidence of 
superiority in other respects ... Hobhouse also revealed the illogicality of 
the argument that mutual aid is the great enemy o f progress. W ith 
Kropotkin, he observed that mutual aid is operative, even in the animal 
world, and that as the level of life is ascended and the human stage 
reached, mutual aid increases; certainly, for example, in the parent-child 
relationship. Since the highest human values are generally supposed to be 
those involving mutual sympathy and the most highly developed social 
life, two alternatives present themselves. These valuations are either 
absolutely false and concepts of higher and lower are meaningless, or 
progress does not depend on the un-mitigated struggle for existence.367
Hobhouse acknowledged that Green’s notion of the common good was helpful but 
he seemed to search for a definition that understood communal action as core to his 
notions o f liberty and freedom:
Freedom is only one side of social life. Mutual aid is not less important 
than mutual forbearance, the theory of collective action no less 
fundamental than the theory of personal freedom. But, in an inquiry 
where all the elements are so closely interwoven as they are in the field of 
social life, the point of departure becomes almost indifferent.368
Community
Taking this as a base, Hobhouse worked on developing his notion o f ‘organic’ 
development in terms of what the community should mean:
The term organic is so much used and abused that it is best to state simply 
what it means. A thing is called organic when it is made up of parts which 
are quite distinct from one another, but which are destroyed or vitally 
altered when they are removed from the whole. Thus, the human body is 
organic because its life depends on the functions performed by many 
organs, while each of these organs depends in turn on the fife of the body,
367 O wen, L .T . Hobhouse, Sociologist, p. 124.
368 Hobhouse Liberalism, p. 67.
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perishing and decomposing if removed therefrom. Now, the organic view 
of society is equally simple. It means that, while the life o f society is 
nothing but the life of individuals as they act one upon another, the life of 
the individual in turn would be something utterly different if he could be 
separated from society. A great deal of him would not exist at all.369
Having taken the term and defined it to his satisfaction he then applied the duality of 
primacy that both freedom and community held, in his view, to the social structures 
around him:
W e can once again help ourselves with the organic metaphor without 
allowing it to dominate us. The developed organism contains minor 
organisms within it. The living body is made up o f organs and the organs 
o f cells, and the cell itself is a living organism. Now the life of the body is 
not perfected by suppressing the life of the cells, but by maintaining it at 
its highest point: self-sufficiency. N or is the organism developed by 
reducing the cells to a uniform type, but rather by allowing each type to 
vary on its own fines, provided always that the several variations are in the 
end mutually compatible. These things are applicable to society, from the 
widest to the narrowest form thereof. If there is ever to be a world state, 
and if such a state is to be reconciled to permanent progress, it is to be 
achieved not by the suppression of nationality, but by the development of 
national differentiation; not by the suppression of political freedom, but 
through the spontaneous movement of self-governing communities.370
Building on the organic view of the community and mutual aid, Hobhouse created 
what he called a ‘theory of harmony’. If both freedom and the role o f the community 
could be nurtured and even encouraged in their differences as a contribution to the 
fife o f the whole, this would produce social harmony despite the profusion of loyalties 
such an understanding would necessarily create:
Society, and particularly civilised society, is, a very complex structure. We 
have not to do with one society, the political community standing over 
against a number o f individuals who are its component members. Each 
individual is a member of many societies. He is one of a family; he 
belongs to a church, to a corporation, to a trade union, to a political 
party. He is also a citizen o f his state, and his state has a place in the 
commonwealth of states. In so far as the world becomes one, that is to 
say, as social relations arise which interconnect human beings all the world 
over, Humanity becomes the supreme society, and all smaller social 
groupings may be conceived as constituent elements of this supreme 
whole.371
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This brings the discussion back to the notion of the common good. In Hobhouse’s 
view, the common good is served by individuals having the freedom to develop 
themselves to their full potential, both as separate entities and within their chosen 
communities. Individuals are only less o f what they can be if taken from their 
community, of whatever size or at any level.
The theory of harmony may appear to some purely formal and empty o f 
content. Professor Hobhouse has shown its fertility by the success with 
which he has applied it to the basic problems of social organisation, 
political and economic ... The category of the common good is 
interpreted by him as neither the sum of individual goods, nor as another 
kind o f good opposed to them, but as a harmony o f which individual 
goods are interrelated elements. The theory of rights is based on this 
conception of the common good. For rights are claims to the conditions 
of harmony, that is, the conditions requisite for the harmonious fulfilment 
o f personality in society.372
In essence, Hobhouse developed an approach that ‘humanised’ or ‘collectivised’ the 
traditional atomistic liberal view. As we shall see, this approach to community, its 
rights and responsibilities, even to the language of ‘mutualism’ and ‘mutual aid’, was 
to become a major theme of the Third Way.
Old Liberalism
Hobhouse was reluctant to cast off the traditions of Liberal thought and sought instead 
to rehabilitate the older thinkers and recast their work in a more sympathetic light. 
Cobden, for example, might have been left behind as one of the mainstays of the 
‘Manchester School’, but Hobhouse sought reapply his thought. As part o f this effort 
he notes that despite the fact that Cobden was often set up as the anti-collective 
villain it was also true that he supported reforms in areas such as child labour where he 
agreed that conditions of true freedom did not apply. Therefore, he agreed that the 
state needed to take a role in protecting children from market forces.373
Righdy understood, therefore, this kind of socialistic legislation appears 
not as an infringement of the two distinctive ideals of the older 
Liberalism, ‘Liberty and Equality’. It appears rather as a necessary means to 
their fulfilment. It comes not to destroy but to fulfil. Similar reasoning 
explains the changed attitude of Liberals to trade unionism.374
372 Ginsberg, Morris. ‘Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse. ’Journal o f Philosophical Studies 4 (1929): 442-452, 
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The case that Hobhouse was building throughout much o f his work on both old and 
new liberalism was simply that old liberalism had a mission. The development o f the 
mercantilist state had shackled the individual to an aggressive and externally 
expansionist regime that had harmed individuals both literally and in terms o f their 
freedom within the community. The circumstances required opposition to fight for 
the rights o f the individual against the overweening state and church. This resulted in 
a negative freedom, but he recognised that those circumstances had changed. He 
understood the need for development of the ideology but also encouraged caution as 
he equally felt there were still tasks to be done that could only be dealt with by a firm 
notion of liberty and sense of the individual rather than handing over to this new state 
all that had been gained:
The old Liberalism, we thought, had done its work. It had been all very 
well in its time, but political democracy and the rest were now well- 
established facts ... The old individualism was standing in our way and we 
were for cutting it down. It was this mood ... that disposed many people 
favourably toward imperialism as a ‘positive’ theory o f the State ... In this 
mood many men of strong popular sympathies were for kicking down the 
ladder by which they had climbed to the point of vantage from which 
their social reforms had been possible. But apart from the question of 
gratitude, to which men allow no place in politics, it is well for a man to 
be sure that he has his feet firmly on the top o f the wall before he kicks 
the ladder aside. That the work of the old Liberalism was done once and 
for all was a too hasty assumption.375
Hobhouse's New Liberalism
Combining the notions of harmony and the organic community, Hobhouse created a 
particular place for liberty in his ideal society. Freedom and harmony became one and 
he created at the same time a ‘positive’ freedom that is not gained at the expense of 
others but that, ‘under the principle o f harmony’ becomes ‘the mainspring o f progress 
and cultural advancement’ and is ultimately, ‘the condition o f mental and moral 
expansion, and is the foundation of science and philosophy, religion, art and 
morals’.376
As will be explored further, New Liberalism was working to understand its differences 
from the rising socialist ideas. Liberty versus equality seemed to be the ground on 
which there would be the most distance. The socialists, and particularly the Fabian
375 Ibid., p. 212.
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strain o f socialism, set out prepared systems for creating equality based on the older 
mechanical model of human nature. Liberals such as Hobhouse felt that approach was 
not only unhelpful but counterproductive, because it went against what he believed 
to be the ‘true’ nature of the free man.
The heart of Liberalism is the understanding that progress is not a matter 
o f mechanical contrivance, but o f the liberation of living spiritual energy.
Good mechanism is that which provides the channels wherein such 
energy can flow unimpeded, unobstructed by its own exuberance of 
output, vivifying the social structure, expanding and ennobling the life of 
mind.377
However, he insisted that this liberty should not be gained at the expense o f others.
To that end he agreed there was a system of rights and responsibilities incumbent with 
liberty. So, even as early socialists were developing state mechanisms that held 
equality as the main driver, liberals were shifting from their atomistic view o f the 
individual to place them within the community — but with that liberty came 
responsibilities. This tension between the progressive parties will return in the Third 
Way debate.
This debate as to the role of the individual leads directly into Hobhouse’s ideas as to 
the role o f the state. The state, in his view, was not about coercion. In another echo 
o f the wider individualist/anarchist debates o f the time, but also of the modern debate 
as to the role of the state, he reached two conclusions. The first, on a moral 
philosophical grounds, was that state coercion did not benefit man, in that it was not 
his own will but that of the state’s and so he had not expanded his own morality or 
conscience but only conformed under threat of coercion:
N ow  when a man overcomes a bad impulse by his own sense o f right and 
wrong his will asserts itself, and it is by such assertions o f the will that 
personality is developed. If by the action of others he is persuaded or 
stimulated to an act o f self-control, if conduct is set before him in a new 
light, if wider bearings of action are seen or dormant feelings evoked ...
But where he is merely coerced no such development takes place. O n the 
contrary, so far as coercion extends there is a certain moral pauperisation, 
the exertion o f will is rendered unnecessary and is atrophied.378
The state then, looked at from the perspective of the individual, is based not on state 
control but on the ‘self-directing power o f personality’, and liberty, instead of being a 
luxury or additional benefit o f a peaceful society is a rational necessity:
377 Hobhouse, Liberalism, p. 73.
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Liberty then becomes not so much a right o f the individual as a necessity 
of society ... The rule of liberty is just the application of rational method.
It is the opening of the door to the appeal of reason, of imagination, of 
social feeling; and except through the response to this appeal there is no 
assured progress of society.379
The state and globalisation
Hobhouse also, explored the function of the state from the state’s perspective. His 
argument flowed direcdy from his notions of the individual and of liberty, in that he 
did not see the state as responsible for clothing and feeding its people but rather, for 
creating the circumstances in which each individual could develop their own 
personality in his ideal of harmony. In an argument that will sound very familiar to 
Third Way proponents a century later, he was, in effect, calling for the state to ‘steer, 
not row’:
Similarly we may say now that the function of the State is to secure 
conditions upon which its citizens are able to win by their own efforts all 
that is necessary to a full civic efficiency. It is not for the State to feed, 
house, or clothe them. It is for the State to take care that the economic 
conditions are such that the normal man who is not defective in mind or 
body or will can by useful labour feed, house, and clothe himself and his 
family. The ‘right to work’ and the right to a ‘living wage’ are just as valid 
as the rights of person or property. That is to say, they are integral 
conditions of a good social order.380
It should be noted that he reserved for the state those roles and functions that would 
otherwise not be possible without some centralised overview. This was not unusual 
even within old liberalism and Hobhouse retained this idea in new liberalism.381
It was in this vein that he could accommodate his ideas on social welfare with liberty 
for the individual: ‘The great ever-present problem of the modem state is the contrast 
of overwhelming wealth and grinding poverty. It is true that poverty is less to-day 
than it was fifty years ago, but wealth is more, and its organised power grows greater 
from year to year.’382
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The frontier
Even more than Hobson, Hobhouse seemed aware of the state in its wider context. 
Perhaps as a natural extension of his biological perspective he was conscious of 
looking beyond the boundaries of the state. He saw serious challenges to state 
sovereignty, recognised the porousness of boundaries and the need for states to 
encourage diversity amongst nations and states while understanding their own place in 
the wider system. He could also see the problems of the state system and the 
‘anarchical society’ of states, but his liberal perspective on what should or could be 
done is quite different from that of later theorists o f the international system — 
certainly as regards to what he identified as the domestic/international ‘frontier’.
It is only in the case of the State that some moral philosophers have 
attempted to draw a line and to speak as though right and wrong stopped 
at the frontier. But on what logical ground this distinction between the 
State and other human associations is supposed to rest, it is quite 
impossible to see. Some writers, starting from the legal rather than the 
moral point of view, lay stress upon the absence in international relations 
of any sovereign law. They tell us that in the absence of a sovereign, law 
can only be said to exist by a kind of fiction, and that if we are in earnest 
in desiring to see law among nations we must look forward to the 
formation o f a single world state with a central power to enforce its 
behests. They point us to the analogy of the growth of law in the modem 
State.383
Simply put, he saw the state as yet another association o f individuals. In much the 
same way as he placed the individual within a network o f loyalties and relationships, 
he also placed the state in its wider context. Unlike the International Relations 
discipline, he saw the state as ‘just another level’, and one in constant flux rather than 
a rigid notion with firm borders. As he asserted:
It [the state] has no mystic sanctity or authority rendering it superior to 
morality or emancipating it from the law by which transgression brings its 
own retribution in the lowering of character. It is an association which 
has its own special constitution and circumstances, and in the concrete its 
duties and rights, like the duties and rights of every other association and 
of every individuals, must be judged in relation to this constitution and to 
these circumstances.384
Moreover, as other associations, such as trade unions, gained strength, he predicted 
that the state would be forced to deal with these other associations on a more equal
383 Hobhouse, Democracy and Reaction, p. 196.
384 Ibid., p. 209.
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footing. It would no longer be acceptable, in his view, for states to ignore the human 
needs expressed by these associations and the state would, in the process, inevitably 
lose some power or sovereignty. ‘I merely note the fact, and I suggest that it is a 
natural consequence, of the very same development out of which political democracy 
has arisen, and a very serious limitation on State sovereignty’.385
Like Hobson after the war in Elements of Social Justice, written in 1922 (which he 
thanked Hobson for reading in manuscript form), he argues quite firmly that:
The conception of a sovereign State implies the final authority of a 
politically organised community, and its independence of all other 
communities ... This fissure is morally wrong, and the source o f war and 
world anarchy. It puts patriotism above humanity, and liberates political 
action from the moral law.386
— though he also concludes in the same work that the ‘territorial divisions of 
mankind will remain ... But most of the interests of mankind transcend state 
boundaries.’387
Even before the war, Hobhouse was consistendy aware o f the international arena in 
which the state operated. He saw his work and the development of Liberalism as a 
project that was not confined to national boundaries. Free trade, democracy and 
liberty were pillars not only for those living in the UK but for all of mankind. It was a 
global project that would advance all humankind. Again, perhaps this was related to 
his evolutionary approach, but even at this stage he identified what he felt to be the 
forces that were bringing the world together:
The cause of democracy is bound up with that of internationalism ...
Physically the world is rapidly becoming one, and its unity must 
ultimately be reflected in political institutions. The old doctrine of 
absolute sovereignty is dead. The greater States of the day exhibit a 
complex system of government within government, authority limited by 
authority, and the world-state of the not impossible future must be based 
on a free national self-direction.388
This stands in sharp contrast to his mood and attitude to the war and its aftermath. 
Like Hobson, Hobhouse was deeply disillusioned and felt that the pressure of the 
international or global world that he hoped would be positive was now dangerous. In
385 Hobhouse, The Elements o f Social Justice, p. 197.
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a talk at the National Liberal Club in 1916 entitled ‘The Future o f Internationalism’, 
which Hobson attended, Hobhouse observed that:
We must agree, I think, that the old cosmopolitan pacifism has passed 
away... The emancipated slave played the tyrant in his turn; and it is out 
of that conception of the almost magical, almost supernational sanctity of 
the national group that has come the idea of the self-contained State ...
We cannot undo the nation or the State.389
Hobhouse recounted what could only really be described as the glory days of the 
Empire, expressing the aspiration of the idealistic liberal that it was a time in which:
... the world had a fair hope of a different order o f things — when it 
seemed that civilised mankind was leaving the military stage behind and 
was embarking upon peaceful industrialism and commerce — when under 
the leadership of the English, it was thought that the economic barriers 
separating nation from nation would be done away with; that there would 
be universal Free Trade, peaceful intercommunication in the sense of 
mutual interdependence, the wiping away o f the principal modem causes 
o f hostility and in short the inauguration o f a regime o f peace.390
The interconnectedness o f the world he has hoped would create peace seemed to 
make it more uncertain. This kind of ‘globalisation’ and the rise of a nationalistic, 
protective State were on the increase and looked set only to continue. In a voice 
similar to that o f Hobson’s recording angel, he looked at what he had once been a 
strong proponent of, in terms of science and rationality but now viewed with 
scepticism. He believed the speed of this kind of advance had outstripped man’s 
morality:
W hat is the condition of the civilised world at the present day? The time 
is long gone by when communities could develop themselves according 
to their own sweet will in absolute or even comparative isolation. The 
contact o f mankind is closer and closer year by year, and the march of 
invention only accelerates the pace. Humanity has become a physical 
unity long before it has become a moral and political unity. Perhaps that is 
at the root of the tragedies of our time. The intercourse between peoples, 
therefore, will continue. It may be based on violence and upon injustice; 
it may be lawless, it may be disorderly but it will still be intercourse 
between nations. It will not cease.391
In the years that followed Hobhouse became no more satisfied with the world’s 
condition or, in many ways, his place in it. In Liberalism, he had called the nineteenth
389 Hobhouse, L.T. The Future o f Internationalism. London: National Liberal Club Political and 
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century ‘the age o f Liberalism’.392 Even after the Liberals appeared to falter he 
continued to work to revitalise the party and the ideology. He declared that progress 
was not a linear process and therefore understood that it could encompass a 
diminishing future as well as a self-improving one, but what he could not foresee was 
the form the retrograde step would take.
592 Hobhouse, Liberalism, p. 110.
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Chapter 8
Early Social Democracy
The rise of socialism
New Liberalism is the main focus of this study, but given that the Third Way 
ultimately derived from the socialist movement, or social democracy, which was 
evolving at the same time, it provides needed context for the current political and 
ideological landscape.
As noted, the Manchester School and economic liberalism formed the prevailing 
economic perspective. Changing circumstances and other social trends led a range of 
economists, philosophers and revolutionaries to outline alternative analyses o f the 
developing capitalist system. Socialism was, at this stage, only one o f these alternatives. 
London had become home, or at least a resting place, for many of the day’s greatest 
and most controversial thinkers. Their perspective on the evolving system of 
capitalism brought a new impetus to work being done in the UK.
The global economic situation also stimulated an analysis of what could be ‘wrong’ 
with a system that produced wealth but also poverty and despair. The UK had been 
unchallenged in the first wave of industrialisation. Its success had been ascribed to free 
trade but the impact of the rise o f competitors, seemed to suggest that it was not free 
trade as much as a lack of competition that had assured the UK’s role.
The initial phase of socialism in Britain was a series of utopian ideals and blueprints 
for an ideal society. These utopias were gradually replaced by an increasing political 
activism and a desire to have an impact on intellectual life. Ernest Barker dates the 
disappearance o f such idealistic approaches and the development of a real political 
theory to 1880. In the wake of these ideals, and following on from Marx, he argues 
there was ‘a new kind of socialism’, which was more ‘evolutionary’ in nature.393
Marxism and communism began to take shape on the continent and in exile groups in 
London. Meanwhile, socialists in Britain remained firmly within the labour 
movement rather than a separate political structure. The struggle was no longer just 
between liberalism and socialism but over the development o f something more
393 Barker, Political Thought in England 1848-1914.
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accurately described as ‘social democracy’. However, important strands o f the debate 
remained in the Liberal Party ‘root’ while other issues were taken into the new 
‘labourist’ party. So while the political philosophies were becoming more distinct they 
were not aligning along party political lines and continued to overlap.
Even as this discussion between the progressive forces was going on in the UK, the 
same struggle was going on amongst the left across Europe. The interaction between 
these groups changed socialism within the UK, while the issues in the UK context 
were similarly having an impact on the course of European socialist politics. Initiatives 
such as an International Working Man’s Association and the International were new 
projects and existed on both national and international levels.
Looking back, it is striking that so many campaigners, thinkers and philosophers 
seemed to approach the problems from a common starting point. Rather like the 
Third Way conferences a century later, the overriding spirit o f the LSE and the 
Fabians and the NLF was of rational enquiry. Issues and problems were dealt with as 
things that must be overcome as a community rather than as opportunities for political 
point-scoring. O f course, some issues were used in that vein as well, but particularly 
for the thinkers presented here — those engaged in the ‘new politics’ or politics at the 
‘frontier’ — there seemed a desire to keep these forces working together. But it is 
equally clear that with time both Liberalism and socialism (or the Labour Party) began 
to acquire harder edges and more clearly defined boundaries. It was as if a lack of 
boundaries defined this timeframe in a way that aggressive definition of boundaries 
was to dominate the beginning of the next.
Social Liberalism -  the 'great divorce'
Hobhouse was particularly concerned about the divide between the New Liberalism 
and rising socialism. He addressed himself specifically to the differences between the 
two — and, like Blair a century later, to the idea that these two political philosophies 
might be able to work together. He clearly felt that the problems they sought to 
overcome were, after all, the same, though he (and others) seemed to frame the core 
problem not as capitalism but as ‘progress’ (which, interestingly he saw as the 
equivalent to social justice). Perhaps this was because, in his mind, capitalism — and 
the global market and free trade — were such givens that they did not warrant more 
discussion except how to cope with their consequences. He was not alone in that 
presumption, as is clear from this comparison:
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The Liberals and the Socialists have attacked the problem of progress, or 
what is the same thing, of social justice, at different sides. The Liberal 
stands for emancipation and is the inheritor o f a long tradition of men 
who have fought for liberty, who have found law or government or 
society crushing human development, repressing originality, searing 
conscience ... The Socialist, or if the vaguer term be preferred, the 
Collectivist, is for the solidarity of society. He emphasises mutual 
responsibility, the duty of the strong to the weak. His watchwords are co­
operation and organisation. The two ideals as ideals are not conflicting but 
complementary.394
The differences that Hobhouse could see were not concerned with basic economics 
but with what he identified as the ‘types of socialism’. For Hobhouse, whose 
watchword was liberty, the main threat of some forms of socialism was a mechanistic 
outlook; the Fabian style of creating solutions for people and using the mechanisms of 
the state to enforce them seemed the most dangerous consequence o f socialist 
thought. He felt that this mechanistic thinking was based on an over-reliance on the 
economy as the single factor in society, while he insisted that all elements o f society 
worked together as in his theory of harmony (as outlined in Chapter Seven) or not at 
all. This becomes an important aspect o f the implementation o f Third Way social 
policy at the turn of the next century.
Hobhouse argued that this socialistic approach was reinforcing a class frame of society 
that was not in the interests of the common good. He also identified the problem that 
would continue to plague socialism, and the Labour Party generally, which was that 
while it eschewed the elites of the old Liberal and Conservative Parties, it was, itself, 
paternalistic:
Official Socialism is a creed of a different brand. Beginning with a 
contempt for ideals of liberty based on a confusion between liberty and 
competition, it proceeds to a measure of contempt for average humanity 
in general. It conceives mankind as in the mass a helpless and feeble race, 
which it is its duty to treat kindly.395
Yet Hobhouse continued to hold out hope that there might be something that could 
be termed ‘Liberal Socialism’; and ‘that “true socialism” was in fact the heir o f 
Liberalism. It is avowedly based on the political victories which Liberalism won, and 
as I have tried to show, served to complete rather than to destroy the leading Liberal 
ideals’.396
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396 Hobhouse, quoted in Arblaster, The Rise and Decline o f Western Liberalism, p. 292.
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This ‘liberal socialism’ would involve the principles of liberty and democracy but also 
a belief in the grassroots rather than a bureaucratic hierarchy. Hobhouse sought 
something that would enable the two parties to pursue progress and mutual aid and 
ultimately ‘make not for the suppression but for the development of personality’, 
rather than compete to the detriment of both.397
It seems, however, that while Liberalism was at least attempting to recover from its 
enthusiasm for the ‘unlovely gospel of commercial competition’, collectivism was 
moving away from this kind of ‘liberal socialism’ and into what he saw as the trap of a 
mechanistic view that imposed a prescription for happiness, rather than an 
opportunity for it:
Everything is to fall into the hands o f an ‘expert’ who will sit in an office 
and direct the course of the world, prescribing to men and women 
precisely how they are to be virtuous and happy ... Humanity, Liberty,
Justice are expunged from the banner and the single word Efficiency 
replaces them. Those who cannot take their places in the machine are 
human refuse, and in the working of a machine there is only one test — 
whether it runs smoothly or otherwise.398
At about the time Hobhouse wrote Liberalism he was consistendy making the case that 
the newly formed Labour Party and the Liberals had more in common than separated 
them. In a variety o f his works, including Liberalism and, before that, Democracy and 
Reaction (1909) and an article entided ‘The prospects o f Liberalism’ for the 
Contemporary Review (1909), he argued, in essence, that if the socialist movement 
could abandon what he saw as its class-based divisive approach so as to better reflect 
true opinion, then the two parties or ideologies could be placed together:
But in reality the position of the Labour Party is one of the paradoxes of 
politics. To begin with, the cleavage which it makes does not correspond 
with the real fissure of opinion. There is no division in principle or 
method between its main body and the advanced Liberals ... But these 
lines o f cleavage, which appear in every measure o f legislation and every 
act of policy, cut across the division of the two parties. The party tie holds 
together men who are in essentials opposed, and divides those who in 
spirit are agreed.399
397 Hobhouse, Liberalism, pp. 89-92.
398 Hobhouse, Democracy and Reaction, pp. 230—31.
399 Hobhouse ‘The Prospects o f Liberalism’, p. 353. This quote is very similar to both Liberalism (p. 49) 
and Democracy and Reaction (p. xxxiii) so over the course o f at least four years he was arguing in the 
same terms.
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Social democracy
As the UK was attempting to develop some kind of evolutionary socialism or 
humanised liberalism there were other evolutionary forces across Europe similarly 
engaged. Michele Salvati in ‘Prolegomena to the Third Way’ in W hite’s book, New  
Labour : Progressive Future?, identifies an ‘epochal transformation’ of the left and points 
out that while there were national variations, it was clear that o f all the changes in the 
movement only two moments would qualify for this scale. This shift between the ‘last 
decades of the nineteenth century and the First World W ar’ is the first such moment, 
leading to ‘labour and socialist parties replacing liberal-democratic or bourgeois- 
radical ones’.400
Before looking at the background to social democracy, or any debate in this 
timeframe, it is important to remember the fluidity in language. Having said that, the 
basic story, was a methodological one in which the parties of the left argued as to 
whether or not the state could be used to achieve their aims or if  it had to be 
overthrown: revolution or reform.
The story o f social democracy begins, not in the UK but with the Marxists, which 
before the First World War most social democrats — except in the UK — considered 
themselves to be.401 The story also requires some investigation of the internal politics 
of the German Social Democratic Party. The SPD was a well-organised and tighdy 
knit party, wielding tremendous power at the Internationals because it was both 
disciplined and large.
Yet, even as Marx was criticising the Gotha Programme of 1875 for being too 
accommodating to the forces of capitalism, others were moving towards a more 
conciliatory attitude. Marx addressed the First International in 1864 and with the help 
of the Germans achieved a split with the anarchists. German Marxists were 
instrumental in the creation of the successor to the First International, meeting in 
Paris in 1889 as the reformed Socialist International. Following Hegel, they sought an 
evolutionary democratic socialism rather than the revolutionary socialism that had 
marked out their forerunners.
At least part of that coherence as a group should be attributed to the adversity suffered 
for their cause. Germany was amongst the first to pass severe anti-socialist legislation.
400 Salvati, Michele. ‘Prolegomena to the Third Way Debate’ in White, Stuart. New Labour: The 
Progressive Future? Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001, p. 152.
401 Drachkovitch, The Revolutionary Internationals.
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From 1878 to 1890 the Anti-Socialist Law was in force and after a respite of four 
years, a new Anti-Socialist law was passed in 1894. In 1897 the Parliament o f Saxony 
abolished equal franchise and two years later Major-General von Boguslawski, a leader 
o f the Junkers and of the Prussian Officers Corps, proposed to deport the Social 
Democratic leaders. In 1898, the Kaiser proposed a new penal law that would make 
‘incitement to strike’ a criminal offence.402
It was also the Germans that created the first social welfare system under Bismarck, in 
order to offer protection to the recently literate and now politicised citizens serving in 
their armies; and to serve the rapid industrialisation of the country. Sassoon suggests 
this unique combination enabled the German Social Democrats to be a powerhouse 
o f the Second International. Germany had become the most rapidly growing country, 
producing more steel and possessing more soldiers, than Britain. It was clear from the 
efficiency debate oudined earlier, that Germany had become a model of development. 
Economically, culturally, and especially in the social sciences and philosophy,
Germany had no rivals.403
Ideologically, the key to German ‘evolutionary socialism’ was framed by Eduard 
Bernstein in 1898, taking the form of the first major criticism of Marx’s approach. He 
refuted Marx’s claims that capitalism would collapse under its own weight, and argued 
instead for the reformist line of the Fabians — who had influenced him while in 
London — that the wider distribution of wealth and the growing idle class had blurred 
the class divisions.404
The tensions between the powerful state and its fear of a rising, literate, military or 
commercial class was clear. As W olf puts it:
Collectivism and nationalism were brought together most completely in 
Germany. Gustav Schmoller, an influential state socialist, wrote that ‘all 
small and large civilised states have a natural tendency to extend their 
border to reach seas and large rivers, to acquire trading posts and colonies 
in other parts or the world. And they constantly come into contact with 
foreign nations, with whom they must, quite frequently, fight ... The 
glorification o f war, the collective and the national and contempt for 
peace, the individual and the cosmopolitan were to become Leitmotifs o f 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German thought. Kant and 
the other great German liberals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century were forgotten. German strength and assertiveness then awoke a
402 Braunthal, History o f the International 1864-1914, p. 269.
403 Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f Socialism, pp. 10-11.
404 Newman and de Zoysa, The Promise o f the Third Way; Brack, ‘The Rise o f  Labour and the Collapse 
o f the Liberals’.
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powerful response in the imperialism and protectionism of Joseph 
Chamberlain in Britain. In turn, the threat of British imperial protection, 
especially when the US was also protectionist, inevitably strengthened 
Germany’s belief that it needed an empire and, later, Lebensraum o f its
405own.
It was the Second International that Donald Sassoon points to as the moment at 
which the wider socialist movement attempted to organise itself on a European basis 
as a system of political parties. Their assumption, according to Sassoon was 
‘convergence’:
They supposed that the societies which surrounded them already 
possessed or were about to acquire common characteristics. Capitalism 
was already their collective destiny ... It followed that socialist parties — 
regardless o f their national differences — could have the same programme 
and be committed to the same medium-term goals: the expansion o f 
democracy, the establishment of the welfare state and the regulation of the 
labour market ... There was a very real trend towards globalisation, 
thanks to an unparalleled growth in world trade and colonialism.406
As demonstrated, the revolutionaries and the reformers disagreed, and finally split 
entirely under the impact of the war. Nationalism, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 
and the birth of communism and the Soviet state pushed them further and further 
apart as the unions found themselves unable to deal with the ‘defence-of-the- 
motherland’ sentiment that overwhelmed the movement.407 As Sassoon points out, 
‘Instead of convergence there was protectionism, depression and war’.408
These issues on the international stage also posed problems for British socialist groups 
as they began to differ over tactics, and eventually philosophy, with their European 
colleagues. In a familiar vein as that argued by Conservatives, the English socialists 
began to separate from their European counterparts on grounds o f tactics and the role 
o f revolution. This produced a dilemma for the socialists. R.B. Haldane explored this 
in an address he made to a socialist audience recounted in an article in the New  
Progressive. He taunted the socialists for their attempts to animate the International 
given the disputes between the reformers and revolutionaries. In an insult 
recognisable in the three-party system of today, Haldane made the aside that the 
socialists of the day could take some positions and campaigns precisely because they
405 Wolf, W hy Globalisation Works, p. 125.
406 Sassoon, Donald. ‘Fin-de-Siecle Socialism: The United, Modest Left.’ New Left Review 227.1 
(1998): 88-115, p. 90.
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
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were not in positions of power. He rather indelicately suggested that as they matured 
they would have to consider the views of the electorate, or in effect, the domestic 
impact of their actions, and that might require compromise. He also identified the 
tensions within the socialist movement, quoting the Fabians suggesting they wanted 
nothing to do with revolutionaries of any kind:
The majority of the people prefer talking about their political business to 
doing it. Party names and traditional controversies carry them a long way.
This is beginning to be understood even by the pronounced Socialist 
parties. In the concisely written Report on Fabian Policy which appeared 
last July...I notice this passage: ‘Each instalment o f Social Democracy will 
only be a measure among other measures, and will have to be kept to the 
front by an energetic Socialist Section. The Fabian Society therefore begs 
those Socialists who are looking forward to a sensational historical crisis to
i - 409join some other society.
Haldane was not far from the truth in this criticism of socialism, and the labour 
movement, as they were tom  between supporting the reforming Liberal Party or 
organising on their own. As Sassoon argues in the New Left Review:
The contrast with the period between the creation of communist parties 
and their collapse after 1989 is obvious enough. But in the year before 
1917, the differences between organised parties o f the Left were glaring: 
then in Britain a powerful trade union movement was still tom  between 
supporting a reformist Liberal Party and a nascent Labour Party taking its 
first faltering steps.410
It was the 1899 Trades Union Congress which finally agreed on the unification of the 
political and industrial wings of the labour movement under one organisation. Most 
unions supported the idea, and though the miners and the cotton spinners remained 
opposed, it was narrowly passed. This led to a special conference in 1900 and the 
formation of the Labour Representation Committee, comprising seven trade union 
representatives, two from the ILP, two from the Social Democratic Federation and 
one Fabian. Ramsay MacDonald was elected secretary o f the new group. Keir Hardie 
characterised the ‘philosophy’ of the new organisation as ‘“labourism” — not 
socialism’.411
This still did not ensure a separate position for the socialists. As Pelling observed, 
‘Indeed, the political independence of the Labour Party always seemed to be in doubt
409 Haldane, ‘The N ew  Liberalism’, pp. 137-38.
410 Sassoon, ‘Fin-de-Siecle Socialism’, p. 94.
411 TU C  History Online unionhistory.info 3 September 2003.
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until in 1918 it accepted a Socialist constitution’.412 Sassoon agrees with this line of 
thought and traces it back to the Fabian-influenced Bernstein, and his so-called 
‘revisionism’ developed while living in London between 1888 and 1901:
In 1900 the unions, together with the ILP, the SDF and the Fabians, set 
up the Labour Representation Committee: ‘Yet the trade unionists who 
accepted the LRC were in the main at heart still Liberals not socialist.’ It 
was not until February 1918 that a Labour Party was constituted on a 
solid national basis with an unambiguously socialist, though appropriately 
vague, indication of the final aim of the movement: ‘To secure for the 
producers by hand or by brain the full fruits o f their industry, and the 
most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of 
the common ownership of the means of production and the best 
obtainable system of popular administration and control o f each industry 
and service’ — the famous fourth paragraph of Clause Four o f the party 
statute drafted by Sidney Webb. It was only then that the British Labour 
movement entered the mainstream of European socialism. Its singularity 
was that, while its continental counterparts had revolutionary goals co­
existing with a reformist practice, the Labour Party was bom  with 
reformist goals. It adopted the post-capitalist aim o f common ownership 
in 1918 partly as a radical response to the birth of Soviet communism, 
partly as an afterthought.413
Tactics
As indicated, the election of 1906 proved an important moment for ‘progressive’ 
politics. From the socialist point of view, Ramsay MacDonald was elected MP for 
Leicester and Keir Hardie, elected at the same time, became the leader of the LRC 
MPs. However, it was felt that Hardie had litde natural talent for the job o f keeping 
the party together and therefore MacDonald became the leader o f the Labour group 
in 1911 — after the People’s Budget o f 1909. MacDonald lost his seat in the post-war 
election in 1918 but was re-elected in 1922 and shortly afterwards was re-elected as 
leader. While he had spent his political apprenticeship steeped in progressive politics, 
it would seem that in this same evolutionary spirit the time was now right for the 
Labour Party to begin to move out on its own. From the time that they had enough 
of a presence in the House to make themselves felt — even though in the beginning it 
was still very much in concert with the Liberals — MacDonald began to move the 
party away from a role of submission to the Liberals to one of strength, and after the 
war, with the Liberal Party split into two warring factions, he saw a real opportunity:
412 Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party, p. 216.
413 Sassoon One Hundred Years o f Socialism, p. 16.
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The key to Labour advance lay, he believed, in the destruction of the 
Liberal party as a rival party of the Left. Labour must therefore retain the 
lead it had established over the Liberals in 1918 and before they could 
effectively reunite, push them permanendy into third place in the political 
stakes. Politics would then revolve around a Conservative/Labour struggle 
in which the Liberals could be presented as an irrelevant and dying party, 
and Labour as the only possible alternative government. To the 
consternation and bewilderment of the Liberals it was this policy of ‘non- 
cooperation’ that was applied skilfully and ruthlessly after 1918. By 1924 it 
had succeed triumphandy. It is these six years then that form the key 
period in the decline of the Liberal party.414
Thus it was that the parties of the left reached divorce rather than accommodation —
with consequences that came to dominate progressive politics into the current day. As
Marquand concludes:
Profound forces were certainly at work. They were bound to have an 
effect of some kind on the structure of politics. But it does not follow that 
they were bound to have the effect that they actually had. British politics 
in this period were extraordinarily fluid. That they eventually setded 
down into the pattern we have known for most of the last sixty years was 
due not to some mysterious manifest destiny, but to the skill, cunning and 
determination o f those who struggled to ensure that they did so. And 
MacDonald was foremost in that struggle.415
414 Adelman, Paul. The Decline of the Liberal Party 1910-1931. Essex: Longman Group Limited, 1981, p. 
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415 Marquand, David. ‘Rethinking Ramsay MacDonald’. The C U SP Review, Autumn 1997 The Centre 
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Chapter 9
Endings and new beginnings
In Chapter Three the importance of transformative moments provided an 
introduction to both the importance of ideology and a comparison of both New 
Liberalism and the Third Way. Considerable time was also spent on the underlying 
changes present at the end of the nineteenth century, not only as background to the 
New Liberalism but also as a foundation to the modem British perception of the state 
and the consequent framework for domestic politics as the ideological debate has 
remained remarkably familiar.
It is argued here that while significant change has taken place over the course of the 
last century these trends were not sufficient in themselves to constitute systemic 
change. Transformation requires a convergence of different types of change at all 
levels and that this convergence is present in the timeframe.
This chapter will seek to set the context for the development o f social democracy and 
New Labour and explore the specific domestic environment before turning to the 
Third Way itself.
Theorising the end
As the economy, the state, culture and politics have gone through fundamental 
change, a number of over-arching explanations have been offered. The end of 
ideology, 416 the end of history,417 and the post-modem analysis suggesting the end of 
politics 418 have all helped to shape the Third Way debate, not least as they all imply 
serious impact on the role of the state in the free of these ‘mega-trends’. These ideas, 
much like globalisation, were not limited to the academic world but entered the 
popular debate. The perception they created was one of uncertainty and volatility and 
often linked to the issues of modernity. This is particularly relevant here given that 
this argument rests on the idea that we have reached the end o f the modem but that 
we can already see the shape of the next age and the politics that are suggested by the 
global form it is taking. The elite modernisers o f the Labour Party looked to these
416 Bell, The End of Ideology; Heywood, Andrew. Political Ideologies: A n  Introduction. Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan, 1998.
417 Fukuyama, The End o f History; Heywood, Political Ideologies: A n  Introduction.
418 Heywood, ibid., p. 323.
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ideas to help them define the political response to these massive societal 
developments.
As well as being predictions of endings at some level, these arguments have another 
element in common. They all operate at the juncture between the domestic and the 
international and have thus coloured the tone o f the domestic and international 
debate. They have played a role as context to the development of the Third Way. As 
a consequence o f the crises oudined by these writers, domestic leaders, by definition 
operating in the arenas that had been declared irrelevant or outmoded, were 
struggling to find a philosophy or political ideology that could cope with both the 
changing roles at each of the three points of agency discussed in Chapter Three — the 
state, the individual and the community in which they interact. They sought to define 
a plan of action that would help them protect a notion o f the good life in the face of 
these changes. The result in the UK was New Labour and its ideological creation of 
the Third Way.
1989 and the left in Europe
1989 is highlighted as the moment of change; Giddens and others regularly use the 
shorthand o f ‘1989 and all that’ to identify a point in time but also to suggest a 
culmination o f change. However, as indicated a century earlier, union unrest and 
social change were already under way long before any identifiable moment. The 
point o f interaction between state and individual — the community — was creating 
change in both the state and the individual.
In the British context the traditional labour and socialist approaches had been fading 
as economic and social change reduced the power o f the mass unions including the 
railway workers, dockers and miners. The experience o f the late 1970s in Britain was 
one o f public-sector resistance even to their ‘own’ government’s attempts to reform 
their power and influence. It was Thatcher who effectively destroyed the union 
stranglehold and created an entirely new operating framework for socialism as an 
ideology and the labour and trade union movement as a power-base for that ideology. 
The failure of the French single-state strategy in the early 1980s was another blow for 
the old protectionist policies.
On the international level, the Cold War, which had dominated political debate from 
1945, was finally ending. The ensuing new world order created a domino effect of 
debates both within and between states. The world, it appeared at the time, was
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simultaneously more secure as traditional threats seemed to implode, and more 
insecure with sudden shifts in traditional blocs creating new opportunities and dangers 
in the international arena.
1989 is remembered as the year when capitalism finally defied Marx’s prediction and 
refused to collapse under its own weight. This fate was reserved instead for 
communism and with it, the old certainties o f the Cold War. For many, this also 
affected socialism, precipitating a crisis within a range o f countries as they responded 
to this global event. Kevin Davey goes so far as to say that ‘the accelerated pace of 
change since 1988 has swept away so many pillars o f socialist thinking that much of 
the traditional left is now in free fall’.419
Sassoon suggests that before this time, it was possible to identify what he calls ‘three 
large families’ within the European left: the communists of central and eastern 
Europe, the northern social democratic parties and a third group in southern Europe 
which he further subdivides depending on the role of the communists within their 
respective systems.420 As John Gray points out, this provided a fairly stable framework 
across Europe, that ‘depended on the geostrategic environment of the Cold W ar’ for 
its stability. ‘It defined its socialist content by opposition to Soviet communism and 
sometimes, also, to American individualism’.421
There were other forces at work in the 1980s; Dahrendorf argues that this was a 
period o f ‘rampant individualism’. He notes in this regard that one can ‘detect strange 
similarities, at least in Europe, between the end of the nineteenth and the end of the 
twentieth centuries’:
Manchesterism then, Thatcherism now. Individuals were set against each 
other in fierce competition and the strongest prevailed or rather those 
who prevailed were described as the strongest, regardless of the qualities 
that led them to their success. Then as now there was a reaction. Around 
1900 it was called collectivism ... the new vogue ... is called
422commumtanamsm.
Marquand also identifies this trend, both in terms of its point of instigation (i.e. rapid 
economic change) and periods o f laissez-faire, with periods of reaction. Marquand 
attributes this approach to Karl Polanyi. Though Polanyi wrote in the 1940s, his idea
419 Davey, Kevin. ‘Waking up to N ew  Time -  Doubts and Dilemmas on the Left’ in Parryman, Mark, 
ed. Altered States: Post-modern Politics Culture. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1994, p. 201.
420 Sassoon, ‘Fin-de-Siecle Socialism’.
421 Gray, ‘After Social Democracy’, p. 327.
422 Dahrendorf, R alf in Etzioni, Amitai, ed. The Essential Communitarian Reader. Oxford: Rowm an & 
Littlefield, 1998, p. 84.
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of the ‘great transformation’ seems applicable to the current situation as much as to 
the nineteenth century. The ‘pendulum’ that he identifies, swings from ‘the social and 
moral disruption of laissez-faire capitalism’ then moves towards ‘a long counter 
movement’ as society ‘spontaneously’ develops systems to rein in market forces and 
address social justice or social need.
The real key to Polanyi’s argument, particularly relevant here to both the globalisation 
debate and the development of New Liberalism and the Third Way, is the stress he 
places on the need for the state to create the free market. It is assumed by many, 
according to his fine, that such markets will somehow create themselves. His point, 
precisely along the lines o f W olf and others, is that the state, by default or design (and 
usually the latter) is responsible. Polanyi therefore suggests that the ‘real essence o f the 
nineteenth century history lay in this double movement — state-imposed market 
utopianism at first, followed by a spontaneous countervailing reaction later’.423 
Interestingly, the rise of social democracy in the early 1990s could be argued as 
another moment of such countervailing forces responding to periods o f individualistic 
expansion.
The result of the movement towards a more open economic frame in the 1980s and 
early ’90s led, as we have seen, to globalisation and thus to a major turning point for 
the European left.424 The Labour Party, with all of its historical baggage in terms of 
the different strands responded differendy to the impact of 1989 than did its European 
counterparts. The tension between New Labour and the European left then becomes 
the difference between democratic egalitarianism (e.g. distribution issues) and the role 
of the state in the economy.
Despite these differences, the change has brought Labour closer to its European 
colleagues as they moved from ‘national’ social democracy based on a welfare state 
and full employment, effectively accepting the constraints of global capitalism; while 
in the UK, as Sassoon points out, the Labour Party ‘abandoned its commitment to 
wide-ranging nationalisation, to neutralism and its hostility to the European 
Community’. He concludes that ‘One hundred years after Bernstein, the Labour 
Party too has declared that the movement is everything, the end is nothing’.425 Ray 
Kiely summarises this thought as: ‘just as the nineteenth century led to social
423 Marquand, The New Reckoning, pp. 30-31; Marquand in Gamble and Wright, The New Social 
Democracy, Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1944.
424 Driver, Stephen and Luke Martell. Blair’s Britain. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.
425 Sassoon, ‘Fin de Siecle Socialism’, p. 93.
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democratic demands that industrialisation be humanised, so twenty-first century social 
democracy should humanise globalisation’.426
Labour as Labourist
These differences between the direction of development in Britain and in continental 
Europe constitute a significant difference between what became known as the Labour 
Party in 1906 and its continental sister parties. As Keir Hardie identified, almost from 
the outset the Labour Party was different from the continental European socialists. On 
the continent the parties helped to create trade unions, whereas in the UK, the 
Labour Party emerged ‘from the bowels o f the trade union movement’.427 This was 
important not least as most continental parties deemed themselves to be Marxist and it 
was often the more conservative tendency of the trade unions that shaped social 
democracy.428 Or, as Sassoon points out, like Pelling:
The leading candidate for the position of ‘most anomalous Left’ in Europe 
was and has perhaps remained the British. Prior to 1914, socialism itself 
did not achieve much popularity among the working class and it took 
longer to become accepted as the ideology of the labour movement than 
anywhere else in Europe.429
This difference is important because it became a strong deterrent to change within, 
effectively, a divided Labour Party in the UK. Various sections of the party related to 
very different perspectives on the continent and the resulting debate in the UK could 
also be said to have continued to evolve in a very similar pattern to the differences 
berween its three founding strands: the ILP, the SDF and the Fabians. Though it was 
no longer about literal revolution it was still very much about the purpose and 
objectives o f the party, which continued to split along these labourist, social 
democratic and socialist lines.
Mirquand, in particular, argues that this combination has held the party back in many 
rejects as socialists and social democrats in particular have looked to gain central 
control, but by finking these traditions to a labourist perspective, created problems for 
progressive politics:
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Ever since the foundation of the Labour Representation Committee, 
moreover, mainstream Labour socialism — again like Labour social 
democracy — has been mediated through the institutions, values and 
collective memory of British labourism. It is this fatal combination of 
centralism and labourism which shackles the Labour Party to the past, and 
prevents it from addressing the crises to which Thatcherism is a response.
So long as that combination lasts, it has no hope of building a new, and 
appropriately radical, equivalent to the progressive coalition o f 1910-
1914/ 3°
Or, as another commentator, David Coates, puts it, the Labour Party has always been 
a ‘broad coalition of two main groupings, two projects, two political universes: a 
coalition of social reformists (keen to subordinate power of private capital to 
progressive social ends) and bourgeois radicals (keen to modernise the local industrial 
base) ... there has always been Old Labour and New Labour’.431
Labour response and reform
The idea that ‘the 1990s are hard times for socialists. A dynamic capitalism is no 
longer much restrained by labour, or by the constraints imposed by socialism’s 
presence’432 was a common sentiment o f the wider debate on ‘whither socialism’ that 
reached its climax in the late 1980s and early ’90s. This period of self-doubt and 
examination fed direcdy from the international to the domestic arena both in 
ideological and economic terms. This urgent international climate provided a 
necessary part of the backdrop to the reshaping o f British politics and also provided 
context for what would become the ‘global Third Way debate’ that will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter Eleven.
Domestically, the Labour Party had been resoundingly defeated at the polls over 
thirteen years at four general elections, including a particularly painful defeat in 1992. 
Its electoral base was literally ebbing away. As Davey in ‘Waking up to New Times: 
Doubts and Dilemmas on the Left’, points out:
The working class, as traditionally represented in the folklore and fantasies 
o f the left, really is disappearing, numerically and politically. Given the 
institutional structure of the British left, the erosion of trade unionism and
430 Marquand, ‘Beyond left and right’, p. 376.
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its decoupling from the political has been particularly significant ... Four 
million members simply vanished from the public sphere into a twilight 
zone of unemployment, casualisation, non-unionised workplaces and the 
informal economy. Like the party they have sponsored for the best part of 
the century, the unions now suffer from falling membership, diminishing 
income and reduced political influence.433
Union membership dropped from 13 million in 1979 to around 7 million by 1997.434 
This basic union membership issue also covers other social trends. For example, the 
number o f women in work rose to the point that it was nearly equal to that of men, 
though often in non-unionised, service-sector, part-time employment.435
However, the lesson Labour learned, particularly from 1992 was that, unlike the New 
Liberals at the end of the previous century, they needed more than their links with 
the working classes; they needed to create links with the new rising professional class. 
Therefore, they sought those ‘information technology professionals’ and moved to 
position themselves as not of the manufacturing working class but o f the new middle 
class. They knew that the socialists would come with them in any case, but they 
needed a new coalition. The de-industrialised or post-modem society or even ‘post­
industrialisation’ — the terms used for the current economic framework — in essence 
meant that the class divide and the core of the Labour Party had been eroded.436 As 
Lindsay German calls it, the ‘logic o f electoralism’ enabled the modernisers to move 
the party to the right and to keep the left in line.437
Blair himself, however, claimed in 1995 that the modernisation project, or ‘New 
Labour’, was not his initiative, but that of his predecessor, Neil Kinnock, and could 
be dated as early as 1983 — long before the ‘real crisis’ of 1989.438
Legacy of Kinnock
Neil Kinnock began the moves to modernise the Labour Party and introduced major 
organisational and policy reforms. While the 1992 defeat was painful, it was testament
433 Davey, ‘Waking up to N ew  Tim e’, pp. 206—07.
434 Seldon, Anthony. The Blair Effect. London: Litde, Brown and Company, 2001, p. 586.
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436 Newm an and de Zoysa. The Promise o f the Third Way; Lavalette, Michael and Gerry M ooney. ‘N ew  
Labour, new  moralism: the welfare politics and ideology o f  N ew  Labour under Blair.’ International 
Socialism 85 (1999): 27-47.
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438 Blair, quoted in Kenny, Michael and Martin Smith. ‘(Mis) understanding Blair’. Political Quarterly 
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to the distance that had been travelled since 1983. Kinnock managed to split the 
Marxists and the socialists on the left of the party and re-establish direct links between 
the party leadership and the unions. A far-reaching policy review reoriented the party 
towards Europe, markets and industrial relations and away horn public ownership and
439protectionism.
Roy Hattersley, Kinnock’s deputy, was also important in this foundational work as he 
and Kinnock both sought to counter the perceived rise of Marxism and militancy. 
Long before Blair and others publicly identified their political roots in the work of the 
New Liberals, Hattersley was drawing from what he saw as the legacy of Hobhouse 
and Green as well as ethical socialists such as R .H . Tawney, to bring the party back to 
the idea o f a ‘conjoining of liberalism and social democracy’.440 As the history of the 
party attests, however, they could not travel fast enough and far enough to win in 
1992. It was the fourth election defeat that galvanised the party into accepting the 
modernisation.
Social democracy and the Third Way
Blair took on the modernisation mantle from Kinnock but made a significant change 
to the analysis in light o f the prevalent societal critiques and the political environment. 
His vision overtly moved the party towards a reformist social democracy that was 
politically, culturally and philosophically situated between strains of socialism and 
liberalism.
Arguably, this was, in fact the ‘real’ position o f the party. Geoff Eley and Sassoon 
agree that socialism’s objective, at least in the UK context, was not:
... an alternative society or the vision of an anti-capitalist revolution, but 
the pursuit of small changes ... From the very beginning — the founding 
o f the socialist parties and the launching of the Second International ... 
there was a tension between the movement’s end-goal, the abolition of 
capitalism, and the immediate push for improvement ... Consistency with 
the end goal of revolution gave way to the immediate or ‘transitional’ 
goals o f reform.441
This has been recognised by others in Labour and socialist history, as Chris Harman 
points out in his article, ‘From Bernstein to Blair: one hundred years o f
439 Gamble, Andrew, ‘Loves Labour Lost’, in Perryman, Altered States.
440 Driver and Martell, New Labour: Politics after Thatcherism.
441 Eley, ‘Socialism by any other Name?’ p. 99.
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revisionism’.442 It is precisely this point of reform that both Bernstein and Crosland 
take up in their respective timeframes as they adjust their views of socialism to the 
context in which they find themselves. Bernstein has already been discussed, but 
Crosland is interesting in that he was consciously attempting to prove the arguments 
o f the original revisionists, and faced similar demographic and electoral changes. 
Essentially both were instrumental in altering the direction of the party to the 
reformist view though in the previous timeframes the revision was that the economy 
was becoming more controllable by the state, and therefore only needed reform, 
whereas the view today is basically that globalisation is uncontrollable except in an 
international framework; national states have litde ability to stand in the face of such 
forces. So, Blair turns the revisionist project on its head but within the reformist 
mould.
Scholte argued that it is this reformist approach or ‘social democracy’ which ‘presents 
the strongest challenge to neo-liberal policies on globalisation’443 and suggests that it is 
more successful in terms of international governance, explaining why parties such as 
Labour have called for a renewal of social democracy as synonymous to the Third 
Way. In a similar vein, others, notably Paul Hirst, co-author with Grahame 
Thompson o f Globalisation in Question, have called the Third Way ‘the original third 
way between laissez-faire capitalism and state socialism’, with the aim ‘to stabilise and 
humanise capitalism, containing the scope o f market forces’,444 or, alternatively, as a 
‘hybrid political tradition composed of socialism and liberalism ... inspired by socialist 
ideals but heavily conditioned by its political environment and incorporating liberal 
values.’445
This shift from the transformative political ideology to the openly reformist approach 
is crucial to the development of the Third Way, although, as we shall see, the Third 
Way strives to take this project even beyond that combination of forces and history. 
As Driver and Martell suggest, the ‘novelty’ o f the Third Way lies in the 
‘combination of left and right’, or ‘a mixture’ of some kind such that:
The third way offers a politics which is beyond the closed ideological 
systems of left and right but which still combines them both and remains 
within the tradition of middle way politics which has been a feature of
442 Harman, Chris. ‘From Bernstein to Blair: one hundred years o f  revisionism.’ International Socialism 
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much o f 20th century British politics — most notably new liberalism, post­
war social democracy and one-nation conservatism.446
O r in a more abstract form, the Third Way is something between the ‘European 
model and the Anglo-Saxon models’ which is able to reconcile the best strengths of 
the market, i.e. efficiency and dynamism, but not leave behind a concern for social 
cohesion and equality.447
At the turn o f the twentieth century the Third Way represents New Labour’s 
response to a transformative moment, as social democracy moves from a period of 
economic expansion to a concern for other more socially orientated values such as 
community and equality or social justice. The Third Way constitutes ‘a paradigm shift 
in the organisation of economic relations’448 or a ‘new paradigm’.449 O r even more, its 
language represents a ‘new synthesis’ as it comes to terms with the ‘period of 
profound social geopolitical and economic change’.450
Though some resist quite such huge claims and argue instead, that, rather than a 
synthesis o f transcendence, the Third Way represents ‘an attempt to combine them 
[left and right] into interdependence with one another or mutual reciprocity — a 
balance o f the old rather than a surpassing of them’, such that ‘the new politics is a 
management of the old opposites: both are still there in tensions with one another ... 
it is not a reconciliation, synthesis or transcendence’.451
The left/right dilemma
Fundamentally, we return to the dilemma of the left/right divide. Politicians and 
commentators alike stumble over whether or not ‘left’ and ‘right’ exist, and to the 
extent that they do, whether or not any specific approach is beyond that division..
In old terminology, the Third Way begins from the ‘left’ of British politics. There 
were deliberate positional claims to a mixed political ancestry, but there was also a 
clear attempt to create a ‘new’, even perhaps a unique, position. This perspective has
446 Driver and Martell, ‘Left, Right and the third way’ in Giddens, Anthony, ed. The Global Third Way 
Debate. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p 42.
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been claimed by various players to be simultaneously ‘between’ the more traditional 
historical approaches found in socialism and liberalism, ‘above’ the struggle by 
proposing not an ideological but a pragmatic approach and ‘beyond’ the left-right 
spectrum by claiming primacy for the inescapable modem reality represented by the 
term ‘globalisation’.
Blair reflected more of than an echo o f the New Liberals when he declared that the 
Third Way is ‘not simply a compromise between left and right’.452 Nor, he argues, is 
it ‘an attempt to split the difference between Right and Left’; instead, it is ‘about 
traditional values in a changed world.453
In what might be a self-conscious awareness of the debates at the end of the 
nineteenth century, Giddens also points out that the Third Way cannot just be a 
‘reversion to ethical liberalism’ not least, as he points out, because ethical liberals 
wrote during the rise o f socialism, while the Third Way and the ‘new politics’ are 
being developed in an age after its demise454 — an age coloured by the end o f all things 
that seem to be relevant to the political environment, though the beginning o f a new 
kind o f politics influenced by the new age.
452 Blair, Tony. ‘Third Way, Better Way.’ The Washington Post 27 September 1998.
453 Blair, T ony. The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century. Fabian Pamphlet 588. The Fabian 
Society London, 1998, p. 1.
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Chapter 10
The Third Way
As indicated in the previous chapter, the economic realities of the 1970s and ’80s 
created domestic political difficulties. The end of the Cold War changed the debate in 
a number of dimensions. For some socialists — even democratic socialists — the collapse 
o f communism, combined with de-industrialisation and globalisation was the final 
straw necessitating a fundamental re-examination of purpose and philosophy. The 
twin foundations of economic and social structures gave way and social democracy 
was left struggling for a base from which to assert a new identity as the ‘modem’ gave 
way to the ‘global’ age.
The modem media is similar to the early social sciences at the turn o f the previous 
century, in that it brings information and images from distant places back to the 
individual. It also provides more graphic information about the domestic realities of 
poverty and crime. Issues of social exclusion, both at home and abroad, became key 
subjects o f debate while pressure for self-governance created an issue o f state, national 
and individual identity. The individual’s relationship to the state, through both 
political and economic means, was under scrutiny, as was the state’s ability to protect 
its citizens militarily or economically. As life expectancy lengthened (and life 
expectation rose), the cost of welfare state provision rose while the state’s ability to 
maintain that support was being eroded.
The Third Way was consciously used to position the Labour Party — or New Labour 
— on three levels. Internally, a political elite of modernisers within the Labour Party 
used the Third Way as a means to force the pace of party development. Kinnock and 
Smith had started the process but the fourth defeat at a general election, in 1992, 
proved that the project had not yet succeeded. Externally, the Third Way, and its 
portrayal of globalisation as the crucial economic and international threat, were used 
to shore up support for domestic policies likely to be unpopular with the party 
faithful. Party supporters were uneasy, but the leadership needed to take the gamble 
that the left would remain loyal as the party moved towards the increasingly 
important non-unionised, professional voter. To do that, the party needed to present 
answers to the significant questions and demonstrate that it was moving away from a 
collectivist/socialist ideology, and perceived trade-union domination, towards a more 
open and responsive form of government.
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Internationally, Labour leaders used the Third Way to engage like-minded parties on 
a bilateral basis and in summit meetings in the name o f ‘progressive governance’. 
Fellow European leaders were actively recruited to the project. The New Democrats 
of the US had found themselves in a similar position and were therefore advocates, if 
not leaders, o f the project. These meetings involved a range of political and academic 
participants, though often from the more ‘popular’ strains of debate. Emphasis was on 
new ideas rather than established ones. The conferences made claims to work on both 
domestic and international issues; they were specifically designed not to focus on 
traditional international issues, but instead on the Third Way and domestic issues — or 
those issues now deemed to be more suitable to global than to single state action. 
They were also geared to gamer international recognition and add credibility to 
domestic leadership. This work on the international stage helped to blur the 
international/domestic divide further and had an impact on both sides of these 
debates.
The result o f this transformation was a new political approach. In this chapter, the 
background o f the Third Way will provide the context for an exploration of its values 
and approach as understood by Blair and Giddens, the main protagonists o f its 
philosophy. This will be followed by a discussion o f Blair’s own understanding of the 
crucial issue o f globalisation, and the ensuing economic discussion. Key concepts of 
definitional features such as ‘equality’, ‘stakeholding’, ‘community’ and 
‘competitiveness’ will then be investigated in more detail, with a view to examining 
the domestic/international links in the following chapter.
Thatcher's long shadow
The Conservatives generally, and Margaret Thatcher specifically, undoubtedly 
changed the terms of political debate during their long hold on office. Thatcherism 
was, though many on the left could not see it, a modernising project from the right 
and one with a variety o f ‘irreversible consequences’.455 There was literally, in many 
areas, ‘no going back’. The Tories proved that radicalism and progress were not the 
prerogatives o f the left.
This created a new domestic context for the Labour Party and, combined with the 
changes around the globe, broke the party’s confidence that its established political 
approach would soon return it to power. Thus, New Labour was granted effectively a
455 Gray, ‘After Social Democracy’.
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clean slate. Rather than attempting to undo Thatcherism, they chose to work from 
that base. The Conservatives were caught in the internal machinations that attended 
the end o f their revolutionary economic era and were therefore unable to move their 
party’s thinking forward. They believed that it was a leadership issue not a positioning 
issue and thus lost their advantage. The Labour Party on the other hand, at least in 
some quarters, recognised that as well as the end o f Thatcher it could be the end of 
the Conservatives — though not the end of Thatcherism per se.
The term ‘post-Thatcherism’ as used here, is therefore not intended as an ideological 
category as much as an indication of a new domestic political landscape. A new 
starting frame had been established by that radical approach. As Driver and Martell 
put it:
O ur interpretation o f New Labour as shifting from social democracy to 
neo-liberalism and conservatism does not amount to an equation of New 
Labour with Thatcherism Mark II. We do not see Tony Blair as the ‘son 
o f Margaret’. New Labour is not Thatcherite, but ‘post-Thatcherite’. It 
has left behind the pre-Thatcher days o f Old Labour and accepted much 
o f the terrain left by Lady Thatcher. Yet it takes this as a starting point 
beyond which there are elements which make New Labour different from 
and beyond Thatcherism.456
This also enabled the Labour Party, for the first time, to think the unthinkable about 
its political future. Production and ownership were no longer unshakeable. The party 
continued to stress that the old ‘left — right’ debate was out of date and the new 
politics went ‘beyond’: beyond left and right, and well beyond Thatcher. Political 
commentators began to agree that the big questions of politics were not answerable in 
the old language. International events provided the catalyst and domestic foundation 
for a new lease of life to the modernising, overtly progressive agenda. Thus, the Third 
Way was bom  with a view to reclaiming the language o f progressive politics. Not 
particularly new language, but infused with its own meaning.
Ultimately, the Thatcher revolution damaged the socialist or labourist approach 
beyond repair. Thus, the Third Way moved towards a reinvention of social 
democracy. As Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright put it in their introduction to New 
Social Democracy, ‘In other words, the third way had to be about a new social 
democracy or it was nothing. It had to be about a new social democracy for new 
times ... Yet it is a moment for understanding that social democracy’s traditional 
mission of domesticating capitalism at the national level now has to be applied to the
456 Driver and Martell, New Labour: Politics after Thatcherism, p. 165.
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continental and global level too.’457 Their reading of the debates discussed in Chapter 
Nine was that they had to link their own efforts to those in other countries if the 
project was to be a success. Economic globalisation and political internationalism 
were, they argued, part of the same response to transformation.
Will Hutton puts it slightly differently:
Socialists may be unwilling to concede it, but socialism, at least as 
conceived by its founding fathers, is in its death throes ... At the end of 
the twentieth century socialism is alive only to the extent it has adopted 
the softer, pluralist and more capitalist-friendly values of its near sibling — 
social democracy ... For social democrats the political task is to find an 
accommodation between current capitalism and socialist values and build 
a political alliance with the centre that can prosecute the consequent 
economic and social programme.458
Driver and Martell provide a good summary o f the Blair/New Labour project. It 
could be suggested that New Labour and the Third Way are not synonymous, but in 
the main they are taken to be a fairly consistent proposition:
Community and social justice combine in New Labour thinking to 
provide the basis for what is hoped is a politics beyond Thatcherism.
Three themes — ethics, economic efficiency and social cohesion — are 
interwoven. Economic success — particularly more jobs — will bring 
greater social justice and social cohesion; which is further strengthened by 
a more dutiful and responsible citizenry; and more social cohesion will in 
turn help create a more viable market economy. The idea o f stakeholding 
... bridges community and social justice. For Labour modernisers, 
stakeholding gives a sense of being a part of a community; of being 
included, of having a stake in society which throws up rights as well as 
responsibilities; o f there being greater opportunities, more fairness and 
social justice; and o f there being more democracy and accountability in 
government and politics.459
W e will return to these concepts when we come to discuss the core values and 
approach of the Third Way.
The details o f the modernisation of the Labour Party have been discussed at length 
elsewhere — the relevance here is the urgency this debate gained in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. This was driven forward by the sudden death of John Smith, which 
provided an unexpected opportunity for fast-track movement by the new leader,
457 Gamble and Wright, New Social Democracy, pp. 6-7.
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Tony Blair.460 Blair also seized the chance to use the favourable ‘wake’ created by the 
Clinton victory in the US to take the party into the debate on globalisation and the 
creation o f a third way.
The US comparison will be discussed at length in the following chapter but it is 
important here to note that both Blair and Gordon Brown had visited the US and 
concluded that the situation of the Labour Party and the Democrats was broadly 
similar. As early as 1984 Gordon Brown went to the Democrat convention in San 
Francisco and met with Clinton well before his Presidential nomination. Blair had 
also been to the US with the all-party tax campaign followed by a study-tour trip in 
the same year, paid for by the US government. They came to the US together for the 
Democratic Convention in 1988.461 Over this time they developed their analysis of 
the commonalities between the Labour Party and the Democrats and shared this with 
Clinton at his first meeting with Blair462 (see Chapter Eleven).
Ultimately, the gamble paid off in 1997, as Labour won back a sizeable chunk of the 
‘middling working class — the so-called C2 skilled manual workers and the C l non- 
managerial office workers — who had deserted Labour in 1979.’463
Moving the Labour Party
From the outset, globalisation and the importance o f international comparisons 
featured in the positioning of the Third Way. For example, Mandelson and Roger 
Liddle argue that the Third Way starts from the recognition o f five ‘insights’ that cross 
this international/domestic frontier:
First, people feel increasingly insecure. This is caused by rapid economic 
and technological change throughout the world and breakdown of society 
in Britain ... Secondly by comparison with other countries Britain is 
badly equipped to meet the challenge o f change ... Thirdly, New Labour 
understands why the New Right failed ... their ideology has taken them 
too far and their own incompetence has cost Britain dear ... Fourthly,
New Labour is fundamentally different from old Labour in its economic, 
social and political approach ... Fifthly, New Labour has a distinctive
460 Gould, Philip. The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party. London:
Abacus, 1998; Mandelson, Peter. The Blair Revolution Revisited. London: Politico’s Publishing, 2002.
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message of its own that goes beyond the nostrums of old Labour and New 
Right.464
Clause IV
Internally, Blair began with the radical step o f challenging Clause IV — a totem of 
socialist idealism. Despite the fact that Hugh Gaitskell, then Labour leader, had 
attempted the same task in 1959 and lost resoundingly,465 Blair set his sights on 
reclaiming the social democratic project in the new context of post-Thatcherite 
Britain. If Labour was to make this pact or new ‘social contract’ with the changing 
electorate, he needed to win the middle-class voter; he also knew that the more 
traditional left had nowhere else to go.
Blair was faced with a situation that would have looked familiar to Ramsay 
MacDonald. For MacDonald the issue was to present socialism as reformist, or 
evolutionary, and for Blair it was a case o f creating something he was determined to 
call progressive politics. MacDonald accepted the frame o f capitalism — though many 
around him at the time, including many in his own party ranks, did not — and Blair 
accepted the basic individualistic economic model o f Thatcher, though he renamed it 
globalisation. To both leaders, the three traditional strands o f Labour Party thought 
were clearly in tension. However, both pushed these groups within the party to 
follow their lead towards the middle ground using arguments of efficiency and 
competitiveness as solutions to global pressure.
Some hoped that these moves on the part o f both leaders were just a right-wing 
smokescreen for electoral purposes, and that each would eventually revert to real 
socialism. MacDonald, for example, was ridiculed for taking to a frock coat and hat 
and taking more care over his personal grooming. A more substantive point in the 
case of Blair is made by Paul Foot, a left-winger of many years’ standing, when he 
pointed out that in fact the original proposal for the wording for Clause IV approved 
by Blair was more right-wing than the final version, not less.466
As symbolic as the Clause IV batde was, Blair also needed to redefine a whole set o f 
key words in the political script. Where these words could not be refined or were 
inadequate, he sought new ones. Phrases such as ‘social-ism’ have already been
464 Mandelson and Liddle, The Blair Revolution, p. 4.
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referred to, but ‘equality’, ‘stakeholding’ and ‘community’ are key concepts, as well as 
examples o f what are termed the values of the Third Way.
It is to these values that we now turn, as understood by both Blair and Giddens. This 
will be followed by a discussion of Blair’s understanding of globalisation, and the 
domestic economic consequences of the New Labour positional attitudes in these 
areas. Four key Third Way concepts will then be investigated.
The Third Way and its values
As noted above, the Third Way was effectively the project of the leader and a close 
coterie o f senior advisers and ministers. This is clear from its development and amply 
demonstrated in the discussion o f the foreign implications in Chapter Eleven.
Looking back on its development, the consistency and cogency o f the messages and 
the careful orchestration of its introduction and development were impressive. While 
this may have been a luxury of opposition it is clear that the New Liberals suffered 
from a lack o f the kind of support from the party leadership that was so evident in the 
case o f the Third Way. It was conceived and organised as a crucial part o f the Labour 
Party’s campaign for election. As such, each element o f the campaign was constructed 
to form a coherent whole, rather than is often the case for parties in government, 
where the overall vision becomes more difficult to project next to ongoing business. 
The Labour Party is no different in this regard and once it entered government this 
level of coordination became more difficult. It is a tribute to the original design o f the 
campaign that the reasoning, logic and key concepts were used as long as they were.
It was only as the initial circle o f Blair cabinet colleagues began to be reshuffled from 
their original posts that the Third Way lost much of this consistency.
In its initial phase, Blair was deliberately the main spokesperson for the Third Way. 
Other political figures were not nearly as prominent, though two o f Blair’s advisers, 
namely Mandelson, his campaign right hand, and Giddens, adviser and academic 
credibility check for the project, were also publicly involved. This line-up supported 
the positional attitude of a party with a new leader with a vision and big ideas. It 
demonstrated an appreciation of history and tradition combined with an inclusive and 
forward-looking project. Blair was a man with international credibility and clout.
Blair often placed the Third Way in the context of his own personal, almost religious, 
values as well as his political views. He also spoke with an evangelising zeal of
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expanding the Third Way to other countries, particularly in Europe. Like New 
Liberalism, for Blair at least, the Third Way was a moral compass as well as a political 
one. Given this almost missionary approach Blair was well placed to paint a kind of 
traditional view of life in Britain while at the same time promoting a particular view 
o f globalisation. This tone appealed to the disillusioned Tory voters so desperately 
needed by the Labour Party at the time. It is interesting to note that this also created a 
tension with the concurrent portrayal o f Blair as the moderniser.467 In Giles Radice’s 
book, What Needs to Change: New Visions for Britain, Blair set out his vision as:
One nation, where we work together to prepare ourselves for massive 
economic and technological change; to extend opportunity in a world of 
deep insecurity, to create a genuine civic society where everyone has a 
stake, where everyone has a responsibility, and where power is pushed 
down towards the people ... and to secure our place in the world as a 
nation cooperating with others in Europe and elsewhere.468
While he stressed values, he also made two points that seem contradictory. He argued 
that his ‘conviction’ is ‘that we have to be absolute in our adherence to our basic 
values’, while, at the same time — indeed in the same speech to the French National 
Assembly, the Third Way sceptics of Europe — that we must also be ‘infinitely’ 
imaginative and adaptable in the applications of values because ‘what counts is what 
works’.469 There was an interesting dilemma being set up as to the immutability o f the 
values he is projecting or whether pragmatism overrules values.
Blair often listed his ‘core values’, and while they obviously varied in light of time and 
circumstance, they were all recognisably related and a fairly limited range. The core 
generally included: (equal) opportunity, responsibility and community. Others such as 
justice, equal worth, society, solidarity, tolerance, democracy, mutual obligation, and 
internationalism are also part of the collection.470 From the perspective of social 
democracy as the combination of socialism and liberalism, the general lack of 
emphasis here on liberty and freedom became a point o f interest and contention for 
many both inside and outside the party.
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Giddens and the Third Way
Giddens has already been discussed at some length in the context of globalisation, and 
in particular his ‘academic’ approach to the subject. However, given that he also has a 
political role in this discussion as Blair’s adviser, and probably the most significant 
contributor to the development of the Third Way other than Blair, it is also worth 
looking at his approach from the overtly political point o f view.
The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy was written a year after the general 
election that brought New Labour to power. It was, in Giddens’ words, designed as ‘a 
contribution to the debate now going on in many countries about the future o f social 
democratic politics’.471 It was the result of previous work (presumably prior to the 
election, during the planning of the campaign) and what he calls a summary of 
‘informal evening discussion meetings’ with New Labour thinkers such as Geoff 
Mulgan (the Director of Demos, the left-of-centre think tank, brought into the 
Number 10 Policy Unit immediately after the election), and Ian Hargreaves (the 
former editor o f the New Statesman). The importance of policy is demonstrated by the 
fact the Downing Street Policy Unit doubled in size when Blair came into office and 
‘Headed by the youthful David Miliband, it is a testament to Blair’s desire, expressed 
while leading the opposition in Parliament, to draw on a coalition of thinkers, 
including people outside the party’.472
Giddens states in the preface to his first book that the reasons for this debate seem 
clear enough and echoes the debates discussed in Chapter Nine — ‘the dissolution of 
the “welfare consensus” that dominated in the industrial countries up to the late 
1970s, the final discrediting of Marxism and the very profound social, economic and 
technological changes that helped bring these about’.473 And while he makes no 
special claims to the name, ‘the Third Way’, he nonetheless feels that it is a useful way 
to demarcate the task ahead, namely the ‘periodic re-thinking’ necessary to bring 
social democracy up to date. Well after he has outlined what he believes to the 
shortcomings of the current political frameworks, he refines this initial statement by 
suggesting that, ‘I shall take it that “third way” refers to a framework o f thinking and 
policy-making that seeks to adapt social democracy to a world which has changed
471 Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f Social Democracy, p. vii.
472 Philpot, Robert. ‘The Brains Behind Tony Blair’ The New Democrat, March 1 2000.
473 Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f Social Democracy, p. vii.
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fundamentally over the past two or three decades. It is a third way in the sense that it 
is an attempt to transcend both old style social democracy and neo-liberalism.’474
His notion o f the renewal of social democracy starts from his presumption that ‘pre­
existing political ideologies have lost their resonance’ and talk only o f Marxism, 
communism and Thatcherite neo-liberalism. If it is a new political ideology he seeks, 
it seems a lapse of historical understanding that he does not look at the philosophical 
roots of his project — namely Liberalism and its variations, found in socialism and 
Conservatism. Social liberalism seems to be avoided, as do the New Liberals, in this 
analysis.
The importance o f the work lies in the fact it draws out what became consistent New 
Labour themes and ideas. Giddens, in a refrain that will become recognisable as part 
o f the same list used by both Mandelson and Blair, outlines what he sees as five 
dilemmas facing the country:
• Globalisation — what exactly is it and what implications does it have?
• Individualism — in what sense if any are modem societies becoming more 
individualistic?
• Left and right — what are we to make of the claim that they no longer have 
meaning any more?
• Political agency — is politics migrating away from orthodox mechanisms of 
democracy?
• Ecological problems — how should they be integrated into social democratic 
politics?475
These dilemmas are then discussed not so much with a view to concrete solutions but 
with a view to forming an approach supporting his thesis that a new, radical kind of 
politics is required. He returns again and again to the theme that it is no longer 
enough to ‘reform’ but to ‘rethink’ government.
Giddens makes it clear in all his work that he is attempting to take the three 
competing strands o f the Labour Party and direct them towards a reformed social 
democracy. In the same way in which he avoids Liberalism as an ideology, he sets up
474 Ibid., p. 26.
475 Ibid., p.28.
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the older aspects of the Labour programme as unworkable and out of date. The Third 
Way for Giddens is really being suggested as the only way.
A common juxtaposition for Giddens is social democracy versus a ‘pure marketplace’. 
As he indicates:
The term [third way] has been around for a while but it is used to mean 
the core traditions o f parliamentary socialism and social democracy. Now 
it means something very different; trying to steer between the two 
dominant philosophies that have failed us, Thatcherism and Reaganism in 
the US. You simply can’t run the world as though it were a gigantic 
marketplace.476
He similarly argues that:
Social democrats should seek a new role for the nation in a cosmopolitan 
world. The emerging global order cannot sustain itself as a ‘pure 
marketplace’... A reassertion of the role o f the nation is important as a 
stabilising force, a counter to endless fragmentation.477
At the same time, however, he promoted the notion of the market and argues that, 
‘Social democrats ... need to overcome some of their worries and fears about 
markets’.478 In the New Statesman he suggests that:
The Third Way is a positive social democratic response to globalisation.
In contrast to neo-liberals, Third Way thinkers argue that globalisation 
needs collective management. It calls for active government on all levels — 
global, national and local.479
Finally, returning to the point made in relation to the discussion o f Giddens on 
globalisation he suggests that:
The overall aim of Third Way politics should be to help citizens pilot 
their way through the major revolutions of our time: globalisation, 
transformations in personal life and our relationship to nature. Third Way 
politics should take a positive attitude towards globalisation but crucially 
only as a phenomenon ranging much more widely than the global 
marketplace.480
476 Giddens, ‘Third W ay’s the Charm’.
477 Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, p 129.
478 Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics, p. 32.
479 Giddens, Anthony. ‘Better than warmed-over porridge’. N ew  Statesman. February 12 1999.
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It's the (global) economy, stupid
If the values o f the Third Way are important, the crux to the project is globalisation. 
As Blair argued:
Over the last fifty years two major political projects have dominated 
politics in Britain and many other Western democracies: neo-liberalism 
and a highly statist brand of social democracy ... Britain has experienced 
both in a full-blooded form. That is why the third way has a particular 
relevance in Britain.481
Essentially, the Labour Party had a specific understanding of globalisation that was set 
out as a driving force behind the Third Way. This, modernisers argued, meant that 
there was a need for a new kind of politics, both domestically and internationally. 
While suggesting that Blair, New Labour and the Third Way are consistent 
propositions, it is worth exploring Blair’s own perspective of this debate.
Like the Third Way, globalisation was carefully positioned by the party and by key 
players within the party. Blair and Gordon Brown, the Shadow Chancellor at the 
time, set about reorienting the party’s economic policy as a response to the challenges 
o f globalisation.482 This enabled the Labour Party to re-interpret the economic 
arguments in the light of the post-Thatcher era on the one side and the collapse of 
communism on the other. Colin Hay argues that this amounted to a ‘paradigm shift’:
We are witnessing the unfolding of a new state regime, a new settlement 
reflected, to at least as great an extent as in the post-war years, in a new 
convergence and consensus. We have moved, or are in the process o f 
moving, from a Keynesian welfare setdement towards a neo-liberal post- 
Thatcher setdement.483
Colin Crouch echoes this sentiment in his article, ‘The Terms of the Neo-Liberal 
Consensus’, and goes on to suggest other implications o f this convergence in domestic 
politics:
From now on both major contending parties in the British state accept 
the essential neo-liberal tenets: markets should rule under the guidance of 
entrepreneurs, with minimal intervention from government; taxes and 
public spending, and in particular the redistributive effect of direct
481 Blair, The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century.
462 Watson and Hay, ‘The discourse o f globalisation’.
483 Hay, Colin. ‘Blaijorism: Towards a One-Vision Polity’. Political Quarterly Vol 68 N o  4 Oct—Dec 
1997: 372-78, p 372.
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taxation, should be kept down; and trade unions should have as marginal 
a role as possible.484
This enabled Blair and Brown to replace older features of the Labour platform and, 
controversially, to accept the spending plans o f the Conservative government prior to 
the 1997 election. Importandy, this also took the party in a new direction in terms of 
economic policy, as well as proposing a new relationship between the state and the 
citizen through that economy. As Marquand points out:
The tension between economic conservatism and political radicalism is 
the easier to define. Both, in an odd way, are legacies of the old regime.
Like David Owen in the 1980s, New Labour in the 1990s has accepted 
the foundational assumptions of the Thatcher counter-revolution in 
political economy. Indeed that is its defining characteristic. It is what 
differentiates Tony Blair from his two most recent predecessors; it is what 
makes New Labour new.485
Positionally, the party’s approach to the economy served to calm the fears of the 
right-leaning electorate that the Labour Party was still a tax-and-spend party and 
reinforced the idea it could be trusted with the economy. O f course the Conservative 
Party had not helped their own case in this regard, as John Major’s government 
stumbled into ‘Black Wednesday’ in September 1992 — this single event shook the 
electorate’s confidence irreparably in the area Tories had been able to dominate for 
over twenty years.
Blair on globalisation
The Labour leadership had recognised that the traditional party support was dying 
out. As the economy shifted from manufacturing to services and information, the 
white, male, un- and semi-skilled employees (and the trade unions that represented 
them) were diminishing in their power and numbers. As Blair argued to the Fabian 
Society:
The industrial order of the last century was built on raw materials, heavy 
industry, unskilled manual employment, great concentrations of 
economics power and antagonism between capital and labour ... But the 
old politics o f the Left was an expression of old industry ... just as the old
484 Crouch, Colin. ‘The Terms o f  the Neo-Liberal Consensus’, Political Quarterly Vol 68 N o  4 O ct-  
Dec 1997: 352-60, p. 352.
485 Marquand, David. ‘After Euphoria: the Dilemma o f N ew  Labour’. Political Quarterly Vol 68 N o 4 
O ct-D ec 1997: 335-38, p. 335.
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politics o f the Right retained a strong aristocratic and paternalistic 
streak.486
In the same speech, Blair goes on to identify what he considers to be the issues. The 
changes that he listed have a familiar note; they match those o f other observers of late 
modem society. Similarly, they are not all features o f globalisation but linked to a 
variety of social trends. Blair identifies globalisation as a potentially useful and 
progressive force but at the same time compresses a range of features of modernisation 
and locates them all under the rubric o f globalisation:
The growth o f global markets and global culture ... Technological 
advance and the rise o f skills and information as key drivers of 
employment and new industries, destroying old patterns of employment 
... A transformation in the role of women ... Radical changes in the 
nature of politics itself, with the growth of the European Union and a 
popular loss of faith with distant, unresponsive and often ineffective 
political institutions and those who work for them.487
Norman Fairclough, in New Labour, New Language?, identifies this kind of discussion 
about globalisation by New Labour, and particularly by Blair, as what he calls ‘a 
pervasive presupposition’.488 By this he means that New Labour uses some terms as 
things to be taken for granted — ‘something we all know’. Globalisation in this kind of 
discourse is both ‘given and achieved’.
Blair also discusses globalisation specifically and, like Giddens, points out that he feels 
the phenomenon is not simply economic and highlights two aspects o f the debate. 
First, the internationalisation of certain issues, e.g. security and terrorism, 
environmental concerns, migration489 and the pressure on the state o f the international 
flows o f trade and investment. Blair portrays this pressure as something that the state 
must be aware o f and deal with, but also hints at the idea that there may be a limit to 
what the state can do and so must be careful as to what it offers.490 In a passage that 
echoes both Harcourt and Wallas in the previous century Blair concludes:
Many o f our domestic problems are caused on the other side o f the 
world. Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago and in my 
own constituency in County Durham. Poverty in the Caribbean means 
more drugs on the streets in Washington and London. Conflict in the 
Balkans causes more refugees in Germany and here in the US. These
486 Blair, The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century, p. 8.
487 Ibid., p. 6.
488 Fairclough, Norman. New Labour, New Language? London: Roudedge, 2000, p. 27.
489 Blair, Tony. Untided speech delivered at Lambeth Palace, 28 July 1998.
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problems can only be addressed by international cooperation. W e are all 
internationalists now, whether we like it or not.491
Thus he illustrates an inevitablist view of globalisation and proposes to cope with the 
consequences by developing the competitiveness of the country and enhancing 
cooperation. If economic convergence is what fundamentally made New Labour 
new, the consequent changes in the roles of the state and individual in this economic 
reality become a matter of negotiation. As has been shown in this and previous 
chapters, the key to the debate was the inevitability of globalisation that was being 
conveyed and the necessity of action by the government to respond to the changes 
being wrought on both the international and domestic levels.
This created a tension within the Labour Party as those who ‘support’ globalisation 
were seen to be on the right, whereas those concerned with the implications, or those 
who are ‘losers’ in the global marketplace, were generally deemed to be on the left — 
e.g. anti-globalisation protestors. However, New Labour and the Third Way argued 
that while they were not ‘in favour’ o f globalisation, it can be made to work for the 
benefit of everyone and can be a force for progress. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter Eleven.
Critique
It was clear from the outset, however, that not all commentators were convinced. 
Some academics accused the Third Way of an absence o f historical understanding and 
lack o f ideological foundation, while political opponents have ridiculed it for lack of 
substance and consistency. O n the point of Thatcher specifically, Marquand writing in 
Prospect on the first anniversary o f a Labour government, opined that:
We know what the new regime is not; we don’t yet know what it is.
Patendy it is not socialist. It is not even social democratic or social liberal 
... The Thatcher paradox: liberal economics combined with Tory politics 
— has been followed by the Blair paradox: economic continuity combined 
with political discontinuity.492
This is a point taken up by Alex Callinicos in Against the Third Way. Despite the 
attractiveness of the Third Way as an ‘escape’ from the ‘dead ends of the past’, he 
argues forcefully that rather than being ‘renewal of social democracy’ or a break with
491 Ibid.
492 Marquand, David. ‘The Blair Paradox.’ Prospect May 1998.
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neo-liberalism, the Third Way, in fact, ‘embraces neo-liberalism’ and ‘abandons 
substantial reform altogether’.493 Finally, as Alan Ryan puts it:
The Third Way rests on the assumption that the ownership of the means 
of production is not the central issue in politics ... Tony Blair’s version of 
the Third Way amounts, rhetorically speaking, to ‘neither/nor’. That is to 
say neither state socialism nor libertarian conservatism; it neither puts its 
trust in the state’s control of increasingly large areas o f human life nor 
does it wish to reject state action in principle.494
The Third Way and its critics
After the publication of the basic volume on the Third Way, a range of commentators 
provided a critique of Giddens. This produced a response from Giddens in 2000 in 
the form of The Third Way and its Critics, useful here in that it provides both a 
summary o f the critique and the Third Way response to some of those criticisms. 
Written, as it was, after a round of elections throughout Europe in which parties 
broadly of the same social democratic hue had come to power, Giddens was able to 
argue that the Third Way agenda had become the core o f political dialogue across 
developed democracies, not just in Britain. As he states, ‘third way politics will be the 
point o f view with which others will have to engage.’495
Perhaps emboldened by this success, Giddens goes further on the role of the Third 
Way. In his first book he had hesitated as to what it constituted, but in this second he 
paints a grander picture: ‘Third way politics is not a continuation of neo-liberalism 
but an alternative political philosophy to it’.496 In more classic terminology, he 
suggests that this is ‘a new social contract, appropriate to an age where globalisation 
and individualism go hand in hand. The new contract stresses both the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens.’497
The arguments against the Third Way fall, according to Giddens, into a relatively 
small number of categories. They are that it: 1) Is an amorphous project, difficult to 
pin down and lacking direction; 2) Fails to sustain the proper oudook of the left and 
hence ... lapses into forms of conservatism; 3) Accepts the basic framework of neo­
liberalism especially as concerns the global marketplace; 4) Is essentially an Anglo-
493 Callinicos, Alex. Against the Third Way. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 122—23.
494 Kyan, ‘Britain: Recycling the Third W ay’, p. 78.
495 Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics, p. vii.
496 Ibid., p. 32.
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Saxon project, bearing the hallmarks of societies in which it originated; 5) Has no 
distinctive economic policy other than allowing the market to rule the roost; 6) In 
common with its two main rivals, has no effective way o f coping with ecological
In the same style that Giddens used to set up the Third Way as the ‘only way’, or in 
the course of the globalisation debate to dismiss his opponents, the critics’ argument 
are framed in such as way to enable Giddens to argue his way through them with 
some ease. The inevitability of issues such as the knowledge society and globalisation 
are relied upon to make the necessity o f change non-negotiable. It is fundamentally 
an argument being made to the discontented (and in his view discredited) left. He 
suggests that he is only trying to better explain his views and close stale debates. He 
also attempts to reinforce closure on debate by raising the spectre o f a divided left and 
electoral defeat.
The fundamentals of third way politics, as I would see them, can now be
briefly stated. The third way:
1 Accepts the logic o f ‘1989 and after’ — that while left and right still 
count for a good deal in contemporary politics there are many issues 
and problems that this opposition no longer helps illuminate. The 
attention which the third way gives to the political centre stems, from 
this fact. This emphasis is wholly compatible with the claim that third 
way politics should involve radical policies.
2 Argues that the three key areas of power — government, the economy, 
and the communities of civil society — all need to be constrained in 
the interests o f social solidarity and social justice ...
3 Proposes to construct a new social contract, based on the theorem ‘no 
rights without responsibilities’...
4 In the economic sphere, looks to develop a wide-ranging supply-side 
policy, which seeks to reconcile economic growth mechanisms with 
structural reform of the welfare state ...
5 Seeks to foster a diversified society based upon egalitarian principles.
Social diversity is not compatible with a strongly defined egalitarianism 
of outcome. Third way politics looks instead to maximise equality of 
opportunity ...
6 Takes globalisation seriously ... Third way social democrats should 
look to transform existing global institutions and support the creation
r  499of new ones.
498 Ibid.
499 Ibid., pp. 50-53.
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Thus laid out, the Giddens proposition is relatively simple. The politics of the 
previous age are not up to the challenges o f the modern world. Solutions that, in a 
previous time, may have sufficed, are no longer adequate and even potentially 
dangerous. The nature of the way in which we construct our identities is being 
altered, not least in terms of how we address the economic sphere. In the globalised 
world, each action has a more immediate impact. Moreover, for the first time in 
history we can see that impact immediately. Telecommunications in particular, have 
created an essential shift in time and space that changes human interaction. This 
should be reflected, Giddens argues, in the ways in which we govern ourselves as 
much as it has already changed our relationships with the society around us.
David Walker summarises the argument:
An admirer still of Marx, Giddens was none the less a premature Blairite 
moving ‘beyond left and right’ before Mr Blair became leader ... The line 
o f argument goes like this. We live in a new age which demands a new 
politics emanating from a radical centre located in an active civil society 
based on a democratic family supported by positive welfare whose 
watchword is equality as inclusion within the cosmopolitan nation.500
As he puts it elsewhere in the same article, referring to Giddens’ participation as the 
speaker for the annual BBC Reith Lecture series:
There’s Tony Giddens in a nutshell: globalisation, emancipation, anxiety, 
escape from ‘fate’. It’s the Sixties all over again ... Here with the BBC’s 
accolade, that great Sixties intellectual ambition of reconciling 
individualism (freedom to love and live as we please) with materialism 
(the inexorable force o f history as discerned by Karl Marx) is achieved.501
New Labour, new concepts
New Labour built the Third Way as a response both to its global environment and its 
domestic political context. Its positional attitudes and definitional features have been 
set out, but to understand these fully there are four key concepts that form the 
structure for the New Labour and the Third Way: equality, stakeholding, community 
(or communitarianism) and competitiveness. Each o f these defining features o f the 
Third Way will now be set out and addressed in turn.
500 Walker, David. ‘Sixties’ Man o f  the World’. Guardian, 23 March 1999.
501 Ibid.
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Equality and its relations
Equality and opportunity, or ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’, are complex concepts. As 
such, they are particularly interesting because they He at the heart o f many batdes 
between the different strands of Labour. There is a fundamental tension between 
equality of opportunity and equality o f outcome as they relate to liberty and the 
individual — all important areas for the Third Way.
Full employment and equality of outcome were the guiding lights o f both socialist 
and Labour thought. Social democrats embrace the market as an engine of society, 
and potentially of the good life, but cannot promise equality o f outcome, only an 
attempt to offer equality of opportunity. They also stand as points of differentiation 
between right and left as the left traditionally held up equality as its societal objective 
while the right tacidy supported hierarchy. The New Labour understanding of 
equality was not that of outcome but of opportunity. Education and employment 
then became key to that opportunity as well as to an individual’s identity. This is 
important, as it also feeds direcdy into ideas of stakeholding and community.
As we saw with New Liberalism, the concept o f human nature dictates much of a 
political philosophy, and the Third Way represented a major shift from the state as 
guarantor o f equality to the state acting only as guarantor of opportunity while the 
individual’s responsibility was to take up that opportunity was linked direcdy to the 
world o f work.
These subde but crucial defining features o f the Third Way are also linked to the 
concept o f liberty — a term, it was suggested, that gets left out o f many discussions, as 
it divides rather than unites progressive thought. The tone of this debate should sound 
very familiar, as they echo New Liberal discussions.
Tactically, Third Way thinkers tread gendy around the ideas of equality and liberty as 
they are all too aware of the dangers they present to party equilibrium. There is deep 
philosophical disagreement within their own ranks, as well as a split across the wider 
spectrum that could potentially damage Labour. Conservatives traditionally support 
opportunity but not equality of outcome, believing as they do that it is the 
individual’s responsibility to seize opportunity, while for the persistent liberal strand of 
thought, it is a more philosophical argument in that the difference lies in the 
interpretation of liberty and the limiting of freedom that is associated with attempting 
to ensure equality of outcome.
216
Giddens argues that while equality and liberty can come into conflict, meritocracy 
amounts to a neo-liberal model of equality as the promotion of the equality o f 
opportunity. This, he suggests, creates very disparate levels o f outcome. While not 
resolving the dilemma he has posed, he goes on:
The new politics defines equality as inclusion and inequality as exclusion, 
although these terms need spelling out given their history within the 
party. Inclusion refers in its broadest sense to citizenship, to the civil and 
political rights that all members of a society should have not just formally 
but as a reality o f their lives. It also refers to opportunities and to 
involvement in public space.502
Thus, rather than improving the neo-liberal idea of equality of opportunity, the new 
politics attempted to square the circle by ensuring a concept of equal citizenship; or, 
as Giddens specifically points out, ‘In a society where work remains central to self­
esteem and standard of living, access to work is one main contact of opportunity. 
Education is another and would be so even if it weren’t so important for the 
employment possibilities to which it is relevant.’503 The new politics places the 
economic value o f the citizen in prime position rather than the older New Liberal 
idea o f the fundamental improvement or worth of the individual as prior to all other 
concerns.
Other Third Way thinkers take up this dilemma of equality and retain the formula in 
which equality equates to ‘inclusion’ — generally taken to mean inclusion in the 
economic sense — while inequality is ‘exclusion’. For example, Samuel Beer posits that 
the ‘vision o f the good life’ as not ‘equality’ but ‘opportunity’.504 While Hargreaves 
and Christie attempt a definition of equality that simply states that ‘the new politics 
defines equality as inclusion and inequality as “exclusion”’, they do concede that these 
terms need some further clarification and set out the refined terms as:
Inclusion refers in its broadest sense to citizenship, to the civil and 
political rights and obligations that every member of the society should 
have, not just formally, but as a reality of their lives. It also refers to 
opportunities and to involvement in public space. In a society where 
work remains central to self-esteem and standard o f living, access to work 
is one main context o f opportunity.505
502 Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f Social Democracy, pp. 102—03.
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Thus the argument is brought back to economic concerns, and the relationship of the 
individual to the state, one in which the individual has rights but is also duty bound to 
fulfil their responsibility to perform an economic function for the state.
Stakeholding
Stakeholding was an early attempt to bridge the potential gap, later identified by 
Amitai Etzioni, between the individual and the market or the bigger economy. 
Stakeholding enjoyed a fairly major introduction into Third Way thinking through a 
number of domestic and international speeches by Blair early in 1996. The most 
famous o f these ‘stakeholding speeches’ was the ‘Singapore speech’.506 Interestingly, as 
early as 1920 the New Liberal C.F.G. Masterman identified an early notion of 
‘stakeholding’ when he said:
The New Liberalism does not advocate these reforms as a means of 
‘buying off Socialism’. It has no belief in the policy of Ethelred to the 
Danes. It advocates these reforms as being right in themselves, and as 
being the only alternative to Socialism. It believes in property, possession, 
and competition for attainment above a standard o f life. It believes in a 
Capitalism widely diffused amongst a whole community, with each man 
and family owning a ‘stake in the country,’ some concern in its future, 
some pride in its possession.507
Essentially, both stakeholding and communitarianism (which will be discussed further 
below) were pre-existing ideas that were co-opted by the Third Way and redefined to 
a certain extent for their own purposes. Driver and Martell, as well as Wright and 
Gamble, suggest that it played a crucial role in the structure of the Third Way 
framework. ‘Stakeholding’, to New Labour, acts as the bridge that connects the 
community to its notion of social justice508 and ‘the requirements of a contemporary 
programme of equality and social justice’.509
As stakeholders, individuals and, to a considerably lesser extent, corporations, are 
connected by virtue o f the fact they have a stake in the society around them. The idea 
is that this stake ensures a longer-term perspective rather than a short-termist approach 
that can be damaging to the community and also, for example, to the environment.
To Mandelson and Roger Liddle, the terms ‘community’, ‘stakeholding’ and
506 Fairclough, New Labour, New Language?
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‘mutuality’, go ‘hand in hand’ and it is the combination of these ideas, that they 
suggest, mean ‘justice’.510 Stakeholding then creates a virtuous cycle of investment and 
concern for the more human costs and benefits of decision-making. These are part of 
the responsibilities that are partner to the rights enjoyed by the society.
To Blair, the community was the environment of the private individual while the 
stakeholder economy was the context in which they operated in the business or 
working world. This related direcdy to the theme o f inclusion as an objective both 
for the individual and the state. The notion of the ‘stake’ suggests a long-term 
timeframe that should encourage both to approach issues that require more basic 
reform such as structural unemployment, and the underclass, which is ‘cut off and 
thus, in his view, contributing not to the good of the community but to the 
unravelling o f civil society.511 Blair set out his vision of the stakeholder economy thus:
I believe in a stakeholder economy in which everyone has the 
opportunity to succeed and everyone has the responsibility to contribute.
It is based on the idea that unless we mobilise the efforts and talents o f the 
whole population, we will fail to achieve our economic potential, and 
continue to fall behind. A stakeholder economy is one in which 
opportunity is extended, merit rewarded and no group of individuals 
locked out ... a stakeholder economy has as its foundation the economic 
stability that is necessary to plan and invest ... It requires more investment 
and better investment — notably capital spending through public-private 
partnership to regenerate our infrastructure, investment by industry, 
funded by patient and committed provision o f capital from the financial 
sector.512
This kind of approach leaves itself open to the accusation that New Labour has 
created a moral imperative for the strong community and individuals, but that the 
parameters for industry and business are much less strident. Personal responsibility has 
come to the fore while the potentially more radical notions o f corporate responsibility 
have moved to the background.
The idea o f stakeholding is useful in that it provides the connection between the 
community and the economy and the state. Again to refer to Blair:
The rights we receive should reflect the duties we owe. W ith the power 
should come the responsibility. This principle applies to us as individuals.
W e should take responsibility for our own actions, for our family. There 
are ‘negative duties’ not to infringe the rights of others. But positive
510 Mandelson and Liddle, The Blair Revolution, p. 19.
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duties exist also, towards the broader community. If society provides the 
chance to work and prosper, we have an obligation to take it and to 
contribute something back ... Then we have the duty collectively as 
society to create the opportunities for all to share in our prosperity.
W ithout a stake in society there is precious litde hope of people feeling 
responsibility towards it.513
First, the basic acceptance of the market-led economy implies that individuals must be 
prepared for the increased competition and different skill requirements of the market. 
To a certain extent, Blair concedes that the state cannot protect its citizens without 
their agreement to supply the flexibility required for a competitive economy. This is a 
crucial change in the balance of relations between the individual and their state or 
community.
Second, the difference between the individual as citizen and the individual as 
consumer or employee becomes a point of potential concern, as more responsibility 
falls on the individual. This feeds into other areas such as education, welfare provision 
and even the government’s devolution agenda. Crouch, in his analysis of the 
emerging neo-liberal consensus, has clearly identified this shift in the balance between 
the market and in the individual:
Stakeholding became litde more than commending to employers the 
value o f consulting their workforces. Nothing that might displease the 
neo-liberal business community, especially the financial community, 
could be risked. What could remain were policies to equip the population 
with first-class work skills, since this part o f the institutionalist strategy 
involved adaptation of people to the needs o f the markets rather than vice 
versa.514
But this goes to the heart of the relationship between government and the individual, 
at least as conceived by New Labour. Part of the new politics generally is deemed to 
be the empowerment of the citizen. New Labour has argued for more responsibility 
for the individual (while taking advantage of what that implies in terms of the ability 
of the state to retract).
New Labour argues that the market-driven economy is the engine o f a successful 
country and therefore, that citizens need to be able to adapt to that rapidly changing 
environment if the country is to remain competitive. It is a circular argument. The 
country cannot be successful if the people do not take responsibility and if they do not
513 Blair, Tony. ‘The Conservative Party seems neither to understand nor to act upon the concept o f  
duty.’ The Spectator 25 March 1995: 18.
514 Crouch, ‘The Terms o f the Neo-Liberal Consensus’, p. 358.
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take responsibility the state will hold them accountable. There is a fundamental 
tension between the perceived needs of the market and the abilities of the individual 
to fulfil the expectations placed upon them by the state. The government wants to 
maintain the perception that it can retain control over its economic fate but argues 
that that control rests on the ability of the citizenry to change. Individuals and 
communities must endlessly adapt to the market or be held responsible for the 
consequences. Marquand righdy points to the weakness o f this line o f reasoning:
In strict logic, perhaps, employee subordination may be compatible with 
citizen empowerment. The market realm and the political realm are 
distinct, and the norms that apply in one are not bound to apply in the 
other. But strict logic is rarely a good guide to politics, and there are at 
least two reasons for thinking that is it not the good guide in this present 
case. In the first place, the vision of the human self-implied by citizen 
empowerment differs radically from the vision implied by employee 
subordination. The citizenship ideal is one of participation, activity and 
self-development, and by the same token, o f accountability, transparency 
and scrutiny. Good citizens debate, argue and question; they don’t simply 
accept what is handed out to them. And they cannot switch off their 
citizen selves when they go to work. That of course, is what the early 
social democrats meant by social democracy. A democracy confined to 
the political sphere was no democracy; it has to embrace the social sphere 
as well. Citizenship was indivisible.515
This notion illustrates in some fundamental ways the core of the approach o f New 
Labour to the role of both the individual and the state. To refer to Driver and Martell 
again:
Stakeholding is expressed more as meaning, in a weaker sense, giving the 
un-employed a stake in society by helping them back to work; a leg-up 
into the economy through Labour’s supply-side education and training 
proposals. Worthwhile as this may be, it is some distance from the radical 
stakeholding about corporate accountability.516
Ryan also points out this tendency in his article, ‘Britain: Recycling the “third way’” : 
‘the emphasis on work as a means to membership in the wider society is itself a “third 
way” thought’.517
The state appears to have a role as neither provider o f first nor o f last resort. ‘The role 
of Government is not to command but to facilitate, and to do so in partnership with
515 Marquand, ‘After the Euphoria: The Dilemma o f N ew  Labour’, pp. 336-37.
516 Driver, Stephen and Luke Martell. ‘N ew  Labour’s Communitarianisms.’ Critical Social Policy 17.3 
(1997): 27-46 , p. 42.
517 Ryan, ‘Britain: Recycling the Third W ay’, p. 78.
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industry in limited but key areas.’518 This illustrates the macro view of the state but 
this individual/state split is further illustrated by his list o f the characteristics o f the 
welfare state:
Tackling social exclusion, from decayed communities to drugs and 
unemployment; mutual responsibility — a hand-up not a hand-out; help 
focused on those who need it most; an end to fraud and abuse; 
public/private partnership on welfare delivery; a re-emphasis on active 
welfare, schools and health, not just benefits.519
The overriding image is that rather than a partnership between the employed and the 
employer with rights and responsibilities accruing to each, work has become almost a 
kind of key to membership in society as a whole. The state is limited to providing the 
tools o f opportunity and equality but the individual is held up to a state-devised 
standard with the sanction of withholding support.
Though it was one o f the more popular of the New Labour ideas, the stakeholding 
concept was ultimately dropped before the 1997 election. This may have more than 
one explanation. Employers saw at least part of this agenda as being a step towards a 
more continental employee consultation process and therefore shied away from it. 
Charles Leadbeater and Geoff Mulgan suggest it was a difficult concept and not clear 
enough. They did try to clarify its strengths in their pamphlet: ‘“Mistakeholding” — 
whatever happened to Labour’s big idea?’,520 but given that the main thrust of their 
argument is the deconstruction of the arguments o f Will Hutton and John Kay — the 
‘stakeholding economists’ and previously advisers to the Labour Party — it may also be 
safe to assume that the language changed because there was a disagreement between 
those who developed the language of stakeholding and those who wanted to change 
it to suit their political agenda. Whatever its exact provenance or continued usage, the 
concept behind stakeholding continued to pervade thinking.
Community
Stakeholding implies a sense of community, be it a community o f individuals or of 
groups, corporations or even the state. To have a stake in something suggests a wider 
group in which there is something to be held in esteem, or of value as a stake. In
518 Blair, Tony. Speech to the CBI, 13 Novem ber 1995, quoted in Blair, New Britain: M y Vision o f a 
Young Country, p. 110.
519 Blair, quoted by W hite, Michael. ‘PM ’s 20-year target to end poverty.’ Guardian 19 March 1999.
520 Leadbeater, Charles and Geoff Mulgan. Mistakeholding: whatever happened to Labour’s big idea? 
London: Demos, 1996.
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Blair’s mind it is clear that this is where the community comes into its own. To Blair, 
‘community’ is strongly linked to ideas such as a new social contract and the rights 
and responsibilities of the citizen. Even more basic to his notion o f community 
however, is his idea o f duty. Duty, in Blair’s terms, almost precedes community, 
forming, as it does, ‘an essential Labour concept’, and, being ‘at the heart of creating a 
strong community or society’.521
The link can be seen more clearly in his argument to the Institute of Public Policy 
Research:
The new centre left recognises the importance of community, o f the 
cultural and moral bonds which unite us. We understand that individuals 
need the common boundaries and mutuality o f communities. Based on 
duties as well as rights.522
Again, this was a fault line with Labour Party history as the ‘rights culture’ was 
deemed to be a problem o f ‘old Labour’. Gordon Brown was also involved in the 
discussion of community as part o f a responsible civic society and the confessional 
tone that the left, however constructed, needed to somehow admit that 
responsibilities were part of the social contract:
In other words the left have accepted that personal responsibility is 
necessary to social progress ... a more balanced approach has emerged, 
one that sees the individual enhanced by a supportive community and 
envisions a strong and effective civic society.523
The idea o f community is applied to almost any situation. Giddens and Mandelson 
both suggest that it can be used synonymously in a range of applications. Mandelson 
argues that the concept should not have been conceded to Labour’s political 
opponents as the principles o f ‘working together, mutuality and justice start with the 
family itself,524 while Giddens lifts it to the larger scale o f globalisation and identifies 
‘community’ as an important part of the shift o f power both upwards and downwards 
as community then forms a necessary link in that change so that local people and areas 
can take control back to themselves.525
But it is Blair that specifically set out a notion of community that includes not only 
the individual but goes on to apply the same logic to the international community. In
521 Blair, ‘The Conservative Party seems neither to understand nor to act upon the concept o f  duty’, p. 
18.
522 Blair, Tony. Untitled speech delivered on the 10* Anniversary o f  the Institute o f  Public Policy 
Research, 14 January 1998.
523 Brown, Gordon. Untitled speech at the N C V O  Annual Conference, 9 February 2000.
524 Mandelson and Liddle, The Blair Revolution, p. 20.
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his famous ‘Chicago speech’ in 1999, Blair personifies the state and suggests that states 
should, in effect, act like individuals. If the state becomes aware of some immoral or 
unjust act it should use its powers and intervene. This approach represented a 
departure both for British foreign policy as well as for basic theories of international 
relations. Traditionally, the state is seen as being different in fundamental respects 
from individuals. The community of states is similarly different. Not much progress 
has been made on this statement since it was made, but its aspirations are evident in 
the work o f other Third Way thinkers, (see more below)
As indicated, David Held has been involved in the development of the Third Way. 
His primary focus has been on the issue o f global governance and responsibility. As 
suggested in Chapter One, his views of globalisation support the idea of an inevitable 
and multi-faceted process that will only be contained by a change in state role and 
more coordinated efforts across borders. The result, in his view, is a global civil 
society that is able to contain globalisation for the benefit of the people.
In a similar vein, Mary Kaldor, an adviser to Robin Cook while he was Foreign 
Secretary, argues that countries which are democratic, are also peaceful — at least with 
each other. In an argument that sounds remarkably like the free-trade supporters at 
the end o f the nineteenth century, Kaldor argues that by enmeshing states in networks 
of trade and commerce, as well as through building their democratic institutions, the 
world becomes a safer place. This current version of what is termed ‘democratic peace 
theory’ has gained support within the International Relations discipline, and 
particularly in the US, where it supports the government’s view of promoting free 
markets across the world.
Communitarianism
It is a short step from the notions o f ‘community’ to the approach of 
‘communitarianism’. The term was coined in 1841by the founder of the Universal 
Communitarian Association. Ironically, to him and others in the critical period at the 
end of the nineteenth century, it meant (as defined for the first time in Webster’s 
dictionary o f 1909) ‘a member o f a community formed to put into practice 
communistic or socialist theories’.526 More recendy, it gained popularity in the US at 
the time o f the Third Way debate and positionally provided more links between the 
Labour Party and US thinking — examined in depth in the next chapter.
526 Etzioni, The Essential Communitarian Reader, p. ix.
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For the Labour Party it represented a considerable shift in both language and intent. 
This more specific understanding of the term community was built into the New 
Labour project as fundamental. Like the Third Way, the flexibility of the term has 
enabled New Labour to fill the concept with its requirements. In this case, they have 
used a relatively moralistic and prescriptive approach. The beauty of such a concept 
for the Labour modernisers is that communitarianism provides at one and the same 
time a critique o f social democracy and of liberalism.
The language used by Amitai Etzioni, another influence on the Third Way from the 
US, established ‘duty’ as a fundamental aspect of the new politics as a powerful 
counter to the ‘rights culture’ of Old Labour. As Driver and Martell argue:
New Labour sell community as the hangover cure to the excesses of 
Conservative individualism. Community will create social cohesion out of 
the market culture of self-interest. And in Labour’s dynamic market 
economy, community will also be good for business, underpinning 
economic efficiency and individual opportunity.527
Etzioni's communitarianism
Etzioni’s work on a resurgent communitarianism, with its strong moral tone, coloured 
the Third Way. He argues, that the web that is society, and more specifically the 
communities in which we live, have not been given enough of a voice in the debate 
between market and the state and suggests that the balance between individual rights 
and social responsibilities, or autonomy and the public good, has been skewed:
There have been marked change in the public vocabulary and dialogue; 
the term communitarian and communitarian concepts have been added to 
that o f both liberals and conservatives as a recognised ‘third way’... the 
new communitarians have been concerned from the onset with the 
balance between social forces and the person, between community and 
autonomy, between the common good and liberty, between individual 
rights and social responsibilities.528
However, what seems to be left out is the way in which these communities reflect 
diversity or pluralist ideals. Despite the fact the communitarian platform indicates that 
the ‘responsive community’ recognises the human needs o f all o f its members, it has 
litde to say on how the community is defined, who establishes its membership, the 
sanctions it is enabled to apply, and the ability o f those who disagree to do so and still
527 Driver and Martell, ‘N ew  Labour’s Communitarianisms’, p. 27.
528 Etzioni, The Essential Communitarian Reader, p. x.
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remain in good faith. In short, the concept of the legitimacy of the community is so 
strong that it leaves room for the abuse o f those who are not somehow deemed to be 
o f the community.
This kind o f reservation is made by the likes of Marquand, who argues that in the face 
o f globalisation, there may indeed be a crisis o f community but that the Etzioni 
approach is more akin to a ‘counsel of despair’. He proposes that rather than 
communitarianism of this variety the answer lies more in what he calls the Christian 
socialist approach o f ‘subsidiarity’. The principle of taking decisions as close as possible 
to the community most affected, is, to Marquand, more just, more cohesive and more 
legitimate.529
Outside the party, there was also scepticism as to the usefulness of a concept that 
could be so differendy interpreted. The main concern of such commentators was the 
creeping coercion within the New Labour notion o f community. Driver and Martell 
suggest that such strength given to ‘community’ somehow ends up shaping the 
individual or that the individual only has value ‘within the context o f society’530 or 
perhaps worse, that community ‘may just be a synonym for the state’,531 though Blair 
specifically suggests that that is not his intention. He argues that ‘community cannot 
simply be another word for “state” or “government”. Both of these have a role to 
play, but we should aim to decentralise power to people, to allow them to make 
important decisions that affect them.’532
However, Freeden is similarly concerned that community ‘has lost the inclusive 
organic nature typical o f mainstream social democracy and has become startlingly 
majoritarian ... communal membership is not ascribed but earned; it is not a status but 
an activity.’533 This fear of authoritarian power to the community was also clear, as 
Martin Powell has pointed out. While community is central to the goal of inclusion 
for the Third Way, there are potential contradictions in the approach, as inclusion 
needs to be reconciled with its potential implications. In other words, who will be 
excluded if they do not live up to community standards? As he puts it: ‘Labour has 
claimed that the third way is a new and distinctive concept that can be mapped out 
for different policy areas. However, despite some central themes, it is not a coherent 
concept...Instead it appears to be all things to all people...Neither does it appear to 
be new: arguably some o f its key components... have their roots in the New Poor
529 Marquand in Radice, What Needs to Change, pp. 76-77.
530 Driver and Martell, New Labour: Politics after Thatcherism.
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Law and in the writings of New Liberals...’534 The rhetoric of inclusion, however 
commendable, leaves some unanswered questions. W ho is part of this included 
group? Citizens are an obvious category, but what about those applying for 
citizenship, such as asylum-seekers or refugees. Using the oft-used exhortation of the 
duties and responsibilities of the individual, how far does this global citizenship also 
require responsibilities from the nation state and, if so, what are those requirements?
Finally, Callinicos takes issue with the idea that community can be some kind of 
‘master concept’ that can be applied ‘on the international as well as the national level’, 
that the ‘doctrine of international community implies, according to Blair, that the 
principle o f non-interference implied by the notion of national sovereignty can, in 
certain circumstances, be overridden’.535
Competitiveness
Closely linked to the key position given to globalisation and stakeholding is the idea 
o f competitiveness. As discussed previously, this idea operates in much the same way 
as the idea of ‘efficiency’ did in the late nineteenth century.
The serious threat of globalisation could only be countered, according to the Third 
Way analysis, by becoming more competitive. This worked entirely in line with other 
notions of stakeholding and community, as well as responsibility and rights. The 
government or the state’s job was to provide opportunities and favourable conditions, 
but it was down to the individual to take advantage of those opportunities and 
compete in the global marketplace. In effect, it was the state’s function to provide 
welfare, but to make the world o f work the place to be. W ork was the individual’s 
passport to belonging — thus it becomes their job to get off welfare.
Blair made this point consistently, including to the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government, where he stated that the UK’s goal was ‘to combine a highly creative 
modern economy, able to compete with all comers in the global market with a decent 
one-nation society’,536 and again to a domestic audience at the Lord Mayor’s banquet, 
in almost exactly the same terms: ‘We compete on brains not brawn ... Britain must 
reinforce its position as champion of free trade throughout the world. We are above
534 Powell, Martin. ‘N ew  Labour and the third way in the British welfare state: a new  and distinctive 
approach?’. Critical Social Policy Vol 20(1) 2000:39-60, p. 57.
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all, a trading nation, open to the world and ready to compete on a level playing field 
with all comers.’537
Education and the welfare state were crucial to this analysis, as Blair pointed out to 
the French Assembly — a country with a very different understanding of globalisation:
The role of government becomes less about regulation than about 
equipping people for economic change by focusing on education, skills, 
technology, high-quality infrastructure and a welfare state which 
promotes work and makes it pay, this is the third way: not laissez-faire, 
not state control and rigidity, but an active government role linked to 
improving the employability of the workforce.538
Finally, he made the same point again at the Economics Club in Chicago by arguing 
that only by ‘competing internationally can our companies and our economies grow 
and succeed’.539
The imperative o f globalisation argues that the state can only help prepare its citizens 
for the domestic marketplace, which flows into the global marketplace. As Lindsey 
German pointedly comments in ‘The Blair Project Cracks’:
All that governments can do is create skilled and educated workforces, 
prepared to work flexibly to suit the demands of global capital, which can 
only be subject to minimal controls or regulation — for example, a 
minimum wage, but one set at a sufficiently low rate so as not to deter 
capital. Tax and wage rates have to be ‘competitive’ in order to attract 
investment; hence the boast that corporation tax is one o f the lowest in 
the world.540
This is put into the language o f both competition and cooperation. The Blair’s 
internationalism is contrasted with the narrow nationalism of the Conservative Party, 
but both the international and the national remain ‘two aspects o f the new global 
order’541 as states must compete and cooperate in the modem world if they are to be 
successful and at peace.
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Conclusion
The Labour Party was faced with a transformative moment in which there was 
change at all levels. The domestic political environment had been fundamentally 
changed by the Conservatives, and particularly by Thatcher. Her links to the US had 
compounded this change by giving it an international focus and support. Europe was 
in flux as the fall o f the Berlin Wall created new dangers, but also a new frame for 
political debate. The Labour Party was thrown back on its own devices and forced to 
develop a new frame.
While accepting the core framework of globalisation and Thatcher’s basic economic 
position as a starting point, the modernisers within the Labour Party created not only 
New Labour as a vehicle, but also the Third Way as a specific response to the 
dominant issues.
The concepts oudined provided the positional attitudes and definitional features 
needed for a new domestic political approach. However, from the outset, New 
Labour and the Third Way also claimed that the renewal o f social democracy had 
European and even global relevance. The blurring o f the boundary between the 
domestic and the international that was part of the ‘global order’ affected not only 
‘high’ foreign policy but other areas o f foreign involvement, such as development.
In the next chapter the impact of the Third Way approach on definitions of 
sovereignty and state boundaries will be examined using the statements of players in 
the development o f that policy. This provides background and a link to an 
examination of the ‘global’ Third Way. The US and Germany provide advanced and 
relevant examples. Finally, New Labour involvement with a wide range o f other 
states identified as collaborators in the Third Way philosophy will be looked at 
through the progressive government summits in which the UK was instrumental.
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Chapter 11
The domestic/international frontier of the Third Way
In the previous chapter the basic building blocks of the Third Way were examined 
for the way in which they formed a synthesising philosophy in response to a dramatic 
transformation.
The concepts, held in common with the New Liberalism, were part o f an overall 
political narrative designed to maintain the state’s credibility in the face of a potential 
crisis o f legitimacy. A conflated concept o f globalisation acted as a crucial explanatory 
feature o f that narrative, and provided both a domestic and an international point o f 
departure for the debate within the UK, and between the UK and other countries, 
particularly in Europe.
This chapter will look at the impact o f the understanding of globalisation as a concept 
in the externally facing areas of government, i.e. foreign affairs and development 
policy, where the boundaries between domestic and international meet in terms of 
practical policy. Rather than case studies, the chapter will examine New Labour’s 
concept of globalisation as it impacted three things: the government’s understanding 
of the interplay between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’; its working notions o f sovereignty; 
and finally, its perception of the potential role of the UK in its understanding of 
international community.
The global nature of the Third Way will also be examined with a look at two close 
cousins of the UK debate, the US and Germany. The relationship between the US 
and the UK, as effectively the co-founders of the concept, is particularly important, 
while the German version of the Third Way will be explored as the continental 
counterpart. The German example is also relevant given that country’s importance in 
the development of social democracy, as demonstrated in previous chapters.
An illustration of the international influence of the Third Way will also be examined 
through the development of the progressive summit meetings instigated and 
promoted by the UK. These events initially tended to take place in the margins of 
other global governance occasions, for example the G8 or the U N  Millennium 
Summit. However, more specific Third Way events were also developed to discuss 
shared issues and best practice. These were not in the same vein as the Internationals 
o f the late nineteenth century, as they were designed for elite groups o f leaders, 
academics and others deemed to be ‘within’ the project — initially from the US and
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the UK. However, as they expanded they became more similar to these previous 
events in that they provided an opportunity for ideologically like-minded parties to 
reach across international boundaries on common issues. They demonstrate the new 
politics of the frontier possible at times of transformation.
'Foreign' starts at home -  sovereignty and globalisation
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, globalisation has a significant impact on 
notions of sovereignty, at least as traditionally understood by the International 
Relations discipline. The discipline’s idea that the state cannot or should not interfere 
with other such entities is under pressure. Many globalisation theorists argue that 
forces outside the state will compel it to act in ways that are not in the interests of the 
state or its citizens, but those of capital markets or business.
For Labour leaders, globalisation presents a modem Pandora’s box. They needed an 
external challenge to create an imperative for internal and domestic change but they 
also wanted to retain their credibility and perceived ability to deliver protection to 
their citizens. They opted to open the box, freeing arguments o f global forces and 
diminished state control. However, they responded with new ideas o f sovereignty and 
international community that suggested that globalisation could be harnessed as long it 
was understood and dealt with at the right level. This put the Labour Party in a 
powerful position by enabling its leadership to portray themselves as the party best 
prepared to help the UK (and other countries) through the transition.
As Giddens points out, the idea o f a traditional Realist approach to states and the 
society o f states seems out of date. Giddens argues that the ‘enemy’ is no longer states 
or people, but issues and forces in the global world. His line is that any state operating 
with a traditional view o f power will be out of step and, more importantly, unable to 
recognise the correct approach to the problems they face. In the same way in which 
the Third Way often compresses levels of analysis by conflating terms such as civil 
society or community and applies them to all levels despite the different prominence 
of the various actors at these levels, he argues for the creation of a ‘global civil 
society’. He does not clarify whether or not it is comprised o f individuals, 
organisations or states, but he does want it to recognise ‘risks and dangers’: ‘Realism is 
the wrong term, since the beliefs to which it refers are becoming archaic’542 To 
Giddens, globalisation is not just about closer ties between nations, or a kind of
542 Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, pp. 137-38.
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‘internationalism’, but a different kind o f sovereignty. He accuses Realism of being a 
‘self-defining theory’ and thus out of date in the global age.543
Similarly, Jean Grugel suggests that the blurring o f the boundaries between the 
domestic and the international also challenge the nature o f democracy. She calls this a 
‘post-sovereign citizenship’ and, like Giddens, indicates that there seems to be a global 
constituency that is no longer held within the confines o f a nation-state. This 
disconnect between the state and its people creates a challenge to the basic Realist 
assumptions o f a self-contained state.544
These issues put the state ‘on the horns of a dilemma’ as Jurgen Habermas put it, in a 
very practical way. States need revenues to deal with the implications of the global 
economy and to ensure continued state growth lest they risk being overtaken in terms 
o f their competitiveness. This is increasingly difficult to achieve within the confines of 
the nation-state, as areas from which states would traditionally raise such funds are no 
longer located within their territory or control.545
Globalisation therefore presents a problem, not only on a global level but also for day- 
to-day politics because it potentially threatens the taxing power o f the state and thus 
its ability to provide welfare. It suggests that forces outside the state impel 
governments to respond if the state is to be able to support the economy and thus the 
well-being of the citizens. In a globalised world, this is often done through 
multilateral negotiations or agreements rather than traditional state-centric action. 
However, that inevitably means that the state has conceded power to those outside 
the state — a difficult position for a government to sustain if traditional notions of 
sovereignty are applied.
Domestic/international frontier
For politicians, problems along the domestic/international boundary are usually 
considered part o f ‘foreign policy’. As we shall see, certain ministers played a role in 
presenting the Third Way understanding of globalisation by their response to the 
problems in their externally facing departments where sovereignty is a daily issue.
543 Ibid.
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Blair set out the basic view that ‘foreign’ could no longer be considered to be 
something ‘out there’, apart or separate from the rest of government policy. As 
discussed previously, this was due to the fact that the communications revolution 
made foreign events a part of domestic debate. Any perceived inconsistencies in 
government policy could be instantly brought back to constituents. It was no longer 
possible that foreign policy might remain unseen by the electorate. Thus, it was 
argued, that it became even more necessary to ensure that foreign policy formed a 
whole with the rest of government policy.
Effectively, government reputation could potentially be damaged if it could be shown 
that foreign and domestic policy did not match. As Blair argued within months of 
taking office, ‘Foreign policy shouldn’t be seen as some self-contained part o f 
government in a box marked “abroad” or “foreigners”. It should complement and 
reflect our domestic goals. It should be a part of our mission of national renewal.’546 
However, it should be pointed out that, by and large, people are still motivated more 
by domestic issues than foreign. It is the instances in which government is perceived 
to be inconsistent that create electoral issues.
The blending or complementarity o f foreign and domestic is also present in 
Christopher W hite’s suggestion that one way through the problem for Blair and 
Cook in particular was to suggest the idea o f ‘pooled sovereignty’, a notion used by 
Geoffrey Howe while Conservative Foreign Secretary under Thatcher. This idea 
enables the state to overcome the difficulties of forces acting on the single state by 
sharing their impact. In other words, though the individual state may not be able to 
confront or defeat these forces, by pooling sovereignty states were once again able to 
withstand the pressures in the global system.547 States were no longer able to 
implement ‘go-it-alone’ national or state-centric policies but they were able to retain 
more control if they cooperated — a central theme to Blair.
Peter Hain, while Minister for Europe at the Foreign Office, made this point in a 
major set-piece speech on the ‘end o f foreign policy’ in 2001. He argued that the 
‘blurring ... sometimes to vanishing point’ of the difference in the interests of various 
states or even between what had been understood as foreign or domestic policy, 
required a new approach by states as to the best way to achieve their domestic — and 
foreign — objectives. This was achieved, he suggested, through linkages between states 
on a common purpose. This was presented as a political as well as a policy challenge,
546 Blair, ‘The principles o f  a modem British foreign policy’, p. 5.
547 White, The Function, Significance and Limitations o f ‘Globalisation’ in the New Labour Discourse.
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thus making an obvious connection between the international and the domestic, but 
also between the theory and practice of politics.
Hain argued that the traditional levers of statecraft are not suited to a world in which 
territories and boundaries are no longer as relevant as before. In a phrase which 
became popular he contended that the new politics needed ‘joined-up thinking’ along 
several axes. Domestic departments needed to communicate more on issues that were 
no longer held within departmental confines and the internal and external ‘faces’ of 
the state needed to communicate more as well as communicating more with other 
states on issues that are more about domestic than foreign policy. Immigration, drugs, 
the environment and, more recendy, terrorism are often held out as issues that have 
no boundaries within governments or between states. He suggests that only through 
these new ‘organising principles’ would it be possible to ‘once again shape events 
rather than be buffeted by them’.548
UK as pivotal
Blair takes up this idea that sovereignty gains in strength through a more effective use 
o f the linkages in the new global system to develop a specific role for the UK. He felt 
the UK role was as a pivot point: ‘building on the strengths o f our history, it means 
building new alliances; developing new influence, charting a new course for British 
foreign policy’.549
While he appreciated that there was litde scope for a medium-sized state in an 
‘enemy-dominated’ world, there was potential for influence in an issue-dominated 
one, by linking with other states in order to display and deploy power. Those finks 
would help the state achieve both international and domestic objectives not possible 
operating alone. O f course, this positional attitude also dealt neady with the reality of 
the U K ’s position and its inability to compete in a more traditional military way. Blair 
clearly sees this as part o f modernity, or of the modem state generally, as well as his 
notion o f a modem UK.
At the outset of the Labour government, in an opening speech to the 
Commonwealth Heads o f Government, reminiscent o f Winston Churchill’s famous
548 Hain, Peter. The End o f Foreign Policy? British Interests, Global Linkages and Natural Limits. London: 
The Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 2001, p. 25.
549 Blair, Tony. ‘Britain’s R ole in the E U  and the Transadantic Alliance’, speech delivered at a 
luncheon to mark the 150th Anniversary o f  the Associated Press, 15 December 1998.
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‘three circles o f influence’ speech, Blair stated simply: ‘Our aim is to be pivotal. To 
use our unique position at the cross-roads between so many international bodies ... 
W e will be measured by what we are and what we stand for, not by what we 
were.’550 Blair identified this as the UK’s best position in its ‘post-empire days’. The 
UK was no longer a superpower and lacked military might, but that need not mean 
the country remained without power or influence. ‘We can make the British presence 
in the world felt ... we can be pivotal. We can be powerful in our influence — a 
nation to whom others listen.’551
International community
Blair also sets out his understanding of the term ‘community’ in the international 
context, which is rather different than that commonly used in UK foreign policy. In 
his Chicago speech discussed in Chapter Ten, Blair argues not along the traditional 
British lines o f pragmatism but for a new ‘doctrine of international community’ which 
encompasses both cooperation, and potentially, competition but within a clear rules- 
based frame. It is worth looking at his programme in some depth.
O n the eve of the new millennium we are now in a new world. We need 
new rules for international co-operation and new ways of organising our 
international institutions...We need to focus in a serious and sustained 
way on the principles o f the doctrine of international community and on 
the institutions that deliver them. This means:
1 In global finance, a thorough, far-reaching overhaul and reform of the 
system of international financial regulation ...
2 A new push on free trade in the W TO  ...
3 A reconsideration of the role, workings and decision-make process of 
the U N , and in particular the U N  Security Council.
4 For NATO, once Kosovo is successfully concluded, a critical 
examination of the lessons to be learnt, and the changes we need to 
make in organisation and structure.
4 In respect of Kyoto and the environment, far closer workings between 
the main industrial states and the developing world as to how the 
Kyoto targets can be met and the practical measures necessary to slow 
down and stop global warming; and
550 Blair, ‘Building the Commonwealth for the 21st century’.
551 Blair, The principles o f  a m odem  British foreign policy’.
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5 A serious examination of the issue of Third World debt.552
As well as a discussion of these international institutions, Blair also proposed a new 
version o f what constitutes a ‘just war’. Given the arguments of Gladstone and Harold 
Wilson before him, some argue his version of community and the ‘ethical dimension’ 
was ‘not new, merely the latest development of this tendency,’553 or part of the long 
Idealist, progressive tradition, while others suggested that the Chicago speech may 
well be looked upon as a significant turning point for British foreign policy, as it 
extended Blair’s ideas of a moral and enmeshed community to the international level. 
It was, in Blair’s view, simply the result of globalisation.
In other words, the changing global context is inducing economic and 
social reform ‘at home’ as well as shining a spotlight on the ‘common 
problems’ facing all states and peoples. Blair’s way of dealing with this 
challenge is by developing the institutions and rules for collective action 
among the members of the international community. As noted at the 
outset, the parallels with these arguments and an English school approach 
to international relations are striking.554
As Dunne and Wheeler point out, Hedley Bull argued that ‘solidarism’ (Bull’s term 
for international community) was, in his time, premature. However, they suggest that 
the end o f the Cold War, combined with the forces of globalisation, could mean that 
the kind o f international community proposed by Bull and taken up by Blair had 
become possible.555
However, most observers also suggest that this high ideal for foreign matters has not 
been delivered. Christopher Hill, for example, suggests that the Chicago speech in 
particular should be ‘commended for its thoughtful approach’556 but, concludes that, 
as yet, there has been ‘little follow-through in terms of the doctrine or efforts to 
obtain international consensus around it’.557
552 Blair, ‘Doctrine o f the International Community’.
553 Vickers, Rhiannon. ‘Labour’s Search for a Third Way in foreign policy’ in Litde, Richard, and 
Mark Wickham-Jones eds. New Labour's Foreign Policy: A  New Moral Crusade? Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000, p. 36; Hill in Seldon, The Blair Effect.
554 Dunne, Tim  and Nicholas Wheeler. ‘The Blair Doctrine: advancing the Third Way in the world’ in 
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555 Ibid.
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Mission statements abroad
These perspectives can be illustrated by two specific areas of government: traditional 
foreign policy and development policy.
W ithin days o f taking government, New Labour set out this departure as Robin 
Cook, the new Foreign Secretary, presented a ‘mission statement’ for the Foreign 
Office. He declared that the government would pursue an ‘ethical dimension’ to 
foreign policy. This attracted comment from journalists and politicians over the 
coming months, including the previous Conservative Foreign Secretary Douglas 
Hurd, who declared it ‘a nonsense’.558 Cook denied that he had intended that all 
policy would be set against some ethical criteria, rather that the ethical dimension 
would be considered alongside the practical and tactical implications — but the media 
was hostile, or at least sceptical. Meanwhile, also within days of taking power, Clare 
Short, the new Minister for International Development, set out her mission statement 
o f  sorts — Short’s speech gained almost no coverage.
W e must leave to one side the value of ethical foreign policy, which resonates with 
the idealist tradition, but appeared naive to modem observers, and likewise not pursue 
the question o f whether or not Cook and Short were fully motivated by the Third 
Way, given their subsequent departures from government putatively on ethical 
grounds. The important element to bear in mind here is simply that both Cook and 
Short identified the same link between the domestic and the international. A shared 
understanding of the logic of globalisation was driving their view of their external 
roles and having an impact on their perceptions of Britain’s role. They had taken the 
analysis of the UK as a ‘pivotal power’ within a new form of international community 
and applied that to their receptive areas of concern.
Thus, at the FCO launch, Cook called it an ‘age o f internationalism’ driven primarily 
by information. He stated that:
The global economy is stimulating growth in trade between nations at 
double the rate o f growth in output within their economies. The 
information revolution has produced satellites and fibre-optic cables that 
enable us to communicate with other countries as rapidly as with the next 
room ... We live in a world in which nation-states are interdependent. In 
that modem world foreign policy is not divorced from domestic policy
558 Cornwell, Rupert. ‘That tricky blend o f realism and idealism.’ Independent 13 Novem ber 1997; 
Riddell, Peter. ‘Wresding with the Dem ons.’ The Times 24 Novem ber 1997; Watt, Nicholas. ‘Hurd 
ridicules C ook’s ethical policy ‘nonsense’.’ The Times 17 December 1997.
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but a central part o f any political programme. In order to achieve our 
goals for the people of Britain we need a foreign strategy that supports the 
same goals.559
Barely two weeks later, although not proposing an ethical dimension but certainly a 
‘moral’ element, Clare Short declared that:
What we want to see is a global society in which people everywhere are 
entided to live in peace and security with their families and neighbours ...
In brief, we want to see a global moral community ... I am concerned to 
ensure that the objectives which we now are seeking to promote in 
developing countries are fully consistent with those which this 
government wants to promote at home ... Globalisation increased the 
need for and the possibility of solidarity between people of all nations.560
'Globalisation' and 'foreign'
Globalisation acted as an imperative for domestic policy but the way in which it is 
reconciled with areas of government whose job it is to interact with the outside world 
presented a particular set of issues. The Department for International Development 
crosses over the domestic/international boundary in a different way than any other 
department, including the Foreign Office, because DFID operates with and through a 
vast number of international institutions and aid organisations. Its main mode of 
operation is not as a unilateral state acting in its own sovereign interests but as a part 
o f a much wider coalition of both governmental and non-governmental sources of 
funding, power and information. They operate in what could be called a pluralist 
paradigm rather than realist one. The department also operates on the kind of long­
term timescales that are not conducive to modem communications; thus it often 
escapes public or press attention.
Short was considered by most to be more of an old-fashioned socialist or of the left, 
and therefore an interesting convert. However, as she developed her role in the 
department, it is less difficult to see how her proclivity towards old-style Labour state 
intervention and the Third Way driver of globalisation were combined.
Development, unusually amongst government departments, and certainly unlike the 
Foreign Office, tends to be able to skirt around issues of sovereignty. States accepting 
aid or support can be limited in their ability to insist on their full rights as sovereign
559 Cook, Robin. ‘British Foreign Policy’, speech delivered at the Launch o f  the FCO Mission 
Statement, FCO, 12 May 1997.
560 Short, Clare. ‘The R ole and Functions o f the Department for International Development’, speech 
delivered at the School o f Oriental and African Studies, 28 May 1997.
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entities, and thus Short was able to exercise her tendency to top-down approaches 
with litde resistance from recipient states.
Unusually, Short refers to the ideological history o f the Third Way and gives it a very 
socialist interpretation. She suggests that ideologies upon which the old politics were 
based — the ‘omnipotent state’ or the ‘perfection of markets’ — were both wrong­
headed, and therefore a ‘new synthesis’ was called for. Part of that synthesis, in her 
view, was an appreciation that globalisation is a ‘fact of life’, an ‘unstoppable’ feature 
o f modem life that could be used to the benefit of people — if only the benefits of it 
could be fairly distributed.561
To Short, it seemed clear that globalisation was the result o f a shift in technology and 
economics, in the same vein as the shift from ‘feudalism to industrialisation’ that 
‘remade the whole political and economic organisation o f the world’. Information 
technology and more general technological change had unleashed forces that 
countries must deal with. However, if managed carefully, they could also be used to 
lift more people more quickly out of poverty.562 In a vein reminiscent to that of 
Blair’s international community, Short also links globalisation and the need for 
renewed international institutions, and a more ‘global’ approach by individual states to 
such institutions. In a direct comparison to the reasons why such institutions were 
developed at the end o f World War II, she calls on progressives to come forward to 
develop an international framework in which the forces of globalisation could be 
tamed and managed.563
She does not claim that globalisation is good or bad but merely, that it is a ‘reality’ — 
but one that can and must be controlled.564 She further argues that if  the benefits are 
not spread more equitably, there is inherent risk and uncertainty as the gap between 
rich and poor will inevitably become wider.565
George Foulkes, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for International Development at the 
time, echoes this point almost word for word in his speech to the Commonwealth
561 Short, Clare. ‘Development and the Private Sector: A Partnership for Change’, speech delivered at 
the Institute o f  Directors, 8 July 1997.
562 Short, Clare. ‘The challenge for the U N  in a globalising world’, speech delivered at the Rockefeller 
Foundation, 26 October 1999; Short, Clare. ‘Globalisation: M eeting the Challenge’, speech delivered 
at the Friends M eeting House, 23 January 1999.
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Trade Union Council Conference, ‘Responsible business: a government perspective’: 
‘Globalisation is generating increasing wealth. But it is also generating great 
instability.’566 Hain, from the Foreign Office perspective, also echoes this thought, 
quoting Short as saying that globalisation is ‘unstoppable’ and also makes the link back 
to technology and even to ‘high’ foreign policy when he suggests that it is not 
possible to stop globalisation any more than it is possible to ‘uninvent nuclear
» 567weapons.
In this overtly political context, unlike the more academic theories o f globalisation 
discussed in Chapter One, technology becomes the core explanation o f how 
globalisation came into being. This is true of Hain, who agreed with Giddens that it is 
not a single process or some kind o f ‘rising tide’, but ‘separate but entwined forces’ 
primarily driven by communication and the links between this kind of rapid 
communication and financial markets and capital. Cook, at the head of the most 
classically defined external department, did not generally use the term ‘globalisation’. 
He relied instead on the more familiar idea of ‘interdependence’ to portray the same 
process. He argued that:
Globalisation is the common term to describe how in today’s world we 
are interdependent with each other rather than independent o f each 
other. W e are bound together by our deepening links in trade and 
investment, in travel and communication. What happens in one country 
can have a direct impact on the prosperity, the security and even the 
climate of countries on the other side of the world.568
Cook was a consistent follower of the Third Way fine that globalisation is driven by 
communication and technology. He regularly reinforced the characterisation of 
globalisation used by both Giddens and Blair, that it had fundamentally altered both 
time and space — thus bringing the whole argument right back to those used by the 
New Liberals:
Through electronic media we are more aware of each other’s affairs.
W hat happens in our homes, on our streets and in our place of work is 
often profoundly affected by events beyond our borders ... the 
implication o f this connection between the domestic sphere and 
international events is clear.569
566 Foulkes, George. ‘Promoting Responsible Business: A Government Perspective’, speech at the 
Commonwealth Trade U nion Council Conference, 29 March 1999.
567 Hain, The End o f Foreign Policy, p. 28.
568 Cook, Robin. ‘Conflict Prevention in the Modern World’, speech delivered to the 54th session o f  
the U N  General Assembly, 21 September 1999, p. 3.
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Or, in language even more familiar, ‘Communication around the globe is becoming 
faster and distance between us are becoming shorter ... Our countries are increasingly 
interdependent. The challenges we face are global challenges and we must face them 
together.’570
The global Third Way
The proponents o f the Third Way have argued that it is not a UK-only project; it can 
be helpful to any European social democracy. This was possible, they argued (as 
discussed previously) because European social democracy grew out of similar historical 
conditions both at the end of the nineteenth century and at the end of twentieth 
century, both periods o f ‘revisionism’.571
N ew Labour endeavoured to portray itself as being ‘in the vanguard of a new politics’ 
and part of a new ‘radical centre’, a perspective that seemed to gain public support on 
an international level;572 and further, that this broad international trend was unified in 
its desire to, ‘re-prioritise liberal values and practices within social democracy, in 
particular to make social democracy more market-friendly’.575
Even before Blair took up the Third Way, social democrats around Europe were 
beginning to move in this direction. The demise of the manufacturing working class 
and the rise of a professional service-oriented middle class was affecting party politics 
across the continent:
Social democratic parties across Europe were talking in the 1980s about 
the combination of social justice with economic efficiency and individual 
entrepreneurialism. In the 1980s and 1990s low inflation and stability 
replaced Keynesianism and high employment as the main goals, leading to 
the rethinking of economic, employment and welfare policies. Many 
European social democrats were well ahead of the British in their moves 
in these directions. Before Tony Blair became Labour leader, the Dutch 
social democrats were adopting their pragmatic approach to the market 
and regulation, and promoting deregulation, privatisation and internal 
markets...Across European social democracy, nationalisation has generally 
been discarded. Many social democratic governments talk of constructive 
partnership between business and government and are pursuing more
570 Cook, Robin. ‘A United Nations for the Twenty-First Century’, speech delivered to the U N  
General Assembly, 23 September 1997.
571 Driver and Martell, New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism; Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f Socialism.
572 White, New Labour: The Progressive Future?, pp. xi-x ii.
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ambitious privatisation programmes than Blair or their own conservative 
predecessors.574
In effect, as argued in previous chapters, it is only recendy that the British Labour 
Party in some senses ‘caught up’ with other European parties by breaking with its 
Labourist past. Thus, it could be argued that just as its neighbours had benefited from 
the U K ’s experience of industrialisation, New Labour modernisers benefited from the 
continental experience o f de-industrialisation and able to leapfrog over their 
continental partners instead of moving piecemeal towards ‘a renewal of social 
democracy’. They were helped in that shift by working with like-minded politicians 
in the US; a partnership that also enabled the UK to be instrumental in bringing 
together instrumental players. So while it would appear that continental Europeans 
had been pursuing effectively a Third Way agenda, it was not until Clinton and Blair 
combined forces that the movement seemed to gain focus and certainly its common 
name.
Tony Blair has had his moments of evangelism in trying to promote the 
third way abroad — and this has led to a certain degree of irritation among 
some listeners ... Blair has been keen to promote the third way abroad — 
not just through fitting in with Europe or playing a part in it, but through 
actively exercising leadership in creating a third-way model that other 
European social democrats will go along with.575
It would be one thing if the claims to a global Third Way were only being made by 
the Labour Party, but it seems clear that support became more widespread.
Internationally many newly elected premiers or rivals for office o f varying 
political persuasions claim allegiance to Third Way values, and saw in 
Tony Blair an inspirational figure. Thus a report in the Independent o f 4 
July 2000 was headed ‘Mongolian ex-communists win a landslide for their 
“third way” while a few weeks later the same paper reported that 
Socialists pin their hopes on a “Spanish Tony Blair” . Indeed supporters o f 
some variety of third ways or new progressive politics extend beyond the 
confines o f Europe and the US to include the presidents of Chile,
Argentina and Brazil, while Thabo Mbeki ... also claims to be a 
follower.576
Yet, the inevitable problem of defining the Third Way arises as the concept seems to 
be able to speak across different countries and cultures. As Salvati points out, ‘there is 
not one but a veritable plurality of “new third ways”; they are culturally specific,
574 Driver and Martell, Blair’s Britain, p. 99.
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national programmes, sometimes little more than catchphrases in electoral 
platforms’.577
Therefore, part of the difficulty of discussions regarding the Third Way is precisely 
that the language has been used in so many contexts. In an age o f global marketing, 
when the positioning of every product is determined by local markets, is the Third 
Way something distinctly British and New Labour, or part o f something more 
international, linking parties and politicians on key issues? Is it something with 
historical roots in the political traditions of British democracy, or just a local franchise, 
a kind of ‘Third Way — Europe Division’?
As A1 From, the leader of the US Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), put it, with 
characteristically American pragmatism that it is: ‘the worldwide brand name for 
progressive politics for the Information Age. In America, the local brand is New 
Democrat; in Britain, it is New Labour.’578
This is not designed to be an exhaustive survey of a global third way, but strands of 
international thinking are relevant. The international use of similar, sometimes 
identical, language, particularly between the UK, the US and Germany, is important 
to establish the link between the international and the domestic spheres, and not only 
on what could be could be termed ‘foreign policy’ — as will be seen particularly in the 
form of the progressive summits.
US Third Way
Close to the UK debate is the shared parenthood of the Third Way by Bill Clinton 
and Tony Blair. Many start from the famous term, ‘triangulation’, coined by Dick 
Morris in the midst of the budget debate in Washington in 1994. Morris argued that 
Clinton should ‘create a third position, not just in between the old positions of the 
two parties but above them as well ... The President needed to take a position that 
not only blended the best of each party’s views but also transcended them to 
constitute a third force in the debate’.579
The story o f the creation of the US Third Way in fact goes back much further. Much 
like its predecessor, New Liberalism, the core of the Third Way was a collection of
577 W hite, New Labour: The Progressive Future?, p. 150.
578 Faux, Jeff. ‘Lost on the Third W ay.’ Dissent Spring 1999: 67-80 , p. 67.
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small, but crucially overlapping groups. In 1992 the Democrats had been out of 
power since 1981 and the party was split into various special-interest factions. These 
cleavages had been badly exposed by an electoral system that requires in-party fighting 
through the primaries before the real campaign against the incumbent party can begin. 
Though both parties go through this process, an unchallenged incumbent, fares much 
better. Thus, the splits within the Democrats had destroyed the potential of some 
candidates. The Democratic leadership attributed this to the fact that the electorate 
was changing; from blue-collar workers to a service economy.
Ronald Reagan had been hugely successful in appealing to this changing group, and 
had picked up the growing suburban voters. Republicans had managed to tap into 
mainstream concerns and developed a form of radical conservative government that 
combined economic and personal liberalisation.580 This problem was not unfamiliar to 
the British Labour Party.
Clinton was associated with the ‘liberal fundamentalists’, or the intellectual liberals and 
minority interest groups within the party. However, he was also a canny campaigner 
from a heartland state, Arkansas. Thus, he was keenly aware of the sensitivities of the 
core Democrat vote and could appeal to both sides of the party.581 He proposed a 
programme of modernisation for the party, both internally and externally, as the 
solution to its political malaise. His focus on new technology, communication and 
changing personal circumstances coalesced under the idea o f globalisation and was 
used to support his political approach o f economic stability, welfare reform and 
financial caution.
The American domestic Third Way brand came to be known as ‘New Democrat’ or 
‘new progressivism’, to use language harking back to the New Deal in the American 
context. ‘New Democrats’, like Clinton, came largely from the southern part of the 
Democratic Party, where their relatively conservative approach appealed to black and 
blue-collar voters. However, they convinced the Democratic Leadership Council that 
this approach was needed to turn the party around. The DLC backed this programme 
of modernisation and renewal as a way to deal with the new Republican threats. The 
result was a distancing by Clinton and the DLC from their tax-and-spend history, and 
taking up a role for government that was ‘enabling’, based on a balanced budget and 
certain key values.582
580 Driver and Martell, Blair's Britain.
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It was during that first election in 1992 that the modernisers of the British Labour 
Party (before they defined themselves as New Labour) and the New Democrats came 
into contact. The Republicans were struggling with Clinton, ‘the comeback kid’ and 
turned to the Conservative Party in London for any damaging information they might 
have on Clinton’s Oxford student days. This prompted the Democrats to ask for help 
from the Labour Party so Philip Gould arrived in Litde Rock and spent the rest of the 
campaign working with the Clinton team.583
Even from this first campaign, Clinton began to change the language of the 
Democrats distancing himself from the traditional power bases (and mythology) of the 
party and building a vocabulary. He presented a caring face on social issues while 
emphasising a strong fiscal approach, a balanced approach to spending on the budget 
and talk o f ‘a new covenant’ with the voter.584
Other people who would later become influential in their own right also assisted in 
the process o f bringing the Labour Party to the attention of the Democrats. One 
example is Jonathan Powell. He was working at the British Embassy at the time and 
followed the Clinton campaign. He could see many parallels in the position of the 
Democrats to that o f the Labour Party who, just months before Clinton’s victory, had 
suffered their fourth consecutive defeat (the first time since 1964 that the US and UK 
elections had coincided). Blair and Brown, both young and relatively inexperienced 
frontbenchers at the time, decided to make a trip to Washington to see if there were 
any lessons that could be learned for the make-over of the left. It was Jonathan Powell 
who helped to organise their trip in January 1993, and he later became an adviser to 
Blair as Prime Minister.585
Blair and Brown visited the US together in January 1993 ... It was not a 
matter of Blair (or New Labour) borrowing piecemeal from the New 
Democrats, but recognising similarities between the ‘modernisers’ in the 
two parties and applying ‘some of the Democrats’ vivid language to a 
body o f ideas which he had already largely developed’. In particular ‘Blair 
had at last found a populist language in which to express the ethical 
socialist ideas which had formed his political convictions’...the traffic has 
been two-way e.g. Clinton took the theme o f ‘one nation’ from New 
Labour in his campaign for re-election in 1996 and has recendy used the 
term ‘Third Way’.586
583 Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, p. 299.
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Clinton’s own position was severely tested after the election of a Republican majority 
congress in 1994, and much of the rhetoric o f equality and inclusiveness began to be 
sidelined as the rows about government spending and the failure o f Clinton’s health 
reform dominated debate. Thus, the American Third Way became associated with the 
policy of ‘triangulation’ or attempting to take a reasonable approach between the 
extremes o f congressional Democrats and Republicans, rather than its original 
intention of a new way for progressive politics.587 It was a period of time known as 
‘the era of retrenchment’, in which Clinton felt he needed to sound more 
conservative to outflank the Republicans at their own game.588 The day-to-day 
struggle for governmental control took over from the high ideals of the Third Way.
Blair had become leader of the Labour Party in 1994 but it was not until 1995 that 
Clinton and Blair actually met in Westminster. Clinton had given a speech in the 
presence o f the Prime Minster John Major but then met privately with the relatively 
new Opposition leader. At that meeting Blair handed Clinton a summary of what he 
saw as the three problems facing the Labour Party and, in his view, all left-of-centre 
parties. The analysis in that note was to become both New Labour election strategy 
and Third Way positioning. Sidney Blumenthal, Clinton’s aide and White House 
communications adviser, quotes from the document at some length:
He (Blair) thought there should be joint meetings on the transatlantic 
political project. The first problem was o f ‘definition’: ‘The labels the left 
o f centre attached to themselves ... big government, tax and spend, liberal 
or social issues, indifference to the family, are discredited ... The values 
are still relevant and popular. We have to find radically different means of 
meeting traditional ends’. The second problem was ‘differentiation’: ‘The 
truth is the era of grand ideologies is over ... We need to colonise certain 
key issues as ours ... The right needs to be seen as sectarian, selfish and, in 
a sense, anti-patriotic, anti-one-nation.’ The last problem was 
‘dissemination’: ‘The left of centre suffers from a chronic lack of 
confidence. One part is seen as pragmatic, out to win but unprincipled; 
the other just longs for the past to come back again. There is a dire lack of 
academic and intellectual backbone to sustain a modem left-of-centre 
project. The commentators often don’t understand it. There is no sense of 
an intellectual movement for change. This feeds a cynicism and disillusion 
that is wholly unjustified.’589
Thus, the networks created two separate debates, each designed for domestic electoral 
concerns but to some extent ‘led’ by both countries. However, the discussion moved
587 Weir, Margaret. ‘The Collapse o f Bill Clinton’s Third Way’ in White, Stuart. New Labour: The 
Progressive Future? Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001.
588 Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, p. 299.
589 Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, pp. 305-06.
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in close enough proximity that they effectively developed in tandem. The progressive 
agenda almost became a new aspect o f the ‘special relationship’.
The evidence of this crucial first step could be seen back in the tone of the DLC’s 
1996 statement. It argued that ‘The New Progressive Politics rests on three 
cornerstones — three ideals rooted in the progressive tradition of American 
democracy: equality of opportunity, mutual responsibility and self-government’.590 
After his re-election Clinton was able to come back to these principles and began to 
focus on a familiar list o f three: ‘opportunity for all, responsibility from all, and 
American community of all.’591
It was not until after Clinton had been successfully re-elected that Blair made his 
second trip to Washington, in 1996. Previous trips by Labour leaders, including Neil 
Kinnock, had not been helpful in the domestic press, not least as the US had not been 
particularly welcoming. But given the relationship that had been developing between 
the White House and New Labour, Blair was welcomed as a colleague.
The UK election the following year brought New Labour into government, with 
Tony Blair as Prime Minister. This was a key turning point both for the US Third 
Way and the global Third Way. Clinton made a point o f coming to London to 
welcome the new Prime Minister and was asked to meet the Cabinet. The ‘special 
relationship’ was firmly back on the media agenda. This was furthered that same year 
when Blair hosted a meeting at Chequers of some o f the most important people in 
the development o f the Third Way.592 The US delegation was led by Hillary Clinton 
and Blumenthal calls this ‘the beginning of an international Third Way’. He argues 
that this was the moment that Clinton felt that he had a partner in the development 
of something bigger that could be applied to like-minded people, or progressives, 
around the world.
The Anglo-American special relationship had never before been 
politically parallel. This parallel gave Clinton’s presidency a new sense of 
coherence and depth, and ratified his course. Moreover, Blair’s success
590 The New Progressive Declaration: A  Political Philosophy for the Information Age July 10 1996 DLC/PPI 
Key Document, www.ndol.org.
591 Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, p. 312.
592 The November 2, 1997 meeting at Chequers involved 20 people including the following: US 
delegation: Hillary Clinton, Sidney Blumenthal, A1 From (president o f  the Democratic Leadership 
Council), Joseph N ye (director o f  the Kennedy School o f  Government at Harvard University), UK  
delegation: Tony Blair, Ed Balls (Treasury adviser), Gordon Brown (Chancellor o f  the Exchequer), 
Anthony Giddens (director o f  the London School o f  Economics), Peter Mandelson (Minister Without 
Portfolio), David Miliband (director o f the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit), and Geoffirey Mulgan 
(deputy director o f the Policy Unit). Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, p. 307.
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dramatically altered the international stage on which Clinton operated ... 
with Blair’s election in 1997, Clinton felt that he himself was leading an 
international movement. That encouraged him as he planned the next 
stage of his own Third Way politics at home.593
Throughout 1998 various high-level meetings were held both in London and in 
Washington on the development of the Third Way. In February Blair took his ‘A list’ 
o f intellectual advisers to the White House, including Tony Giddens, Gavyn Davies 
(later Chair of the BBC Board of Governors), Geoff Mulgan and David Miliband. In 
the margins o f the Northern Ireland discussions the Third Way was also on the 
agenda at another meeting at Chequers. In July there was a White House meeting 
designed to plan the upcoming New York University Symposium on ‘Strengthening 
Democracy in the Global Economy’ in September.
The New York University event was the point when, in Blumenthal’s words, the 
‘Third Way went public’, coinciding as it did with the publication in the UK of 
Blair’s Fabian pamphlet, The Third Way: New Politics for a New Century, followed 
shortly thereafter by Giddens’ first book, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social 
democracy. It was also the first time in which the discussions brought in more European 
leaders, such as European Commission President Romano Prodi, and President 
Stoyanov of Bulgaria.
W ith so much activity it is hardly surprising that Robert Reich, former Secretary of 
Labour under Clinton, declared in 1999 that ‘we are all third wayers now’.594 He 
argued that Western Europe and the US had developed a shared platform of reducing 
budget deficits and deregulation (in the US) or privatisation (in Europe), together 
with an acceptance of globalisation in trade, freedom of capital and a commitment to 
flexible labour markets and decreasing welfare.595
As Clinton gained international confidence and the Third Way gained ground, the 
DLC was prompted to say:
The Third Way is a governing political philosophy and a political strategy 
that is taking root in progressive political parties throughout the world ...
Its public ethic is mutual responsibility. Its core value is community. Its 
oudook is global ... It is rapidly becoming the most successful and 
influential political movement in the world.596
593 Ibid., p. 308.
594 Quoted in Driver and Martell, Blair’s Britain, p. 97.
595 Ibid.
596 Democratic Leadership Council, The Third Way, Talking Points June 13 2000 www.ndol.org.
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Clinton and globalisation
From the early campaigning days to a more recent view of the Third Way, Clinton’s 
Administration both used and developed the Third Way debate over his eight years in 
office. As he approached the end of his second term he came to focus on globalisation 
and its impact on political debate.
For example, in his final State of the Union address he identified globalisation as 
‘America’s final frontier’ and suggested that, ‘we must reach beyond our own borders, 
to shape the revolution that is tearing down the barriers and building new networks 
among nations and individuals and economies and cultures’.597 In his final speech in 
the UK as President, known as his ‘globalisation lecture’ at Warwick University, he 
thanked and praised Blair for his role in the development of the Third Way but 
primarily outlined what constituted for him the core of the debate.
As with any debate that is conducted in public on a national, let alone an 
international, stage, it is not surprising that the language evolved or that other, more 
current issues have merged into the framework. For example, at Warwick, he 
suggested that the Third Way was made possible by the collapse of the East. The 
ending o f the Cold War, meant to him that ‘no overriding struggle for survival diverts 
us from aiding the survival o f the hundreds o f millions o f people in the developing 
world’.598 Thus, in one neat turn, Clinton was able to absolve the US and the West 
from not turning their attention to these issues sooner, because they had been 
involved in a struggle for ideological survival.
Like Blair’s (and Cook’s and Short’s) approach to globalisation Clinton strives to 
position his Government as pivotal to the shape of globalisation. He argues that 
globalisation has great potential and politicians should not try to stop, but to guide it. 
As he put it:
We have worked hard in our respective nations and in our multi-national 
memberships to try to develop a response to globalisation that we all call 
by the shorthand term the Third Way. Sometimes I think that term tends 
to be viewed as more of a political term than one that has actual policy 
substance, but for us it’s a very serious attempt to put a human face on the
597 State o f  the Union address, January 2000, quoted in Newm an and de Zoysa. The Promise o f the Third 
Way.
598 Clinton, Bill. ‘Globalisation’. Speech given to invited audience at Warwick University, 14
December 2000.
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global economy and to direct the process o f globalisation in a way that 
benefits all people.599
Clinton, like Blair, believes globalisation is unstoppable. He suggests that one o f the 
main drivers of this process is the media because it enables information to be spread 
instantly — but more important is his reflection that it becomes the responsibility of 
those in the developed world to shape the force o f globalisation for the rest of the 
world.
Echoing his domestic statements, and much in the same vein as Blair’s concept of 
‘international community’, he indicated that the practical application of that 
responsibility is the creation of a ‘global social contract’. There is clear sense that to 
join this international community or to participate in this contract has clear 
obligations on the part of the participant. Poverty programmes benefit people but also 
open global markets. It was essentially an updated view of enlightened self-interest.
Although the Democrats were defeated in the 2000 election, the original values of the 
Third Way remained a part o f the DLC mantra. Until 2003 they promoted the idea 
that New Democrat values and beliefs are ‘neither liberal nor conservative but 
progressive’, and ‘in the vital centre o f American values and aspirations. They
represent a new and different course for the country that is more important than any
600party .
American critique
According to Jeff Faux, the American Third Way under Clinton made three primary 
claims:
• It provided a distinct analysis of the declining political fortunes of the 
Democratic left;
• It was an effective formula for rebuilding social democratic parties;
• It was a credible new strategy for addressing the issues o f the post-cold war
601age.
600 Democratic Leadership Council. ‘The N ew  Democrats Declaration’ Blueprint Magazine July 27, 
2003. www.ndol.org.
601 Faux, ‘Lost on the Third W ay’, p. 68.
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Faux analyses these three claims on the basis of Clinton’s policies while in 
government. In general, he concludes that the Third Way was a useful device but is 
not ‘beyond’ left and right as much as a compromise between them. It has not been a 
campaign platform, but a platform from which to govern. It has not changed the 
programmatic spending realities, nor has it fundamentally changed most of the 
historical policies of the old liberals, but merely changed their packaging to make 
them more palatable to the majority. Finally, he suggests that by narrowing the debate 
around governance o f society to the governance of the public sector, it changed the 
terms of engagement around issues such as poverty and the good life in general.
Faux concludes that the questions being asked by this approach are right, but the 
answers are still fundamentally flawed. He does not take issue with the idea that there 
is a real need for a new politics but he presents serious concerns that this new way in 
fact merely leads back to the old ways. The brand positioning is right but the product 
on offer has not, in fact, changed.
Die Neue Mitte
Closer to the daily UK debate, and perhaps more relevant given the need for allies in 
the European Union, has been the German Third Way, Die Neue Mitte or New 
Centre.
As noted in previous chapters, the German experience o f social democracy is one of 
repeated recovery and revision. Its Marxist roots colour the debate in much the same 
way as the history of the union tradition in the British Labour Party colours UK 
debate. From Bernstein through to the 1959 reforms of the Bad Godesberg 
Programme, where the SPD committed itself to ‘the need to protect and promote 
private ownership o f the means of production’,602 to the policy reviews o f the 1980s, 
led first by Willy Brandt then by Oskar Lafontaine and Hans-Jochen Vogel, it could 
be argued that the history of the German version o f social democracy was an 
ideological response to Marxism603 as well as inevitably a response to changing 
technology and electoral constraints.
The most recent SPD reforms of the 1980s and ’90s — known ultimately as the Berlin 
Programme — were not undertaken by a party elite (unlike the UK) but were part of a
602 Albert, Capitalism again Capitalism, p. 18.
603 By Driver and Martell, amongst others.
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larger deliberative process. They were attempting to find a new social democratic 
settlement that would move the party forward in the face of intense economic 
pressure both from the reunification and global economic pressure.604
The context o f the Third Way in terms of UK politics of the 1970s and ’80s has 
already been pointed out, but to contrast that experience with Germany is equally 
important. German politics did not undergo the same kind of change as the UK. 
Germany’s relatively closed, union-based system supported by high taxes and welfare 
provision was not challenged until the process o f reunification. Thus, it ‘escaped’ the 
process o f the break-up of the ‘social partnership’ that Thatcher instigated in the UK 
as well as the breakdown of the union power-base. That is why the Berlin 
Programme was so important.
The political tensions within the SPD were highlighted by the ending of the Cold 
War and the process of reunification. While western leaders like Clinton in his 
Warwick speech welcomed this development as a great triumph, Germany was left to 
deal with the consequences of assimilating sixteen and a half million people effectively 
overnight. The reintegration of East Germany into the west reopened debates not 
only about social welfare and taxation but at a deeper level o f ideology, including the 
role o f the state and the individual. The political parties of the west were forced to try 
and bring their eastern electorate into western political thinking.
As Mark Leonard in his introduction to Bodo Hombach’s (described as ‘the German 
Peter Mandelson’) book on the German Third Way indicates:
The challenge now is to flesh out the Third Way/Neue Mitte as a 
governing philosophy ... to be an effective governing philosophy, a 
political theory needs to tell a distinctive story about the world. Marxism, 
conservatism, liberalism and social democracy all had four elements: ‘a set 
o f values or an underpinning ethic’, ‘a theory of human nature and 
society’; ‘a sense of progress and a vision of the sort o f society they aimed 
to create’; ‘a road map or toolkit to guide political practice’.605
Bodo Hombach, a close adviser to Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and architect of the 
Neue Mitte, responds to Leonard’s notion of conflicting philosophies by arguing in 
very familiar terms that the constraints of left and right are no longer applicable. The 
crises of the 1980s and ’90s effectively broke the equilibrium of these competing 
political systems:
604 See Meyer in Giddens, The Global Third Way.
605 Leonard, Mark, in Hombach, Bodo. The Politics of the New Centre. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 
xiv.
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The country was presented with a false antithesis — a philosophy of all- 
consuming economic growth or a hidebound defence of every aspect of 
the traditional welfare state. There is no way back to redistributive 
policies. The renewal o f the social democratic model that supersedes the 
categories o f ‘left’ and ‘right’ is an international model. There are still 
murmurings of discontent in Germany when responsibility is transferred 
from the state to the individual ... there must be a system of social 
security in place which encourages people to take risks...We need 
equality o f opportunity, equality at the outset, not at the outcome.606
The language of a third way was not new in Germany, but provided a useful overlay 
and an international, cooperative dimension from the European level to the domestic 
debate. Thus, the Third Way was reintroduced by a Chancellor under pressure from 
his party and from the opposition to find a way to appeal to those same middle classes 
under threat from global economic change. As Thomas Meyer puts it:
The concept of the neue mitte developed by Schroder, o f course partly an 
electoral label aimed at eliciting a positive response from the mass media 
and increasing the reach of the SPD within the middle classes ... But it 
also reflects the conviction that fresh ways o f approaching deep-rooted 
political dilemmas had to be found once in government.607
As well as the changes created by reunification, this deliberative approach is also the 
result o f Germany’s coalitional national political system and the nature of the Lander. 
The German government must deal with the power o f the strong interest groups 
representing both employers and unions. Power in the system is much more diffused 
than in the UK and certainly the relatively rapid reform that was possible in the UK 
between 1987 and 1997 would not have been possible in the German environment. 
As Driver and Martell put it:
The need to combine moderate electoral appeal with more radical appeal 
to coalition partners, the social-market culture and the devolved nature of 
the German political system and institutions lead to different outcomes 
there compared to other countries where institutional and cultural 
pressures diverge.608
A Third Way milestone for international cooperation followed the success of the 
Labour Party in 1997 and the SPD in 1998, in the joint Blair and Schroder 
document: Europe: The Third Way /Die Neue Mitte released in 1999. It was careful to 
take on board national cultural differences by including references to partnership with
606 Ibid., p. xxxiii.
607 Meyer, ‘From Godesberg to the N eue mitte: the new  social democracy in Germany’ in Giddens, 
The Global Third Way, p. 78.
608 Driver and Martell, Blair's Britain, p. 107.
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the trade unions though New Labour had been working hard to limit the perception 
o f trade-union influence.
There is some speculation as to Schroder’s commitment to the Third Way but he 
used it to present himself as a global player. As Blair and Schroder suggested in their 
statement:
The trademark of the approach is the New Centre in Germany and the 
Third Way in the United Kingdom. Other social democrats choose other 
terms that suit their own national cultures. But though the language and 
the institutions may differ, the motivation is everywhere the same. Most 
people have long since abandoned the world-view represented by the 
dogmas of left and right. Social democrats must be able to speak to those 
people.609
Though the process and the response differed, the same values set out by the 
American and UK Third Way could also be identified in the German version: the 
desire to be ‘pragmatic’ rather than ideological, the conviction that it is equality of 
opportunity and not of outcome that should be ensured by the government and the 
importance put on the notion of rights and obligations as part of the positional 
attitudes of the new centre.
Their apparent commitment to the Third Way approach seemed to be related to the 
analysis o f globalisation and an effort to align Europe on the social democratic agenda. 
As Blair and Schroder said in the same statement:
The politics of the New Centre and the Third Way is about addressing 
the concerns of people who live and cope with societies undergoing rapid 
change — both winners and losers. In this newly emerging world people 
want politicians who approach issues without ideological preconceptions 
and who, applying their values and principles, search for practical 
solutions to their problems through honest, well constructed and 
pragmatic policies.610
The Blair-Schroder paper gained some generally favourable coverage in Britain but 
provoked controversy in Germany, leading Schroder to distance himself from some of 
its more free-market aspects.611 This delicate balance o f interests may explain why 
Schroder carefully sought to place the thinking of the Third Way within a national 
historical context. Locating the debate as something that came out o f German 
experience rather than as an import from the US or the UK, he argued for a new
609 Hombach, The Politics o f the New Centre, p .159.
610 Ibid., p. 163.
611 Driver and Martell, Blair's Britain, p. 104.
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politics. Simply put, because the first two ‘German’ ways failed. As he pointed out at 
the Third Way conference in Washington DC in April 2000:
After the Second World W ar people tried to venture upon a path that 
they called the social market economy in Germany.. .And that was not 
based upon the wider masses of the population, the workers foregoing 
their just share of prosperity within their society and their just share of 
education, but it was based upon participation and involvement of the 
working masses ... And if you ask yourself what could be the flesh to the 
bones o f the Third Way, then I think we have to go back to those roots.
For me the Third Way means participation of as many as possible ... I say 
we need to make sure that as many people as possible can participate in, 
can share in opportunities, but also responsibilities within society.612
At home, Schroder officially set his government on the Third Way course in June 
2000 by cutting taxes significantly and deregulating the economy, though he 
promised to secure pension rights.613
This perceived abandonment of ideology disturbed his electorate, and particularly the 
supporters of the SPD. While Blair’s battle for modernisation o f the Labour Party was 
a response to periods of free market approach to government, Germany began from a 
different place. The reforms they had attempted up to that point had not 
fundamentally disturbed state mechanisms of the social partnership. The Third Way 
represented a threat to that consensus, as the subsequent disastrous election results, 
polls and even a high-level SPD party commission, all seemed to concur. The 
commission went so far as to say that the Third Way could even be potentially 
dangerous to Germany’s ‘social peace’ given that it appeared to threaten the social 
guarantees that had become fundamental to what citizen expectations.
German critique
Oskar Lafontaine, a senior SPD politician and one o f the leaders o f the policy review, 
objected to the Third Way as a capitulation to the market and big business. He 
became the lightning rod of discontent with Schroder’s and the Third Way generally, 
and resigned as leader of the party and Finance Minister in Schroder government in 
March 1999614 in protest at what he saw as the movement towards the right and the
612 Democratic Leadership Council. ‘From N ew  Democrat to N ew  Labour to N ew  Middle: The Third 
Way goes Global’. Transcript o f conference, April 2002.
www.dlcppi.org/ conferences/thirdway/transcript.htm.
613 Newm an and de Zoysa, The Promise o f the Third Way.
614 Lafontaine, Oskar. The Heart Beats on the Left. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. vii.
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abandonment of social democracy. To him, the Third Way encapsulated all that was 
wrong with the direction of the party and explained subsequent defeats at the polls.
Shortly before the European elections in 1999 Tony Blair and Gerhard 
Schroder published a joint declaration calling for a left-wing supply-side 
policy. Generally speaking the appeal fell on deaf ears. The SPD and the 
Labour Party both suffered considerable setbacks. In Europe the welfare 
state is seen as the prerequisite for a properly functioning democracy. It is 
not possible for the countries of Europe to take over the present British 
economic model as it stands.615
Lafontaine, a traditional socialist by British standards, argued that politics had become 
dominated by media concerns. The interests o f the electorate, particularly ‘the 
worker, the unemployed and the pensioners’ had been forced off the agenda while 
the ‘market’ dominated. Ironically, in Lafontaine’s view, Blair was promoting 
‘Thatcher-like’ reforms, particularly in the area of union relations. This was to be 
fiercely resisted by both the left and the centre of German politics. In Lafontaine’s 
view, profits, the market or share value should not lead policy:
Padded with scientific jargon and supported by the media, neo-liberalism 
has become a kind of conservative ideology masquerading as the 
embodiment o f ‘the end of all ideologies’, and ‘the end of history’. The 
call for less state turns increasingly into a call for less democracy.
Democratic political decisions are replaced by the demands o f the market, 
and, as history has shown, many adapt to the claim of the prevailing 
Zeitgeist.616
Only time will tell if the German local franchise will be able to continue or will need 
to re-position itself in the local market. As Lafontaine concludes, ‘we must not forget 
that feelings are not trade on the stock exchange. They belong to the heart. And the 
heart beats on the left.’617
French footnote
While Blair and the New Labour modernisers actively sought to promote the Third 
Way throughout Europe, there were pockets o f resistance. France stands out as an 
example of a country that did not take up the Third Way with enthusiasm. As part o f 
his evangelising mission, Blair spoke to the French National Assembly (in French) on 
the Third Way. It was noticeable that centre-left Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin ‘was
615 Ibid., p. viii.
616 Ibid., p. 205.
617 Lafontaine, The Heart Beats on the Left, p. 207.
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said to scowl and read his mail while all around him listened attentively.’618 This 
behaviour reflects a pattern — while opinion ranged from interest to distrust they did 
not overtly obstruct it given that Jospin did participate, albeit reluctantly.
Unlike Germany, the French state is centralised with a high level of state involvement 
in all public services — though like the Germans they also promote what they call the 
‘active state’, despite Jospin’s privatisation programme. Thus:
Jospin’s rhetoric is, to some extent, an attempt to keep his five-party 
centre-left coalition on board. He needs to, ‘talk left’ to appeal to his 
socialist, communist and green ‘gauche plurielle’.619
As Martin Marcussen points out, it is a matter of utilising the language of 
globalisation, but applying it to local political arguments. In his paper to the 
International Studies Association, ‘Globalisation: A Third Way Gospel that Travels 
W orld-W ide’, he argues:
O n one extreme the British Third Way uses globalisation to keep the 
state away and the economy prudent ... On the other extreme the French 
volontarisme uses globalisation to keep the state busy when it come to 
social regulation at both the national and international levels ... In Great 
Britain Tony Blair argues that globalisation demands a leaner state in a 
context of market competition, whereas in France, Lionel Jospin argues 
that globalisation requires that the role of the state should be strengthened 
in the economy. Both use globalisation as an argument to promote 
reforms.620
Another important element to the development of the Third Way, as mentioned, is 
the overlapping personal involvements of the players and high levels o f mutual trust.
It is in this regard that the French position was most exposed. While Jospin attended 
Third Way meetings he retained a distance and even criticised the Third Way for 
what he saw as ‘creeping “Anglo-Saxon” hegemony’:621
His presence at Third Way meetings resulted in tensions because he was 
suspicious o f Clinton’s and Blair’s intentions and clung to old socialist 
ways o f speaking. Clinton wanted a broad, inclusive, ‘floating opera’ with 
as many participants as possible. But Jospin did not want too many leaders 
o f parties belonging to the Socialist International to become part of the 
Third Way, because he saw it as a cooptation that would diminish the 
virtually irrelevant organisation, in which he believed he exercised
618 Driver and Martell, Blair's Britain, p. 96.
619 Ibid., p. 106.
620 Marcussen, Globalisation: A  Third Way Gospel that Travels World Wide, p. 5.
621 Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, p. 673.
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influence. He did not understand the historically unique opportunity that 
the others grasped about Clinton.622
Progressive summits
Unlike the Internationals at the turn of the nineteenth century, these Third Way 
‘summits’ were not deeply divided (with some minor exceptions) but meetings of 
active participants. Various groupings often took the opportunity of other events that 
brought a range o f leaders together such as NATO or the G8 -  to discuss the Third 
Way. The most important aspect of these sessions was that they were not to discuss 
foreign policy per se but to discuss commonalities o f domestic politics, or the new 
‘global’ issues.
Even more intriguing from an International Relations perspective is the fact that they 
evolved towards a system of communication from these meetings through 
communiques that focused not on foreign policies but on their domestic philosophical 
approach. The Third Way seems to have succeeded where reformers of the previous 
century had failed in that they created the framework for an agreed political 
programme and positional attitudes for a consensual social democracy.
These more formal summits evolved from the early meetings between Blair and 
Clinton — or their respective teams — and gradually developed their own agendas. 
From the NYU symposium where the Third Way first ‘went public’, the meetings 
were more consciously designed for external consumption, though always leaving 
room for private discussion. They also ranged in size — often as a result o f whatever 
the event it was attached to. Thus, the meeting around the NATO anniversary in 
1999 in Washington was relatively large623 while the Florence meeting had a number 
of European leaders in attendance624 to discuss ‘progressive governance in the twenty- 
first century’.
Given that many of these early meetings were in the margins of other events there 
was relatively little formal infrastructure. Blumenthal makes it clear that Clinton felt 
the US was a, if not the, driving force behind their attendees and subject matter.
623 Including Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Massimo D ’Alema, Gerhard Schroder and W im  Kok (ibid., p. 
644).
624 EU Commission President Romano Prodi, Hillary Clinton, Cherie Blair, E U  Foreign Minister 
Javier Solana, Director-General o f the International Labour Organisation Juan Somavia, Tony Blair, 
Massimo D ’Alema, Gerhrad Schroder, Lionel Jospin and Fernando Henrique Cardoso o f  Brazil; 
‘prominent intellectuals from Europe and the US [also] joined the party’ (ibid., p. 672).
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Similarly the UK could arguably take credit for much o f this early work but 
Blumenthal also identified this same link between the domestic and the international, 
as highlighted by both Short and Cook within the British context, when he says:
Through organising the Third Way summits, Clinton’s administration had 
encouraged the sharing of what we called ‘best practices’ of social policy 
with other governments. The most intensive cooperation existed with the 
British; traffic about domestic issues between British ministries and 
American departments became a regular part of the relationship. But 
discussion also began with other Europeans — and they responded in kind. 
Constant exchanges are obviously integral to a healthy foreign policy, but 
this was a new dimension in international affairs. It was also natural that 
the political actors would hold many conversions about politics — opening 
informal but regular channels on political strategy.625
However, by the time of the Berlin meeting in September 2000626 Clinton was 
coming to the end of his second term. Thus, it makes sense that this seems to be the 
first meeting that involved the Policy Network, a UK-based organisation that 
described this meeting as ‘ the first large high-level summit of the network in its 
current form’.627 The organisation was not officially set up until December of that 
year, with support from Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroder, Giuliano Amato and Goran 
Persson, and with Peter Mandelson as the Chair.
The communiques that were eventually produced by these summits are very similar 
to each other but it is the fact they exist that is important. Between eleven and fifteen 
heads of government and state would gather and while the transcripts, in John Lloyd’s 
words, have an air o f ‘self-congratulatory vacuity’ about them,628 they exist as joint 
statements between leaders of different countries.
They are also remarkably consistent — presumably the hallmark of being agreed 
between so many different political and linguistic traditions that statements are best 
left untouched between meetings, if it can be helped, rather than disturb what must 
be a precarious balance of language. However, they are all direct descendents of the
625 Ibid., pp. 668-69.
626 Thirteen leaders: W im  Kok, Clinton, Blair, Schroder, along with the new participants Prime 
Minister Goran Persson o f Sweden, President Fernando de la Rua o f  Argentina, Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien o f  Canada, Prime Minister Costas Simitis o f Greece, Prime Minister Helen Clark o f N ew  
Zealand, Prime Minister Antonio Guterres o f Portugal, President Ricardo Lagos o f  Chile, and 
President Thabo Mbeki o f  South Africa. Prime Minister Giuliano Amato replaced D ’Alema o f Italy. 
(Jospin only joined the next day rather than the opening dinner; Blumenthal claims that Clinton 
effectively blocked his attendance or ‘trumped’ him for his perceived lack o f support in Florence (ibid., 
p. 673).
627 Policy Network website, www.pohcy-network.net.
628 Lloyd, John. ‘Intellectuals and N ew  Labour’. Prospect. October 1999: 22-27.
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New Democrats’ declaration and Third Way values. The Berlin communique, for 
example, sets out the familiar three-part structure of the basic premise of globalisation 
being potentially used to the good and built on the ‘core values’ of ‘opportunity for 
all, responsibility from all and community of all’, and all based on ‘progressive 
governance’.629 Blumenthal, as a lead person on this document, had drafted it before 
the conference with counterparts in other governments but recalls how eager Clinton 
was that it should be:
A first step ... He believed the Third Way network could be used to 
advance a progressive agenda in other international forums such as the G8 
... the unstated yet keenly felt assumption among the leaders was that the 
new internationalism required at its centre a certain kind of American 
president.630
The pattern also seems to follow the Blair/Clinton idea of the extended domestic 
analogy. So, in the international context, it becomes the responsibility of wealthier 
states to actively participate in global governance structures in good faith, and the idea 
o f community becomes the international community of states.
O n the eve o f the U N  Millennium Summit, the Prime Ministers o f Sweden, the 
Netherlands and the UK and the Chancellor o f Germany penned a joint statement on 
the wider topic o f progressive politics. Again, the content of the statement was not 
particularly new, promising as it did: ‘a wider winner’s circle’, a ‘strengthened civil 
society’ and, a ‘commitment to a global social compact’ but the core o f their 
statement was simply that:
Although our four countries are part of many historical networks, we are 
today also part of a bigger political family of renewed, modernised 
progressive politics. Our values endure, but our approach is radically 
reformed. W e all embrace the potential of globalisation. In fact our shared 
political conversation symbolised political globalisation. But we are 
committed to tackle the problems that come in its wake. For us there are 
three foundations for global progress.631
Though the leaders still meet in the margins o f other events, the organisation of Third 
Way-specific events seems to have been taken up by the Policy Network. It was 
involved not only with Berlin in 2000, but Stockholm and the London summit of 
2003 as well as a range o f smaller meetings. They have also started a number of 
international working groups, taking on specific issues o f concern. The Network’s
629 Berlin communique, www.progressive-govemance.net.
630 Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, p. 675.
631 Blair, Tony, Gerhard Schroder, W im  Kok and Goran Persson. ‘What the left has to offer the new  
world o f  global economics.’ Independent, 6 Sept. 2000, 4.
260
stated aim is to ‘facilitate dialogue between politicians, policy makers and experts 
across Europe and from democratic countries around the world’.632 The infrastructure 
has become more stable with regular communiques from the summits and reports of 
activities. They have also founded a new journal, Progressive Politics.
It would appear that the organised nature and focus of the Rainbow Circle has been 
cross-fertilised with the global reach o f the Internationals to create a modem 
counterpart on a global scale. It remains to be seen if this organisation can sustain itself 
in a way that its predecessors could not.
632 Policy Network Website, www.policy-network.net.
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Conclusion
There have been two inter-related projects of this thesis. The first is a case study or 
comparison between New Liberalism and the Third Way. The second is a wider 
discussion o f the issues around globalisation and its potential impact on international 
relations. These are linked by the core question of whether or not we can use the 
process of evolution within domestic political ideologies as evidence o f a particular 
type of shift specifically in the state’s development. If we can, what, if any, 
conclusions can be drawn from a comparison o f New Liberalism and the Third Way?
Notions o f ‘globalisation’ have become ubiquitous in discussions o f both international 
and domestic affairs, and thus before a useful comparison of the two political 
approaches o f New Liberalism and the Third Way as responses to such periods could 
be made, the development of the globalisation debate was discussed. The business- 
school approach began as a primarily economic argument but then seemed to apply 
economic conclusions across all aspects of society. This line suggested that 
globalisation was overwhelming the state and severely limiting its ability to act 
independendy or even in its own defence. The global economy, according to this 
approach, operated as a single entity and states would be swept in its wake.
Proponents o f this perspective suggested this single market is a desirable development, 
though this characterisation of globalisation is also used by anti-globalisation protestors 
given their opposition to what they see as the damage of a single global market on 
local cultures and economies.
Sceptics — in line with this thesis — argued this perspective failed to recognise the 
similarities between the current period and previous and very similar stages of rapid 
economic development. They comprehensively demonstrated that while current 
growth in international trade was extraordinarily rapid; it had happened before. Thus, 
they suggested that globalisation was not new or as invasive as the business case 
suggests, and need not be as overwhelming as portrayed by either neoliberal 
enthusiasts or anti-globalisation protesters.
Other aspects o f the debate included the latest development which is an attempt to 
create a version o f ‘strong state globalisation’. This line is important to the argument 
here because its in-between position is reminiscent of the Labour Party’s. This 
approach recognises that globalisation is taking place and identifies its threats and 
challenges, also commends it as having potential for good. However, they also 
suggest, the state (and the electorate) need to understand the process better. These
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practitioners (more often than theorists) argue that states have an important role in 
managing this process as states remain the only entities with the necessary power. 
Those supporting this view are clear that the state also needs to evolve towards a new 
more overtly interdependent — or ‘global’ — form.
The frame o f the globalisation debate was examined from the political perspective, 
particularly that o f Anthony Giddens. As he and other modernisers used the 
implications o f this debate as a political imperative for wholesale reform of domestic 
politics with inevitable implications for the welfare system, economic management 
and many areas of domestic policy. They argued that the encroachment of the 
international into domestic policy implied by globalisation required a political, 
ideological response if the country was to be protected from the worst case scenarios.
A relatively uncommon approach to the globalisation debate is also valuable in this 
context. Authors such as Reiger and Liebfried provocatively suggest that globalisation 
is not necessarily formed by forces outside a state’s control. Rather than being at the 
mercy of unseen forces, they suggest that states are actually the authors of 
globalisation. The state’s approach to the welfare system or chosen form of capitalism 
creates the context in which all states operate. This contrasting view is important, 
given the relevance to the question of potential causality between the domestic and 
international political arenas.
It was demonstrated that one of the most challenging of problems within this debate is 
the fact that despite claims globalisation is larger than economics, most theories 
continue to conflate a range of other changes and trends in society under this label. 
However, it was suggested that the debate’s focus on whether or not the process is 
unique or continuing, and its impact on state control, did not reach the core of the 
issue. As these approaches all agree that since there was a massive change, the question 
that should be asked is: what is globalisation doing to the development of the state? In 
most discussions around globalisation, little time is spent on the dynamics o f a shift in 
the capitalist system coinciding with technological and societal change, and what that 
might mean for our understanding of the development o f the state.
This was then taken up in a discussion of the impact of globalisation on the 
International Relations discipline. International Relations, it was argued, has 
difficulties with the globalisation debate due to the problems identified above. The 
conflated types o f change have different causes, points o f agency and impacts on the 
state as both a domestic and international actor.
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International Relations theory is hampered in its ability to cope with this 
phenomenon by three factors. First, it has spent little time on the actual process of 
development in individual states as it evolves from one stage to another. The ‘pre­
modem ’ and the ‘modem’ state as well as the ‘modem’ or the ‘global’ state are all 
treated simply as states. Phrases such as ‘late-industrial nations’ are used with litde 
explanation as to any kind o f transformative process is required to move from one 
stage to another. The state and its powers are generally used in a timeless sense and 
therefore it is difficult to differentiate relations between states at different levels of 
development and those between outwardly similar states.
Given that this thesis is focused entirely on Britain and western developed ‘late 
m odem ’ states, the issue of state development within Britain was relevant for two 
reasons. First, because New Liberalism and the Third Way were both instigators and 
products o f change in the development of the state and second, because a comparison 
o f the development of these two philosophies demonstrates the range of factors that 
influence state development and thus the speed at which they evolve. This is also 
relevant as some states take very different approaches to their power and their ability 
to influence their own development, discussed by Reiger and Liebfried and 
demonstrated by Albert.
The blurring o f the international/domestic boundary was then highlighted as a second 
challenge to International Relations. The differing salience of issues inside and outside 
the state and their impact on the ‘other side’ is difficult for the discipline to explain. 
The separation between political science and International Relations has been perhaps 
too complete, as it has made it more difficult to understand state actions in a more 
holistic way. This factor is especially important in the context of the globalisation 
debate because, as indicated, one of its core arguments is the increasing overlap and 
softening of the boundaries between international and domestic.
Finally, and implied by the previous two points, is the fact that states, the primary 
actor within the International Relations discipline, are not monolithic entities acting 
o f their own accord, but are led by political parties and leaders. These individuals have 
issues in their own particular environment with opportunities and constraints. These 
must be understood as filters of a state’s international actions. In the case of these two 
political approaches, the international change in the form of globalisation was causing 
significant upheaval on the domestic level. It becomes increasingly difficult not to take 
into account domestic issues, and particularly the electoral, pressure on the individuals 
and parties — at least in the context o f these modem/developed states.
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Again, it was observed that a larger argument might be helpful to the difficulties 
encountered by the International Relations discipline. The idea of a type of change 
which could be identified as ‘systemic’ as the state shifts from one stage of 
development to another was proposed to alleviate some of the pressure caused by 
older, more traditional, approaches. If the international/domestic boundary is 
understood as something that is shaped by pressures both inside and outside that 
boundary, that appreciation has implications for notions of sovereignty and state 
development.
This kind o f change was outlined with a focus on the two political philosophies to be 
examined. Transformation was defined as points of simultaneous social, technological 
and economic change. The subsequent understandings o f time, speed and distance 
create new relations between local, national and international and between society, 
state and economy. It is argued that changes at all levels at both these periods created a 
shift first from the pre-modern to the modem, and now from the modem to a new 
stage o f state development.
The two periods proposed and the two political responses were then set out by what 
were called ‘positional attitudes’ — or ideas that place a political approach within the 
spectrum of debate, as well as their ‘defining features’ — or those things that are not 
policy-specific but guide the policy decision-making processes.
New Liberalism and the Third Way share four positioning attitudes:
1 A rational or pragmatic approach to politics and policy;
2 An open or porous approach to others in an attempt or need to create a new 
majority;
3 A portrayal o f themselves as part of the left, or progressive, tradition;
4 An overt internationalist approach to their aspirations and actions.
The four defining features oudined included:
1 A sense o f duty and a self-governing morality which manifested itself in a new 
social contract o f rights and responsibilities;
2 A notion of community based on an idea of duty and the individual’s place as 
being not separate from, but within, the community in which they live and 
work as a social being;
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3 A role for the state as guarantor of various forms of basic security, not as the 
provider o f all the wants and aspirations of the electorate;
4 A response to international economic pressure by arguing that it is not the 
state’s role to provide everything but that the state and individuals needed to 
be competitive, or efficient, to deal with these external economic forces.
These positional attitudes and defining features were then used as a framework in 
which to investigate both New Liberalism and the Third Way in some depth. They 
were placed within their historical context to better understand both domestic and 
international pressures as well as the prevailing intellectual climate of ideas.
Having suggested that these were both periods of transformation, it was demonstrated 
that the changes in other aspects of society were reflected in the political dialogue.
New Liberalism and the Third Way compared
In more specific terms, New Liberalism and the Third Way were compared as two 
domestic political approaches developed by an educated elite whose members had 
contact with each other over a range o f activities. These relatively small overlapping 
groups based their philosophies on the concept of a self-sufficient individual operating 
within a firm, moral community — but a community that was designed to support the 
individual’s interaction with an increasingly competitive marketplace.
Both New Liberals and the Third Way were faced with a massive change in the 
make-up o f the voting public by enfranchisement and (de)industrialisation. These 
changes damaged the ability o f any political party to create a majority. The New 
Liberals responded to these challenges by attempting to include the newly 
enfranchised working class as part of their efforts to broaden state legitimacy. They 
attempted to create a progressive coalition by working with the emerging socialists.
The Third Way had a similar problem as the economy shifted away from 
manufacturing to service industries. However, the Third Way attempted to win over 
this new class of voter by moving away from, not towards, the working class. They 
sought to create a ‘big tent’ of opinion, with support from a range o f opinion formers. 
Their cause was progressive politics and progress more generally.
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This electoral dilemma produced difficult internal party struggles for both New 
Liberals and the Third Way. Old Liberalism and old Liberals were part of a propertied 
class and reluctant to join with workers entirely, and thus their attempt at an 
accommodation between the evolving Liberal Party and the emerging socialists 
ultimately failed. The Third Way was forced to reinvent this coalition for electoral 
reasons and called for a reconciliation of this ‘great divorce’. That process was aborted 
as they won a majority in the country without needing to create a party political 
manifestation of the coalition.
The domestic role of the state was under considerable pressure at both points in time. 
The New Liberals were challenged by new information on social deprivation and an 
electorate fed by a growing press. They were forced to abandon the idea o f the 
‘night-watchman’ state and adopt a more proactive position. This involved shifting 
from a negative idea of freedom to a positive concept of promoting the welfare of the 
individual.
The Third Way assumed the role of the state adopted by the previous Conservative 
government by converting the language of rights and responsibilities to their 
advantage and creating the enabling state. Government, in their view was destined to 
‘steer, not row’. While the New Liberals were adjusting to a demand for an increasing 
scope and size o f the state the Third Way was attempting to maintain the smaller 
state.
They were also both forced to re-examine the U K ’s economic position in the world 
as a result of external economic factors. New Liberals had to deal with the Great 
Depression of the 1870s, and the imposition o f tariffs by other countries, that created 
unemployment and hardship while the pressure of globalisation made it increasingly 
difficult for the Third Way to ensure domestic economic growth. A response of 
efficiency and competitiveness became common language for all parties at both times.
The organic analogy was also used at both times as they were convinced o f the 
comparability of different levels o f society. Through the application of the organic 
system they argued for a strong community for the individual, through mutualism and 
communitarianism, and proposed an early idea of interdependence theory in which 
the system of states should also be seen as a community with the same rights and 
responsibilities as one would expect of neighbours within a local community.
Also on the international scale they participated in debates o f ideas and policies. 
Despite the sharing of ideas through the historic meetings of the Internationals or best
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practice through progressive summits, the tension between the continental political 
ideas o f collectivism (socialism, and communism) and those at home produced a 
version o f a ‘weak state’ in Britain. While Britain retained its differences from 
continental political development, it was actively engaged with the process and to a 
certain extent attempted to lead such debate.
However, in a striking difference, the liberal ‘modernisers’, or New Liberals, did not 
enjoy the initial support of the leadership o f the Liberal Party. Just after the end o f the 
nineteenth century they did come to have more direct political influence with Lloyd 
George and a selection of MPs elected on a more overt New Liberalism platform, but 
too late for basic reform.
In contrast, the Third Way was developed as core to the leadership and campaigning 
efforts o f the leader and the entire leadership team. Arguably, this was more necessary 
in the twentieth century, given the greater reliance on electronic media for 
communication with the electorate, but New Liberals still suffered for their lack o f 
influence throughout the higher echelons of the party. Their influence was diffused 
through newspaper articles, journals, associations and academia for most o f their 
development with litde or no focus on the business o f politics. Also, there was no 
binding consensus as to the proper analysis o f the issues, nor the best approach to 
them.
This intermingling of ideas and actors became a more formal and overt process in 
both timeframes. The Internationals at the end of the nineteenth century were 
relatively chaotic, and ended up splitting along various lines over the period o f their 
existence, but the same could arguably be said about the progressive summits. They 
appear to our current view to be more conscious and deliberate than their 
predecessors but they have also gone through significant change. From small bilateral 
meetings, they have expanded to include so many different political cultures and 
domestic objectives that their desire to be inclusive may have outstripped their ability 
to be productive. Regardless of their eventual form or dissolution, they were created 
out of both domestic necessity and innovative politics. In that sense, they are all 
examples o f a kind of frontier politics possible at such transformative moments.
This complex interplay of the domestic and the international ultimately shapes both 
‘faces’ o f the state. The internal and external pressures have always, to a certain extent, 
been defined by each other, but this current period of transition seems to have 
consolidated the ideas of interdependence as the state evolved. The ways in which the
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two faces o f the state interact are now more transparent and exposed both to domestic 
politics as well as to their international counterparts.
Thus, the two faces o f the state are perhaps not, as Halliday suggests, so Janus-like as a 
yang—yin, each containing within it the germ of its antithesis. Perhaps this is the 
beginning o f the development within International Relations o f a third face or triform 
Hecate — a three-faced figure used particularly in northern Europe with an eye not 
only on both past and future but a fu.ll face looking over the present.
The end of the Third Way?
Throughout this thesis there has been a constant underlying question as to whether or 
not the Third Way moment has passed. This question remains to some degree open 
but it is worth a brief look at what seems to be its current position. Certainly the 
specific language of the Third Way has fallen out of common usage, even by the 
Prime Minister. In some senses this is understandable given the pressure of running a 
government and particularly the tensions created by the war in Iraq between members 
of the cabinet and between the states that had been meeting regularly as part of this 
progressive project.
The end o f New Liberalism is argued here as being the onset o f the Great War. As 
the Liberal/Labour progressive coalition fell into disarray and the International split 
with the return of nationalistic state-centric sentiments, there was little scope for the 
ideas and ideals o f New Liberalism.
While it is still impossible to say with any certainty that the Third Way is facing a 
similar demise, commentators such as John Gray have begun to make such 
predictions. He has gone so far as to write about the ‘Blair project’ in the past tense.
In International Affairs he looks at the Third Way but as an analysis o f where it went 
wrong. The relevance here is that, while he talks about the Third Way, he also hints 
at the idea that it was a particular response to an external change in the political 
environment on not only the domestic but the global political scene as well:
The Third Way — a strategy of national development equidistant from 
old-fashioned social democracy and unfettered capitalism — was a 
metaphorical extension of Clinton’s tactic. Its strength was its recognition 
that social democratic values could no longer be effectively promoted by 
the social democratic policies of the past; new policies were needed that 
reflected a world very different from that which existed when Labour was
269
last in power. Its weakness was its assumption — which it took from neo­
liberal ideology — that capitalism had overcome its propensity to periodic
More important here is the fact that Giddens and even the Policy Network — recently 
charged with the ongoing support of these Third Way summits — have also declared 
the Third Way finished. In his most recent contribution to the debate, Giddens 
‘officially’ moved away from the Third Way and towards the language that has been 
developed over the course of his work and the work of the Third Way summits and 
the Policy Network. As well as going beyond the left and right continuum he declares 
that, ‘We have to go beyond where the third way thinking has got so far’.634
His most recent book, The Progressive Manifesto (2003) is a collection of articles based 
on the Third Way summit in London 2003, one o f the largest events to date for this 
governmental, intergovernmental, civil society, and academic approach to politics. 
Though Clinton is no longer in power he still looms large, while the various 
governments involved have become more and more focused on European neighbours 
who have EU as well as Third Way agendas to discuss.
‘September 11’ has become a date like ‘1989’. It is deemed to need litde explanation 
as it seems to go without saying that these are moments of irreversible change. 
However, unlike 1989, which was an opening of states and ideology, 9/11 is deemed 
by many, including Cooper, Giddens and Gray, to mark a change towards a more 
closed and suspicious international society. These potential tensions are compounded, 
it could be argued, by the suspicions o f most world governments around the conflict 
in Iraq. This is highlighted by the fact the US has moved considerably towards the 
market state and into a less cooperative mode of operation while social democrats 
around Europe have become more shaky. For the Third Way, the new environment 
ushered in by 9/11 has become the self-explanatory reason why the Third Way needs 
to move to a new level. Like the term globalisation, to state 9/11 as a reason is also to 
imply it as an explanation.
Giddens suggests that the Third Way has done its work. In exacdy the same tone as 
many of the New Liberal thinkers a hundred years ago talked o f ‘old Liberalism’, he is 
not willing to let the Third Way be entirely swept away. He seeks to acknowledge 
the Third Way as a transitional phase that is now coming to a close. In effect, it did its 
job, and therefore can be put to one side, but he argues that the work started under its
633 Gray, John. ‘Blair’s Project in Retrospect.’ International Affairs 80.1 (2004): 39—48.
634 Giddens, Progressive Manifesto, p. 1.
270
umbrella should continue. The electoral objectives of the Third Way are now openly 
recognised and the issues of economic pressure, a new citizen contract and a new 
form of internationalism remain crucial to the new progressive agenda. The Third 
Way could only go so far, he argues, but what he calls the neoprogressives (neoprogs) 
need to go further and deeper into reform territory.
Matt Browne, the head of the Policy Network, makes a similar conclusion in his 
contribution to a new collection of essays, Rethinking Social Democracy. He suggests 
that:
One of the central themes running through this collection is that the 
Third Way, as it was originally formulated, has had its day. It was 
originally conceived in the 1990s as a response to a particular political and 
economic conjuncture that has since passed. The Third Way was intended 
to make the modernising Left politically relevant in an era where free 
market ideology and neoliberal doctrine appears to be sweeping all before 
it. Today, the collapse of economic optimism and the insecurities o f the 
post-September 11th world have combined with a host of new challenges 
to make the assumptions o f the mid-1990s appear wildly out o f date.635
The contents of this book are much more consciously international than previous 
work on the Third Way. This is not surprising, as the Third Way has achieved 
considerable success in reaching out to its European counterparts. Still, it seems to 
cover essentially the same topics and territory as Giddens’s first book, or Blair’s Fabian 
pamphlet. Even the title suggests that not much is significandy different. Perhaps the 
argument is, in fact, that the only way to survive in the emerged ‘global’ world is by 
constandy re-presenting ideas as new rather than risking appearing to fall behind. It is 
difficult to understand Giddens’ assertion that the Third Way no longer works given 
that he argues only that ‘the world has moved on’, (and thus the language of the 
Third Way must follow). Perhaps, like Gray, he anticipates the end of the Blair era 
and therefore wants to move the progressive project away from any political fallout so 
that it has some hope of continuing under the aegis of other left-of-centre thinkers 
and politicians, just as it continued on some level despite the absence of Clinton.
In Blair’s speech to the most recent progressive conference in 2003, there was almost 
a sense o f preparation for closure, as he anticipates a Third Way legacy and recounts 
its journey. He opens by noting that the conference now includes prime ministers and 
presidents from over thirty countries, not only from Europe but also from North and 
South America, Africa and New Zealand:
635 Browne, Matt and Patrick Diamond, eds. Rethinking Social Democracy. London: Policy Network, 
2003, p. 347.
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United in our belief in progressive politics. United in our desire to see the 
values of progressive politics shape change. United in our determination 
that it is progressive politics, not the right, that should prepare our 
countries for the future.636
He goes on to suggest that all countries ‘face the same challenges’, all o f which are 
familiar, as they are the themes discussed thus far. They are also all domestic: ‘pensions 
and health care reform, improving the quality of education, social exclusion, drugs 
and crime, how to be economically competitive and socially just’.637
As the war in Iraq continued to attract considerable criticism from those within and 
outside the party as well as from the public, Blair’s domestic agenda was being 
obscured. It is not surprising, then, that he devoted his speech to a prestigious and 
international event on home territory to recounting the domestic successes of New 
Labour and the Third Way. His summary to that group is a good insight to 
understanding where he believes the Third Way to be, as it echoes all of the themes 
outlined here where he continues to set himself apart from at least some o f his 
European counterparts vis-a-vis the relationship with the US:
I want to share our experiences with you, as a progressive party, eighteen 
years in opposition, following a Thatcherite government that attacked 
virtually every value and tradition the left held dear. We have leamt much 
from Europe, from the Democrats in the US, from progressives round the 
world ... There is a risk, seen very clearly in parts of the European left, 
that we end up defining ourselves in economic terms, as anti­
globalisation, and in foreign policy terms, by anti-Americanism. Both are 
a cul-de-sac. Let me focus on the former. W e aren’t going to stop this 
global change. And, in many ways, with it comes enormous 
opportunities. It is my conviction that only a modernised social 
democracy — the true description of the Third Way — can offer a sensible 
answer to its challenge.
Fundamental to this is the re-casting of the relationship between citizen 
and state, to one that is neither dependency nor abandonment, but a 
partnership between the two, based on mutual rights and responsibilities 
to provide opportunity and security for all in the face of globalisation. A 
relationship of dependency is a welfare state that simply gives to its 
recipients, who expect to be given to and who get what is given. It tends 
to be monolithic and passive. Abandonment is where much o f the right 
want to go, where, in an increasingly insecure world, people sink or swim 
according to their own devices. Partnership is not a soft word. It implies
636 Blair, Tony. ‘Opening Speech to the Progressive Governance Conference’, delivered in London, 13 
July 2003.
637 Ibid.
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give and take on both sides. It implies that the individual has 
responsibilities as well as rights; that they have to do as well as to receive.
It changes the nature of the state from the institution that does it all, 
controls it all, to one that enables. And it is far closer to what true social 
democracy should be about. Solidarity is a mutual concept. What flows 
from this, however, is a policy agenda that is both radical and involves 
hard choices for our own supporters as well as our opponents.638
He argues that only through courage and self-awareness was the Labour Party able to 
‘become New Labour and to govern in a way that helped economic growth and 
social justice develop together’. He concludes not with a need for the Third Way but 
by arguing that simply there was ‘no other way’.
Talk of the Third Way in such terms is to be expected at these dedicated summits. 
Party conferences are an altogether different audience and the language o f the Third 
Way was notably absent. However, the shift to the language of the ‘progressive’ was 
much in evidence. The 2004 Labour conference was the last opportunity to promote 
a vision to the party and to the country before the general election widely expected in 
early summer 2005. Blair and Gordon Brown did not waste that opportunity, but 
used their keynote speeches to promote an almost identical agenda. These two early 
modernisers at the very heart of the reforms that made the Labour Party electable, and 
thus core to the development o f the Third Way (and the only two left in their 
original cabinet posts from their first victory), had adopted a new language.
This new language was that of ‘progressive politics’. Direcdy to the electoral heart of 
a pre-election conference, they reached out to the British voter and encouraged them 
to feel proud of their ‘courage’ to elect New Labour. They were also exhorted to 
continue towards ‘progress’ by finding a new ‘purpose’ in progressive politics. Given 
the New Labour managerial approach to politics, progress was made to seem almost 
more important than ongoing progressive politics. The ideology and aspiration of the 
Third Way were being put in second place behind the pragmatic electoral issues of 
politics.
Foreign policy is not traditionally considered to be crucial to domestic electoral 
success, but this may be a new feature o f the next stage o f state development. It is not 
unusual for governments to lose mid-term elections over specific disputes, and Blair 
himself indicated a concern for the importance of a match between foreign and 
domestic policy. But the strength of opinion suggests Iraq may be a general turning
638 Ibid.
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point for the importance o f foreign policy in electoral politics if two bye-elections — 
one loss for the Labour Party and one near miss, are an indication of General Election 
voting intent.
In the meantime, Labour’s domestic agenda has become bogged down and even 
overwhelmed by foreign policy. Thus, the party conference was a set-piece moment 
to point out the success stories o f the government and the progress made on its key 
issues. Progress is not the same in ideological terms as progressive but there was a 
sleight of hand at work in the speeches o f the Prime Minister and the Chancellor to 
create a sense of momentum using this as a base.
The Prime Minister talked of ‘progressive politics’ or ‘progress’ no less than seven 
times in the course of his speech. Progress is something achieved, something that has 
developed over the course of the first two terms of Labour government. Progressive 
parties and progressive politics are touchstones, almost articles of faith for the future 
and what is still to come. Interestingly, he almost recalls his proposal for a progressive 
coalition or reconciliation o f the left as he opened by pointing out that the Labour 
Party faced the prospect, ‘unique in their hundred-year history’, o f a third successive 
term. Having set that effectively as his goal, he then strove to create a link between 
what he stands for and what has been achieved. He needed to explain that the high 
expectations of the left are aspirations and while utopia has not been attained, progress 
has been gained and that progress is all any realistic government can offer.
Brown’s theme was essentially the same. ‘I come here ... not just to tell you what we 
have done but to tell you how much more we have yet to do’ — in effect what 
progress has been achieved, but also that the future lies in a ‘progressive consensus’.639 
He does not use the term ‘progress’ specifically but he does use ‘progressive’ eight 
times. Brown also more overtly draws on the political and ideological sense of the 
word, and notably draws on the historical moments of the 1906 and 1945 
governments as being part o f that tradition. In almost every mention of the 
progressive consensus he also talks of a new ‘national purpose’. Like Blair, he argues 
that such a consensus is based on social justice and development going hand in hand — 
both at home and abroad.
I believe that we had shown that when we make a compelling case and 
trust the progressive instincts of the British people we can build a shared 
sense of national purpose, we can build a progressive consensus that 
inspires the country, a consensus that prosperity and justice for all can
639 Brown, Gordon. ‘Prosperity and Justice for All’, Speech delivered to the Labour Party Conference,
27 September 2004.
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advance together ... And in our generation I want us to build a shared 
national purpose, a British progressive consensus, much more than a set of 
individual policies announced by politicians but a set of beliefs that come 
to be shared by the British people — that Britain can lead by example as 
the first country of the global age where prosperity and justice advance 
together.640
A key part o f that progressive analysis, returning to Giddens and Matt Browne, is the 
world after 9/11. They both suggest that that event created a new kind o f insecurity, 
a rise o f populism and a resurgent fundamentalist right. This is interesting in the 
course o f this argument because it has been posited that the end of New Liberalism 
had been similarly optimistic, hoping and arguing for closer and closer international 
cooperation and economic integration. Instead, the movement dissolved in the face o f 
nationalistic sentiment and uncertainty as states and civil society groups began to close 
down their international activities in favour o f isolationist or internal concerns.
Polanyi’s pendulum, depicting the ‘great transformation’ of the nineteenth century, 
was used by Marquand and others to illustrate the idea that the 1980s and ’90s may 
have seen a similar process of laissez-faire capitalism being followed by long counter­
movements as ‘society spontaneously developed new mechanisms to subject market 
force to social needs’. Marquand went on to argue that the pendulum seemed to be 
‘swinging again’, though ‘at much greater speed’.641
This thesis has argued that this comparison may be more correct than even Marquand, 
let alone Polanyi, had supposed. Periods of rapid globalisation or systemic 
transformation create similar domestic political responses, in this case New Liberalism 
and the Third Way. Those domestic responses also have a significant impact on the 
process and development of globalisation and thus the development of the state from 
one stage to another — pre-modern to the modern and modern to the global. Thus 
the two faces o f the state have a complicated inter-relationship that has not, as yet 
been fully explored, but is arguably demonstrated by the similarities between these 
two political approaches from the progressive political perspective in the UK. The 
frontier between domestic and international is opened by such moments o f 
globalisation and transformation and domestic ideology responds. This, in turn, 
changes the form of the state and thus reshapes the international space.
Britain may offer a specific case at particular points in time, but the similarities in the 
context and the domestic political responses o f New Liberalism and the Third Way
641 Marquand in Gamble and Wright, The New Social Democracy, p. 11.
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remain. This would suggest that there is further work to be done in the area of 
globalisation as to its phases or cycles, and other similarities that may be present at 
such times. Likewise, more could be done to bridge the gap between political science 
and International Relations to better understand the relationship between the 
domestic and international political landscapes. More work could also be done on the 
stages of state development: the process of transition from one stage to another and 
the ways in which states at different levels operate together. Or, more subtly, an 
investigation of the differences between states that are, ostensibly, at the same stage of 
overall development, but who have very different views of their own power and thus 
approach issues such as globalisation from different perspectives, with varying degrees 
of success. In effect, does the state create globalisation or does it really respond to 
globalisation as an outside force?
There may be other domestic political approaches or philosophies that could be used 
to demonstrate similar issues. It may also be possible that they would not be limited to 
the developed, western European world — though Indian or Asian influences were 
notably absent from the Third Way initiatives. Various models of capitalism are being 
developed as various emerging and developing countries evolve within their own 
cultural contexts. For Britain, New Liberalism and the Third Way provided important 
transitional domestic political philosophies as the state went through moments of 
transformation. In the same way that New Liberalism closed down, it is suggested 
here that the porousness that produced the Third Way has begun to close. 
Internationally, the question will be how this new stage of state development will 
manifest itself, and domestically, whether or not a repositioning of the language of the 
Third Way towards a ‘progressive consensus’ linked to a sense of ‘national purpose’ 
will be enough to carry the underlying project of progressive politics forward. It has 
effectively achieved a reconciliation, or at least a coalition of the left to the extent that 
it has achieved two elections o f a Labour government, but it remains to be seen if it 
can be sustained into an unprecedented third successive term — albeit perhaps not as 
the Third Way.
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Appendix A
Economic context
The assertion that this period of transformation is somehow comparable to the current 
phase of globalisation, requires some basic figures as context. By 1800, Europeans 
controlled 35 per cent of the land area of the world; by 1878 this was 67 per cent.642 
Given the advances in terms of both information and health care, the population of 
Europe more than doubled during the course of the nineteenth century, from 200 
million to 430 million.643
In England, the population increased by a quarter in the twenty years between 1851 
and 1871. The Empire had reached nearly 8 million square miles and 268 million 
people.644 In terms of urbanisation in Britain, in 1800 only London had a population 
o f more than 100,000; by 1900 there were twenty-three cities of that size.645 The 
1911 census o f England and Wales reported that the urban population had risen from 
8.99 million in 1851 to 28.16 million in 1911 — an increase from 50.2 per cent of the 
total population to 78.1 per cent.646
At the height of British power the country ruled a quarter of the world’s population 
and a fifth o f its land surface. It was also the world’s biggest capital exporter; between 
1870 and 1913, roughly the period of interest, the proportion o f British wealth 
invested overseas rose from 17 per cent to 33 per cent, far higher than the comparable 
figure in any other country in the world at that time. The Empire was growing as 
new acquisitions were made in rapid succession and Great Britain came out as the 
overall winner of territory in both Africa and Asia. At the same time, some colonies 
were gaining self-governance or dominion status. As Black indicates:
Between 1860 and 1914, Britain also owned approximately one-third of 
the world’s shipping tonnage and by 1898 about 60 percent o f the 
telegraph cables, a crucial aspect of imperial government and defence 
planning. Between 1890 and 1914 she launched about two-thirds o f the 
world’s ships and carried about half of its marine trade ... Investment 
abroad ensured that overseas income as a percentage of UK gross domestic 
product rose from 2% in 1872 to 7% in 1913, the sum invested being far 
more than for any other European country; in 1914, 43% of the world
642 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, p. 176
643 Briggs and Snowman, Fins de Siecle, p. 164.
644 Merrell Lynd, England in the 1880s, p. 8.
645 Porter, R oy. London: A  Social History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 205.
646 Black, A  New History of England, p. 220.
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foreign investment was British and Britain was the sole state in Europe 
selling more outside the continent than in European markets.647
Technology
Rapid development in technology also had an impact on the conquest of time and 
space for business and production. This was true not only in the UK but right across 
the developed world. For example, Alexander Graham Bell was demonstrating his 
telephone in 1876 while Thomas Alva Edison was showing his phonograph in 1878. 
The first transatlantic telegraph cables were laid and German and British collaboration 
produced the internal combustion engine in 1885. The radio arrived in 1896, the 
same year that the French brothers Auguste and Louis Lumiere were showing the 
British public moving pictures. It is important to note that many o f the most 
important innovations were the result of a cross-fertilisation o f ideas and expertise 
between inventors, scientists and businessmen between countries. There was a spirit 
o f progress and internationalism at all levels.
One invention that had a reach far beyond its technology was the steam printing 
press. This innovation affected not only economics but the entire cultural base and 
social and political context in which it operated.
Mechanical typesetting was introduced towards the end of the century.
New technology was expensive but the mass readership opened up by the 
lower prices that could be charged after the repeal of the newspaper taxes 
justified the cost. The consequence was more tides and lower prices. The 
number o f daily morning papers published in London rose from eight in 
1856 to twenty-one in 1900, and of evening papers from seven to eleven 
while there was also a tremendous expansion in the suburban press.648
The rise of newspapers
The new mass readership brought newspapers into their element. For example, by 
1888 the Daily Telegraph had a circulation of 300,000,649 compared with the previous 
century when technology meant that papers were only weeklies and considered a 
success if they sold 10,000. The Echo reached a circulation o f 200,000 in 1870; Lloyd's
647 Ibid., pp. 190-91.
648 Ibid., p. 197.
649 Ibid.; Briggs and Snowman, Fins de Siede.
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Weekly News was the first paper with a circulation over 100,000 and was selling over
600,000 by 1879, over 900,000 by 1893 and over a million copies a week by 1896.650
Social reform
The new media also provided a means to disseminate information about the social 
conditions of the country and, by providing an overview, enabled activism. The cadre 
o f reformers, investigative journalists and academics were quick to take advantage of 
this new voice and created ‘modern’ social awareness and reform campaigns. The 
Fabian Society, the Extension Movement (see further below) and the Settlement 
Movement651 and every hue of religious and political organisation began to draw 
attention to the plight of the poor.
The proximity of these people and groups to each other played a significant role in 
the intellectual life of Britain, as we shall see in the next chapter. Ralf Dahrendorf 
points to some of this crucial overlap in his history of the London School of 
Economics. The University Extension Movement started with Cambridge dons 
before it caught on in Oxford where it soon became a movement:
As the Oxford magazine put it in 1883: ‘A new faith, with Professor 
Green for its founder, Arnold Toynbee for its martyr, and various 
societies for its propaganda, is alive amongst us’ ... Attendance resembled 
more the later Open University mixture ... o f people already on the way 
to semi-professional jobs, white-collar people, an aspiring middle class by 
education rather than money. This was not true for a venture in which 
the Oxford Committee joined the Revd Samuel A. Barnett in 1884, 
when a setdement in the East End of London was set up. It was named 
after Toynbee, the young martyr for the cause, who had collapsed and 
died after an extension lecture. O ther setdements preceded or followed 
Toynbee Hall, but this particular combination of education and social 
work based on a residential centre remained the most successfiil o f its 
kind. Moreover, it became almost an extension o f LSE or was it, for a 
while, even the other way round? Certainly all those involved in the 
foundation of the School, without exception, had played their part in the 
good works of Toynbee Hall ... generations of lecturers, many from LSE,
650 Black, A  New History of England, p. 198.
651 The first settlement house was Toynbee Hall, established in 1884 by an Anglican at St Jude’s, 
Whitechapel. Its main purpose was to place educated young men and wom en in disadvantaged urban 
areas to improve their understanding. The movement spread across England and to the United States, 
where the most famous was Hull House in Chicago.
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were involved in community work and exposed to the poverty and later 
the racial discrimination of East End life through Toynbee Hall.652
Sidney Webb (1859—1947), founder of the LSE, a leading Fabian and social reformer, 
for example, used the reports of these new social sciences (see further below), as well 
as the media, to plead with political parties to do something about the conditions of 
the working classes. In an open letter to the Liberal Party, Webb quotes extensively 
from a document entitled, ‘Facts for Socialists from the Political Economists and 
Statisticians’ published by the Fabian Society. The facts were certainly stark:
W hen one out of every five Londoners dies in the workhouse or hospital; 
when every year 1 in 8 of the wage-earning class has to accept pauper 
relief; when in some rural districts every aged labourer is a pauper; when
20,000 adult men are constandy unemployed in London alone; when half 
the children of the working men die of overcrowding and privation 
before reaching 5 years o f age; so long as these are the facts o f life in 
England, there can be no doubt as to the problems for the politician in
653earnest.
Others such as Edwin Chadwick (1800—90) became a pioneer of sorts in this new 
science o f reporting on everyday conditions. He was responsible for the Poor Law 
Amendment Act in 1834, which formalised the workhouse structure, and went on to 
author a report entided The Sanitary Conditions of Labouring Population of Great Britain 
(1842). Laws governing the working hours of children and women soon followed and 
the first public health act created a General Board of Health in 1848. It was this effort 
that many others sought to emulate over the course of the next two decades.
It is also important to point out that this debate was far from isolated in the UK — or 
even confined to European or continental commentators. The American Henry 
George was particularly influential; his book, Progress and Poverty: A n  Inquiry into the 
cause of industrial depressions and of increase of want with increase of wealth: The Remedy was 
widely reported when it appeared in 1879 and ‘sold in hundreds of thousands of 
copies’.654 The book influenced a large number o f British reformers, as did the author 
himself when he came to the UK in 1882 for a lecture tour. As Hugh Gaitskell points 
out from his political perspective in the 1950s, ‘Like so many contemporaries, 
including Liberals like Lloyd George and others much further to the left, they were 
greatly influenced by Henry George, the author of Progress and Poverty — who in turn
652 Dahrendorf, LSE, pp. 30-31.
653 Webb, ‘Wanted, a Programme: An Appeal to the Liberal Party’, p. 11.
654 Flinn, M .W . A n  Economic and Social History o f Britain 1066-1939. London: Macmillan, 1962, p. 326.
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had taken so many of his ideas from the British classical economists, John Stuart Mill 
and David Ricardo.’655
Henry Pelling puts it more strongly, pointing out that George’s writing arrived in 
Britain during ‘the most acute phase of the agricultural depression’ and with his tours 
particularly to areas hardest hit, Pelling suggests that:
Scodand and Ireland were remarkably influential in setting people 
thinking about political economy on lines that often led them much 
farther than George himself would have wished. Although he was not a 
Socialist, he was responsible for the early political education o f many o f 
the subsequent leaders o f the Socialist movement in this country.656
O r finally, as John Davis states in A  History of Britain, 1885—1955:
The dominant influence was the American writer Henry George, whose 
doctrines of land reform proved to be extraordinarily tenacious. George 
was an amateur economist who applied traditional rent theory to modem 
urban conditions ... The Cabinet Radicals Joseph Chamberlain and John 
Bright lionised George on this visit to Britain in 1882.657
Barker argues that the book did not contain any new ideas, but ‘added new vigour’ 
and ‘husde’ to an old doctrine and suggested that ‘the line o f thought continued in 
Fabianism, though its founders drew inspiration from Proudhon in France and Marx 
in Germany as well as from their own soil.’658
Like the Third Way, the reformers were looking to other places for their ideas and 
applying them, perhaps inconsistendy, to their own circumstances. In that light, it is 
worth a relatively long sample of George’s work. It is interesting in that it links 
technological change to the economics of society and thus sounds very like current 
globalisation discussions.
The present century has been marked by a prodigious increase in wealth- 
producing power. The utilisation of steam and electricity, the 
introduction of improved processes and labour-saving machinery, the 
greater subdivision and grand scale o f production, the wondrous 
facilitation of exchanges, have multiplied enormously the effectiveness of 
labour.
At the beginning of this marvellous era it was natural to expect, and it was 
expected, that labour-saving inventions would lighten the toil and
655 Gaitskell, Recent Developments in British Socialist Thinking, p. 6.
656 Pelling, The Origins o f  the Labour Party, p. 10.
657 Davis, A  History o f Britain, 1885-1939, p. 18.
658 Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, pp. 214-15.
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improve the condition of the labourer; that the enormous increase in 
power of producing wealth would make poverty a real thing o f the past.
Could a man of the last century — a Franklin or a Priestley — have seen, in 
the vision of the future, the steamship taking the place o f the sailing 
vessel, the railroad train o f the wagon, the reaping machine of the scythe, 
the threshing machine of the flail; could he have heard the throb o f the 
engines that in obedience to the human will, and for the satisfaction of 
human desire, exert a power greater than that of all the men and all the 
beasts of burden of the earth combined... could he have realised the 
enormous saving of labour resulting from improved facilities o f exchange 
and communication — sheep killed in Australia eaten fresh in England, and 
the order given by the London banker in the afternoon executed in San 
Francisco in the morning o f the same day; could he have conceived of the 
hundred thousand improvements which these only suggest? What would 
he have inferred as to the social condition of mankind?659
There are a number of other reports that should be mentioned in this discussion of 
the development of social sciences, as they bear direcdy on the development of the 
public and political debate. In 1883 Andrew Meams wrote a pamphlet, The Bitter Cry 
of London, looking into slum housing, which led to a Royal Commission. Concern 
over sweated labour660 produced a House of Lord Select Committee report in 1888661 
— one o f many on the problems of these industries from both select committees and 
Royal Commissions. Many discovered the fact — or rather avoided in their divided 
conclusions — that sweated labour seemed to be touchstone for a variety of other 
social ills.
Charles Booth (1840—1916) investigated the problem o f ‘worthy’ or ‘morally sound’ 
individuals who seemed to work hard but remained poor. For Victorians the idea that 
one could work hard all day and remain unable to make progress was difficult to cope 
with in terms of the prevailing philosophy of progress, which was at the heart of 
classical liberalism. In 1889 Booth famously set out to try and disprove H.M. 
Hyndman’s (1842—1921) figure of 25 per cent living below subsistence levels as a 
‘wild overestimate’.662 He discovered it was, in fact, too modest. His report, Life and 
Labour of the People of East London, was followed two years later by his study of the rest
659 George, Henry. Progress and Poverty. N ew  York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1907, pp. 3 -4 .
660 This phenom enon became known as the ‘sweated trades’, lumping together a large range o f  
industries, including nailers and matchbox-makers as well as cobblers and piece-workers. The term 
gradually became more focused on the textile industry and those working at home, domestic 
workshops and the practice o f ‘putting out’. (Bythell, Duncan. The Sweated Trades: Outwork in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain. London: Batsford Academic, 1978.) The ‘Sweated M ovem ent’ was a social 
campaign to address this problem.
661 Davis, A  History o f Britain, 1885-1939, p. 17.
662 McLennan, Held and Hall, State and Society in Contemporary Britain, p. 17.
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of London, a groundbreaking piece o f work in terms o f analysing the sources and 
structure of poverty and society. It was later supplemented by Seebohm Rowntree’s 
(1871—1954) 1901 study based on York, Poverty — A  Study of Town Life, inspired by 
both Booth’s and his father’s work in the 1860s.
These reports detailed the impact of efforts to improve conditions and discovered that 
some legislation positively hindered the work of public health reforms. For example, 
in the area o f housing the authorities were enabled to demolish unsuitable housing 
but not given the necessary powers to build replacement stock. Other laws created 
incentives for landlords to let their properties fall into disrepair, compounding the 
problems o f sanitation and disease. Taken together, they were part o f the first attempt 
to understand life in poverty-stricken areas of the country. They would eventually be 
key to political leaders such as Ramsay MacDonald (see Chapter Eight) and inform 
thinking both in terms of political ideology and practical policy. The cross between 
the practical and the political had been made.
Having mentioned the LSE in the context o f various movements at the time it should 
also be pointed out here that the LSE was important in the promotion and 
dissemination of the kinds o f reports listed above. It also demonstrates the level of 
overlap between groups — a point we shall return to. Dahrendorf argues that the 
Fabians who established the LSE in 1895, Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Graham 
Wallas and George Bernard Shaw, were:
Early representatives o f a post-Gladstonian England which more often 
than not turned against a market-oriented, free-trade liberalism.
Gladstone’s last government had fallen in March 1894; now Lord 
Rosebery o f the ‘efficiency’ movement was Prime Minister, and Joseph 
Chamberlain, the social imperialist, began to dominate public debate as 
well as political reality ... They dreamt of an organised, well-run society 
rather than the free-for-all o f ‘Manchester liberalism’, o f the hegemony of 
well-trained benevolent experts rather than entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
they were convinced that the first step o f the road to reform was to find 
out facts: ‘facts shall make you free’. That is why they, Sidney Webb at 
any rate, wanted a London School of Economics and Political Science, 
and that is what they wanted this School to promote.663
663 Dahrendorf, L SE , p. 7.
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Appendix B
James Ramsay MacDonald
Ramsay MacDonald was bom  in 1866 in Lossiemouth, on the Morayshire coast of 
north-east Scodand, the illegitimate son of Anne Ramsay and John MacDonald.664 
Though education was not a natural part of his environment, Jamie, as he was known, 
was bright and became, like the others discussed, a teacher or more precisely, a pupil- 
teacher. He read everything that passed his way in his remote village — a habit that 
brought him in touch with some of the most important debates of the time:
The seeds o f his evolutionary Socialism were germinating in the soil 
prepared for them by the labours of Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and Alfred 
Russell Wallace. The storm of controversy excited by the publication of 
the Origin of Species in 1859 raged violendy throughout his youth. Every 
year added to the intellectual ferment that went on around him.665
Another book that particularly impressed him was Henry George’s Progress and 
Poverty.666 (See Appendix A -  social reform.)
Unlike the others listed here, MacDonald was not Oxford- or even university- 
educated. He was not part of the new middle classes but decidedly working class. For 
MacDonald, the issues of low pay or union membership were not intellectual or 
moral concerns but realities of his life and surroundings. This makes him unusual in 
that much of the discussion and debate of this time is concentrated around the 
educated middle classes rather than those the ideology and legislation most affected. 
Most o f the modernisers in both the nineteenth- and twentieth-century contexts were 
an educated elite.
In 1885 he found work in Bristol but after about a year made his way to London, 
where he found a job as a clerk for the Cyclists Touring Club. He had a passion for 
science and was studying for a science scholarship, but collapsed, due to near- 
starvation, and had to give it up. He was also becoming interested in politics and the 
workings of the Fabian Society and the London Ethical Movement (where he met 
Hobson). After he had recovered his health, he became more active in these circles 
and went to work as a clerk for an MP.
664 Morgan, Austen. J. Ramsay MacDonald. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987, p. 12.
665 Tracey, Herbert. From Doughty Street to Downing Street: The R t. H on.J. Ramsay MacDonald M .P., A  
Biographical Study. London: John Marlowe, Savage and Co., 1924, pp. 17-18.
666 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
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Thus, he arrived in London just a year before Hobson and entered into the same 
tumultuous social context. The various social reform groups and journals, however, 
did provide an avenue of contact between these groups and in fact it was through one 
o f these groups that MacDonald met Margaret Ethel Gladstone, daughter of John Hall 
Gladstone, a chemistry professor and active Liberal (though apparently no relation to 
W.E. Gladstone), who became his wife and in some senses his benefactress.
In 1893 the Independent Labour Party was set up and MacDonald joined a year later, 
the same year in which he joined the Rainbow Circle. He became the secretary of 
the Rainbow Circle for the first six years of its existence and this brought him into 
more regular contact with Hobson, though it did not stop his other political activities. 
In 1895 he was the ILP candidate in Southampton but lost resoundingly — as did all of 
the other ILP candidates at the time.
At this time both MacDonald and Keir Hardie began to extend their participation 
abroad. In 1895 Hardie went to the US for fifteen weeks while MacDonald went for 
a similar period of time two years later. Both trips were ‘more like political progresses’ 
than holidays.667 Back in the UK, the burgeoning socialist groups met in 1900 to 
discuss the way forward for the movement and the Labour Representation 
Committee was formed. MacDonald was chosen as the secretary and he stepped 
down from this role with the Rainbow Circle, though he remained active.
The international workers’ movement was also expanding its activities. Hardie 
participated in a range o f International congresses and while occasionally present, 
MacDonald was less vocal. However, MacDonald did participate at the congress of 
the Second International in 1907 in Amsterdam on the issue of colonialism. At this 
point it became clear that colonialism and the issues o f tactics in response to a threat 
o f war would split the Second International along national grounds, serving to 
highlight to MacDonald the differences between British socialism and continental 
strands o f thoughts.
In 1910 MacDonald visited Germany, on a fact-finding trip to observe the conditions 
o f the workers and to better understand the background to the rising competition 
coming from Germany. In a pamphlet he wrote for the Daily News, he outlined what 
he saw as the differences between the UK and Germany. First and foremost, he noted 
the differing role of government in terms of its investment in industry as well as in
667 James, Jowitt and Layboum, The Centennial History of the Independent Labour Party, p. 307.
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education and social welfare provision. He concluded from this trip that free trade, 
not protection, was the answer.
Darwin, evolution and MacDonald
In line with both Hobson and Hobhouse, the biological analogy of society intrigued 
MacDonald. Perhaps it was his similar scientific interests or the fact it was simply the 
prevailing framework of the day, but MacDonald also took the concept o f evolution 
and applied it to economic and social structures. He was not uncritical of Darwin but 
as he noted, ‘evolution, the dynamic o f life, was carried in triumph into the company 
o f accepted beliefs’.668
Whereas Hobson and Hobhouse used Darwin as a departure point, MacDonald kept 
closer to his evolutionary ideas. As Barker noted, ‘Socialism under the influence of 
Marx came into alliance with biology, and the alliance is most conspicuous today in 
the writings of Mr Ramsay MacDonald who may be regarded as the aposde of a 
definitely biological Socialism’.669
In 1905 MacDonald wrote Socialism and Society, which became a core text for 
socialists across the country, commonly read in study groups. MacDonald had taken 
Darwin and proposed a form of evolutionary socialism. This was, for many, the 
‘middle way’ and his popularity grew in fight o f his support for something other than 
revolution or status quo. His popularity was also helped by his frequent speaking 
engagements around the country and by the fret he was considered to be a platform 
performer that few in the emerging party could match.
‘The phrase “evolutionary socialism” caught on, and provided the Labour Movement 
with a well-thought-out and respectable alternative to the extremists of the Social 
Democratic Federation and the British Socialist Party.’670 This was particularly 
important as the developing rows within the international workers’ movement were 
based almost entirely on the differences between evolutionary and revolutionary 
advance o f the socialist cause. MacDonald refused to move with his colleagues in the 
SDF who became increasingly frustrated with the slowness o f progress and gravitated 
towards continental views of anarchism and revolution. Later, Keir Hardie was
668 Barker, Bernard, ed. Ramsay MacDonald’s Political Writings. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 
1972, p. 69.
669 Barker, Political Thought in England 1848-1914, pp. 208—09.
670 Barker, Ramsay MacDonald’s Political Writings, p. 2.
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similarly to separate himself from the SDF as its tactics and approach were becoming 
impossible if the socialist movement was to continue to retain the support of the 
trades unions — especially for their work in the House of Commons.
Thus, the organic analogy was, for MacDonald, important as a positional attitude both 
domestically and in his international role. It not only brought the focus back to 
groups but also conceived of society as an entity in its own right as well as being made 
up of the individuals within it. MacDonald even went so far as to claim that rather 
than capitalism releasing original or innovative energy, it deadened the impulse and 
brought about greater uniformity.671 This may also be why Kropotkin appealed to 
MacDonald. His ‘mutual aid’ approach enabled MacDonald to contain an otherwise 
dangerous philosophy of anarchism within a system based on the individual placed 
firmly within the community.
Despite MacDonald’s attempts to create something less extreme than some of his 
contemporaries, he did not shy away from identifying some controversial thinkers as 
forebears o f socialism on the continent. MacDonald’s history, Socialism (1907), was the 
product o f a period of flux. Ideologies were changing and politics ranged over 
domestic and international issues. Looking at some of the personalities MacDonald 
included as socialists it is clear that he was not concerned by any stigma that might 
have attached to them at a later date. For example, in much the same way that Green 
has been identified as a fulcrum between socialism and Liberalism, MacDonald 
identified Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, a self-identified anarchist, as being ‘on the border 
between Socialism and Anarchism’.672 Others he charts as core included Saint-Simon, 
Fourier, Louis Blanc, Godwin, Robert Owen and of course Marx.673
MacDonald bemoaned the fact that during the ‘liberal epoch’ o f the nineteenth 
century, these ‘socialist pioneers were forgotten’ but, he argued, ‘the stream of 
Socialist evolution had never been altogether absorbed in the name of the liberal 
epoch. A section o f the working class had never been liberal, because liberal stood in 
its eyes for the triumph of the capitalist employer, or for the destruction o f inter-class 
personal relationships.’674
So, while nodding in the direction o f the forerunners o f socialism he was also striving 
towards a British school o f socialism. His goal was something that would be ‘post-
671 Freeden, ‘True Blood or False Genealogy’ in Gamble and Wright, eds. The New Social Democracy.
672 Barker, Ramsay MacDonald’s Political Writings, p. 73.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid., p. 123.
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Marxist’ in terms o f means and less class-dominated. It sounded much in the same 
vein as the New Liberals and the terms Hobhouse used, such as ‘advanced liberals’, 
for their views o f social change. MacDonald was similarly looking for something that 
would be new and different and that would stand out as ‘the most advanced Socialism 
in Europe’675 -  a theme that will sound very familiar in the discussion of the Third 
Way.
MacDonald clearly saw that the movement in the UK needed to be different from the 
rest o f the continent in at least two other ways. As suggested previously, the British 
labour movement contained at least three separate strands, the ILP, the SDF and the 
LRC, before the Labour Party came into existence. They each took a slighdy 
different view of issues such as the nature of capitalism and human nature and the 
reformability o f both, and suggested varying routes to progress. This brought British 
socialists into conflict with their continental colleagues.
As well as the tactical differences, the final issue was the different influence of trade 
unions in the UK as opposed to the rest of the continent. Socialists in other countries 
created a political presence long before the UK Labour Party existed. Representation 
o f the worker at an international level had been dealt with by active trade unions.
The TU C  even attempted to exclude socialist political parties in favour of unions in 
other countries at a congress they hosted. Effectively, the Labour Party in the UK 
developed as a union-based party more than a socialist one. This presented problems 
then which continue through to the modern day for the Third Way.
The Socialist doctrine systematises these industrial changes. It lays down a 
law of capitalist evolution. It describes the natural history o f society. It is 
not, therefore, only a popular creed for the marketplace but a scientific 
inquiry for the study. Like every theory in sociology it has a political 
bearing, but it can be studied as much detached from politics as 
Darwinism. Socialism is a theory of social organisation, which reconciles 
the individual to society.676
If New Liberals argued that the mission of old liberalism had been completed and was 
now undergoing change, MacDonald was arguing that it had achieved its mission but 
now it was time for it to retire from the field. However, he was also a very careful 
tactician. While he may have foreseen the overall strategy of a Labour Party 
eventually replacing the Liberals he did not seek an overt break amongst the 
progressive political forces. Socialism was the political ideology o f the new era, but it
675 Ibid., p. 100.
676 Ibid., p. 13.
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would take time for that to evolve, or develop, and MacDonald was willing to work 
with others to secure his own party’s fortunes until he felt ready to take that ground.
And as much as MacDonald was striving to create a clearly different position, the 
overlap between thinkers cannot be ignored. For example, it has been noted that 
MacDonald knew Hobson through the London Ethical Movement and, particularly, 
the Rainbow Circle. Barker argues that there is a clear line back to Hobson in much 
o f MacDonald’s thought:
Many of the strands discussed above come together in J.A. Hobson’s 
work, and here, at least, there is relatively concrete evidence of the 
influence and derivation o f ideas... there is no doubt that he influenced 
MacDonald a great deal. Labour and The Empire (MacDonald, 1907) 
followed Hobson’s Imperialism fairly closely, and many o f Hobson’s 
economic and social arguments are echoed in MacDonald’s work.677
Evolution versus revolution
Like the New Liberals, MacDonald also faced serious challenges as a result o f the 
changing political climate. As well as developing his own ‘evolutionary socialism’ he 
needed to bring the rest of what could be a very militant, revolutionary constituency 
with him, namely the wider collectivist, labour, socialist movement: a problem shared 
by Blair a century later.
To that end, MacDonald negotiated very carefully and while he did not avoid the 
language of revolution common at the time in certain strands o f socialism, he was 
equally careful to argue that Britain needed something different from what had 
developed on the continent. He felt that there was a middle way, an approach that 
did not require revolution but could be part o f an evolution of British politics. In a 
strange turn of perspective, MacDonald was arguing in a similar vein to the 
Conservatives when he portrayed the continental socialists as dangerous. Rather like 
the position of the Third Way on globalisation, he was suggesting that capitalism was 
a ‘fact of history’ and that the answer was to use the new tools o f the global world to 
prepare for the changed future.
The term ‘evolutionary Socialism’ was invented to suggest the possibility 
that socialism could come by other than revolutionary means, and to 
discredit Marx as unnecessarily fond of bloodshed and class war ...
MacDonald’s frequent use of biological parallels and examples has been 
taken as proof that he differed from Marx on precisely this point —
677 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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‘evolution’ versus ‘revolution’. It seems that MacDonald himself thought 
that this was the centre of his difference with Marx ... It is not that 
MacDonald specifically set out to avoid revolution. This argument placed 
great weight upon the education o f democracy for the higher stage of 
society to come, and insisted that in order to reap the benefits of an 
expanding technology, the people should wait and prepare themselves.678
New socialism?
The point captured by Bernard Barker above also speaks to what can be seen almost 
at the edges o f MacDonald’s work. In a similar vein to his Liberal colleagues, he 
claimed to be radical but he accepted at some level the capitalist system just as the 
Third Way accepted globalisation a century later. ‘The Socialist, contrary to what his 
critics ask people to believe, does not consider that the Industrial Revolution and the 
consequent establishment of the Capitalist system as we know it were bad; he accepts 
them as historical facts’.679
He believed in the concept of liberty — more than the Fabian mechanistic forms 
would allow — but placed that liberty more strongly within a community context. 
W ith the Liberals, MacDonald suggested that liberty within the idea of socialism was 
the ‘liberty o f man to fulfil his true being’. As Freeden points out, this leaves ‘litde 
space between the concepts of individuality and community, a lack of space 
reproduced in Amitai Etzioni’s communitarian views ... influential in New Labour 
circles’.680
678 Ibid., pp. 28, 44.
679 MacDonald, J. Ramsay, Why Socialism Must Come. London: Independent Labour Party, 1924, p. 4.
680 Freeden, ‘True Blood or False Genealogy’ in Gamble and Wright, eds. The New Social Democracy, 
pp. 156-57.
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Appendix C
Thomas Hill Green
T.H. Green is the earliest of the thinkers outlined here. He was bom in April 1836 in 
a small village in Yorkshire, like Hobhouse a son of a rector. His mother died when 
he was one and the children were raised by a nanny. His father provided his early 
education and he then went to Rugby between 1850 and 1855. He did not 
distinguish himself either as a student but in 1855 he went to Balliol College, Oxford. 
It was here that he met Benjamin Jowitt, one of the first to bring Hegel’s ideas to 
England. As Hegel became more popular in Britain he became less fashionable in 
Germany, being ‘replaced there by neo-Kantianism and even a type of British 
Empiricism’. There was ‘an exchange of philosophical roles between the two 
countries’.681
It was also at Balliol that he met other political students and made his life in Oxford 
both inside and outside the university. He joined the Old Mortality Club, a ‘radical 
student society’, as well as the campaign for access for women. He took up with a 
temperance society and also worked with the local Liberal association. While he was 
involved in local politics, he was not as engaged in national debates, even though 
many o f his students were. Like both Hobson and Hobhouse, he rather fell into 
teaching when he completed his degree and became a fellow of the college in 1860.
In 1865 he briefly became an assistant commissioner with the Schools Inquiry 
Commission, but decided to return to academic life at Balliol the following year.
Green died relatively young from blood poisoning in 1882. His impact was therefore 
not primarily due to his publications — though his lectures were assembled as a book 
in 1913 by Bernard Bosanquet, himself a student o f Green’s — but to the impact he 
made on those he taught. Herbert Samuel, also a student at Balliol and later a Liberal 
MP, and Hobhouse — though not directly a student of Green’s — took his ideas and 
developed what would become the core of New Liberalism.
Green was very much a part of the Idealist tradition which, as indicated, held so much 
sway with his students. As was common at Oxford, many went on to become famous 
in their own fields. Although the Liberal Party was defeated in 1895, it enabled the 
generation influenced by Green to develop their thoughts and participate in the 
debate and eventually, as exemplified by Samuel, to enter the parliamentary party,
681 Hamlyn, D .W . The Penguin History o f Western Philosophy. London: Penguin, 1987, p. 280.
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bringing their arguments to the wider Liberal Party, though this did not happen until 
after 1900.682
Overview
As a philosopher Green has been put into a variety of categories, the clearest of which 
seems to be as the first British Hegelian ‘of note’.683 He ‘attacked the empiricist or 
sensationalist belief in atomic sensations, stressing that reality must involve relations, 
which are themselves contributed by the mind ... Green also embraced the Hegelian 
view o f the status of the state’.684
However, his political affiliations were slightly more diverse. He was active in the 
local Liberal association and with many Liberal causes, and he was also intensely 
Christian, all o f which led him to him being claimed by a range o f groups. The 
Liberals obviously have some expectation that he would be considered amongst their 
number but others identify Green as a turning point not only for socialism but 
particularly a form of Christian socialism that resonates more with socialists than with 
many Liberals. Over time, he has gradually been moved more towards the socialist 
side of the ledger, as more emphasis is put on his Christian and radical beliefs than his 
starting point of liberty.
Green is an excellent example of the flux of political thought and the way in which 
different currents were and could be interpreted. He is also a good example of Matt 
Carter’s warning that caution should be used when attempting to categorise thinkers; 
he makes a particular case for Idealists in this context:
Despite repeated attempts by modem commentators, the British idealists 
still remain exceedingly difficult to place within the different traditions of 
nineteenth century political thought. O n the one hand, they were 
predominandy Liberal Party supporters and their writings regularly 
focused on debates about how to renew the tradition o f liberalism. They 
are also often linked with the development of a New Liberalism ...
However it is true that almost all the idealists were sympathetic to 
socialism in a certain form. Furthermore, the link between idealism and 
the Liberal Party, strong though it may have been in Green, showed signs 
o f wear in later years, and was even broken by some idealists.685
682 Emy, Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics.
683 Hamlyn, The Penguin History of Western Philosophy.
684 Ibid., p. 281.
685 Carter, T .H . Green and the Development o f Ethical Socialism, p. 135.
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Though Carter may be posthumously nominating Green for being a key to Christian 
socialism, Liberals have long identified his contribution to Liberal thought more than 
to socialist development. Ian Bradley, in the Strange Rebirth of Liberal Britain, 
considered him to be a turning point for Liberalism and the beginning o f New Liberal 
thought by humanising, or perhaps in his case, applying his form of Christian 
morality, to traditional Liberal thought:
Mill and other liberal theorists in the first half of the nineteenth century 
were primarily concerned with intellectual and civil liberty. In the second 
half a number o f prominent thinkers extended this argument for liberty 
into other areas of life. These New Liberals, as they came to be called, 
never lost sight of the moral and spiritual basis of liberalism but they saw 
that there were other evils apart from censorship, social pressure to 
conform and the over-mighty authority of the Established Church and the 
state, from which men and women needed to be liberated. Poverty, 
illness, bad housing and inadequate education, they argued, were just as 
much o f a hindrance to individual self-fulfilment and the exercise o f 
choice, and to free people from those particular constraints would require 
the positive use of public authority. The founding father of this New 
Liberalism was the Oxford philosopher, T.H. Green. In his view of 
liberty he stood firmly in the tradition of Milton and Mill. ‘W hen we 
speak o f freedom’, he wrote in 1880, ‘we do not mean merely the 
freedom to do what we like irrespective of what it is we like. We mean 
the greatest power on the part o f the citizens as a body to make the most 
and best o f themselves.’686
The combination of Hegel and the German idealist tradition offered a more positive 
view o f the state than Liberal thinking could accommodate. Green therefore rejected 
the system in which individuals were primary units and in which society was either 
their secondary creation or simply a group of individuals together. The community or 
society came into its own as individuals gained rights, but with the appreciation that 
rights are derived from the community and owned by individuals in and of 
themselves. He also took from the Idealists the idea that the Liberal concept of 
freedom was misconceived as it posed freedom and state action as irreconcilable 
opposites. He felt instead that freedom could be strengthened through the exercise of 
positive action.687
Even without the benefit o f historical distance, Green was identified, if not as the 
father o f the New Liberalism, then certainly as one who applied the principles of 
idealism to the current debate:
686 Bradley The Strange Rebirth of Liberal Britain, p. 26.
687 Arblaster, The Rise and Decline o f Western Liberalism.
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N ot a modification of the old Benthamite premises, but a new philosophy 
was needed; and that philosophy was provided by the idealist school, o f 
which Green is the greatest representative. That school drew its 
inspiration immediately from Kant and Hegel, and ultimately from the old 
Greek philosophy of the city-state. The vital relation between the life of 
the individual and the life of the community which alone gives the 
individual worth and significance, because it alone gives him the power of 
full moral development; the dependence o f the individual for all his rights 
and for all his liberty, on his membership of the community; the 
correlative duty of the community to guarantee to the individual all his 
rights (in other words all the conditions necessary for his, and therefore 
for its own, full moral development) these — were the premises of the new 
philosophy.688
Perhaps it is best to agree with Freeden when he points out that while it may not 
have been Green himself, certainly the ‘immediate generation o f liberal thinkers to 
succeed Green took liberalism into areas considered to this day by many to be so close 
to socialist thought as to render a clear distinction impossible’.689
Idealism and Darwin -  a middle way?
Green was an academic and a religious man rather than a journalist or political writer. 
This kind o f ‘purity’, if it can be called that, may help to explain why both Liberals 
and socialists look to Green as a point of departure. He was steeped in the dominant 
Idealist tradition not only o f Oxford but o f nineteenth-century thinking. Thus, he 
was well placed to accommodate changes in the environment without forcing them 
into a party political form. What Carter calls the ‘unifying and synthesising nature of 
Idealism’ suggests that in the midst of intellectual confusion and for some, crisis, 
‘Idealists could find a middle way’. Carter goes on:
In the debate about the state, the idealists saw no problem in supporting 
both state action and individual freedom. While the religious orthodox 
were rejecting discoveries of biology and geology, the idealists maintained 
a position which combined the theistic and scientific.690
— or, as he puts it in a similar thought elsewhere, ‘They had also managed to find a 
third way between the individualism of the Manchester School and the socialism of
688 Barker, Political Thought in England 1848-1914, p. 11.
689 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 194.
690 Carter, T.H. Green and the Development o f Ethical Socialism, p. 11.
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Marx.’691 Freeden also identifies Idealism, and Green in particular, as a kind o f fulcrum 
of change in the debate:
T.H. Green served in this process as an ideological halfway house towards 
the communitarian theories o f the British new liberals. Human nature was 
reaffirmed as developmental, though this was now accompanied by the 
cultural influence o f the Idealist conception of (self)-realisation, that is, of 
moving from a potential to an actual state.692
For Hobson and Hobhouse, Darwin was the point of departure. They used his 
biological argument as a base to develop the biological and evolutionary argument 
and to apply it to the individual, the community and the state whereas Green seemed 
to see Darwin as an obstacle; or perhaps he avoided the wider potential of Darwin’s 
argument. As Freeden observes:
The absence of the post-Darwinist view of evolution in Green’s writings 
is as telling a symptom of his failure sufficiently to radicalise liberalism as is 
the presence of that view a hallmark of the new liberalism. It is revealing 
that Hobhouse swore by evolutionary theory from early adulthood.
Already when being taught in an Oxford still under the shadow of the 
newly departed Green, Hobhouse linked evolution, progress, and 
individual development.693
Freeden identifies, instead, D.G. Ritchie as the person who best bridges this gap 
between Liberalism and what he calls the ‘evolutionary rhythm’ of Darwinian 
thought, but the New Liberalism was, above all, a combination of ‘Idealist, utilitarian, 
and evolutionary perspectives’.694
691 Ibid., pp. 143-44.
692 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 179.
693 Ibid., p. 69.
694 Ibid.
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